Judgment : These petitions are filed under Sec.482, Crl.P.C, to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioners/accused in C.C.No.258ofl982and C.C.No.482 of 1983 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Madurai. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of these petitions can be stated as follows: The petitioners are the employees of the Madurai Municipal Corporation between 1975 and 1978. The total strength of the Staff in the stationery Department are a Manager, a Head Clerk, 5 Junior Assistants and one attender. On 7. 1979 the Commissioner, Madurai Municipal Corporation, had issued an order of suspension against all the staff working in the Stationery Department, Numbering about 8, on the ground of detection of malpractice in the issue of papers to the printers for printing purpose and helped the printers numbering 6, to claim bill amount in excess and cheat the Corporation and also in the issue of papers to other departments by making false entries, and thereby caused loss to the Corporation on account of excess billing for ruling, stitching, binding etc., from 4. 1978 to 25. 1979 to the tune of Rs.60,000. After suspension, the Commissioner did not hold enquiry and no opportunity was given to the petitioners to give their explanation. No departmental proceedings were instituted against any of the said staff till this dale. The first information report was filed on 22. 1980 in Crime No.7 of 1980 against 18 persons including 6 primers. On the basis of the first information report in Crime No.7 of 1980, two cases in C.C.No.258 of 1982 and C.C.No.482 of 1983 were filed. One Duraisami, Manager, has made representation to the Government against the unlawful suspension and obtained an order of reinstatement. The rest of the entire 11 staff have filed writ petitions questioning the validity of the suspension order and the High Court quashed the order of suspension made against them. After the filing of the charge-sheet, they were again suspended. The charge-sheet, according to the respondent, was filed in C.C.No.258 of 1982 on 8. 1982 and in C.C.No.482 of 1983 on 14. 1983 implicating all the staff as well as printers for the offences punishable under Secs.l20-B, 404, 409, 420,466-A and 471 read with Sec.466, I.P.C. 2. These petitions have been filed for quashing the proceedings on various grounds. The charge-sheet, according to the respondent, was filed in C.C.No.258 of 1982 on 8. 1982 and in C.C.No.482 of 1983 on 14. 1983 implicating all the staff as well as printers for the offences punishable under Secs.l20-B, 404, 409, 420,466-A and 471 read with Sec.466, I.P.C. 2. These petitions have been filed for quashing the proceedings on various grounds. But, at the time of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his argument on the only ground, namely, there is inordinate and inexplainable delay of 3 years in filing the charge-sheet and thereafter there is a delay of 7 years in completing the examination of P.W.1. The said delay is not on account of the accused or due to unavoidable circumstances. It is stated that the accused were made to appear in court for three years on 37 adjournments from the date of filing of the first information report to the date of filing of the charge sheet on 14. 1983. 15 months thereafter, after 29 adjournments, summons were issued to P.W.1 on 29. 1984. P.W.1 did not appear for 8 adjournments for nearly 6 months and later he was examined by chief on 23. 1985. Thereafter, for 22 adjournments (for nine months) he did not appear. He appeared only on 2. 1986 after nine months. After 2. 1986, for one year and 3months, that is, for 26 adjournments, he did not appear, again he appeared only on 15. 1987. Subsequently he did not appear for four adjournments and again appeared on 27. 1987 and that was his last appearance in court and gave evidence in chief. Thereafter for four years, that is for 36 adjournments, though the case was posted for his appearance, he did not appear. These petitions were filed in March, 1991. One month later, P.W.1 died on 25. 1991. It is contended that though the petitioners have repeatedly filed petitions urging issuance of warrant to P.W.1, they were dismissed, on account of the reason that the court has shown undue importance and respect for the witness. It was urged that the trial court has been granting adjournments on mere representation on the side of the prosecution and sometimes even without representation. Though the trial was protracted for nearly 9 years, the prosecution has not even completed the evidence of P.W.1. From the date of filing of the charge-sheet on 8. It was urged that the trial court has been granting adjournments on mere representation on the side of the prosecution and sometimes even without representation. Though the trial was protracted for nearly 9 years, the prosecution has not even completed the evidence of P.W.1. From the date of filing of the charge-sheet on 8. 1982, the court has to adjourn the case for 55 times and P.W.1 appeared in court on 23. 1985. Subsequently, out of the total 106 adjournments taken for his appearance for about 7years, he appeared only on 9 days. Subsequently from 1987 to 1991, for four years consecutively, he did not appear. It was further contended that the charges related to the period 1975 to 1978 and it was in respect of the entries in the books,signatures, calculations made in the indent for supply, etc. Among the accused, four of them including one printer (first accused) died, 7 accused retired, 4 accused alone are eligible to remain in service. Even the defence as well as prosecution witnesses have already retired from service and they are not available. The memories of the accused with regard to the receipt and supply, method of calculation adopted and signatures, etc. faded away. It is impossible for the petitioners to remember the identity of the forms for which supply was made and witnesses whom they could summon to support their case. Even if they could summon their presence, it would be a doubtful proposition whether they would be in position to remember what happened more than 12 years back and help them in their defence. It is further submitted that the petitioners may not be in a position to effectively cross-examine the witnesses to be examined on the side of the department. It is vehemently urged that in view of the delay, the witnesses, whether for the prosecution or for the accused, could speak so late in the day, not to what they saw or heard but only to what they should persuade themselves to believe that they saw or heard. This would be a total travesty of justice. Further, the petitioners suffered not only monetary loss but also mental agony on account of thestigma, false scandal and false charges levelled against them and continued the same for the last 12 years unreasonably. According to them, the criminal prosecution, instead of departmental enquiry, is purely motivated one. This would be a total travesty of justice. Further, the petitioners suffered not only monetary loss but also mental agony on account of thestigma, false scandal and false charges levelled against them and continued the same for the last 12 years unreasonably. According to them, the criminal prosecution, instead of departmental enquiry, is purely motivated one. The inordinate delay in prosecution rendered much hardship to their service as they continued to be under suspension for the last 12 years resulting in great mental agony and financial distress. The petitioners and their family members have virtually become destitutes on account of the callous and irresponsible attitude of the complainant for the last 12 years. Lastly it was submitted that once the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial and the right to the fair, just and reasonable procedure has been violated, the accused are- entitled to an unconditional release. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel drew the attention of this court to various decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts including our High Court. 3.Per contra, in the counter filed on behalf of the respondents, by the Inspector of Police, Madurai City Crime Branch, Madurai, while denying the allegations, it is submitted inter alia that the necessary ingredients to constitute criminal offence under Secs. 120-B, 421, 406, 477 - A and 409, I.P.C. are clearly there in the charges as well as in the evidence given before the court. It is stated that the final report was filed on 8. 1982 in C.C.No.25S of 1982and another on 14. 1983 in C.C.No.482of 1983. C.C.No.258 of 1982, 6 persons are involved including some of the petitioners and in C.C.No.4S2 of 1983,17 persons are involved including some of the petitioners. In both the cases the trial started on 23. 1985. The trial in both the cases continued only from that date, that is, for the past 6 years only and not 11 years as staled. The reason for starting the trial with such delay is not on the part of the prosecution alone. All the accused including the petitioners are responsible. It is staled that the defence counsel have not finished the cross-examination of P.W.1, though they have started it on 2. 1986 for the reasons best known to them. The Court was vacant for some time without any regular presiding officer. All the accused including the petitioners are responsible. It is staled that the defence counsel have not finished the cross-examination of P.W.1, though they have started it on 2. 1986 for the reasons best known to them. The Court was vacant for some time without any regular presiding officer. Since voluminous records are involved, it took time for the preparation of copies to the accused. There was neither wilful nor wanton delay on the part of the prosecution to launch criminal proceedings in both the cases. Hence he prayed for dismissal of the petitions. 4. The point for consideration in these petitions is whether the two cases are liable to be quashed for the reasons stated by the petitioners. 5. The main challenge is made in respect of the inordinate and inexplicable delay in filing the charge-sheet as well as in trial. After perusing the records produced in this case, it is seen that the petitioners who were employed in the Madurai Municipal Corporation, were prosecuted in respect of the malpractice in issuing papers to the printers for printing purpose and other depart-ments during the period 4. 1978 to25. 1979and account of the same, the Corporation suffered a loss of Rs.60,000. It is not in dispute that all the 12 staff were suspended by the order dated 7. 1979 by the Commissioner of Corporation of Madurai. They were reinstated in 1983. Subsequently, on the filing of the charge-sheet on 8. 1982 a second suspension order was passed. Admittedly, no departmental enquiry was initiated and no usual show cause notice was issued to them giving opportunity to the petitioners to put forward their contentions. But, only on 22. 1980 the first information report was registered in Crime No.7 of 1980 against 12 staff as well as other printers. Though the first information report was registered on 22. 1980, it is seen that the charge-sheet was filed only on8. 1982and 14. 1983 in the two cases. It is not in dispute that in between the period the caused appeared for 37 adjournments. After the filing of the charge-sheet summons were issued to P.W.1 only on 29. 1984. For 29 adjournments, they had to appear in court for the issue of summons to P.W.1. Even after the issue of summons, P.W.1 did not appear in court for six months. He would appear for the first time on 23. After the filing of the charge-sheet summons were issued to P.W.1 only on 29. 1984. For 29 adjournments, they had to appear in court for the issue of summons to P.W.1. Even after the issue of summons, P.W.1 did not appear in court for six months. He would appear for the first time on 23. 1985 and he was examined in chief. Subsequently also he did not appear for 22 adjournments. After 9 months, he appeared on 2. 1986. Thereafter he appeared on 15. 1987, it is contended by the learned counsel, that for 26 adjournments during the period of one year and 3 months, they appeared in court and P.W.1 did not appear. Subsequently, he did not appear for four adjournments and appeared on 27. 1987 and thereafter he did not appear and it was his last appearance. The court adjourned the case on 36 occasions during the period of 4 years and P.W.1 did not appear. It is stated that even though the examination of P.W.1 was not completed, P.W.2was examined and subsequently there was no progress and even P.W.2 was not tendered for cross examination. After 1987 no appearance of P.W.1 was made and the case has been adjourned periodically. There is absolutely nothing to show that any coercive steps were taken to secure P.W.1. There is every force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court granted adjournments on mere asking by the prosecution and on many occasions, even without any representation on behalf of the prosecution. In para 14 of the counter it is vaguely staled that the reasons for starting the trial with such delay is not on the part of the prosecution alone; but all the accused in both the cases are equally responsible and the court was also vacant for some period without regular presiding officer. It is also slated that though the defence counsel commenced the cross-examination of P.W.1 on 2. 1986, they have not finished the cross-examination for the reasons best known to them, it is to be noted that unless P.W.1 appeared, the question of finishing the cross-examination of P.W.1 does not arise. The various particulars given by the petitioners with regard to delay, at the lime of arguments, is not disputed. Hence it cannot be said that the delay is on account of the accused. The various particulars given by the petitioners with regard to delay, at the lime of arguments, is not disputed. Hence it cannot be said that the delay is on account of the accused. From the particulars narrated above, the delay is only on account of the prosecution. The prosecution cannot justify the delay by merely saying that the court was also vacant for some time without any presiding officer. Considering the period of 11 years, the period during which the court was vacant was very negligible and in any event the accused are not responsible for the same and the accused can rely on the said period also for construing the inordinate and inexplicable delay in the disposal of the case as there is constitutional guarantee for speedy trial under Art.21(2) of the Constitution. 6. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on catena of decisions in support of his contentions. In Suite of Bihar v. Uma Shankar, 1981 M.L.J. (Crl.) 489: (1981)2 S.C.J. 170: (1981)2 S.C.R. 402 : 1981 Crl.L.J. 159:1981 S.C.C(Crl) 198: A.1.R. 1981 S.C. 641, it was held: "Where the trial had not made much headway even though a period of 20 years had gone by and the High Court had quashed the proceedings, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of the High Court in appeal by special leave even though the accused themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case and allegations in the public report disclosed serious offence, as such protraction meant considerable harassment to the accused." In State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir, 1985 Crl.L.J. 584, it has been held, "15. It is unnecessary to further elaborate and labour the point, because it seems manifest that now by precedential mandate the basic human right to speedy trial has been expressly written, as if with pen and ink, into the constitutional right of life and liberty, guaranteed by Art.21." In para 35 it was observed: "Once the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial and the right to a fair, just and reasonable procedure has been violated then the accused is entitled to an unconditional release and the charges levelled against him would fall to the ground." Further, in para 45, it was observed: "A callous and inordinately prolonged delay of 10 years or more, which, in no way arises from the accused’s default (or is otherwise not occasioned due to any extraordinary and exceptional reasons), in the context of the reversal of a clear acquittal on a capital charge would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Art.21. Any procedure or practice which allows such horrendous delays cannot but be labelled as oppressive, arbitrary and fanciful." In S.G.Nain v. Union of India, 1992 Crl.L.J. 56V, it has been held: "...2. At the enquiry before the Magistrate the scope of the complaint was enlarged by includ-inganoffence underSec.409, I.P.C. The appellant asked for quashing of the prosecution on the ground that necessary sanction under Sec.197 of the Crl.P.C. was not obtained. The learned Magistrate by his order dated May 12, 1978 rejected the prayer. The revision against the said order was dismissed in limine by the High Court. This appeal via Special Leave Petition is against the order of the learned magistrate as upheld by the High Court. It is difficult to get over the fact that the prosecution against the appellant is pending for almost fourteen years. Apart from mental agony it must have adversely effected him in his service career. In the facts of this case it is difficult rather impossible to a fair trial the appellant after such a long time-lapse. It would be sheer waste of public time and money apart from causing harassment to the appellant. It is no doubt correct that this appeal has been pending in this Court for almost eleven years but that is no ground to permit this state-prosccution to go on. It is not the state action but its effect on the citizen which is relevant. It is no doubt correct that this appeal has been pending in this Court for almost eleven years but that is no ground to permit this state-prosccution to go on. It is not the state action but its effect on the citizen which is relevant. We have been taken through the complaint. We are not sure whether an offence under Sec.409, I.P.C. even prima facie is made out. In any case it is not necessary to go into the facts of the complaint or the question of applicability of Sec. 197, Crl.P.C. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that it would not be in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution against the appellant to continue. We, therefore, quash the complaint dated August, 10,1977, and the prosecution against the appellant.” In S. V.Ramachandran v. State by Inspector, Railway Protection Force, 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 152, it has been held: “5. 1 have considered the sole contention of Mr.A.Raghunathan. Total inaptitude, carelessness and abject-negligence in the conduct of this prosecution is “apparent. Facts regarding adjournments need no repetition. If the prosecution had not been able to produce even a single witness for over seven years and even one witness produced made himself scarce on one occasion, it will be unfair, to still hold, that the petitioners will have to necessarily face the ordeal of a trial, for no fault whatever at their end. It is not disputed that only on very few occasions, the petitioners were absent and that too on petitions filed under Sec.317, Crl.P.C. which were allowed. Identity of the petitioners never stood challenged. The value of the properties seized appears to be Rs.2,700. Day in and day out courts impress upon the prosecution agency the need for speedy trial and fair procedure, since they would fall within the mandate of Art.21 of the Constitution of India. This case is an example of how the law laid down is thwarted with impunity. Eleven years rolled by, since the commission of the offence alleged. Day in and day out courts impress upon the prosecution agency the need for speedy trial and fair procedure, since they would fall within the mandate of Art.21 of the Constitution of India. This case is an example of how the law laid down is thwarted with impunity. Eleven years rolled by, since the commission of the offence alleged. If for about seven years, the prosecution had not been able to produce witnesses most of them government officials, regarding an occurrence which h:.d taken place a year earlier, no useful purpose would be served in allowing this prosecution, to survive any fur-ther, it is said, that the complainant had persuaded himself to represent that he was not able to present in court since he was line duty for several years. This is obviously ridiculous and cannot workout to the disadvantage of the petitioners. Long delay and inaptitude in the conduct of this prosecution will be sufficient to quash the pending proceeding in C.C.No.9422 of 1982 on the file of the VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. This petition is allowed & all further proceedings in C.C.No.9422 of 1982 on the file of the VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, shall stand quashed.” In C.Sivakumar v. State of A.P., 1991 Crl.L.J. 2337, the learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed the impugned proceedings, and while doing so, the learned Judge relied on the decision of the apex Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986S.C. 1773:1986 Lab. I.C. 885: (1986)3 S.C.C 103 : (1986)2Lab. L.J. 334: (1986)3 S.C.J. 47, where it was held: “If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time. It is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course, the trial is held upon account of some interim order passed by a superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. It is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course, the trial is held upon account of some interim order passed by a superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right.” The learned Judge also relied on the decision of the said court reported in G.Balachand Varma v. State of A.P., (1985)2 An.L.T. 433, wherein it was held that ‘the continuance of three criminal cases from 1979 onwards for a period of over six years during which the prosecution has not examined single witness is clear abuse of process of law and has resulted in manifest injustice to the petitioner. It is, therefore, a prominently fit case for quashing the proceedings, under Sec.482, Crl.P.C.“After quoting the said two judgments the learned Judge observed in para 7: “The learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to the entries in the docket argued that on 19 adjournments P.W.1 was absent, A.P.P. was absent on 23 adjournments and nothing took place on 156 days of hearing. The prosecution was not at all taking any interest in either producing witnesses or completing their evidence the accused might have also contributed for the delay, for some time. Though the learned Public Prosecutor has argued that one more opportunity may be given to the prosecu-tion to produce witnesses and complete the cases, having regard to the progress of the cases referred to above, I feel that ho useful purpose will be served by giving any further opportunity to the prosecution to produce witnesses. Therefore, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that to make them still to face prosecution amounts to harassment and abuse of process of court." Consequently the learned Judge quashed the proceedings. The facts involved in the said case are almost the same, as in the above quoted case, the offences were the same; there were about 350 adjournments, and out of 156 days of hearing, P.W.1 was absent on 19 adjournments and A.P.P. was absent on 23 adjournments. The facts involved in the said case are almost the same, as in the above quoted case, the offences were the same; there were about 350 adjournments, and out of 156 days of hearing, P.W.1 was absent on 19 adjournments and A.P.P. was absent on 23 adjournments. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners cited various other decisions also since the ratio laid down is almost the same there is no use of mulcting the case laws. Hence I am of the firm view that in view of the inordinate and inexplicable delay of 11 years and in view of the fact that the petitioners attended the Court for more than 340 hearing dates and the evidence of P.W.1 was not completed and considering the nature of the charge and the harassment to the petitioners it would not be in the interests of justice to permit the prosecution to continue as the delay has caused great prejudice and denial of justice to the petitioners. This is one such case where the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial and lair and reasonable procedure has been violated and that the petitioners are entitled to unconditional release. 7. In the result, the petitioners are allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No.258 of 1982 and CC.No.4S2 of 1983 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Madurai are hereby quashed.