JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed under section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against, the judgment and order dated 29-4-87 passed by tie Family Court, Lucknow. 2. Reg. Suit No. 250 of 1982 was filed b> the respondent against her husband (present appellant) under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for judicial separation. The appellant, on the contrary, filed Reg. Suit No. 87 of 1984 against the respondent under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage. Both the -nits were consolidated. 3. Reg. Suit No. 250 of 1982 was filed b> the respondent against her husband (present appellant) under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for judicial separation. The appellant, on the contrary, filed Reg. Suit No. 87 of 1984 against the respondent under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage. Both the -nits were consolidated. 3. On 29-4-87, which was the date fixed in the case, the parties, namely, appellant and the respondent, gave a joint statement to the following effect before the Family Court :- izHkk&nsoh oknuh o jke xqyke izfroknh us c;ku fd;k fd ge nksuksa ds chp viuk esa fuEu izdkj ls le>kSrk gks x;k gS%& 1- ge nksuksa dk ,d nwljs dk lkFk jguk ukeqefdu gks x;k gS vr% ge nksuksa rykd ds fy;s jtkeUn gSaA 2- izfroknh oknuh dks 9500@& ( ukS gtkj ikWap lkS :i;s ) vnk djsxkA ;g :i;k nks fd'rksa esa vnk gksxkA igyh fd'r esa 5000@& ikWap gtkj :i;s 06-07-1987 dks vnk gksxk rFkk nwljh fd'r 4500@& pkj gtkj ( ikWap lkS :i;s ) 08-10-1987 ( vkB vDVwcj 1987 ) dks vnk gksxhA 3- mijksDr jDe dh vnk;xh ds vykok vkSj dksbZ ysu nsu QjhdSu ds chp 'ks"k ugha gSA 4- QjhdSu dh yM+dh uhrk jkuh oknuh ds ikl gS mlh ds ikl jgsxhA oknuh dksbZ jde xqtkjs dh vius fy;s ;k yM+dh ds fy;s izfroknh ls ikus dh vf/kdkjh ugha gksxhA 5- oknuh dh nj[kkLr vUrfje xqtkjs dh /kkjk 24 H.M. Act ds vUrxZr bl vnkyr ls [kkfjt gks pqdh gS mldh vihy ;k fuxjkuh oknuh us Hon. High Court esa dj j[kh gSA oknuh og vihy ;k fuxjkuh [kkfjt djk ysxhA 6- oknuh dksbZ nkok oknh ds fo:) fdlh izdkj dk ;kuh ngst okilh ;k xqtkjk dk ;k cPpksa ds xqtkjs dk izfroknh ds f[kykQ ugha djsxhA 7- mijksDr jDe dh vnk;xh ij ekStwnk nkok [kkfjt le>k tk;sxk vkSj izfroknh dk nkok ua0 87@84 jke xqyke cuke izsek nsoh nkok rykd fMxzh le>k tk;sxkA 8- ;fn mijksDr jDe dh vnk;xh izfroknh mijksDr le; esa ugha vnk djsxk rks ekStwnk nkok oknuh fMxzh le>k tk;sxk vkSj nkok izfroknh dk 87@84 rykd dk [kkfjt le>k tk;sxkA 9- mijksDr le>kSrs ds vuqlkj ekStwnk nkok 250@82 o nkok 87@84 fu.khZr fd;k tk;sA lqudj Lohdkj fd;k g0 jke xqyke ekS;Z g0 izsek nsoh 29-04-1987 4. This joint statement was signed by the appellant as also by the respondent. This joint statement was signed by the appellant as also by the respondent. It was on the basis of the above joint statement that the suits were decided. 5. Ram Gulam, the appellant, has challenged the decree in the present appeal on the grounds, inter alia, that he had not made the statement before the Family Court and had not agreed to have the suit decided in the manner decided by the Family Court. Several grounds questioning the decree have been raised in the memo of appeal. 6. Section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides as under :- "19(1). Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court :- (4) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court. (5) An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges." 7. In view of the above statutory provision that against a decree passed with the consent of the parties as appeal shall not lie, it is not open to the appellant to urge that the appeal be considered on merits, as it has been admitted by a Division Bench. 8. Mere admission of an appeal does not mean that objection as to the maintainability of the appeal has been disposed of or given up. The objection as to the maintainability of the appeal can still be raised and it can be validly urged on behalf oi the respondent that appeal against a consent decree is not maintainable. 9. It may be stated that an appeal also does not lie under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure again a decree passed with the consent of the parties. 9. It may be stated that an appeal also does not lie under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure again a decree passed with the consent of the parties. In Katikara Chintamani Dore and others v. Suatreddi Annananaidu and others AIR 1974 SC 1069 it was held that a consent decree is not appealable. The words "decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties" imply and involve an agreement between the parties. An important consideration for the agreement involved in a consent decree is that both sides give up their right of appeal. The judgment by consent operates as an estoppel and once it is established that the decree was passed by consent it immediately becomes non appealable but it remains valid and binding on the parties as another decree (see Zahirul Said Alivi v. Sadhmi Narayan, AIR 1932 PC 251 ). In the Privy Council case, referred to above, it was also observed that the proper method of questioning a consent decree is either by review or by a regular suit and not by way of appeal. 10. A perusal of the joint statement made by parties before the Family Court, which has been reproduced above, would indicate that respondent had given up her right to claim maintenance for herself and for the child and had also agreed that her suit filed under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act be treated as dismissed. She had also agreed that the suit of the appellant for divorce be decreed. The respondent had also agreed that she would not agitate the matter in any court regarding articles of dowry or for maintenance of herself and the child. 11. The ground urged by the appellant that he was made to give joint statement under threat that an order for heavy instalments of maintenance will be passed against him, cannot be accepted at this late stage. It was open to the appellant to have raised the question before the Family Court itself and he ought to have urged there that the statement was not voluntary. It was open to the appellant to have raised the question before the Family Court itself and he ought to have urged there that the statement was not voluntary. Since the record indicates that a joint statement was recorded in the presence of the parties which was also signed by the parties and note was made by the Principal Judge, Family Court that it was recorded on his dictation, we are not prepared to entertain the plea urged by the appellant that the joint statement was not made by him voluntarily. 12. The appeal has no merits and is dismissed.