Lingam, B. C(died) v. Statesenko Larissa — 1992 DIGILAW 574 (MAD)

Judgment :- MISHRA 1. A learned single Judge of this Court has ordered to implead the applicants in Application No. 2807 of 1986 as party-defendants in C.S. No. 134 of 1986, a suit for partition. This, he has ordered exercising the Courts power in this behalf to pass orders without any application, although he has found that the person who claimed authority under the power of attorney, allegedly executed by the applicants therein, was not competent to represent them. Two appeals accordingly are preferred, one by the Plaintiff against the order to add the applicants in Application No. 2807 of 1986 as party-defendants and the other on behalf of the applicants therein in respect of that part of the order, in which the learned single Judge has found the power of attorney document not valid. It is not in dispute that the estate with respect to which the plaintiff and the defendants in C.S. 134 of 1986 are in dispute for partition, belonged to one Dr. V. Natarajan since deceased. In the plaint, a claim for partition and separate possession of 1/7th share in the properties has been advanced by the plaintiff alleging that Dr. Natarajan died on 13-5-1984 leaving no issues and no other preferential heir than the plaintiff and the defendants. According to the plaintiff, Dr. Natarajans wife predeceased him and he died intestate. Plaintiff and defendants 3 and 6 are brothers of late Dr. Natarajan. Defendants 1, 2, 4 and 5 are sisters. The applicants, however, have sought to be impleaded as party-defendants in the suit saying that a natural son to the 6th defendant Vinayagam, known as Balamani Natarajan, was adopted by Dr. Natarajan as his son, since he had no children and Balamani Natarajan had predeceased his adopted parents, Dr. Natarajan and his wife, leaving behind his adopted parents, his wife, the 1st applicant and daughter, 2nd applicant. Dr. Natarajans wife died in January, 1983 leaving behind the properties mentioned in plaint schedules A to D, which properties, devolved equally on Dr. Natarajan and his grand daughter, the 2nd applicant and after the death of Dr. Natarajan, his estate also devolved on the 1st applicant and her daughter, i.e. to say, the daughter of the adopted son of Dr. Natarajan, known as Margaritha. According to the applicants, they alone were/are entitled to Inherit the entire estate of Dr. Natarajan and his wife Jayammal. Natarajan, his estate also devolved on the 1st applicant and her daughter, i.e. to say, the daughter of the adopted son of Dr. Natarajan, known as Margaritha. According to the applicants, they alone were/are entitled to Inherit the entire estate of Dr. Natarajan and his wife Jayammal. They would suffer seriously if brothers and sisters of Dr. Natarajan were allowed to proceed without they being impleaded as parties to partition the suit properties. 2. It is on the record that 1st applicant who has claimed to be the wife of the adopted son of Dr. Natarajan, lived in a foreign land earlier known as U.S.S.R. One V. Cheenu Prabhakaran claiming to be the power of attorney agent filed the petition on their behalf. 3. The plaintiff as well as some defendants seriously contested the application on grounds inter alia that (i) Cheenu Prabhakaran who claimed to the power of attorney agent, has no locus standi to prosecute the application on behalf of the applicants, (ii) The applicants were foreign nationals and not residents of India or Indian citizens. They were also not Hindus. They had no right whatever to the estete of late Dr. Natarajan and Jayammal Natarajan. Since they were/are alien, they were not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for being added as party-defendants in the suit. 4. Besides the above, they questioned the claim of adoption, the marriage of the first applicant with the alleged adopted son of Dr. Natarajan as well as that the 2nd applicant was not born to the adopted son of Dr. Natarajan. The learned single Judge who heard the parties, has found as follows:— “But, in the present case, once Mani Natarajan was found to be the adopted son of Dr. Natarajan, certainly, the applicants herein, viz., the wife and daughter of Mani Natarajan, will have a right to contend that they have a right to succeed to the properties of Dr. Natarajan. Though the plaintiff seriously disputes, as seen from his counter, the factum of adoption as well as the marriage of the 1st applicant with Mani Natarajan, the main contention is only regarding the question of adoption. The document filed on the side of the applicants include the certificate of marriage between the 1st applicant and Mani Natarajan issued by the Dept. The document filed on the side of the applicants include the certificate of marriage between the 1st applicant and Mani Natarajan issued by the Dept. of Civil Registry Office in the City of Moscow, to prove the marriage between Mani Natarajan and 1st applicant, on 11.4.72 and the certificate of Birth of the 2nd applicant. It shows that the 2nd applicant was born on 22.6.73 only in Madras to Mani Natarajan and the 1st applicant. The marriage between Mani Natarajan and 1st applicant has taken place in Russia and the child was born to them in India. They also produced the letter written by Dr. Natarajan wherein Dr. Datarajan admits the marriage. It is not necessary to refer to all the documents at this stage. Therefore, the factum of marriage between Mani Natarajan and the 1st applicant cannot be seriously disputed by the plaintiff. Of-course, the plaintiff may have a serious dispute about the contention of the applicants that Mani Natarajan has been adopted by late Dr. Natarajan. The documents filed by the applicants show that Dr. Natarajan treated Mani Natarajan as his son, educated him and spent for him. But, these documents are not sufficient to establish the factum of adoption. Admittedly, Dr. Natarajan had no issues. He was in a high position and amassed wealth. Therefore, it is quite possible that Dr. Natarajan treated Mani Natarajan who is his own brothers son, as his son, showered love and affection on him and spent for him. It may be as a result of adoption or it maybe even without formal adoption. The documents filed on behalf of the plaintiff show that Dr. Natarajan had no issues and the legal heirship certificate issued to Dr. Natarajan shows Dr. Natarajan himself as the heir of his wife. The applicants documents relate to the period when Mani Natarajan was alive, i.e. prior to 1976. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, there is nothing to show that Dr. Natarajan treated Mani Natarajan as his son after his death in the 1976 and his wife and daughter as his daughter in law and grand daughter. The applicants have not made out a firm case to prove the case of adoption of Mani Natarajan by Dr. Natarajan but the evidence let in shows that Mani Natarajan might have been adopted by Dr. Natarajan. The applicants have not made out a firm case to prove the case of adoption of Mani Natarajan by Dr. Natarajan but the evidence let in shows that Mani Natarajan might have been adopted by Dr. Natarajan. In that event, the applicants will have a valid interest in the suit properties and it is not proper to drive them to a separate suit.” On the question of the power of attorney agents capacity to represent the applicants, learned single judge has held. “As regards the contention that the power of attorney is not proper, I am of the view that the contention is well founded. The power does not authorise the power of attorney agent to sue on behalf of the applicants. Therefore, the power of attorney agent cannot act on the basis of a decfective power.” 5. Learned counsel for the applicants/respondents in the appeal filed by the plaintiff (O.S.A. 8 of 1987) has contended that an order impleading parties is not a judgment for the purpose of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court and has, thus, submitted that the plaintiffs appeal should be rejected as not maintainable. He has, for the said purpose, placed reliance upon more than one judgment of this Court, viz., Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar 60 M.L.J. 237, Selvam Mudaliar v. V. Raju Mudaliar 1952-2-M.L.J. 653 = 65 L.W. 1000 (D.B.) and A.S. Manavala Chettiar v. T.V. Selvarajan & others 1991 T.L.N.J. 166 since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 127. Since the earlier two judgments are referred to in the third cited above, we may for our purpose extract that portion of the judgment, wherein reference has been made to such judgments of the Court, which threw light on the point, including a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce C. Salim A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 130. The Bench considering as to what may be the meaning of the word ‘judgment’ under clause 15 of the Letters patent, has said as follows:— “In order to fall within the meaning of ‘judgment’ under clause 15 of the Letters Patent the order must contain the traits and trappings of finality either by deciding the questions in controversy in ancillary proceedings or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceeding and such an adjudication must also decide and affect the rights of parties. It has also to be borne in mind that every intermediary order cannot be regarded as ‘judgment’, but only such orders deciding or affecting the rights of parties and putting an end to or terminating the proceedings, can be treated as ‘judgment’. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid well-established principles, we are of the view that the order appealed against, would not fall under ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The effect rather than the form, of the adjudication has to be looked into and if so done, the order appealed against is nothing but a step towards a final adjudication in that new parties are added without in any manner adjudicating upon or settling any substantive rights and could be properly called initiatory in character in that new parties are introduced into the arena of litigation in order to project their cause. Such an order does not at all put an end to the litigation or decide the rights of parties. It is true that even intermediary orders may some times fall within the expression ‘judgment’ occurring in clause 15 of the Letter Patent, but in every case, the nature and effect of the order alone would be determinative of its character as a judgment for purposes of clause 15 of the Letter Patent. We have earlier pointed out that the effect of the orders appealed against is merely to bring respondents 1 to 3 in these appeals within the arena of the suit in order that they may put forward their case that the institution in question is public temple and not a denominational institution. That by no means can be regarded as an adjudication upon either the rights of the parties or even as regards the character of the institution. The order appealed against it has also kept alive the suit and the other proceedings. Therefore, judged by the well laid down tests, the order appealed against cannot be regarded as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We are also fortified in this view of ours by the decisions, to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3. Therefore, judged by the well laid down tests, the order appealed against cannot be regarded as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We are also fortified in this view of ours by the decisions, to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3. In Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar A.I.R. 1981 SC 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N the question arose whether an order impleading certain parties to the suit instituted on the original side, would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Dealing with this question the Division Bench pointed out that what must be looked into is the general nature and effect of the order and judged by the tests of adjudication of rights and termination of proceedings, such an order would not be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In considering the nature of the order for impleading parties to a suit the court pointed out that such an order is not final adjudication and that there is no settlement of rights other than the right to be heard in the cause and its effect on the newly added parties, would be to put them on the road towards adjudication without settling substantive rights. We are of the view that the principle laid down in this decision would be equally applicable here. In Selvam Mudaliar v. Raju Mudaliar A.I.R. 1974 SC 1719, Rajamannar C.J. and Venkararama Aiyar, J. considered whether an order allowing an application for addition of parties would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of clause 15 of Letters Patent. Referring to Ramaswami Chettiar v. Kanniappa Mudaliar A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 130 and applying the ratio of that decision the Bench took the view that the appeal was not maintainable. In our view this decision would govern these appeals also. We may also usefully refer in this connection to the decision in Shanti Kumar v. H.Ins. Co. New York 1984 (1) SCC 358 . In that case an application seeking an amendment of the plaint was allowed but on appeal, that order was set aside. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended that no appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order allowing an amendment of the plaint. Co. New York 1984 (1) SCC 358 . In that case an application seeking an amendment of the plaint was allowed but on appeal, that order was set aside. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended that no appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order allowing an amendment of the plaint. In dealing with this question the Supreme Court pointed out that in finding out whether any decision is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent each case must be looked into to ascertain whether there is a decision determining the rights of liabilities of the parties affecting the merits of the controversy of the parties and it also puts an end to the proceedings so far as the court dealing with it is concerned. However on the facts of that case the Supreme Court took the view that by reason of the operation of the law of limitation the respondent had acquired an immunity from liability and that was sought to be taken away by the amendment and that had touched upon the merits of the question by determining the rights or liabilities based on limitation and the decision was also final so far as the trial court was concerned. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of the appeal on the basis of the order appealed against under clause 15 of the Letters Patent having determined the rights or liabilities of the parties based on limitation having finality. Such considerations do not arise at all here. Again, in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben 1981 (4) SCC 8 the Supreme Court considered the question whether an order refusing to appoint a receiver or to grant interim injunction, is appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In a very elaborate judgment referring to the entire case-law the Supreme Court pointed out that the word ‘judgment’ occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, should receive a larger wider and liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code, but at the same time any order passed cannot be said to be a ‘judgment’. It was also pointed out by the court that a ‘judgment’ could be of three kinds, Viz. , (1) final judgment, (2) preliminary judgment and (3) intermediary or interlocutory judgment. It was also pointed out by the court that a ‘judgment’ could be of three kinds, Viz. , (1) final judgment, (2) preliminary judgment and (3) intermediary or interlocutory judgment. Obviously in this case there is no question of any final judgment because the suit or action brought by the appellant has neither been dismissed nor decreed either in part or in full. Nor can the order in this case be regarded as a preliminary judgment affecting the rights of the appellant or the proceeding as a whole. If at all, the order appealed against would fall only Under the category ‘intermediary or interlocutory judgment’ but even then the order must directly affect a valuable right of the appellant or decide an important aspect of the trial. The order appealed against in this case does neither. The Supreme Court also catalogued the instances of interlocutory or intermediary orders which may be regarded as ‘judgment’ and an order of the kind forming the subject matter of these appeals is not one among them. However, the decision in Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce C. Salim A.I.R. 1972 Delhi 102 proceeds to hold that an order impleading a party to the suit would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. That conclusion has been arrived at on the reasoning that addition of a party against the will of the plaintiff enlarges the scope of the suit and would amount to a de novo trial as far as the newly added party is concerned and therefore, it cannot be said that such an order is not ‘judgment’. It had also been stated that vital and valuable rights of the plaintiff are affected. The impleading of new parties and consequential amendment of the plaint on such addition and other related steps as pointed out earlier, would all be purely procedural and initiatory and would not in any manner either decide the rights of parties or determine the proceeding finally in so far as that court is concerned and under those circumstances, we are unable with respect to accept the reasoning that vital and valuable rights of the plaintiff are affected and therefore, the order would be a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent. Thus on a due consideration of the nature of the order passed in Application Nos. Thus on a due consideration of the nature of the order passed in Application Nos. 1536 to 1538 of 1990, we are of the view that no right of the parties had in any manner been touched upon or adjudicated and settled and that the proceedings before the court had also been left in tact and under those circumstances the common order passed in the applications cannot be regarded as ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We therefore hold that the appeals are not maintainable and deserve to be dismissed.” The Bench, however, which decided that the order to add a party or not to add a party, is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, proceeded to consider the propriety of the order appealed against on merits as well and found on merits that the impugned order was valid. It is, however, indeed an occasion for us to express ourselves on an issue of this kind, for, we have found certain aspects of the law, which in our view require/required consideration, before a definite view is expressed on the question whether an order to add a party in particular, will be a judgment for appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court or not. In the case of Sha Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben A.I.R. 1981 SC 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N, which has been referred to by the learned Judges deciding the case or A.S. Manavala Chettiar supra, it has been pointed out that there can be judgments, which may be termed as final judgments, preliminary judgments, intermediary or interlocutory judgments and that final judgments and preliminary judgments indisputably shall be appealable under Clause 15 or the Letters Patent, but in so far as intermediary or interlocutory judgments are concerned, it is pointed out that “.. Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1. to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and therefore appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide on important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide on important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgement the adverse effect on the party concerned must be directly immediate rather than indirect or remote.” After saying as above and giving examples of the types of orders that may not be said to be appealable or may be said to be appealable, the Supreme Court has said: “Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment.” The Supreme Court has enlisted a number of examples of the orders, which might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the trial judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The Supreme Court has said: “We might, however, at the risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which may be treated as judgments: (1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant. (2) An order rejecting the plaint. (7) An order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. .. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff.” There can be, thus, no manner of doubt that an order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action, which completely alters the nature of the suit, will be appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. .. (15) An order deciding payment of court-fees against the plaintiff.” There can be, thus, no manner of doubt that an order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action, which completely alters the nature of the suit, will be appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. There are, however, certain legal consequences of addition of parties. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which deals with the Courts power to order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant be struck out and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit, be added, has a provision in sub-rule (4) thereof which reads as follows:— “Where defendant added plaint to be amended Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.” Sub-rule (5) also may have relevance, which reads as follows:— “Subject to the provision of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.” If the Court otherwise directs, there may not be amendment of the plaint required, but if there is no direction by the trial court and a defendant is added, sub-rule (4) of Order 1 Rule 10 says, the plaint shall be amended in such manner as may be necessary and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. The consequential amendment of addition of party may be of a substantial nature introducing a new cause of action completely altering the nature of the suit. 6. The consequential amendment of addition of party may be of a substantial nature introducing a new cause of action completely altering the nature of the suit. 6. The purpose for which we have adverted to these provisions, is not over, unlesss we also refer to a later judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jugal Kishore Paliwal v. S. Sat Jit Singh A.I.R. 1954 Madras 1057 = 67 L.W. 729 (F.B.). By the Illustration 1 in the quotation from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben A.I.R. 1948 Madras 371 = 61 L.W. 370, one may get the impression that an order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action alone is appealable. In Jugal Kishore Paliwal v. Sat Jit Singh O.S.A. Nos. 93 and 94 of 1992. judgment dated 12-8-1992 since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 159, the Supreme Court has said in a short, but effective order as follows:— “Counsel for both the parties are present and we have heard them at length. The High Court was clearly wrong in refusing to go into the merits of the case on the ground that appeal was not maintainable in view of the Full Bench decision in Universityof Delhiv. Hafiz Mohd. Said A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786. This decision is no longer good law in view of our decision in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kanin A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 195 = 66 L.W. 37 where we have laid down various parameters and conditions under which an appeal can lie from a single Judge to the Division Bench. Paragraph 115 at page 1816 of the above-referred decision may be extracted thus:.. Thus, in other words, every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters or moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment. Similarly, orders passed by the trial judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court in appeal against the final judgment. In the instant case as the amendment of the written statement was sought at the time of framing issues and it vitally affects the right of the parties and seeks to work some injustice to the plaintiff, it merits serious consideration by the appellate court on the question whether or not amendment should be allowed. It would certainly not be a purely interlocutory order against which no appeal before the LPA bench would be maintainable. More than this we would not like to say at this stage as we intend to send the case back to the Division Bench for admitting the appeal and disposing it of according to law on merits. The order or the Division Bench dated April 1, 1982 is set aside and the division bench is directed to admit the appeal and decide it on merits in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above. 7. Indeed, the Courts have to correct themselves many a time to bring the administration of justice in tune with the principles of law that are indicated in the judgments of the Supreme Court. We can take for an illustration a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Central Brokers v. Ramanarayana Poddar & Co. A.I.R. 1974 SC 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N, in which over-ruling an earlier judgment of this Court in Abdul Nabhi Saheb v. Ramadashmahah O.S.A. No. 103 of 1989, judgment dated 3/10/1991, since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 132 (F.B.) the Court expressed that an order made under S. 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, or any other provision of law for the stay of trial of a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of that term in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and would, therefore, be not appealable. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben supra, the Supreme Court has given a specific illustration, viz., an order staying or refusing to stay a suit under S. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be treated as a judgment for appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben supra, the Supreme Court has given a specific illustration, viz., an order staying or refusing to stay a suit under S. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be treated as a judgment for appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The Full Bench Judgment of this Court has, thus, been found wrong and, what it over-ruled in the judgment of a Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Nabhi Saheb v. Ramadashmamah 1991 T.L.N.J. 166. since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 127 is acknowledged as correct in law. A Bench of this Court, of which one of us is a member, while dealing with the case attracting Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has observed in the case of Radhika Komel Parekh v. Komel Parekh A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 130 as follows:— “Before we proceeded to hear the appeal, learned counsel for the respondent questioned the maintainability of O.S.A. No. 94 of 1992 arising out of the order in Application No. 69 of 1992 on the ground that an order passed on an application for stay of the proceedings under Section 10. C.P.C. is not a ‘judgment’ and thus no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable. He relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Central Brokers v. Ramarayana Poddar & Co. (A.I.R. 1954 Madras, 1057 = 67 L.W. 729) (F.B.) in which overruling an earlier judgment of this Court in Abdul Nabhi Sahib v. Ramadashmamah (A.I.R. 1943 Madras 371 = 61 L.W. 370) the Court expressed that an order made under S. 10, Civil P.C., or any other provision of law for the stay of trial of a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of that term in CI. 15 of the Letters Patent and would, therefore, be not appealable. The Full Bench of this Court in this behalf mainly relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Debi (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198 = 66 L.W. 371) in which two tests have been laid down to find out whether an adjudication in a particular processing is a judgment or not; if they are so (1) whether it terminates the suit or processing, and (2) whether it affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself. .. .. The decision in the case of Govindarajulu v. Dever and Co. (A.I.R. 1954 Madras 248 = 66 L.W. 914) or in Angadu Narasimhalu Chettiars case (1991 (II) M.L.J. NRC 1 = 1992-1-L.W. 429) (supra) in which it has been held that an order transferring a suit from one Court to another is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the letters Patent, stands on a different footing and distinguishable from the Full Bench Judgment in the case of Central Brokers (A.I.R 1954 Madias 1057 = 67 L.W. 729 (F.B.) (supra) in which it has been held that an order made under S. 10 Civil P.C. or any other provision of law for the stay of trial of a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of that term in Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent and would, therefore, be not appealable. Govindarajulus case (A.I.R. 1954 Madras 248) and Angadu Narasimhalu Chettiars case (1991 (II) M.L.J. NRC I = 1992-1- L.W. 429) (supra) are distinguishable for the reason that there may not be any occasion, in the case of an order to transfer a suit or refuse to transfer a suit from one Court to another, for a judgment at interlocutory stage will be an order of moment or affecting any party. We, are, however, spared of any exercise of distinguishing the Full Bench judgment which, on the face of it, cannot be distinguished from the facts of the instant case or of recording any difference of opinion and a reference thus to a larger bench or request to the Chief Justice for such an order for the reason of a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786 in which this aspect of the matter has been fully gone into and it is stated in no uncertain terms that an order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 C.P.C. is appealable under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. 15 of the Letters Patent. There is, however, no reference in this judgment of the Supreme Court to the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Central Brokers A.I.R. 1954 Madras 1057 = 67 L.W. 729 (F.B.) (supra), but the, case of Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 195 = 66 L.W. 37 (supra) which has been relied upon by the Full Bench of this Court as stating the law on the subject, has been referred to and the Supreme Court has said as follows: “This Court also has incidentally gone into the interpretation of the word ‘judgment’ and has made certain observations but seems to have decided the cases before it on the peculiar facts of each without settling the conflict or the controversy resulting from the divergent views of the High Courts. This Court, however, has expressed a solemn desire and a pious wish that the controversy and the conflict between the various decisions of the High Court has to be settled once for all some time or the other. In this connection, in Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot, (1953 SC 1159 = (A.I.R. 1933 SC 198 = 66 L.W. 37) this Court observed as follows:— (at p. 200):— In view of this wide divergence of judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this Court at some time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which the different view mentioned above purports to be based and attempt to determine with so much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word ‘judgment’ as it occurs in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts. We are, however, relieved from embarking on such enquiry in the present case as we are satisfied that in none of the views referred to above could an order of the character which we have before us, be regarded as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.” After referring however to the various other judgments of the Supreme Court and analysing the entire ambit of the scheme of the Letters Patent and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, both old and new, the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimjis case 1 (supra) has stated as follows:— “Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment consists of the reasons and grounds for a decree passed by a court. As a judgment constitutes the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of course that the judgment must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word ‘judgment’ as used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term ‘order’ or ‘decree’ anywhere. The intention, therefore of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word ‘judgment’ should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word ‘judgment’ used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word ‘judgment” has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds:— (1) A final judgment- A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, nothing also to be decided. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division Bench. (2) A preliminary judgment- This kind of a judgment may take two forms- (a) where the trial judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit, but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger Bench, (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to the maintainablity of the suit, e.g, bar of jurisdiction, resjudicata a manifest detect in the suit, absence of notice under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the trial judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial which affects a vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment, so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment- Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and therefore, appealable. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment- Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial judge in a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiffs case on his own evidence without being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appelable to a larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected, the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial judge would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly, suppose the trial judge passes an order setting aside an exparte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Or. Thus, such an order passed by the trial judge would not amount to a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly, suppose the trial judge passes an order setting aside an exparte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Or. 43, R. 1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed exparte falls within Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The fact, however, remains that the order setting aside the exparte decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the trial judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to a larger Beach.” After stating as above the Supreme Court has pointed out that: “in the course of the trial, the trial judge may pass a number of orders whereby some of the various steps to be taken by the parties in prosecution of the suit may be of routine nature while other orders may cause some inconvenience to one party or the other, e.g., an order refusing an adjournment, an order refusing to summon an additional witness or documents, an order refusing to condone delay in filing documents after the first date of hearing, an order of costs to one of the parties for its default or an order exercising discretion in respect of a procedural matter against one party or the other. Such orders are purely interlocutory and cannot constitute judgments because it will always be open to the aggrieved party to make a grievance of the order passed against the party concerned in the appeal against the final judgement passed by the trial judge. Such orders are purely interlocutory and cannot constitute judgments because it will always be open to the aggrieved party to make a grievance of the order passed against the party concerned in the appeal against the final judgement passed by the trial judge. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court against the final judgment”. After stating some more examples the Supreme Court has said: “Thus, these are some of the principles which might guide a Division Bench in deciding whether an order passed by the trial judge amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. We might, however, at the risk of repetition give illustrations of interlocutory orders which maybe treated as judgments; (1) An order granting leave to amend the plaint by introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other valuable right accrued to the defendant. . (13) An order staying or refusing to stay a suit under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Item No. 13 is an order staying or refusing to stay a suit under section 10, C.P.C. the order impugned in the instant appeal.” 8. We have embarked a little more than needed in the case on this aspect of the law, for, it is always necessary to see that a judgment has no special feature except that it is a decision of moment affecting and affects the right of one or other parties. While in a given case an order giving a look of a judgment otherwise, may not be Found to be a judgment for the purposes of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an order looking innocuous and ineffective otherwise may for one particular reason be found to be a decision of moment and thus, a judgment appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We need to make no further research on the subject except to draw our attention to a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Loyal Textile Mills Limited, Madras v. Allenberg Cotton Company, etc. Tennessee, United States of America rep. by its Chairman A.I.R. 1974 SC 1786 = 94 L.W. 91 S.N, in which this aspect of the law has been dealt with in some more detail. We have, thus, our reservations to the view as expressed by a Bench of this Court in the case of A.S. Manavala Chettiar v. T.V. Selvarajan and others O.S.A. No. 103 of 1989, judgment dated 3/10/1991, since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 132 (F.B.). It may not be that easy to persuade a Court to ignore the Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Gurmauj Saran v. Joyce. Salim 1991 T.L.N.J. 166. since reported in 1993-1-L.W. 127 or the effect of the amendment of the plaint for the purpose of maintainability of the appeal in the case of an order to add a party as a defendant. We are in the instant cases, however, not inclined to, for the reason of any difference of opinion, do any further than saying that in a proper case, this Court may be required to give a fresh look to the question of maintainability of an appeal against an order to add a defendant in a suit. On merits, however, we have good reasons to agree with the view expressed by the learned single judge. True, learned single judge has not given any consideration to evidence that would prima facie show that the applicants are necessary party-defendants to a suit where the plaintiff and other defendants appear to allege that they are alone entitled to inherit the properties of late Dr. V. Natarajan and his wife Jayammal. To satisfy our judicial conscience, we asked learned counsel for the applicants/respondents in the appeal on behalf of the plaintiff to produce such evidence that would show that Balamani Natarajan was the adopted son of Dr. V. Natarajan and his wife Jayammal, that the 1st applicant Larissa Was the wife of Balamani or that the 2nd applicant Margaritha was born to Balamani and Larissa. In a plethora of documents that have been produced we have been able to notice some valid legal evidence to show that Dr. V. Natarajan and his wife Jayammal, that the 1st applicant Larissa Was the wife of Balamani or that the 2nd applicant Margaritha was born to Balamani and Larissa. In a plethora of documents that have been produced we have been able to notice some valid legal evidence to show that Dr. Natarajan had acknowledged Balamani as his son and Larissa was taken by Balamani as his wife and there are other materials also, which may go one way or other. But, one thing is clear that there is prima facie evidence to treat the applicants-respondents as persons interested in the estate of V. Natarajan and thus, entitled to be heard before any dispute as to the estate of Dr. Natarajan is determined in a properly constituted legal proceeding. A Court should make no further investigation at the stage of deciding whether to add a certain person as a party-defendant in the case of a property-dispute. The Supreme Court has in the case of Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Answar Begum A.I.R. 1990 Delhi 130 has said, “In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a parry, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Where the subject matter of the litigation is declaration as regards status of a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.” Learned judge has precisely for the said reason only chosen to relax the strict rule of a direct and present interest to be determined before the applicants/respondents are added as party-defendants, for, in his opinion, to which we record our respectful agreement, by adding the applicants, the Court would be in a better position to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the controversy. 9. No exception can be taken to the Court suo motu ordering for the addition of parties. All that is required in such a situation is to serve the notice upon the parties and to ensure that the party concerned has got the opportunity to appear in the proceedings. 9. No exception can be taken to the Court suo motu ordering for the addition of parties. All that is required in such a situation is to serve the notice upon the parties and to ensure that the party concerned has got the opportunity to appear in the proceedings. We are informed at the Bar by the learned counsel for the applicants/respondents that a fresh power of attorney has been executed by them in favour of Chennu Prabhakaran, the person who alone had moved on their behalf in the suit. How that power of attorney shall work, however, shall be seen in the trial court, when the applicants/respondents enter appearance. Appeals, on their behalf, on this score, in our opinion, are unnecessary. 10. In the result, we find no merits in either of the two appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but on the facts of these cases, there shall be no order as to costs.