( 1 ) MR. Mahinder Narain, J.-With respect to the assessment year1976-77, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following questions of law to this Court : " (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, theincome-tax Officer had jurisdiction to make assessment u/sec. 143 (3) and whether his order dated 30. 03. 1979 was a nullity inlaw? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, thecommissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had the right or jurisdiction on 19. 07. 1979 when he passed the order to extend theperiod of limitation to pass draft assessment order which hadexpired on 31. 03. 1979? (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case thecommissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was justified in law insetting aside the assessment and directing the Income-taxofficer to make fresh assessment by taking recourse to Section 144-B of the Act ?" ( 2 ) FOR the purpose of decision of this reference, it is necessary torefer to the provisions of Section 144-B of the Income-tax Act which existedprior to it being omitted from the income-tax Act as amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984. Section 144-B of the Income-tax Actreads as under: " (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where, in anassessment to be made under Sub-section (3) of Section 143,the Assessing Officer proposes to make, before the 1st day ofoctober, 1984, any variation in the income or loss returnedwhich is prejudicial to the assessee and the amount of suchvariation exceeds the amount fixed by the Board under Subsection (6), the Assessing Officer shall, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter inthis section referred to as the Draft Order) to the assessee. (2) On receipt of the Draft Order, the assessee may forward hisobjections, if any, to such variation to the Assessing Officerwithin seven days of the receipt by him of the Draft Order orwithin such further period not exceeding fifteen days as theassessing Officer may allow on an application made to him inthis behalf. (3) If no objections are received within the period or the extendedperiod aforesaid. or the assessee intimates to the Assessingofficer the acceptance of the variation, the Assessing Officershall complete the assessment on the basis of the Draft Order. (3) If no objections are received within the period or the extendedperiod aforesaid. or the assessee intimates to the Assessingofficer the acceptance of the variation, the Assessing Officershall complete the assessment on the basis of the Draft Order. (4) If any objections are received, the Assessing Officer shall forward the Draft Order together with the objections to thedeputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner shall afterconsidering the Draft Order and the objections and after goingthrough (wherever necessary) the records relating to the Draftorder, issue, in respect of the matters covered by the objections,such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Assessingofficer to enable him to complete the assessment. Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assesseeshall be issued under this Sub-section before an opportunity isgiven to the assessee to be heard. (5) Every direction issued by the Deputy Commissioner under Subsection (4) shall be binding on the Assessing Officer. (6) For the purposes of Sub-section (1), the Board may, havingregard to the proper and efficient management of the work ofassessment, by order, fix, from time to time, such amount as itdeems fit:provided that different amounts may be fixed for differentareas;provided furthar that the amount fixed under this sub-sectionshall, in no case, be less than twenty five thousand rupees. (7) Nothing in this section shall apply to a case where a Deputycommissioner exercises the powers or performs the function ofan Assessing Officer in pursuance of an order made undersection 125 or Section 125-A. " ( 3 ) IN the assessment year in question 1976-77. the assessee had returned a total income of Rs. 47. 798. 00. The Income-tax Officer made the assessment. on a total income of Rs. 1. 49. 710. 00. While purporting to do so, he didnot comply with Section 144-B of the Income-tax Act. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the provisions of Section 144-B of theincome-tax Act were attracted inasmuch as the amount which had been fixedby the Board under the provisions of Section 144-BW was rupees 1 lac. Thevariation in the instant case being more of rupees 1 lac, the provisions ofsection 144-B (6) were attracted. ( 5 ) THE Income-tax Officer had made the assessment on 30. 03. 1979. An appeal was preferred against the order of the Income-tax Officer. Thevariation in the instant case being more of rupees 1 lac, the provisions ofsection 144-B (6) were attracted. ( 5 ) THE Income-tax Officer had made the assessment on 30. 03. 1979. An appeal was preferred against the order of the Income-tax Officer. In theappeal, the assessee contended that as Section 144 of the Income-tax Act hadnot been complied with, the assessment order was bad in law. ( 6 ) THE Commissioner (Appeals) came to the conclusion that thematter was procedurally irregular, and the defect was curable, and not fatalto the validity of the assessment. Accordingly, the assessment is set aside. Direction was given to make an assessment in accordance with law. Thisdirection was given following the Allahabad High Court judgment reported in90 ITR 197. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunaland contested the correctness of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals ). ( 8 ) BEFORE the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal it was contended thatthe Income-tax Officer not having complied with the mandatory provisions ofsection 144-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Commissioner (Appeals)should have annulled the assessment instead of setting it aside. It was alsocontended that the Commissioner (Appeals) by setting aside the assessmentorder had extended the period of limitation for passing of the draft assessment order, which had already expired. This the Commissioner (Appeals),had no power to do. ( 9 ) THE Tribunal, however, followed its earlier order in Mehta Charitable Trust, Nainital, ITA No. 3099 (Del) 78-79, and in the case of Vimlatalkies, ITR No. 5342 (Del) 77-78 dated 25. 10. 1979, and held that the orderof the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) could not have anulled. ( 10 ) BEFORE us Mr. Syali contended that the provisions of Section 144-B of the Income-tax Act require that the Income-tax Officer mustproceed in the manner specified by the statute, wherever he wishes to makean addition of amount inexcess of the limit fixed by the Board, whether theaddition is to equal the limit or exceeded it. That the manner provided bythe statute is that the Income-tax Officer must prepare a draft order [section 144- (B) (1)]. invite objections [section 144-B (2 ). On receipt of objections. send the draft order to the Deputy Commissioner [section 144-B (4)]. It isonly after proceedings before theDeputy Commissioner, that the Income-taxofficer can proceed again in the matter, in accordance with the directions ofthe Deputy Commissioner [section 144-B (5) ]. invite objections [section 144-B (2 ). On receipt of objections. send the draft order to the Deputy Commissioner [section 144-B (4)]. It isonly after proceedings before theDeputy Commissioner, that the Income-taxofficer can proceed again in the matter, in accordance with the directions ofthe Deputy Commissioner [section 144-B (5) ]. ( 11 ) IN other words, Mr. Syali con tends that where the provisions ofsection 144-B of the Income-tax Act require the Income-tax Officer to act ina certain manner, he is permitted to act only in that manner, or he cannotact at all. All other methods are forbidden to the Income-tax Officer. Forthis proposition, Mr. Syali relies upon the principle of law which was reiterated by the Privy Council in Nazir Aimed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC253f2 ). (1875) I Ch. D426. ( 12 ) THE aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Supremecourting Bahadur Singh and Another v. State of Vindh-P. . AIR1954supreme Court 322: Ballabhdas Agarwala v. J. C Chankravarty, AIR 1960supreme Court 576: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhand other Singh and Others. AIR1964 Supreme Court s; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Girdharlal Moti Laland Others, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 267; and Ramachandra Keihav Adke (Dead) by LRs. v. Govind Joti Chavare and Others, AIR 1975 SC 915 . ( 13 ) IN connection with the said contention one has to note thatarticle 265 of the Constitution says that no tax shall be levied or collectedexcept by authority of law. By virtue of this provision, no tax can be levied,and no tax can be collected without authority of law. The authority of lawunder which the income-tax can be levied, is the Income-tax Act, 1961. Levyof tax is preceded by determination of the amount leviable as tax, and theword "levied" in Article 265 of the Constitution would include the procedureby which the income-tax is quantified. ( 14 ) THE procedure for quantifying income-tax is provided by theincome-tax Act, 1961. The said procedure is statutory assessment proceedings, and when statute provides a particular procedure which leads to levy oftax. that procedure cannot be varied from the one postulated by the statute. If the tax is not levied according to the statutory procedure, the levy of taxwould not be according to the authority of law. The levy of tax by non-statutory procedure would be contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution ofindia. that procedure cannot be varied from the one postulated by the statute. If the tax is not levied according to the statutory procedure, the levy of taxwould not be according to the authority of law. The levy of tax by non-statutory procedure would be contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution ofindia. In this view of the matter, the observations made by the Privycouncil in Nazir Aimed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2), (1875) ICh. D and the subsequent cases become significant. ( 15 ) MR. Syali further contends that whereas in the normal case, theincome-tax Officer has undoubted jurisdiction to proceed to pass anassessmentorder, by virtue of the provisions of Section 144-B, wherever the Income-taxofficer proposes to make addition of an amount equal to or exceeding thelimit fixed by the Board under Section 144-B (6), in the instant case rupeesi lac, his jurisdiction to pass an assessment order is eclipsed until such timeas the Deputy Commissioner after proceeding in accordance with the provisions of Section 144-B passes a direction under Section 144-B (5), which direction is binding on the income-tax Officer, who has to pass assessment ordersin accordance with such directions. ( 16 ) MR. Syali also cited before usll31tr 22 (Gujarat)andl964supreme Court 1300, at page 1304, wherein it has been said that there cannotbe any waiver of provisions which confers jurisdiction. Mr. Syali also cited182 ITR 162 (Gauhati) which lays down that Section 144-B lays down conditions precedent. Only upon those conditions precedent being satisfied, theincome-tax Officer can have jurisdiction to pass an order of assessmentwherever additions are made in excess of the limit fixed by the Board undersection 144-B (6 ). ( 17 ) THE aforesaid pronouncements of the Gujarat High Court andthe Gauhati High Court appear to be in consonance with the principle laiddown in Nazir Ahmed s case, and the cases where the principle in Nazirahmed s case was accepted by the Supreme Court, although no specificreference to these cases is made to the said cases. ( 18 ) LARGE number of other cases referred to by Counsel, do notspecifically refer to the principle in Nazir Ahmed s case. All judgmentspronounced by Courts in ignorance of a statute or statutory provisions arejudgments Per Incuriam. They are not precedents, they have no bindingeffect. 1988 (2) SCC 607 (7 Judges), 1942 (2) All ER194 and 1944 (1) Aner 300. All judgmentspronounced by Courts in ignorance of a statute or statutory provisions arejudgments Per Incuriam. They are not precedents, they have no bindingeffect. 1988 (2) SCC 607 (7 Judges), 1942 (2) All ER194 and 1944 (1) Aner 300. ( 19 ) THE cases referred to by Mr. Syali are; 128 ITR 445: 155 (1)SCR 117, 121; 194 ITR 700, 707 Delhi; 181 IIR 247; 170 ITR 3s2; 1964 SC207; 1990 (2) SCC 71 ; 194 ITR 186 Delhi; 1975 Supl. SCR 365; 1974 SC 1719;40 ITR 298; 90 ITR 197; 129 ITR 488; 138 ITR 518; 151 ITR 73; 148 ITR243; 18 ITR 569; 160 ITR 693; 180 ITR 297; 180 ITR 625/1966 SC 593; 1968sc 4368; 152 ITR 220; 179 ITR 139; 97 CTR (2) SCC 71; 179 ITR 139; 1955 (2) SCR 589 ; 1955 SC 781; 113 ITR 22; 180 ITR 84; 145 ITR 477; 141itr 758 and 157 ITR 206. ( 20 ) CASES referred toby Mr. Gupta are 194 ITR 186; 194 ITR 700;40 ITR 298; 90 ITR 197; 138 ITR 518: 129 ITR 488; 18 ITR 569; 148 ITR283; 151 ITR 73; 152 ITR 220; 162 ITR 543; 179 ITR 139: 180 ITR 297; 180itr 625; 128 ITR 445; 97 CIR 138; 194 ITR 186; 194 ITR 700; 113 ITR22; 180 ITR 84; 182 ITR 84; l82 ITR 162 and 48 STC 466. In my view,where the statute provides a thing to be done in a particular manner, it mustbe done in that manner; or not at all. All other methods are forbidden. Ifthis was not so, there is no point of having a statutory provision, or a statutory methodology. Of course, the aforesaid observation will hold good onlywhen a statutory provision is not ultra vires the Constitution. In the instantcase there is no contention that the provisions of Section 144-B of the Act areultra vires the Constitution. ( 21 ) I am also of the view that the undoubted jurisdiction which theincome-tax Officer has to make an assessment order, was eclipsed when conditions of Section 144-B (6) were satisfied. When the Income-tax Officerchooses to make an addition to the return in excess of the limit fixed by theboard under Section 144-B (6), and that jurisdiction is eclipsed. ( 21 ) I am also of the view that the undoubted jurisdiction which theincome-tax Officer has to make an assessment order, was eclipsed when conditions of Section 144-B (6) were satisfied. When the Income-tax Officerchooses to make an addition to the return in excess of the limit fixed by theboard under Section 144-B (6), and that jurisdiction is eclipsed. ( 22 ) IN my view because of provisions of Section 144-B (6) the jurisdiction to pass an assessment order, which vested in the Income-tax Officer, hasbeen taken away, and instead he is statutorily obliged to carry out the binding directions issued by the Deputy Commissioner, which in this case wasnever sought by him. The Income-tax Officer s powers and jurisdiction tomakean assessment is taken away by the said provisions, and he is onlypermitted by statute to make a draft assessment order, and finally to makean assessment order in accordance with the directions issued by the Income-tax Commissioner. ( 23 ) IN this view of the matter, as the judgments cited by the Counselhave not considered the provisions of Section 144-B in the light of Nazirahmed case, or the judgments of the Supreme Court, the said judgments neednot be considered in detail, as they are not approached the question of jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to make an assessment in the light of theprovisions of Section 144-B, that is to say the jurisdiction of the Income-taxofficer to pass an assessment order is taken away by the provisions of Section 144 (2) when he proposes to make an assessment order by making addition of an, amount equal to and in excess of the limit fixed by the Boardunder Section 144-B (6), Income-tax Officer s jurisdiction to pass orders himself being replaced by a statutory obligation to comply with the bindingdirections of the Deputy Commissioner, in the matter of making an assessment order. ( 24 ) I am further of the view that the Deputy Commissioner by settingaside the order in appeal cannot extend special period of limitation providedin Section 144-B. ( 25 ) IT is also necessary to record that Section 144-B of the Income-taxact has been deleted from the Income-tax Act w. e. f. 01. 04. 1989. ( 24 ) I am further of the view that the Deputy Commissioner by settingaside the order in appeal cannot extend special period of limitation providedin Section 144-B. ( 25 ) IT is also necessary to record that Section 144-B of the Income-taxact has been deleted from the Income-tax Act w. e. f. 01. 04. 1989. ( 26 ) IN this view of the matter the questions under Section 256 (1) ofthe Income-tax Act have to be answered thus ; (1) The Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction to pass the assetsment order dated 30. 03. 1979, and the same is contrary to theprovisions of Section 144-B of the Income-tax Act, the order ofassessment is, therefore, a nullity as having been passed without jurisdiction. (2) The Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) could not extendthe period of limitation on 19. 07. 1979, and to pass a draftassessment order which had expired on 31. 03. 1979. (3) In view of the fact that Section 144-B of the Income-tax Act didnot confer power in the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)to set aside the assessment order, he could not re-confer thejurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to make a freshassessment.