JUDGMENT Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee J.: This is an appeal against the order dated 21st September 1991 passed by the learned District Judge, Purulia in Misc. Appeal No. 20 of 1991 whereby the prayer for ad interim injunction was considered and refused in an appeal which was preferred against the refusal to grant injunction by the learned Trial Judge by the order dated 14th September 1991 in Title Suit No. 123 of 1991. 2. The Stamp Reporter of this court put a note in the file as to the maintainability of this appeal and called upon this court to decide whether the present appeal would lie against the order of the learned District Judge refusing prayer for ad interim injunction. 3. The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for declaration and also filed a petition under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for temporary injunction against the defendants restraining them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff/appellant over the suit property till the disposal of the suit. The said prayer was considered by the Trial Court and the Trial Court after hearing the plaintiff/appellant and the defendant/opposite parties disallowed a prayer for injunction on contest by the order dated 14th September 1991. The Trial Court refused the injunction and vacated the order for status quo which was passed earlier. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the learned Trial Judge disallowing the prayer for ad interim order of injunction and vacating the order for status quo, before the court below in Misc. Appeal which was tiled to that behalf, the appellant filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for injunction during the pendency of appeal and also prayed for ad interim injunction pending disposal of the said injunction petition. The court below by the order dated 21st September 1991 rejected the prayer for ad interim injunction. This is the appeal against the order passed by the court below refusing the prayer for ad interim injunction. The question is whether the order rejecting the petition for injunction under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 is appealable order or not. 5. The court below by the order dated 21st September 1991 rejected the prayer for ad interim injunction. This is the appeal against the order passed by the court below refusing the prayer for ad interim injunction. The question is whether the order rejecting the petition for injunction under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 is appealable order or not. 5. Order 43 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the order from which appeal would lie under s. 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 43 rule 1 sub-rule (r) provides that an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXIX is appealable. 6. This is an appeal against an order rejecting the petition under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 by the Lower Appellate Court. The power of the Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court to grant injunction either pending disposal of the suit or during the pendency of the suit are utmost similar, inasmuch as, in both the cases whether in the pendency of the suit or the appeal the court is to consider on the very self-same condition whether injunction should be granted or not. The point is raised in this case where an order has been passed under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of the Code, appeal lies and it does not lie when it is rejected and secondly, whether rejection of prayer for injunction under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of the Code by the Lower Appellate Court is also an order within the meaning of Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of the Code, so as to attract clause (r) of sub rule (1) of Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. 7. In Madhu Mian vs. Rajaram Barai reported in AIR 1943 Cal. page 177, a Division Bench of this Court held that "Order/rejecting application under s. 26(g)(5) falls under s. 26(g)(6) and consequently, it has the force of a decree and is appealable as such in accordance with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. As a second appeal lies in such a case, a revision is incompetent. page 177, a Division Bench of this Court held that "Order/rejecting application under s. 26(g)(5) falls under s. 26(g)(6) and consequently, it has the force of a decree and is appealable as such in accordance with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. As a second appeal lies in such a case, a revision is incompetent. In this case, the scope of Clause (r) of rule 1 of Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Code was considered and held that "under Order 39 rule 1 the court can make an order granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant from doing certain acts and under Order 40 rule 1 the court may appoint a receiver whenever it considers such appointment to be just and proper. Yet when orders are passed rejecting an application either for appointment of a receiver or for granting of a temporary injunction the orders are held to be orders under those rules and hence appealable under rules of Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Code". 8. In the case of Sm. Mayarani Dutta vs. Bhupal Banerjee reported in AIR 1981 Cal 264 , the learned Single Judge of this court relying upon the Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Madhu Mian vs. Rajaram Barai reported In AIR 1943 Cal. 177 decided by Bijon Kumar Mukherjee and Pal J.J. held that "Order granting or rejecting temporary injunction is final order and appeal lies and not revision." 9. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Saraju Prasad Singh vs. Gangaprosad Shah reported in AIR 1951 Cal. 446 wherein Roxburgh and K. C. Chunder JJ., held at para 7 that- "In our opinion, the argument confuses the temporary and limited nature of the injunction with the question of the finality of the order itself. The order, so far as it ran, though it was an order for an injunction for a limited period was clearly final. The plaintiff wanted to restrain the opposite parties immediately from the time of filing of his plaint and forever. The order, so far as it ran, though it was an order for an injunction for a limited period was clearly final. The plaintiff wanted to restrain the opposite parties immediately from the time of filing of his plaint and forever. The period may be divided into three parts : first, he wanted an immediate order to operate at once and temporary until the Court would give notice and hear the remaining defendants; secondly, an order to cover the period from the time of hearing the defendant till the final disposal of the suit; thirdly, an order in the suit itself for a permanent injunction. Each of the orders would be a final order so far as it went. In our opinion, the ad interim injunction was clearly one made under Order 39 Rule 2 and was appealable under O. 43 R. 1 C.P.C." 10. In the case of Kalahasti vs. P. C. Munuswami Chetti reported in AIR 1975 Mad. 3 it was held that "An order passed by an appellate court under Order 39 Rule 1 cannot be construed as an order passed by the court in exercise of its original jurisdiction." A contrary view was taken by the learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in that case wherein it was held that an order passed by the appellate court under Order 39 rule 1 is not an appellate order. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Single judge of the Madras High Court in this behalf in view of the fact that when an order rejecting an injunction whether issued granting injunction or refusing injunction, is an order passed by the court in exercise of the power conferred upon the court under the provisions of Order 39 rule 1 and 2, it cannot be said when positive is passed, it is an order under Order 39 rule 1 and 2. When the court in exercise of that power refuses or rejects the prayer for injunction, it is not an order under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. 11. When the court in exercise of that power refuses or rejects the prayer for injunction, it is not an order under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. 11. In Tridandy Swami Sreemat Bhakti Ballabh Tirtha Maharaj vs. Bhakti Lalit Giri Maharaj, Sree Chaitanya Gaudiya Math & others FMAT No. 280 of 1991 dated 27.2.1991, in which one of us was a party held that when a lower Appellate Court exercises its power under Order 39 rule 1 and 2, the same is also appeahble. Supreme Court in the case of Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo reported in (1988) 3 SCC 619 held that "Settled view prevailing in a High Court should not ordinarily be disturbed" and further in the case of Mohar Singh vs. Devi Charan reported in AIR 1988 SC 1365 held that High Court is normally bound by its own earlier decision. 12. In view of the above two Division Bench judgment of this court as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this court as also in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of which one of us was a party in the case of Tridandy Swami Sreemat Bhakti Ballabh Tirtha Maharaj vs. Bhakti Lalit Giri Maharaj, Sree Chaitanya Gaudiya Math, FMAT No. 280 of 1991 dated 27.2.1991, we hold that the impugned order and judgment is appealable and appeal is maintainable. A. K. Bhattacherji, J. : I agree. Appeal allowed.