JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---In this and the companion two appeals, the Bombay Municipal Corporation has assailed the correctness of three orders of acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 39th Court, Vile-Parle, Bombay. The Bombay Municipal Corporation Authorities had filed three complaints against the accused in his capacity as trustee/landlord of the premises by the name of 'Ambika Bhuvan', situated at S.V. Road, Goregaon (West). It was alleged in the first case, which is the subject-matter of this appeal, that the roof repairs had not been carried out within the prescribed time and that, therefore, an offence punishable under section 377-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act had been committed. In the second case, it was alleged that certain repairs to the drainage and plumbing systems had not been carried out and that an offence under section 257 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act had been committed. In the third case, respondent No. 1 had been directed to carry out some structural repairs, such as re-plastering, etc., and on noncompliance an offence under section 354 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was alleged. It is common ground that in all these three cases, notice was served on respondent No. 1 calling upon him to comply with the requisitions within a period of 15 days. Shortly thereafter an inspection was carried out and it was disclosed that the requisitions of the notice had not been complied with, whereupon the three prosecutions were instituted. The Bombay Municipal Corporation produced a copy of the notice and contended that in so far as the accused had not carried out what he had been lawfully ordered to do that the offence was complete. It was contended that more than 15 days had elapsed in each case since the date of the service of the notice and that, therefore, the offence was complete. The accused had contended that the notice period was too short and that the Bombay Municipal Corporation ought not to have rushed to the Court with such haste and the learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties, upheld the view that the time period that had been allowed to the accused was too short and that, therefore, no offence can be said to have been committed. The accused was accordingly acquitted in all the three cases, and the Bombay Municipal Corporation has through the present set of three appeals challenged those orders of acquittal. 2. Shri Rai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, has drawn my attention to the notices that were served on the accused. He states that repairs to the roof, to the drainage system and to the structure were absolutely essential, that under the normal circumstances the accused was obliged to have maintained the building and on his not having done so that the Bombay Municipal Corporation had to step in and order him to carry out the requisite repairs. He states that the notice is required to be time-bound and that as of necessity the time afforded has got to be of a short duration as delay would be extremely prejudicial in case of this type. He draws my attention to the averments in the notice which are to the effect that the building was not only old but that it was in a virtually bad condition and that unless the requisite repairs were carried out, it was a source of danger to the occupants and even to the passers-by. He states that, therefore, there was valid reason for prescribing a short time as the repairs had to be urgently undertaken and, therefore, the Bombay Municipal Corporation had made the job time-bound. Shri Rai further pointed out that had the accused commenced the job or if he had shown any valid reason why he could not do so within the prescribed time and required some extension that the Bombay Municipal Corporation would certainly not insisted on prosecuting him. He states that even after the expiry of the prescribed time in this case the accused had totally ignored the notice and that, therefore, the Bombay Municipal Corporation was left with no option except to take legal steps in the matter. Shri Rai also made a strong grievance of the fact that instances of the present type are rampant and that it is, therefore, very essential and in the public interest that the courts must take a sufficiently rigorous view of noncompliance because the consequences are very grave. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the trial Court, according to him, was totally wrong and unjust and ought to be set aside and that the accused ought to be convicted. He, therefore, submitted that the order of the trial Court, according to him, was totally wrong and unjust and ought to be set aside and that the accused ought to be convicted. 3. Shri Walawalkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 accused, has advanced a submission which is of considerable substance. He has pointed out to me, in the first instance, that the courts have got to take a practical and a realistic view of the situation and he stated that in assessing whether the 15 days' time that was afforded by the Bombay Municipal Corporation was reasonable or not would depend entirely on the nature of the work and the magnitude of the jobs concerned. It is true that the term "reasonable" is something that is not defined, that it is a matter of fact, that it is a flexible concept which will have to be construed in relation to the situation that prevails in a particular case. The short point, therefore, is as to whether on the facts of the present case the acquittal was justified on the ground that 15 days was unreasonably short. Shri Walawalkar has drawn my attention to section 46 of the Contract Act wherein there is a reference to the phrase "reasonable time". He has drawn my attention to the commentary under this section and he has relied on section 105 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to illustrate his point that what may be reasonable in a given situation may not be construed as reasonable in another one. On facts, Shri Walawalkar points out that what the accused was asked to carry out was not something which he could physically do. He states that in order to comply with the terms of the notice, it was essential for the accused to get outside help. The notice itself prescribes that the jobs in question were required to be done with the assistance of a licensed plumber. There is a valid reason for this because the Bombay Municipal Corporation would not and should not permit substandard jobs to be undertaken in these areas. Shri Walawalkar also points out to me that the Court has to take judicial notice of something else, namely, the aspect of availability of assistance. There is a valid reason for this because the Bombay Municipal Corporation would not and should not permit substandard jobs to be undertaken in these areas. Shri Walawalkar also points out to me that the Court has to take judicial notice of something else, namely, the aspect of availability of assistance. Quite apart from the attendant circumstances, like the finance involved, etc., the real issue is as to whether the accused was in a position to have complied with the requisitions if he so wanted. It is Shri Walawalkar's case that skilled person, such as licensed plumbers, are not easily available and that, therefore, when the job involves reliance on such category of persons that a long period of time ought to have been given so that the accused could have secured such assistance and could have carried out the job in question. It is, therefore, the argument canvassed by learned Counsel that having regard to the totality of these aspects that are involved in the present case, the view taken by the learned Magistrate was not an unreasonable one, that it was not incorrect and that, in any event, the decision cannot be characterised as being perverse and, therefore, that this is not a case in which interference is called for in an appeal against acquittal. 4. Shri Walawalkar sought to place reliance on a relatively old decision of the Privy Council in the case of (Sheo Swarup v. The King Emperor)1, 1961 Indian Appeals page 398, wherein the Privy Council laid down the principle that it is still good law, namely, while dealing with appeals against acquittal, the High Court should be slow in interfering because the trial Court has had the advantage of evaluating several factors which the High Court does not have the benefit of. Under these circumstances, the Privy Council had observed that interference should be slow and that the cases in which this is done should be few and far between. This view has been consistently followed by courts. Under these circumstances, the Privy Council had observed that interference should be slow and that the cases in which this is done should be few and far between. This view has been consistently followed by courts. Shri Walawalkar relied on other decision in the case of (Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P.)2, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 15, wherein the Supreme Court grafted on an additional piece of reasoning to the earlier concept by observing that the presumption of innocence gets fortified when the accused is acquitted and that the High Court should take cognizance of this while dealing with an appeal against acquittal. In a subsequent decision reported in the same volume at page 637 in the case of (Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh)3, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 637, the Supreme Court has once again reiterated this position. In sum and substance, therefore, what is contended by learned Counsel is that unless and until it can be demonstrated that the decision of the trial Court is manifestly wrong, merely because better reasoning is possible or another view is permissible, interference would not be justified. 5. The entire controversy hinges around the type of notices that were served on the respondent No. 1 accused. The three notices, though under different sections, have been served on the respondent-accused on 10-8-1983. The notices describe various jobs by way of repairs, rectification, etc., that are required to be carried out by the accused within a period of 15 days from the receipt of service hereof. As indicated earlier, the requirement is that the jobs had to be done by a licensed plumber, in the case of the notice under section 257(1)(a) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, i.e., the matter relating to the drains. As regards the other two jobs, namely, structural repairs and repairs to the roof, these, undoubtedly, had to be done with the assistance of specialised or skilled contractors/labourers, and in all the three cases though the work was considerable, the time-limit prescribed was 15 days. Shri Rai has contended that there is a valid reason for this, namely, that it was the duty of the accused to have done these jobs in his capacity as the landlord without waiting for any coercive steps from the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Shri Rai has contended that there is a valid reason for this, namely, that it was the duty of the accused to have done these jobs in his capacity as the landlord without waiting for any coercive steps from the Bombay Municipal Corporation. He states that the point of time at which the Bombay Municipal Corporation steps in is when such jobs have not been done and necessarily the situation is extremely bad. At that stage, urgency is of utmost necessity and the completion of the jobs and undertaking of the repairs is, therefore, essentially time-bound. He states that if the landlord is allowed to drag his feet that the nuisance and damage to the residents of the building and users and passers-by will be extremely high and, therefore, immediate steps are required to be taken. This, according to Shri Rai, is the justification for prescribing the time-limit of 15 days. He states that this much time is more than enough for the landlord to have the job attended to and he clarifies that if the defaulting landlord commences the work, that the Bombay Municipal Corporation Authorities will supervise it and ensure that it is completed. If there are valid grounds for not being able to commence it and some extension of time is required, then the authorities will certainly grant reasonable extension of time. Shri Rai contends that in the present case no difficulties were pleaded, no extension of time was asked for and that the landlord has totally ignored the notice possibly from the view that at the highest he would be penalised and that it is more economical for him to pay a small fine than to undertake the job in question. 6. Shri Walawalkar's argument is entirely different. He has drawn my attention to the nature of the work and it is his submission that even if the landlord were to attend to the matter with utmost expediency that it is physically impossible to carry out that magnitude of work after getting hold of the requisite help within the short period of 15 days. He has drawn my attention to the nature of the work and it is his submission that even if the landlord were to attend to the matter with utmost expediency that it is physically impossible to carry out that magnitude of work after getting hold of the requisite help within the short period of 15 days. Shri Walawalkar contends that the authorities have acted unreasonably, that the notice itself is void and stillborn in law in so far as it is the manifestation of an arbitrary and unreasonable act on the part of a public authority and, therefore, even if the respondent-accused did not comply with the notice, the prosecution was not maintainable on the ground that the notice in question was unenforceable in law. 7. It is true that the law on the point enjoins upon public authorities at all stages to act fairly and reasonably and I do not have to cite the case law on this point which is now well-crystallised, particularly after Maneka Gandhi's case. A perusal of the record indicates that urgency did exist and, therefore, to my mind, the Bombay Municipal Corporation having called upon the respondent-accused to carry out the job on an urgent basis is understandable. The only fault, to my mind, that one can find is with regard to the wording of the notices. Having regard to the nature of the repairs that were required to be carried out, the correct wording of the notice ought to have been that the accused should have been called upon to commence the jobs within a period of 15 days and to complete the same without any interruption or stoppage thereafter on an expeditious basis. I do not see anything particularly unreasonable in having called upon the landlord having regard to the fact that the situation had arisen because of the past inaction or negligence on the part of the landlord himself which had given rise to that state of affairs, and to my mind, if there was any valid reason of if the landlord felt that the time period of 15 days for the jobs in question was unreasonably short, he ought to have taken all necessary steps to make an effort to at least commence the jobs in question and if there was impossibility in his way to have asked for extension of time. To have ignored or defied the notice, to my mind, is what constituted the breach. This, as indicated by me above, does not condone the manner in which the notice is worded, as I have already held that Shri Walawalkar is right in pointing out that the outer limit of 15 days was unreasonable. It is necessary for the authorities concerned to evaluate the quantum of work and the nature of work, to take a realistic and practical view of the time-frame involved and to set a reasonable deadline and, as indicated by me, to frame the notice properly whereby they can insist on commencing with the work within 15 days, but it may be unreasonable to hold that the completion should also be within 15 days. This aspect of the matter, as pointed out by me, is of consequence because on the wording of the notice, as he rightly pointed out, the implication to the respondent-accused is that if he has not completed the job within the prescribed period of 15 days, an offence is complete and could still be alleged against him. To this extent, therefore, he would be vulnerable and would be entitled to say that, that part of the notice which required him to complete the jobs within 15 days is unreasonable and is liable to be struck down. 8. Having regard to this position, the objections canvassed by Shri Walawalkar on behalf of the respondent-accused are substantially upheld except to the limited extent that there was a breach on the part of the landlord in having totally ignored and not even having made any attempt to comply with the requisitions or to have pointed out any valid reasons that might have been in his way which required further time. 9. The last question that arises is as to whether to this limited extent interference by this Court at this point of time would be justified. I have already held that the objections canvassed by learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent-accused must be upheld to the extent that the outer limit prescribed in the notice is defective. If that be so, the breach alleged by the accused is, undoubtedly, a technical one and to that extent could have possibly attracted the minimum penalty. I have already held that the objections canvassed by learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent-accused must be upheld to the extent that the outer limit prescribed in the notice is defective. If that be so, the breach alleged by the accused is, undoubtedly, a technical one and to that extent could have possibly attracted the minimum penalty. However, it could still be argued that a conviction on that score would be an absurdity because the gravamen of the charge consists in not having carried out the repairs which presupposes not having carried out the repairs completely. To argue that the landlord ought to have commenced within the period of 15 days but that at the same time he should not be penalised if he could not complete the work within the period of 15 days would almost lead to an absurd situation in law and to this extent I am in full agreement with the submissions canvassed by Shri Walawalkar when he pointed out that no actionable breach can be said to have taken place in this case. I do not dispute that the reasoning and the wording of the order passed by the learned Magistrate could have been slightly better, but the fact still remains that the acquittal awarded by him to the respondent-accused is not liable to be disturbed. The position in law as canvassed by learned Counsel is well-crystallized and it unequivocally casts a duty on this Court to reverse the order of acquittal provided substantial miscarriage of justice has arisen and in cases where the order of the trial Court is perverse or manifestly wrong. The principle would not permit interference by this Court in borderline cases or in petty offences where the section would have to be stretched to its maximum to squeeze out a conviction. In this view of the matter, the appeal fails and the same stands dismissed. 10. The Registrar of this Court shall forward a copy of this judgment to the Municipal Commissioner, Bombay Municipal Corporation, who shall ensure that copies thereof are circulated to the various officers who are incharge of Municipal prosecutions of this type including the law officers of the Bombay Municipal Corporation as the guidelines laid down in this judgment ought to be taken note of. Appeal dismissed. *****