JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---This application has been preferred by the National Textile Corporation through its Senior Manager and in substance is for a relief that the earlier judgment of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 814 of 1989 and Criminal Writ Petition No. 1891 of 1989 dated 27th November, 1990 be reviewed. The application is obviously one under section 362 Cr.P.C. though it is sought to be contended by Mr. Naren Thakore, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, that he is invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. 2. Briefly stated, the N.T.C. who are the applicants before me in this proceeding had instituted criminal proceedings against the Directors of the Finlay Mills Ltd., who were the registered owners of certain trade marks. The unit of the Mills had been taken over by the N.T.C. in which capacity they were manufacturing certain textile products to which the trade marks in question apply and it was the Corporation's case that even though the accused were the registered owners of the trade marks that they cannot be permitted to use the same. It was pointed out to the trial Court that the products in question which were being manufactured elsewhere had been using the same trade mark and that consequently the accused were criminally liable since the Corporation contended that the rights and the trade marks in question had vested in them on take over of the units as the same constituted property. The accused moved the High Court for quashing of the criminal proceedings, inter alia, contending that they were within their legal rights in using the trade marks in question as they were the registered owners of the same and that regardless of the take over of the unit, that the law could not preclude them from exercising those rights. The matters was hotly contested and this Court through a detailed judgment running into as many as 57 pages substantially upheld the contentions canvassed by the accused and quashed the criminal proceedings. If the respondents were aggrieved by the findings in that judgment, obviously they ought to have carried the matter higher which was not done. On 27-1-1992 the present Review Application was filed which was virtually 14 months after the decision of the case through the earlier judgment. If the respondents were aggrieved by the findings in that judgment, obviously they ought to have carried the matter higher which was not done. On 27-1-1992 the present Review Application was filed which was virtually 14 months after the decision of the case through the earlier judgment. Since the Review Application had to be heard by the same Judge who had decided the earlier matter, the same was kept pending by the office, until I was sitting singaly on the criminal side. 3. It is relevant to point out that the office has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the present application by specifically pointing out that section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes a total bar to any alteration of a final judgment that has been signed except when it comes to correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error. My attention has been drawn to two judgments of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court, page 87 in the case of (State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala)1, wherein it has been laid down that the High Court has no power to review its order or judgment and further that the inherent powers cannot be invoked for exercise of the power of a Court to review a judgment and order. Again in A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court, page 736 in the case of (Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal and others)2, it has been laid down that the power to review for clerical or arithmetical errors, cannot be enlarged even by invoking the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. In not one but two judgments, the first of them being in the case of (Suresh T. Kilachand v. The State of Maharashtra)3, reported in 1991 Maharashtra Law Journal, page 1547 and the second in the case of (Sunder Lalwani v. State of Maharashtra)4, reported in 1991 Criminal Law Journal, page 2015, the relevant provisions of law and the case law on the subject have both been discussed and considered thread bare and I have taken the view that it is impermissible to alter a final judgment having regard to the express bar prescribed by section 362 of Cr.P.C. Furthermore, I have held that this bar cannot be surmounted by having recourse to the provisions of section 482 Cr.P.C. Relying on a Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court and a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court a submission had been advanced by the learned Counsel in those cases that in the interest of justice it was permissible to recall a judgment by virtue of the powers vested in the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. Distinguishing these judgments, I have held in the second of the cases referred to supra that there is no distinction between an order of recall and a review and that under these circumstances merely by using different terminology, one cannot indirectly achieve what is not permitted to be done directly. 4. In the light of this position, regardless of the grounds on which the review has been sought, I pointed out to learned Counsel for the applicants that the law did not permit any such course of action. Mr. Chitnis, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original petitioners pointed out to this Court that if at all the present applicants were aggrieved by the earlier judgment, since they contend that there are certain errors in it, that they ought to have pointed the same out to the appeal Court and that too within the time limit prescribed by law. Mr. Mr. Chitnis contended that not only was the earlier judgment a final judgment but that it has now become irreversible since the period within which it ought to have been appealed against has long elapsed and that it has, therefore, acquired a complexion of finality which cannot now be disturbed. Putting it more simply, Mr. Chitnis contended that this application is hopelessly time barred and that it should be dismissed outright. As regards the limitation question, Mr. Thakore pointed out to me that the N.T.C. is required to go through various Government channels before which the necessary sanctions are obtained and that these procedures were time consuming and considering the fact that it is a public body, that this Court should condone the aspect of delay. It was his contention that by virtue of a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1990 Criminal Law Journal page 1599 in the case of (Mostt. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee)5, that it was still permissible for this Court to correct what Mr. Thakore contended was a substantial error of far reaching consequences and that the present petition was maintainable. It was his plea that if the applicants have a valid and good case on merits that the technical bar of limitation should not disqualify them. Since the issue is one of some importance, I have condoned the delay, issued rule and heard the learned Counsel on the date when the same was returnable. 5. It is essential to briefly point out that Mr. Naren Thakore has relied on sections 24, 47 and 48 of the Trade Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Mr. Thakore has reproduced paragraph 18 of the original judgment wherein after considering the position in law and on facts, this Court has recorded the finding that the petitioners who were the accused and who are the registered proprietors of the trade marks had and continued to have every right to the user of the trade marks in question. Mr. Thakore has contended that under section 24 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 there is a prohibition for two or more persons to use a trade mark independently or to use it as joint proprietors. Section 24 of the Act read as follows : "24. Mr. Thakore has contended that under section 24 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 there is a prohibition for two or more persons to use a trade mark independently or to use it as joint proprietors. Section 24 of the Act read as follows : "24. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), nothing in this Act shall authorise the registration of two or more persons who use a trade mark independently, or propose so to use it, as joint proprietors thereof. (2) Where the relations between two or more persons interested in a trade mark are such that no one of them is entitled as between himself and the other or others of them to use it except-- (a) on behalf of both or all of them; or (b) in relation to an article with which both or all of them are connected in the course of trade; those persons may be registered as joint proprietors of the trade marks, and this Act shall have effect in relation to any rights to the use of the trade mark vested in those persons as if those rights had been vested in a single person". 6. Mr. Thakore also relies on section 48 of the Act which reads as follows: "48. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 49, a person other than the registered proprietor of a trade mark may be registered as the registered user thereof in respect of any or all of the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered otherwise than as a defensive trade mark; but the Central Government may, by rules made in this behalf, provide that no application for registration as such shall be entertained unless the agreement between the parties complies with the conditions laid down in the rules for preventing trafficking in trade marks. (2) The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed to be use by the proprietor thereof, and shall be deemed not to be use by a person other than the proprietor, for-the purposes of section 46 or for any other purpose for which such use is material under this Act on any other law." 7. The argument that is canvassed is that two parties cannot be permitted the use of a trade mark except in the circumstances whereunder they have been duly registered as joint owners etc. Mr. The argument that is canvassed is that two parties cannot be permitted the use of a trade mark except in the circumstances whereunder they have been duly registered as joint owners etc. Mr. Thakore's contention is that for such a situation, the registration as contemplated by section 48 of the Act would come into play and that it is only the Central Government that can permit such joint user. The learned Counsel contends that the findings recorded by this Court in substance permit the accused persons to use the trade marks whereas the N.T.C., by virtue of the fact that the unit has been taken over is ipso facto entitled to use the trade mark and that consequently, an incongruous situation has arisen whereby without joint registration which is only permissible under sanction of the Central Government, two parties are permitted the joint use of the trade mark. He contends that this situation results in an infringement of statutory provision and that it is, therefore, essential to correct the error. 8. Normally, I would have refused to go into this issue at all since Mr. Thakore has to first cross the hurdle of maintainability. Since he has presented the two issues, one intertwined with the other, it is essential to deal with both of them. As regards the point under the Trade Marks Act, to my mind, the argument is based on a misreading of the relevant sections. Section 24 prescribes a bar on the registration of two or more persons in the circumstances set out in that section and Mr. Thakore is right in stating that section 48 prescribes the Central Government as the authority to permit such joint registration. The dispute resolved by this Court through the earlier judgment had nothing to do with the joint registration but was limited to adjudicating the question as to whether the accused who were the registered owners could be prosecuted for the user of their own trade mark. This Court has not gone into the issue of joint registration whether it should be permitted or otherwise and hence, to my mind, the argument itself is misconceived. 9. It is essential to clarify that the findings in the judgment do not conflict with any statutory provisions. The accused were the registered owners of the trade marks and are alleged to have used them in that capacity. 9. It is essential to clarify that the findings in the judgment do not conflict with any statutory provisions. The accused were the registered owners of the trade marks and are alleged to have used them in that capacity. The N.T.C. by virtue of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 had only taken over the management of the Finlay Mills Ltd., and in such capacity, since the N.T.C. had stepped into the shoes of the accused, who were earlier running the same unit, the Division Bench held that they cannot be stopped from the user of the trade marks in respect of those very products. It is by operation of law and virtually, through a deeming fiction that this situation in question has arisen which situation is materially distinct and distinguishable in cases where for purposes of joint user the parties have applied for registration of trade mark in more than one name. There is, therefore, no conflict whatsoever with the provisions of sections 24 and 48 of the Act and even on merits this application is groundless. 10. Mr. Thakore relied on the Supreme Court decision in (American Home Products Corporation v. MAC Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. anr.)6, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court, page 137 where, in the course of a dispute between two drug companies the Supreme Court, inter-alia, had occasion to interpret section 48 of the Act. The facts of this case bear no similarity to the present one and I fail to see any relevance between the dispute that fell for adjudication in that proceedings and the subject matter of the case decided by me. That proceeding concerned a dispute between two companies in relation to a similar product and the implications of registration in relation to those facts. Also, it was a civil proceeding and did not concern the question of review of a final order. 11. As regards the main issue of maintainability, having regard to the position in law as set out by me in the decision referred to supra, prima-facie, this application cannot stand. Mr. Also, it was a civil proceeding and did not concern the question of review of a final order. 11. As regards the main issue of maintainability, having regard to the position in law as set out by me in the decision referred to supra, prima-facie, this application cannot stand. Mr. Thakore had, however, contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Simrikhia's case referred to supra constitutes a departure from the earlier position in law and he relies on the following sentence : "If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate order to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of Court." 12. Mr. Thakore has overlooked the subsequent observations of the Court in the same decision which read as follows : "Where there is no such changed circumstance and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order, exercise of the powers to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in fact a review, which is expressly barred under section 362." 13. Further in paragraph 6 of the same judgment, the Court has observed as follows : "The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under section 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981)1 S.C.C. 500 that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore, clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code." The decision in question, therefore, far from supporting Mr. Thakore is against him. 14. Mr. Thakore relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court, page 2162, in the case of (Girdharilal Gupta v. D.N. Mehta and another)7, wherein the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Article 127 of the Constitution observed that when the attention of the Supreme Court was not drawn to the particular provisions of the statute, it can review its decision. It is not a case of mistaken judgment. It is not a case of mistaken judgment. That decision was one under the provisions of the Constitution and was not concerned with the bar prescribed by section 362 Cr.P.C. and would, therefore, not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 15. Next, Mr. Thakore relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and others)8, reported in 1975 Criminal Law Journal, page 812. In that case, there were certain long drawn out proceedings and the Calcutta High Court quashed the same in exercise of its inherent powers. The order was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that an earlier application for quashing had been dismissed and that the second petition constituted a review of the earlier order which was not permissible in law. The Supreme Court clarified the position that the de novo consideration of the matter did not amount to a review as the earlier order dealt with the circumstances prevalent at that time and the subsequent one with the changed situation. In any event, the issue involved is not the question of the principles analogous to res judicata but the statutory bar which does not permit a review in a criminal case of a final judgment. 16. Having regard to the position both on law and on facts, the application fails and is dismissed. Rule to stand discharged. Application dismissed. -----