B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by Azad Husain, the husband of Smt. Sanjeeda, respondent No. 2 and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 against whom process has been issued under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short the Code), for an offence under Section 498a, I. P. C. vide order dated 5. 10. 1989 passed by the 1st Additional Munsif Magistrate, Saharanpur in Case No. 678 of 1989 (Sanjeeda Yasmin v. Azad Husain ). Thereafter revision was filed by petitioners and the same was dismissed on 22. 1. 1992 by the IVth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur. ( 2 ) A complaint (Annexure- I to the petition) was filed by respondent No. 2, the wife against the petitioners with the allegations that the petitioners have committed an offence under Sections 498- A/504/506/323, I. P. C. read with sections 4/5 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. On that complaint statements were recorded in view of the provisions of Sections 200 and 202 of the Code. After recording a finding that there was sufficient ground for proceeding, he issued process by the impugned order directing the accused applicants to appear in court on a particular date. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners urged that the Magistrate erred in issuing process under Section 204 (1) of the Code as the case was not triable at Saharanpur, rather it was triable at Muzoffarnagar, where the marriage was solemnized. Reliance was placed on Vijai Ratan Sharma v. State of U. P. . ( 4 ) THE point for determination is as to whether process could have been issued and whether the case was triable at Saharanpur or Muzoffarnagar. In the complaint (Annexure -1, vide para) allegations were made that the marriage was performed at Saharanpur. Allegations have also been made in the compliant making out a case under Sections 498-N504/506/323, I. P. C. and 4/5 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In the complaint (Annexure -1, vide para) allegations were made that the marriage was performed at Saharanpur. Allegations have also been made in the compliant making out a case under Sections 498-N504/506/323, I. P. C. and 4/5 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In view of Section 179 of the Code when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued, as the marriage was performed at Saharanpur, it cannot be said that consequence would not ensue there. What appears material consideration is the procedure. Section 179 has to be read along with Sections 180 and 182 (2) and 465 of the Code. If these provisions arc read conjointly the only possible inference is that the court at Saharanpur was competent to try the offence against the petitioners. ( 5 ) SECTION 182 (2) is precisely on the point. This sections including Sections 179 and 180 deal with procedure. The rules pertaining to procedure are not by themselves an end but they are means to achieve the ends of justice. They are not hurdles to obstruct the path of justice. Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage by enabling the court to do justice must be preferred. The rules of procedure are not to become mistress, instead of remaining handmaid of justice. (See Owners and Parties v. Fernandeo Lopaz and others, C. B. I. Special Investigation Cell v. Anupam, Judgments Today. ( 6 ) NOT only that different sub-sections have to be read and interpreted harmoniously. There is a maxim INTERPRETATION ET CONCORD ARE LEGES LEGIBLTS EST OPTIMUM INTERPRETANDI MODUS. which connotes that harmonious construction commended then any other construction. ( 7 ) IN the present case certain sections under Chapter XIII of the Code have bearing on the subject. Section 177 provides Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence was ordinarily to be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 was intended to provide against conflict of areas in order to prevent an accused from getting off because of doubt as to which Magistrate has jurisdiction. Section 177 provides Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence was ordinarily to be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 was intended to provide against conflict of areas in order to prevent an accused from getting off because of doubt as to which Magistrate has jurisdiction. There are four contingencies i. e. , 1st where an offence was committed partly in one local areas and partly in another, 2nd, where offence was continuing, 3rd where offence consists of several acts. 4th where it was uncertain in which of several local areas the offence was committed, it may be, inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Section 179 provides that an offence shall be triable where act is done or consequence ensues. ( 8 ) SECTION 180 of the Code was in respect of alternative jurisdiction of offence by reason of its relation to any other Act, which is also an offence. In other words, it is a relation of one part of code with the other when section 180 is in operation. Since section 182 of the Code is mainly comparatively for our purpose. Subsection 1 of section 182 provides that a person accused which practices deception from distance is triable not only at the place where message was received from other place also from where accused has been sending message. Where a subsection 2 of Section 182 provides with regards to the offence of bigamy the place where the offence was committed and also where the offender resides with her spouse by first marriage. The enquiry in the present case is covered under sections 180 and 182 of the Code. ( 9 ) THERE is other aspect of the matter. The aforesaid sections have to be read alongwith section 465 of the Code, which is residuary section in the Chapter enacted with a view to correct any error, omission, irregularity committed by the court of competent jurisdiction while holding the trial even if some irregularity has been committed that would not be material unless it occasions failure of justice or is prejudicial to the accused. The basis purpose for enactment of this section is to secure justice by preventing anamolies of trial already held just on technical grounds without any prejudice to the accused. The basis purpose for enactment of this section is to secure justice by preventing anamolies of trial already held just on technical grounds without any prejudice to the accused. There is no other purpose for enactment except that possibility of acquittal just on grounds of technicality may be eliminated. In the present case, no prejudice would be caused to the accused just by holding trial at Saharanpur rather than at Muzoffar Nagar where the marriage was solemn ised. ( 10 ) UNDER these circumstances I am of the opinion that there is no irregularity or illegality in the impugned orders even if trial is held at Saharanpur. There has been no failure of justice nor the accused has been prejudiced in any way. ( 11 ) IN Vijai Ratan Sharma v. State of U. P. (supra), the view was taken that where a series of acts so connected together as to form same transaction, the trial can be held at any place, Consequently that case does not help the petitioner. ( 12 ) IT is just the process that has been issued against the petitioners and the trial has not yet commenced. The petitioners want to thwart those proceedings. There is no error in the impugned order, much less an error apparent on the face of record. The petition lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.