JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---Rule. Respondent No.1 waives service. By consent rule is made returnable. Forthwith Heard parties. 2. The present petition is filed by the management seeking to impugne an order passed by the Industrial Court on the 16th of October, 1992 in Complaint (ULP) No. 1071 for 1992. By the order, the Industrial Court has allowed the complaint filed by the first respondent and has declared that the petitioner had engaged in unfair labour practice under Item 9, Schedule-IV of The Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The petitioner is directed to cease and resist from engaging in the unfair labour practices mentioned in the complaint and is directed to withdraw the order of suspension issued against the first respondent. 3. The petitioners, by an order dated 3rd of July, 1992 issued a chargesheet against the first respondent and suspended him pending the inquiry. A copy of the chargesheet and suspension order is annexed at Exhibit-A to the petition. On 4th of August, 1992 the first respondent filed the instant complaint alleging that the petitioner is not justified in continuing the order of suspension beyond a period of five days. According to the first respondent the petitioner is duty bound to permit him to resume duties at the end of the period of five days. 4. Reliance is placed on behalf of the first respondent on Standing Order 22-A which recites as under : "22A. An employee may be suspended pending enquiry into an alleged misconduct for a period not exceeding five days. If he is found guilty as a result of the enquiry, the period of suspension shall be treated as leave without pay. If, however, he is found to be not guilty, he shall be entitled to his wages for the period of suspension." 5. The above Standing Order was the subject matter of construction before the Industrial Court. By the impugned order the Industrial Court has found that under the Standing Order the management is not entitled to suspend an employee beyond a period of five days. It held that the management is bound to permit the employee to resume the duties with effect from the 6th day of the date of the order of suspension. Consequent upon the said interpretation given by the Industrial Court, the complaint of the first respondent was allowed. It held that the management is bound to permit the employee to resume the duties with effect from the 6th day of the date of the order of suspension. Consequent upon the said interpretation given by the Industrial Court, the complaint of the first respondent was allowed. Taking exception to the said decision the management has preferred the present petition. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the contending parties, I am of the view that, if a strict interpretation is given to the Standing Order, the view taken by the Industrial Court, on a prima facie scrutiny would appear to be justified. However on deeper scrutiny it would appear that the view expressed by the Industrial Court that the petitioner is bound to provide work to the first respondent on the sixth day after the order of suspension cannot hold water. 7. In the case of (Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union), reported in 1959(II) L.L.J. Page 544 the Supreme Court has observed : " The first question therefore that falls for consideration is the extent of the power of the employer to suspend an employee under the ordinary law of master and servant. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a servant to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to...work, he will have to pay wages during the so-called period of suspension......." 8. In my view, all that the Standing Order provides is that the petitioner is not entitled to suspend the first respondent for a period beyond five days. That, however, does not mean that at the end of the period of five days the petitioner is bound to provide work to the first respondent. In my view, all that the Standing Order provides is that the petitioner is not entitled to suspend the first respondent for a period beyond five days. That, however, does not mean that at the end of the period of five days the petitioner is bound to provide work to the first respondent. All that can happen is that at the end of five days of the suspension period the ordinary law of master and servant will come into play, the said law provides that in the event of the petitioner forbidding the first respondent to carry on his duties, the petitioner will be bound to pay him full wages. 9. The departmental inquiry initiated against the first respondent contain charges which can not be termed as trivial. The inquiry is bound to take more than the period of five days as stipulated in the Standing Order. It would, therefore, be neither legal nor proper to direct the petitioners to take back the first respondent in service and provide him with duties. All that can be directed is payment of full wages. 10. A Standing Order which contains a phrase similar to the Standing Order under consideration, was a subject matter of a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh and others)2, 1959(II) L.L.J. Page 231. All that can be directed is payment of full wages. 10. A Standing Order which contains a phrase similar to the Standing Order under consideration, was a subject matter of a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh and others)2, 1959(II) L.L.J. Page 231. The clause which was the subject matter of the decision of the Supreme Court read as under : " An employee may be suspended, fined or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice if he is found to be guilty of misconduct, provided suspension without pay, whether as a punishment or pending enquiry, shall not exceed ten days." Hence, a clause "an employee may be suspended provided the suspension shall not exceed ten days" was considered and this is what the Supreme Court stated : " In such a case, if the standing orders provide that suspension without pay will not be for more than a certain number of days, the enquiry must either be completed within that period or if it goes beyond that period and suspension for any reason is considered necessary, pay cannot be withheld for more than the period prescribed under the Standing Orders." Hence, it would be that when the Standing Order prohibits the suspension of a worker beyond a stipulated period, all that it enjoins the employer and entitles the employee is the payment of full wages after the stipulated period. It cannot give a right to an employee to work and it cannot confer any obligation upon an employer to provide work at the end of the stipulated period. All that it enjoins is a duty cast upon the employer to pay full wages at the end of the stipulated period. 11. The very Standing Order which is the subject matter of my consideration being Standing Order 22-A was the subject matter of consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of (The National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. v. Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union and another), in Appeal Lodging No. 1219 of 1990 in Writ Petition No. 2560 of 1990. The Division Bench (Coram : S. P. Bharucha and B. N. Srikrishan, JJ.) passed the following order : " The applicable Standing Order 22-A states that an employee may be suspended pending enquiry into an alleged misconduct for a period not exceeding 5 days. The Division Bench (Coram : S. P. Bharucha and B. N. Srikrishan, JJ.) passed the following order : " The applicable Standing Order 22-A states that an employee may be suspended pending enquiry into an alleged misconduct for a period not exceeding 5 days. The order of suspension was to operate pending the enquiry. The Industrial Court struck it down but said in the judgment that the suspension beyond 5 days is illegal. We clarify the position and dismiss the appeal. On the 6th day the suspension of the employee ceases and he is entitled to be paid his full salary from then on. Subject to the payment of such full salary, however, the employer may keep him away from work pending the enquiry." 12. In my view, the view expressed by The Division Bench applies in all fours to the present case. As held by the Division Bench I hold that, all that the first respondent is entitled from the 6th day of the order of suspension is payment of his full salary. He, however, cannot insist that he will continue to work. The petitioners will be entitled to keep him away from work pending the enquiry. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court on the 16th of October, 1992 in Complaint (ULP) No. 1072 of 1992 is set aside and the said complaint is dismissed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). There shall be, however, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. -----