Jaspal Singh, J. ( 1 ) IS the eligibility requirement of at least 50%marks in graduate/post graduate examination for appearing in the entrancetest for admission to the 1st year LL. B. course violative of the Constitutionof India ? This, in short, is the question which has led to this order. ( 2 ) HOWEVER, first a brief resume of the facts. It is the admitted case that before the academic year 1991-92,admission to the First year LL. B. course used to be made in the followingorder of preference. Category 1. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Honour sdegree, (iii) Bachelor s degree Examination in that order inarts, Sciences, Business Management, Science or Commerce ofthe University of Delhi with not less than 55/o marks (orequivalent grade ). Category 2. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Honour sdegree, (iii) Bachelor s degree Examination in that order inarts, Sciences, Business Management, Science or Commerce ofany other University recognised as equivalent to that of thisuniversity of Delhi with not less than 55% marks (orequivalent grade ). Category 3. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Bachelor sdegree Examination in that order in Engineering, Medicine (including Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicine) Surgery,education Architecture, Agriculture, Nursing, Home Science,physical Education, Library Science, or any other such likecourse of Delhi University with not less than 55%, marks (orequivalent grade ). All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Bachelor sdegree Examination in that order in Engineering, Medicine (including Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicine) Surgery,education, Architecture, Agriculture, Nursing, Home Science,physical Education, Library Science or any other such likecourse of any other University recognised as equivalent to thatof this University-with not less than 55% (or equivalentgrade ). All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Honour sdegree, (iii) Bachelor s degree Examination in that order inarts, Social Sciences, Business Management, Science orcommerce of Delhi University with not less than 50 /, marks (or equivalent grade ). Category 6. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Honour sdegree, (iii) Bachelor s degree Examination in that order, inarts, Social Sciences, Business Management, Science orcommerce of any oilier University recognised as equivalentto that of University of Delhi with not less than 5q/o marks (or equivalent grade ). Category 6. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Honour sdegree, (iii) Bachelor s degree Examination in that order, inarts, Social Sciences, Business Management, Science orcommerce of any oilier University recognised as equivalentto that of University of Delhi with not less than 5q/o marks (or equivalent grade ). All those who have passed (i) Master s degree, (ii) Bachelor s. degree Examination, in that order, in engineering. Medicine (including Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicine) Surgery,education, Architecture, Agriculture, Nursing, Home Science,physical Education, Library Science, or any other such likecourse of Delhi University with not less than 50 % marks (orequivalent grade ). Category 8. All those who have passed (i) Master s degree (ii) Bachelor sdegree examination, in that order, in Engineering, Medicine (including Ayurvedic and Unani System of Medicine), Surgery,education, Architecture, Agriculture, Nursing, Home Science,physical Education, Library Science, or any other such likecourse of any other University recognised as equivalent to thatof University of Delhi with not less than 50 % marks (orequivalent grade ). ( 3 ) HOWEVER, for the academic year 1991-92 the Law Coursesadmission Committee decided that an admission test be held and laid rulestherefor which were subsequently approved by the Academic Council as perthe procedure prescribed by the Delhi University Act, 1922 and the Statutesand Ordinances issued thereunder. The Rules stipulated that entrance test"will be. open to all those who have obtained at least 50% marks ingraduate/post-graduate degree examination. " The same eligibility requirement has been extended to the academic year 1992-93. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the Rule laying down the abovenoted eligibility requirement is ultra vires and is violative of Articles 14 and21 of the Constitution of India in asmuchas it arbitrarily and without anyrational or reasonable basis debars from appearing in the entrance testthose who have obtained less than 50 % marks in graduate/post-graduatedegree examination. During arguments it was further urged that right toeducation being a concomitant to Fundamental Rights, as enshrined in Partiii of the Constitution those having obtained less than 50/o marks ingraduate/post-graduate degree examination could not be discriminatedagainst or denied the opportunity of getting admission in the LL. B. course. ( 5 ) NEEDLESS to say the respondents have found no substance in thepetition and have, thus, stoutly resisted it. B. course. ( 5 ) NEEDLESS to say the respondents have found no substance in thepetition and have, thus, stoutly resisted it. To put it briefly, their defenceis that the eligibility requirement is not violative of Articles 14 and 21 as itdoes not, in any manner, put any illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable impediment in the way of one getting education. Their armoury comprised oftwo Division Bench judgments delivered by this Court. The first is Jayantsud v. The Faculty of Law through the Dean, University of Delhi, 1992 (1)Delhi Lawyer 294, while the second is Monica Garg v. University of Delhicivil Writ No. 2852/92 decided on 8/09/1992. ( 6 ) BEFORE I. embark upon an examination of the contentions raised,it may be mentioned that the judgments, REFERRED TO to above, do lend somesupport to the defence put up by the respondents as far as Article 14 of theconstitution is concerned, though they did come under heavy attack fromthe side of the petitioner. For the present, however, I am leaving thejudgments at that. ( 7 ) IS the eligibility requirement violative of Articles 14 and 21 of theconstitution ? The respondents say it is not. They have pointed out thatsuch an eligibility condition has been there since long and that the onlychange affected from the academic year 1991-92 onwards is that they haveintroduced an entrance examination and the eligibility condition has beenmade applicable for the entrance examination itself leading to final selectionon the basis of merit alone, replacing thereby the preferential basis ofselection. The respondents further say that the University has been havingsuch type of eligibility requirements for its various other courses as well. The objects sought to be achieved by prescribing the eligibility requirementsfor admission to the 1st year of the LL. B. course are stated to be asfollows:- " (A) Since the seats are limited and the number of candidates ismuch larger, the best amongst the available candidates, shouldbe selected to promote the standards of legal education. (b) The administrative inconvenience should be reduced to theextent possible in the process of selection without sacrificingthe objective as at (a)". ( 8 ) THE respondents claim that the first condition of eligibilityprescribing that the candidate must have secured at least 50/, marks in thegraduate/post-gradnate examination on the basis of which he seeks admissionto the first year of LL. (b) The administrative inconvenience should be reduced to theextent possible in the process of selection without sacrificingthe objective as at (a)". ( 8 ) THE respondents claim that the first condition of eligibilityprescribing that the candidate must have secured at least 50/, marks in thegraduate/post-gradnate examination on the basis of which he seeks admissionto the first year of LL. B. course, has the purpose of : " (I) ensuring that the final selection is made from amongst thosecandidates who have attained a reasonable degree of proficiencyin their own discipline as reflected in the percentage ofinarks secured by them in their respective examinations, and (ii) reducing the number of candidates from amongst whom thefinal selection is to be made". It is stated that the second condition of eligibility providing for anentrance test and making admission in the order of merit on the basis of theresult of that test, has the purpose of :" (i) getting rid of the problem that arise on account of j (a) varyingstandards of education prevalent in various Universities or (b)nature of courses pursued by the candidates; (ii) providing competition for evaluation of relative merits andaffording equal opportunity of selection to all those whosatisfy the first condition of eligibility; thus making selectionaccording to capability. "it is claimed that both the conditions of eligibility have a direct nexusand rational relation to either of the two objects that are sought to beachieved. ( 9 ) AS noticed above, even before the academic year 1991-92admission to the First Year LL. B. course was regulated. There was an orderof preference. related to the percentage of marks obtained, and, as rightlypointed out by the respondents that very fibre is still retained with the onlychange brought about being the introduction of an entrance examinationwith the eligibility condition having been attached to that examinationitself. It is in this context that the earlier scheme assumes importance. And,while dealing with it, the following is what was observed by a Division Benchin Kanishka Aggarwal v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 Delhi 105 at page "does it lay down a scheme which may be condemned asconstitutional heresy ? Does it provide a blanket ban to the talentwaiting in its wings but outside the precincts of the University ofdelhi ? Is the Order of Preference so obnoxious as to suffer fromthe vice of excessiveness ? Does it provide a blanket ban to the talentwaiting in its wings but outside the precincts of the University ofdelhi ? Is the Order of Preference so obnoxious as to suffer fromthe vice of excessiveness ? Or is it societally so injurious as to cutthe very roots of equal opportunity, for each according to hisability ? The answer must be in the negative. The Order ofpreference neither provides a blanket ban nor suffers from anyother vice. In actual practice it has opened doors to not less than36% of the aspirants from the outside universities, that is, muchmore than the required minimum of 25/o It escapes the gallowson this score alone. Reference, it may be mentioned, was madeto Greater Bombay Municipal Corporation-v. Thukral Anjali, A. I. R. 1989 S. C. 1194. It does not infuse life to the lifeless. The factswould reveal that it was a case farthest from the issue before us. It was actually related to college-wise institutional preference andit was this which was struck down being violative of Article 14. The order of Preference before us provides no such college-wisereservation or preference. We thus refuse to lose more breath onit. More so, because complete answer is provided effectively andeffusively by Jagdish Saran v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 820 . The soul is in paragraphs 46 and 49 of the Report. They are : "in the light of this discussion about the know-how andknow-why of reservations, what are the conclusions thatemerge vis-a-vis the Delhi graduates ? Neither Delhi nor thedelhi University medical colleges can be designated as categories which warrant reservation. But there is one weightycircumstance which must be in our remembrance. Reservation for Delhi graduates is not that invidious because,as stated in the beginning, the students are from familiesdrawn from all over India. Not sons of the soil but sonsand daughters of persons who are willy nilly pulled into thecapital city for reasons beyond their control. This reservation is, therefore, qualitatively different. "we recognise that institution-wise reservation is constitutionally circumscribed and may become ultra-vires if recklesslyresorted to. But even such rules, until revised by competentauthority or struck down judicially, will rule the roost. Thatis why we have to concede that until the signpost of noadmission for outsiders is removed from other universitiesand some fair percentage of seats in other universities isleft for open competition the Delhi students cannot bemade martyrs of the Constitution. But even such rules, until revised by competentauthority or struck down judicially, will rule the roost. Thatis why we have to concede that until the signpost of noadmission for outsiders is removed from other universitiesand some fair percentage of seats in other universities isleft for open competition the Delhi students cannot bemade martyrs of the Constitution. " ( 10 ) IT was, however, contended by Mr. R. K. Saini, Advocate for thepetitioner that the Supreme Court, having declared education to be concomitant to Fundamental Rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution,any requirement coming as a hurdle in the fulfitlment of that right would bebad. It was thus argued that setting up of. eligibility conditions or holdingof entrance examinations could not be justified and that, in any case, theuniversity having decided to hold an entrance examination and thereafterto grant admission on the basis of merit attained, there was no justificationto limit the entrance examination to those only who had attained 50%marks or above in their gradulation /post-graduation examination. ( 11 ) LEGAL education seems to have always been a hot subject. Thefact that there is a larger number of candidates than seats available hascreated complications. As far back as December 1960, Mr. M. C. Setalvad,the then Attorney General of India, spoke as follows at the Third Conferenceof the Indian Law Teachers Association at Lucknow : "unless there is a charge in the fundamental approach of responsible public opinion in the country and particularly in the views ofthose who are at the helm of affairs, there is little hope of legaleducation movirs out of the ever-deepening rut in which it hastravelled for nearly a century. It has to be recognised andacknowledged that, if an Indian democracy has to develop andthe Indian citixen has to live under the rule of law, as is the basicidea of our Constitution, we must have a body of lawyers whoare well trained from the first days of their law study. . . . . . It isthe lack of appreciation of this fundamental issue which has lednot only to funds not being available for legal education, but tolegal institutions being used in some places as profit-makingconcerns. . . . . . It appears to me that the two basic problems are,first, the obtaining of the proper student personnel by restrictingthe number of admissions, and, secondly, the obtaining of teacherswith adequate equipment, status and dignity. . . . . . It appears to me that the two basic problems are,first, the obtaining of the proper student personnel by restrictingthe number of admissions, and, secondly, the obtaining of teacherswith adequate equipment, status and dignity. If these two basicproblems can be adequately solved, the comparatively subsidiaryquestions of the methods of teaching and examination will notpresent much difficulty. He further said: "with so disproportionate a student-teacher ratio, it isimpossible to conceive of even a semblance of legal education beingimparted at these institutions. What then is the remedy ? Theobvious answer is the limitation of admissions. Our student worldand the general public have long recognised that admission toscientific, medical, engineering and other technical institutionsmust need be restricted. There is no reason why similar restrictions should not be imposed on admissions to institutions teachinglaw. It has to be realised that law is also a technical and scientificsubject and that a well-conducted discipline in law is impossible inthe absence of restricted classes and a very liberal student-teacherratio. " ( 12 ) IT may be mentioned that selective method of admissions hasbeen adopted in most of the institutions in the United States and other countries. As already noticed above, a form of this system was in existence inthe respondent University even before the academic year 1991-92 andwhatever changes have been made, they are at the instance of a Committeeappointed under the Chairmanship of late Mr. V. S. Deshpande, a retiredchief Justice of this Court and comprising of highly experienced lawteachers. ( 13 ) FROM the very nature of things and considering the fact thatthere is a larger number of candidates than seats available, it is neitherdesirable nor possible to throw admission open to all the students. Once thisposition is accepted, the respondent University cannot be denied the rightto decide the manner and the method by which admissions to be madeunless, of course, the classification results in pronounced inequality. I amfirmly of the view that classification of candidates into those who possessmerit and those who do not possess merit is a valid classification. It is alsoworth remembering that Article 14 does not insist that classification shouldbe scientifically perfect or logically complete. (See Kedar Nath v. State ofwest Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404 ). Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment of burden does not pre se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. It is alsoworth remembering that Article 14 does not insist that classification shouldbe scientifically perfect or logically complete. (See Kedar Nath v. State ofwest Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404 ). Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment of burden does not pre se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. It must necessarily be shown, in orderto attract the operation of the Clause, that the differentiation is unreasonableor arbitrary, and that it does not rest on any rational basis having regardto the object to be achieved. (See Shriram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendulkar and Others, AIR 1958 SC 538 ). ( 14 ) THE LL. B. course conducted by the respondent University attractsstudents from different sources and streams. Thus the marks obtained bythem. in their qualifying examinations cannot be a reliable guide to assesstheir merits and the object of selection for admission being to receive cream of the cream, the prescribing of minimum qualifying marks for sitting inthe entrance examination itself leading to final selection on the basis of themarks obtained in the entrance examination is a method of selection whichensures fair play and justice and which at the same time affords equal opportunity to all eligible candidates. Viewed in this perspective, the scheme ofadmission hardly militates against the equality mandate. ( 15 ) IT was argued that the Supreme Court having declared educationas concomitant to Fundamental Rights there could not be any banging,barring and bolting of the doors of the Faculty of Law on the plea of merit. It was further contended that the very fact that some of the unqualifiedcandidates permitted provisionally to sit in the entrance examination hadsecured more marks than many of the qualified candidates, was sufficient initself to show that prescribing qualifying marks for sitting in the entranceexamination was in no way a surer test to attract the best material. ( 16 ) AS already emphasised by me above, the only nutritive methodof admission and to which there can be no substitute is by way of merit andmerit alone. It is. a criterion which can neither be denounced nor renounced. To keep the doors ajar for all without regard to merit "is to temporise with the country s development in the vital areas, of professional expertise" (Jagdish Swan v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 820 ). It is. a criterion which can neither be denounced nor renounced. To keep the doors ajar for all without regard to merit "is to temporise with the country s development in the vital areas, of professional expertise" (Jagdish Swan v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 820 ). ( 17 ) TRUE, the expression "personal liberty" in Article 21 is of widestamplitude (See, for example State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR 1983sc 803) and includes all those aspects of life which go to make a man s lifemeaningful, complete and worth living (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 (2) SCR 621 ) and that "educational facilities" is one of the "minimumrequirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live withhuman dignity" (Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC atp. 812), but then by declaring all this and so also that education is concomitant to the Fundamental Rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution,the Supreme,court has not sacrificed merit. Rather in (Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, J. T. I 992 (4) SC 292) itself the Supreme Court has repeatedlylaid emphasis on merit as being the "only method" of admission "in consonance with fair play and equity" (page 303 ). This much for the first limbof the contention noticed above. ( 18 ) IT was not disputed before us that some of the candidates whobad secured less than 50/o marks in their graduation/post-graduation examination but had been allowed to sit in the entrance examination either onaccount of an order of this Court or on account of the fact that till then themarks obtained by them were not known, have secured much more marksin the entrance examination than those who had secured more than 50/omarks in their graduation/post-graduation examination. It was on the basisof the performance of such initially unqualified candidates that it was contended that prescribing quiifying marks for sitting in the entrance examination was in no way a surer test to attract the best talent. " ( 19 ) THE object of the scheme of admission is to secure the bestpossible material by first prescribing qualifying marks for sitting in theentrance examination and thereafter by picking up the best on the basis ofthe merit attained in that examination. Since it would not be possible toadmit all candidates, some basis for screening the candidates had to be setup. Since it would not be possible toadmit all candidates, some basis for screening the candidates had to be setup. What should be that basis is essentially a question of policy and dependsinter-alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirement, and evenadministrative difficulties. What the scheme has done is that those consideredto be sub-standard are weeded out at the very initial stage. This unrelenting strictness in the matter of selection is imperative. More so in professional post-graduate courses where the "best alone is likely to blossom as thebest" and I do feel that this does not fall short on the guarantee of liberty,justice and equality and the right to live with human dignity embodied inour founding document. It creates no privileged species. Of course, it maynot be difficult to pick holes in the current system of selection. The veryfact that some initially unqualified students when allowed to compete withthe qualified, have come out with flying colours proves that the methodadopted is not perfect. However, we have to go by the existing methodology at least till better modes are devised. ( 20 ) COMING to the two judgments Mr. Saini was extremely criticalof Jayant Sud v. The Faculty of Law through the Dean, University of Delhi. He regarded it as no judgment under Article 14 as according to him, it was"totally devoid of reasons", and in support he drew our attention to thefollowing observations made by the Division Bench: "high Court can interfere only if the action of the respondents isarbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. We do not find the action of therespondents to be so in any way"the grievance of Mr. Saini was that it was a finding sans reasons. And. coming to the judgment in Monica Garg v. University of Delhi, it was contended that since it was based on the judgment in Jayant Sud s case, it toocould not be taken as a sound precedent. However, a mere reading of thejudgment in Monica Garg s case would reveal that it does give reasons andonly in the passing refers to what was held in Jayant Sud s case. Undoubtedly, the judgments do not examine the question from the point of view ofarticle 21 of the Constitution but do deal with the method of selection andthe requirement of qualifying marks for eligibility to sit in the entranceexamination. Undoubtedly, the judgments do not examine the question from the point of view ofarticle 21 of the Constitution but do deal with the method of selection andthe requirement of qualifying marks for eligibility to sit in the entranceexamination. Both hold the scheme to be not violative of Article 14 of theconstitution and to that extent, do lend weight to the case of the respondents. For the reasons recorded above, the challenge of the petitioners mustfail but with no order as to costs.