JUDGMENT Miss Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The Division Bench of this Court (Bhawani Singh and Devinder Gupta, JJ.) has framed the following points on which the learned Judges have differed and sought the opinion of this Court :— 1. Whether the petitioners were appointed under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975 and their appointments were regular and valid and not ad hoc/stop gap appointments as contended by the High Court ? 2. Whether the guidelines issued by the High Court for conducting viva-voce test were not superseded after the commencement of the Rules of 1990, and, if so, whether the selections made vide interview dated 7-9-1991 were not proper and violated any of the Rules of guidelines issued by the competent authority? In case it is found that these guidelines have been superseded, whether holding of viva-voce test is a sine-qua-non for proper selection to the posts? 3. Whether the writ petition has become infructuous and the amendment of the writ petition by C. M. P. No. 69 of 1991 could be allowed ? 4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners were entitled to be regularised against the posts which they are holding at present on equitable or legal basis ? 5. Whether respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had locus standi to challenge the appointments of the petitioners ? Point No. 1 This point can be split in two parts, "whether the petitioners were appointed under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975" and "their appointments were regular and valid and not ad hac/stop gap appointments as contended by the High Court." Taking the second part first, it has never been the case of the petitioners that their appointments were regular and not ad hoc stop gap appointments, as envisaged under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. Both, the petitioners and the High Court, have a common case to the extent that the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis for a short duration till regular appointments under the Rules in force could be made. Both have claimed that such appointments could be made and were made under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. Both, the petitioners and the High Court, have a common case to the extent that the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis for a short duration till regular appointments under the Rules in force could be made. Both have claimed that such appointments could be made and were made under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. Their appointments, even on ad hoc basis and for short term duration, were bad being violative of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975 is the case of respondent No s 2 and 3 who are from the category of Class IV employees of the High Court and claim their right to be continued/appointed as Clerks on ad hoc basis under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. This is the controversy which forms the first part of the point. So far the second part of the point is concerned, it neither arises nor there is a difference of opinion. 2. For giving opinion on the first part of the first point, first of all Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975 is to be examined. It was :— "9. (a) Where it is necessary to fill a vacancy in any post and undue or administrative inconvenience is expected in appointing a person who is qualified for or entitled to such appointment or a duly qualified person is not available, the appointing authority may appoint any other suitable person temporarily until an appointment is made in accordance with these rules." 3. An appointment under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975, though termed temporary was of the nature of ad hoc stop gap arrangement "until appointment is made in accordance with these males," The pre-requisite to make such an appointment was :— (i) Administrative inconvenience was expected in appointing a person who was "qualified for" or "entitled to" appointment ; and (ii) duly qualified person was not available. 4. The question arises who were "qualified for" or "entitled to" to the posts of Clerks/Restorers under the Rules of 1975 at the relevant time. Rule 6 of the Rules of 1975 provided :— "6. 4. The question arises who were "qualified for" or "entitled to" to the posts of Clerks/Restorers under the Rules of 1975 at the relevant time. Rule 6 of the Rules of 1975 provided :— "6. The qualifications for recruitment to any post or class of posts shall be as are specified in the Second Schedule : provided that the Chief Justice may, by general or special order, relex the qualifications as aforesaid and/or add to the qualifications for a post or class of posts." 5. Serial Nos. 14 and 15 of the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975 provided for the qualifications for recruitment to the posts of Clerks/ Restorers. These were :— "Sr. No. 14 (a) By selection from amongst the matriculate court servants and officials of the Subordinate Courts having knowledge of typing in English or Hindi with a minimum speed of 30 words per minute serving in the scale of not less than Rs. 750-1340 having an experience of atleast three years in the grade. (b) By direct recruitment from amongst the candidates possessing 1st Division in Matriculation or Higher Secondary Part I Examination of Second Division in Higher Secondary Part II, Pre-University, Pre-Medical, Pre-Engineering, F. A., F. Sc. Parts I and II of B. A. B. Sc. or B. Com. of any University in any Division and having knowledge of type writing in English or Hindi with a minimum speed or 30 words per minute and preferably knowing stenography. Note : Mode B to be adopted when no candidate available by mode A. Sr. No. 15. (a) By promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit from amongst the Court servants having matriculation or equivalent qualification with an experience of five years in service. (b) By direct recruitment from amongst the 1st Division Matriculates or having equivalent qualifications." 6. In order to understand the true import of the Note appended & below Sr. No. 14, Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975 needs to be referred to Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975 was :— "4. Recruitment to a post or class of posts may be made by one or more of the following methods, namely :— (a) by promotion of a Court servant on the basis of seniority- cum-merit or on the basis of merit-cum-seniority as provided in the Second Schedule. Recruitment to a post or class of posts may be made by one or more of the following methods, namely :— (a) by promotion of a Court servant on the basis of seniority- cum-merit or on the basis of merit-cum-seniority as provided in the Second Schedule. When promotion is on the latter basis, the selection will be, in the discretion of the Chief Justice either on the basis of oral and/or written departmental examination as may be prescribed from time to time by the Chief Justice. Where the Chief Justice considers it appropriate, a Depart mental Promotion Committee may be constituted by him for making the recommendation for the purposes of such selection. (b) By direct recruitment on the basis of such examination as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice from time to time. (c) By transfer or deputation of a person serving outside the Court in connection with the affairs of the State of Himachal Pradesh or attached to Courts subordinate to the High Court or serving in any other High Court in the Union or attached to courts subardinate thereto, notwithstanding the provisions made in the Second Schedule. Note : Where more than one method is provided in the Second Schedule, it shall ,be open to the Chief Justice to select any one or more of such methods for effecting such recruitment." 7. As per the Note appended below Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975, it was left to the discretion of the Chief Justice to select any one or more methods out of the methods provided in the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975 for recruitment. In these Rules method of recruitment meant mode of recruitment. Nate appended below Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975 was a general provision which applied to all categories of posts whereas the Note below Sr. No. 14 of the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975 was a special provision applied to the post of Clerks only. In other words, by providing note below Sr. No. 14 of the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975, the Chief Justice had expressly exercised his discretion once for all for recruitment to the post of Clerks that mode (b) would be adopted when no candidate was available by mode "(a)" instead of exercising the discretion on each occasion, which might have arisen for recruitment to the post of Clerks. This Note did not out over ride the Note of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975 and took away the general discretion of the Chief Justice to select any one or more of the methods/modes provided for recruitment to the post of Clerks but the selection of the Chief Justice was made known that method/mode "(b)" of direct recruitment would be adopted when no candidate was available by method/mode (a)" of promotion. Method/mode "(a)" provided for selection from amongst • the matriculate court servants and officials of the subordinate courts serving in the scale of not less than Rs. 750-1340 having knowledge of Typing in English or Hindi with a minimum speed of 30 words per minute and three years experience in the grade, 8. The Note below Sr. No 14 of the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975 was part of the Rules and was to be given effect at the time of making recruitment to the post of Clerks/Restorers. Even for making temporary/ad hoc/stop gap appointments under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975, this Note was to come in play to know who were "qualified for" or "entitled to" to the post. For making appointment under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975 to the post of Clerks, a matriculate Court servant and official of the subordinate courts having knowledge of typing in English or Hindi with a minimum speed of 30 words per minute serving in a scale of not less than Rs. 750-1340 with three years experience in the grade were "qualified for" or "entitled to" as provided by Sr. No. 14 of Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975. Similarly, for the post of Restorers, matriculate Court servants with five years experience were "qualified for" or "entitled to" as provided by Sr. No. 15 of the Second Schedule to the Rules of 1975, if the Chief Justice exercised his discretion for method/ mode "(a)" of the recruitment, as provided by the Note appended below Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975. There is no dispute that at the relevant time "qualified for" and "entitled to" court servants and officials of subordinate courts were available. There is no dispute that at the relevant time "qualified for" and "entitled to" court servants and officials of subordinate courts were available. But it is the case of the petitioners and the High Court that in their appointment, undue or administrative inconvenience was expected and the Chief Justice permitted to appoint the petitioners on ad hoc basis until appointments were made in accordance with the Rules. The petitioners were appointed in May/June, 1990 for a period upto July, 1990 which was further extended from time to time upto 30th October, 1990. But the Chief Justice terminated their ad hoc appointment by his order dated 2nd October, 1990 passed on the administrative side and directed ad hoc appointment of thirteen Clerks and Restorers from amongst the matriculate Court servants and officials of the subordinate courts. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the petitioners had filed the present writ petition and obtained an order, of statue-qua on 30th October, 1990 which is continuing till today. 9. To find out what was the undue or administrative inconvenience, records of the Registry of this Court, where the appointments in question were dealt with have been perused. From the nothings on File No. HHC/Admn. 2 (16)/82-III, dealing with the subject "Uninvited applications from 16th January, 1986 onwards, it is clear that uninvited applications for all Class III and Class IV posts used to be filed in routine without taking any action thereon irrespective of the fact that these applications were by children of retired or retiring employees of the High Court or sub ordinate courts or by members of backward class or by some very needy persons. Two uninvited applications of petitioner No 13, Rajiv Kumar were ordered to be filed without any action on 19th May, 1990 (Note 125). On the other hand, from the nothings made in another file of Administration Section No. HHC/Admn. 2 (2l)/82-I, started from 26th June, 1986, it appears that preparation for filling up of vacant posts of Clerks/Restorers started in September, 1989. A number of Class IV employees were appointed as Clerks/Restorers on ad hoc basis. Nikka Ram and Hem Singh, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, who were working as Mali and Peon respectively were appointed as Clerks. On 30-4-1990, in his Note Nos. A number of Class IV employees were appointed as Clerks/Restorers on ad hoc basis. Nikka Ram and Hem Singh, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, who were working as Mali and Peon respectively were appointed as Clerks. On 30-4-1990, in his Note Nos. 362 and 363, the then Registrar considered the uninvited applications of petitioners Nisha Walia, Pushpa Rawat, Shankar Lal Sharma, Sunil Sharma and Pradeep Chauhan and made a proposal that they may be called for screening test for their ad hoc/temporary appointment as Clerks/Restorer against the two vacancies of Clerks and two vacancies of Restorers then available. It was noticed by the Registrar in the earlier part of his note that "It may also be submitted that we have already given chance to some of the matriculate Class IV employees working in the Registry to work on ad hoc basis which had to be done strictly in accordance with the seniority. However, ad hoc promotions to Class IV employees as Clerks has not worked well " 10. The proposal of the Registrar was accepted by the Chief Justice on the same date. After screening, the names of the petitioners Nisba Walia, Sunil Kumar and Pushpa Rawat were recommended for appointment as Clerks and the names of petitioners Pradeep Chauhan and Shankar Lal Sharma were recommended for appointment as Restorers by the Registrar on 7th/8th May, 1990, which recommendations were accepted by the Chief Justice and their appointments were made. On coming to know about the ad hoc appointments of the petitioners, some Class IV employees made representations which were dealt with at various levels in Notes 132 to 164 of File No HHC/Admn. 2 (16)/82-III In his note dated 30-5-1990, the Deputy Registrar (Admn ), in respect of the claim of Class IV employees stated that "....In this connection, it is pointed that in the past we have given representation to so many Class IV officials by appointing them on ad hoc basis as Clerks, Restorers etc. However, it was found that this arrangement of ad hoc promotions of Class IV employees has not worked well. This fact is very much within the knowledge of the Honble the Chief Justice on the basis of a submission made to that effect in a separate file No. HHC/Admn. 2 (21)/82-I (N/362), placed below." 11. However, it was found that this arrangement of ad hoc promotions of Class IV employees has not worked well. This fact is very much within the knowledge of the Honble the Chief Justice on the basis of a submission made to that effect in a separate file No. HHC/Admn. 2 (21)/82-I (N/362), placed below." 11. The Registrar called for the reports of the ad hoc Clerks/Restorers appointed directly and from amongst the Court servants. Thereafter, in his Nothings of 13th June, 1990 (Notes 152 to 164), he had stated that the work of all directly appointed and promoted ad hoc Clerks/Restorers was reported to be satisfactory except respondent Nos. 2 and 3, Nikka Ram and Hem Singh, who continued working on the post of Mali and Peon, respectively, despite their promotion as ad hoc Clerks. The Registrar recommended their reversion. After giving the background, he concluded :— "In view, of the above circumstances, since senior Class IV employees do not deserve promotion, therefore, the criteria of giving ad hoc appointments as Clerks/Restorers to the Class IV employees fails and we cannot adopt this course. Since the Registry is over-burdened with work and we cannot keep the posts of Clerks and Restorers vacant more so, in view of the forthcoming appointments of three Honble Judges in this Court, therefore, some ad hoc appointments for filling up the vacant posts will have to be made Since the rules are likely to be finalised within a period of 3 months therefore, these ad hoc appointments will have to be made at the first instance for a period of less than three months, i. e. upto July 31, 1990." 12. The Registrar made proposal to hold screening test of twelve more applicants whose uninvited applications were received in the Registry. Thereafter, petitioner Nos 6 to 12 were appointed as Clerks and petitioner No. 13 was appointed as Restorer on ad hoc basis vide order dated 28th June, 1990. 13. On the other hand, by order dated 15th June, 1990, respondent Nos, 2 and 3 were reverted to the posts of Mali and Peon, respectively. Feeling aggrieved, they filed C. W. P. No. 483 of 1990 challenging their reversion and continuance of ad hoc appointments of respondent Nos. 13. On the other hand, by order dated 15th June, 1990, respondent Nos, 2 and 3 were reverted to the posts of Mali and Peon, respectively. Feeling aggrieved, they filed C. W. P. No. 483 of 1990 challenging their reversion and continuance of ad hoc appointments of respondent Nos. 3 to 15 in the said petition, who are petitioners in the present writ petition They also prayed that the posts of Clerks/Restorers may be filled in accordance with the Rules and till then the Court servants and officials of subordinate Courts might be appointed on ad hoc basis. Various orders passed in that writ petition have been reproduced in the judgments of the two learned Judges and this Court need not repeat them. The important fact that needs to be mentioned is that whereas on 1st October, 1990, the Chief Justice extended the ad hoc appointments of the petitioners, on the very next day, that is, 2nd October, 1990, he terminated their ad hoc appointments by the following order : — "A most unusual rule virtually providing for cent per cent reservation of all the clerical posts in the H. C. in favour of Class IV employees, if available, was not brought to my notice when the Registry made proposals for ad hoc appointment of Clerks and Restorers. Now that I find such rule, I review the order dated l-iO-1990 and terminate the ad hoc appointment of the 13 Clerks and Restorers and direct ad hoc appointment of Clerks and Restorers from the eligible Class IV employees, as a purely temporary measure. Steps will be taken for regular selections and appointment of Clerks/Restorers in the existing vacancies. This order will be given effect to after obtaining the necessary clarification of the order dated 26-9-1990 in C. W. P. No. 483 of 1990 and subject to such directions that the Division Bench may issue. Post C W. P. 483 of 1990 before the Division Bench consisting of Bhawani Singh and Gupta, JJ. on 5-10-1990 for being spoken to. Sd/- 2-10-1990." 14. Post C W. P. 483 of 1990 before the Division Bench consisting of Bhawani Singh and Gupta, JJ. on 5-10-1990 for being spoken to. Sd/- 2-10-1990." 14. In view of the order of the Chief Justice on the administrative side, C. W. P. No. 483 of 1990 was dismissed as infructuous by order dated 5th October, 1990, which is as under .— "It appears from the office file produced before us that the Chief Justice has reviewed the order extending the period of ad hoc employment of respondents No. 3 to 15 after 31-10-1990 and has ordered ad hoc appointments of eligible, as a temporary measure, out of persons under Rule 9 (a) of the Himachal Pradesh High Court (Recruitment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1975, and before actually making such appointments, matter has been placed for seeking clarification from this Court in this regard, Since the claim of the petitioners that for these appointments on ad hoc basis, they should have been considered has been met, therefore, we, in view of this development, modify our order of 26-9-1990 and permit respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to appoint eligible and suitable candidates as Clerks and Restorers from out of the category to which the petitioners belong, as a temporary measure till regular selections are made within the time already allowed by this Court in its order dated 26-9-1990. The engagement of respondent Nos. 3 to 15, as ordered on 1-10-1990, will continue till 31-10-1990 in the interest of High Court work and that they are already working, so entitled to this extent of relief equitably. The writ petition is rendered infructuous and is dismissed as such." 15. When the process to make appointments out of the category of Class IV employees was in progress, the present writ petition was filed challenging the Rules of 1975 to the extent these provided cent per cent promotion to the posts of Clerks for Class IV employees and to restrain the High Court from making even ad hoc appointments under the Rules of 1975. It was also prayed that their services as ad hoc employees might not be terminated till recruitment under the new Rules, which were in the process of being finalised, were made. 16. It was also prayed that their services as ad hoc employees might not be terminated till recruitment under the new Rules, which were in the process of being finalised, were made. 16. From the order dated 2nd October, 1990 of the Chief Justice, passed on the administrative side, it becomes clear that had his attention been drawn to the Rules, he would not have given permission to appoint the petitioners. He reviewed his order dated 1st October, 1990, terminated the ad hoc appointments of the petitioners and ordered ad hoc appointments of Clerks/Restorers from amongst eligible Class IV employees. Had there been real undue or administrative inconvenience in appointing Class IV employees, the Registry would have brought it to the notice of the Chief Justice. All these facts and circumstances show that in order to appoint the petitioners, genuine claim of Court servants and officials of subordinate courts for ad hoc appointments was not dealt with in the right perspective though they had made representations at the earliest when only petitioner Nos. 1 to 5 were appointed and appointments of petitioner Nos. 6 to 13 were made after rejecting their representations. Earlier, a number of posts of Clerks/Restorers were filled in from amongst the Court servants/Peons and their work was found satisfactory (Notes 152 to 164 dated 13th June, 1990 of the Registrar in File No. HHC/Admn. 2 (I6)/82-III). If two of them did not actually work on the post of Clerks for reasons best known to them or the Registry, it could not be said that all Class IV employees were not fit to be appointed. The general statements made by the Deputy Registrar (Admn.) (Note 145 dated 7th June, 1990 in File No. HHC/Admn. 2 (16)/82-III) and the Registrar (Notes 152 to 164 dated 13th June, 1990 in File No. HHC/Admn 2 (l6)/82-III) that "promotion of Class IV employees was not workable" and "senior Class IV employees did not deserve promotion" etc. etc. were not substantiated by facts on record By way of a supplementary affidavit, a list of eligible Peons has been placed on record which shows that thirteen of them are matriculate and two are graduates who had more than two to. five years service to their credit. Apparently, no efforts were made to find out whether they could be appointed on ad hoc basis and all of them were rejected as a Class. five years service to their credit. Apparently, no efforts were made to find out whether they could be appointed on ad hoc basis and all of them were rejected as a Class. Instead, the petitioners were appointed when none of them except petitioner Nos. 2, 6, 7, 9 & 11, were eligible to be appointed as a direct recruit. Admittedly, all of them, except petitioner Nos. 5, 9 and 12, are close relations of the employees of the High Court and must have submitted their applications after acquiring knowledge from their close relations that there were vacancies in the posts of Clerks/Restorers in the High Court. Only their applications were considered and no public notice of any kind for inviting applications was given. On the other hand, during the same period, for filling up six posts of Peons after due advertisement, as many as 750 candidates were interviewed. From the records, it is also not clear as to what type of screening test was given to the petitioners to test their suitability However, it was only a formality as all who had taken the said test were found suitable. By any standards, this procedure cannot be termed as fair and just even for ad hoc/stop gap appointments of Clerks/Restorers. Appointments to jobs in Government, public institutions and, more so, in the constitutional institutions like the High Court, even on ad hoc/stop gap basis or for a short period, should be made in conformity with standards or norms which ate not arbitrary, irrational, irrelevant and discriminatory. On the facts and circumstances proved on the record of this case, these standard or norms are not fulfilled. 17. In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, the appointments of the petitioners on ad hoc /stop gap basis were not in conformity with Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. Under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975, court servants and officials of the subordinate courts were to be appointed who were available but they were not considered on the fallacious ground that a few of them who were appointed earlier had not worked well, which could not be termed as undue or administrative inconvenience. Point No. 3 18. Under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975, court servants and officials of the subordinate courts were to be appointed who were available but they were not considered on the fallacious ground that a few of them who were appointed earlier had not worked well, which could not be termed as undue or administrative inconvenience. Point No. 3 18. After Point No. 1, Point No. 4, whether the petitioners are en titled to be regularised on equitable or legal basis, could be answered straightway, but before that Point No. 3 needs to be answered because it was after amendment of their writ petition that the petitioners could pray for the relief of their regularization Admittedly, after coming into force of the Rules of 1990 and repeal of the Rules of 1975, with effect from November 13, 1990, the reliefs sought for initially in the writ petition had become inappropriate By filing C. M. P. No, 869 of 1991, the petitioners prayed for amendment of their writ petition to seek relief of their regularization even by relaxation of the Rules of 1990 if they were found not eligible under the said Rules. It is correct that by amendment, the petitioners intended to substitute the reliefs initially sought for by them but it cannot be said that these were based on entirely different cause of action. The petitioners were appointed on ad hoc/stop gap basis and continued as such for about six/seven months, therefore, they deserved to be regularised despite the Rules of 1990, was n<5t an altogether new and inconsistent case which could not be permitted by way of amendment. To avoid multiplicity of litigation and to do justice between the parties, the Court could take into account the subsequent events which happened during the pendency of the litigation though the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as these are at the commencement of the Ms. 19. In this regard the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shikharchand Jain v. Digambar Jain Praband Karini Sabha and others, AIR 1974 SC 1178, are required to be kept in view. These are given in Para 11 of the judgment. 19. In this regard the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shikharchand Jain v. Digambar Jain Praband Karini Sabha and others, AIR 1974 SC 1178, are required to be kept in view. These are given in Para 11 of the judgment. The relevant portion thereof is as under :— "......But it is open to a Court including a court of appeal to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate ; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation or (3) to do complete justice between the parties." 20. These principles were further reiterated and followed in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 ; Bosnia Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 and Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders (supra), Justice Krishna Iyer said :— "We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings* It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the Us has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justified bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just Circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling report to that course in law or justice. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling report to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for application or this equitable rule are myriad " Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, since the Rules of 1990 had come into force superseding the old Rules of 1975, on the basis of which the petitioners had sought their reliefs initially, the amendment sought for could be allowed in order to shorten the litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the relief sought for in the writ petition had become infructuous or inappropriate after coming into force of the Rules of 1990, therefore, the amendment of the writ petition by C, M, P. No. 869 of 1990 could be allowed. Point No. 4 21. Coming to Point No. 4, in the opinion of this Court, the petitioners were not entitled to be regularised on the posts against which they were working either on equitable basis or legal basis. It is held in answer to the first point that the appointment of the petitioners on ad hoc/stop gap basis was dehors Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. Besides this, their ad hoc/stop gap appointments have not been found made by following the procedure which could be termed fair, just, rational, not arbitrary and not discriminatory to pass the test of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. By continuing for a few months from May/June, 1990 to 2nd October, 1990 under the order of the Chief Justice, on the administrative side, and thereafter upto November and till today under the orders of the Court, neither any legal right nor equity is created in favour of the petitioners to entitle them to regularization There does not seem any justification not to make regular appointments to the posts of Clerks/Restorers in accordance with the Rules of 1990 to substitute the petitioners who are admittedly appointed on ad hoc/stop gap basis until appointments were made in accordance with the Rules of 1975 or the Rules of 1990. 22. 22. This Court need not refer to the catena of cases on which the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon as these have been discussed and analysed by both the learned Judges in their judgments The law laid down in these judgments is to be applied in each case in the background of its facts and circumstances. The ratio dissidendi of these judgments of the apex Court, which were delivered during the last more than a decade, is that there is no justification not to regularise employees or to keep them daily rated or casual labour for a number of years. Security of work has been considered as of utmost importance not only to the labour but also for the maximization of production. To employ labour on daily wage or casual basis is against our constitutional philosophy, particularly, the concept of right to work under Article 41 of the Constitution. Termination has serious consequence, therefore, an effort should be made to absorb them permanently or to consider them for regular appointment, if they have qualifications and experience for the posts, for which the Supreme Court has given directions in these cases. But these directions were given in the context of facts and circumstances of each case. Regularization or absorption of daily wage/casual labour/ ad hoc employees who have worked for a reasonable period may be a rule but there can be exceptions to it. 23. The present case falls in the category of exceptions. The petitioners are disentitled to regularization for the reasons that their initial appointment on ad hoc stop gap basis is found bad, in violation of the Rules. Under the Rules of 1975, none except petitioner Nos. 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11 had qualifications/eligibility for the post of Clerks/Restorers. 24. Under the Rules of 1990, the position continued to be the same so far the post of Clerk is concerned. For the post of Restorer, all the petitioners are eligible under the Rules of 1990 but the question of regularization is of those only who were appointed and are presently working against the post of Restorer. Out of those who are eligible, petitioner Nos. For the post of Restorer, all the petitioners are eligible under the Rules of 1990 but the question of regularization is of those only who were appointed and are presently working against the post of Restorer. Out of those who are eligible, petitioner Nos. 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11 have appeared in the typing/written test held for the post of Clerk but have not found a place in the Select list Their appointments on ad hoc basis have been questioned/challenged from the very beginning. They were specifically told by incorporating a clause in their appointment letter that they were being appointed on ad hoc basis and for a very short period until regular appointments were made. Since the process for making new Rules was going on, regular appointments were not made under the Rules of 1975, for which reason appointments were required to be made on temporary /ad hoc/stop gap basis but in accordance with the Rules of 1975. Assuming but not admitting that the ad hoc appointments of the petitioners were under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975 as alleged by them, they have a right to continue till regular appointments are made under the said Rules or under the new Rules of 1990. They could compete with others for regular selection but they cannot be regularised as there does not exist any provision in the Rules of 1990 which hold the field from 14th March, 1990. As such, they are not entitled to be regularised on legal basis, 25. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that right to life includes right to work which will be denied to the petitioners it they are not regularised. For making this submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1986 SC 180. 26. Almost a similar argument was considered by the Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others, JT 1992 (1) SC 394, and Justice Sawant, speaking for the Bench observed in Para 20 of the judgment :— "There is no doubt that broadly interpreted and as a necessary logical corollary, right to life would include the right to livelihood and, therefore, right to work. It is for this reason that this Court in Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others, AIR 1986 SC 180, while considering the consequence of eviction of the pavement dwellers had pointed out that in that case the eviction not merely resulted in deprivation of shelter but also deprivation of livelihood inasmuch as the pavement dwellers were employed in the vicinity of their dwellings. The Court had therefore, emphasised that the problem of eviction of pavement dwellers had to be viewed also in that context. This was, however, in the context of Article 21 which seeks to protect persons against the deprivation of their life except according to procedure established by law. This country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has not so far attained the capacity to guarantee it, and not because it considers it any the less fundamental to life. Advisedly, therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on Directive Principles Article 41 of which enjoins upon the State to make effective provisions for securing the same "within the limits of its economic capacity and development". Thus even while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work the Constitution makers though it prudent not to do so without qualifying it." 27. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court refused the relief of regularization after examining the objects of the schemes to provide income for those who are below poverty line and particularly during the period when they are without any source of livelihood and not to provide the right to work as such even to the rural poor. It was held that those employed under the schemes could not ask for more than what the scheme intended to give them and that their claim for regularization on the basis of employment received under the Scheme will frustrate the scheme itself. This judgment of the Supreme Court answers the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. 28. Another point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that if the petitioners are not regularised, not only they but even the members of their families will suffer serious consequences, such as, economic ruination and their settled life will be disturbed. This judgment of the Supreme Court answers the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. 28. Another point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that if the petitioners are not regularised, not only they but even the members of their families will suffer serious consequences, such as, economic ruination and their settled life will be disturbed. For this, the learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the observations made in Jacob M. Puthuparambil and others v. Kerala Water Authority and others, (1991) 1 SCC 28. This argument has been raised to be rejected. In fact, from the very beginning, the petitioners knew that their appointments were on ad hoc/stop gap basis until regular appointments were made under the Rules. As such, neither they nor their members of families could entertain the hope that their appointments would continue in future and they could accommodate their needs according to it. In fact, they had hardly put in a couple of months service when their appointments even on ad hoc/stop gap basis were challenged by respondents No. 2 and 3 in CWP No 483 of 1990; thereafter the Chief Justice had himself terminated their appointments on 2nd October, 1990 and they are on lease of life given by the interim order passed in the present writ petition. All of them except petitioners No. 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11 knew that they were not qualified under the old Rules of 1975. Under the new Rules of 1990, their position did not improve except of petitioners No. 3, 4 and 13 who are eligible for the posts of Restorers. Out of the eligible, petitioners No 2, 6, 7, 9 and 11 have appeared in the typing/written test held for the post of Clerks but none of them has been selected. 29. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioners were not entitled to be regularised on the posts against which they are working at present, on equitable or legal basis. Point No. 2 30. So far point No. 2 is concerned, it is correct that the guidelines of 1985 were framed by the orders of the Chief Justice when the Rules of 1975 were in operation. Point No. 2 30. So far point No. 2 is concerned, it is correct that the guidelines of 1985 were framed by the orders of the Chief Justice when the Rules of 1975 were in operation. In these guidelines, the source of power to frame them has not been stated but if Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975 is read with these guidelines, it is clear that these are express exercise of the discretion by the Chief Justice under the said Rule. Under Rule 4 (a), when promotion of a Court servant was to be made on the basis of merit-cum-seniority, it was the Chief Justice who exercised his discretion to tell that the selection would be on the basis of service record or on the basis of oral and/or written departmental examination as prescribed by him from time to time. Wherever the Chief Justice considered it appropriate, he might constitute a Departmental Promotion Committee for making its recommendations for the purpose of promotion. Further Rule 4 (b) of the Rules of 1975 provided that direct recruitment was to be made on the basis of such examination as might be prescribed by the Chief Justice from time to time. By making the guidelines wherein besides providing for the constitution of Screening Committee, separate oral and/or written tests had been prescribed for promotion and direct recruitment, the Chief Justice had expressly exercised his powers under Rule 4 of the Rules of 1975. As these Rules stood repealed by Rule 25 of the Rules of 1990, the guidelines made under the Rules of 1975 also stood superseded. The guidelines of 1985 have not been specifically saved as required under Rule 25 of the Rules of 1990 31. The next question to be answered under Point No. 2 is, "whether the selections made vide interview dated 7-9-1991 were not proper and violated any of the Rules or guidelines issued by the competent authority ?" 32. Before answering this question, this Court may straighten the facts that as stated in C. M. P. No. 1079 of 1991, whereby the guidelines of 1985 were brought on record, the allegations of the petitioners were that no interview was held for making selections under the Rules of 1990 and the guidelines of 1985 were violated. Before answering this question, this Court may straighten the facts that as stated in C. M. P. No. 1079 of 1991, whereby the guidelines of 1985 were brought on record, the allegations of the petitioners were that no interview was held for making selections under the Rules of 1990 and the guidelines of 1985 were violated. This Court has carefully perused the Nothings made in loose file No. HHC/Admn 2 (16) 82-111 wherein the selections in question made under the Rules of 1990 have been dealt with, to verify whether any interview was held on 7th September, 1991 as stated in Point No. 2. It is clear from the records that no interview was held for making selections and on 7th September, 1991, the Chief Justice has directed that the Select list of Clerks prepared of four candidates from the reserved category and of seventeen candidates from the general category be displayed on the Notice board but no appointments are to be made without the orders of the Court in view of the order dated 30th October, 1990 passed in this writ petition. Therefore, this Court is to answer whether the Select list, which was ordered to be dis- played on 7th September, 1991 was prepared in violation of the guidelines of 1985. As already stated above, as the guidelines of 1985 stood superseded by the Rules of 1990, there is no question of their violation. Other wise also, under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1990, it is left to the discretion of the Chief Justice whether the selection is to be made on the basis of oral and/or written examination as prescribed by him from time to time when the criterion of promotion is merit-cum-seniority. Further, for the direct recruitment also, it is the- Chief Justice who prescribes examination from time to time It may be made clear that examination includes oral and/or written examination. In the present case, the Chief Justice vide his orders dated 8th May, 1991, on the administrative side, (Loose File No. HHC/Admn. 2 (16)/82-III) had prescribed typing test and written test, consisting of three papers in English, General Knowledge and Arithmetic’s, and has not prescribed interview. The select list has been prepared on the basis of typing test and the written test. 2 (16)/82-III) had prescribed typing test and written test, consisting of three papers in English, General Knowledge and Arithmetic’s, and has not prescribed interview. The select list has been prepared on the basis of typing test and the written test. In view of these facts on record and Rule 7 of the Rules of 1990, this Court holds that the Select list ordered to be displayed on the Notice board by the Chief Justice vide her orders dated 7th September, 1991, is proper as it is prepared by following the due procedure laid down under the Rules of 1990. 33. Regarding the third part of this point, that whether holding of viva voce test is a sine-qua-non for proper selection to the posts of Clerks/ Restorers, the answer of this Court is in the negative. As already discussed above, for selection to the posts of Clerks/Restorers made in accordance with the Rules of 1990, holding of viva voce test was not the essential requirement. However, in a number of judgments, discussed by both the learned Judges in their judgments, merits and demerits of holding interview for assessing the personality and character of a candidate besides his intellect and knowledge by putting him to written test have been examined. The ratio dissidendi of these cases is that it all depends upon the requirement of a service or a post that what kind of an oral and/or written test should be prescribed and what weightage should be attached to either of them Though oral interview test alone has not been found to be very satisfactory test for assessing and evaluating the capacity and calibre of candidates, yet, it can supplement the written test. In none of these cases, recruitment has been held to be bad if selection is made by not holding oral interview, more so, if the Rules do not provide for such an oral interview. 34. In the present case, discretion is left to the Chief Justice under the Rules of 1990 and if he has chosen not to prescribe oral test, it is with a purpose. For the posts of Clerks and Restorers in the High Court, typing test and written examination is sufficient to assess the intellect and knowledge of the candidates. 34. In the present case, discretion is left to the Chief Justice under the Rules of 1990 and if he has chosen not to prescribe oral test, it is with a purpose. For the posts of Clerks and Restorers in the High Court, typing test and written examination is sufficient to assess the intellect and knowledge of the candidates. They mainly deal with, files, do typing work, for which traits of their personality and character need not be tested by oral interview, as in the case of admission to higher education or selection to Indian Administrative Service, Indian Police Service and other public services. 35. In the result, in the opinion of this Court, holding of viva voce test was not a sine qua non for selection to the posts of Clerks/Restorers. Point No. 5 36. Regarding the fifth point that whether respondents No. 2 and 3 had locus standi to challenge the appointments of the petitioners, the answer of this Court is in the affirmative as they belong to the category of Class-IV employees who were "qualified for" or "entitled to" for appointment under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. They and other Class IV employees had aright to claim that they might be continued/appointed even on ad hoc/stop gap basis instead of the petitioners. For their lapse that they did not join the promotion post of Clerk and continued working on the lower post of Mali/Peon, they might not be entitled to continue/be appoint ed as Clerk but they have a locus standi to challenge the appointments of the petitioners being in violation of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1975. After coming into force of the Rules of 1990, they have got a right to be considered for promotion against 20% posts of Clerks and 40% posts of Restorers and have no right to contest regularization of the petitioners under the Rules of 1990 as it can only be against the quota of direct recruits. 37. With its opinion on all the five points, this Court sends back this case to the Division Bench for passing appropriate orders in the writ petition. Order accordingly.