JUDGMENT S.H.A. Raza, J. - Aggrieved against the order of their termination dated 27.3.1991, the petitioners have filed these petitions mainly on the ground that their services were terminated for the reason of the fact that their appointment was alleged to have been found as irregular and void without giving them an opportunity to show cause against the same. 2. The petitioners were appointed on various dates on various posts and were confirmed on their posts on different dates, which is apparent from the following chart: W. P. No . Name Date of Post appointment Confirmation Date 2160/91 Humayun Raza Zadi 19989 Octroi Inspector 24.4.90 3218/91 Naemuddin Ansari 18989 Chungi Moharrir 1590 2162/91 Mohd. A. Siddiqui 20989 Checking Clerk 12490 2176/91 (a) Brij Mohan 20989 Octroi Moharrir (b) Lal ji 16490 20290 Octroi Peon 2218/91 (a) Maqsood Ahmad 18989 Moharrir 1890 (b) Badruddin Khan 18989 Moharrir 16490 2678/91 (a) R. K. Misra 8.989 Octroi Moharrir 1590 (b) Chedi Ram 151189 Octroi Moharrir (c) Vidya Prasad 18989 Octroi Moharrir (d) Chandrika Prasad 41289 Octroi Moharrir 161090 (e) Misri Lal 251189 Octroi Moharrir 2747/91 (a) Shabbir Ahmad 31190 Peon 161190 (b) Imtiyaz Ali 20989 Peon 161190 (c) Mohd. Ali Khan 18989 Moharrir (d) Saghir Ahmad 15490 Moharrir 16291 2367/91 R. K. Srivastava 22989 Octroi Moharrir 2462/91 (a) Mohd Salman Khan 18989 Moharrir 1590 (b) Shamshad Ali 18989 Moharrir (c) Anwarul Haq 18989 Moharrir 16490 3633/91 (a) Km. Rafatunnisa Khanam 271288 Clerk 151189 3217/91 Ashfaq Ali 11789 Clerk 20990 3613/91 Mohd. Shahid Khan 20989 Peon 161190 (b) Makhmoor Ahmad 20989 Peon Confirmed (c) Mohd. Husain 18989 Peon Confirmed 3612/91 (a) Anis Ahmad 18989 Moharrir 16490 (b) Ashraf Ali 301289 Octroi Moharrir 2909/91 Hari Shankar Bhatnagar 41089 Pump Attendant 3611/91 Mohd. Nazeer 20989 Peon 17490 3204/91 (a) Abdul Qadir 18989 Octroi Moharrir Confirmed (b) Banwari Lal 161189 Peon Confirmed (c) Abdul Hameed 26989 Peon Confirmed (d) Abdul Rahman 20989 Peon 161190 (e) Budhi Lal 161189 Peon Confirmed (f ) Tahir Husain 18989 Moharrir Confirmed (g) F. A. Khan 17989 Moharrir 15490 (h) Mohd. Tariq 20989 Peon Confirmed (i) Mahmood Khan 9290 Peon Confirmed (j) Chet Ram 20989 Moharrir Confirmed (k) Shabbir Ahmad 20989 Peon 3. Mr. Tariq 20989 Peon Confirmed (i) Mahmood Khan 9290 Peon Confirmed (j) Chet Ram 20989 Moharrir Confirmed (k) Shabbir Ahmad 20989 Peon 3. Mr. H.P. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Municipal Board, Nanpara supported the action of the opposite parties in terminating the services of the petitioners mainly on the grounds that the appointments were not made in conformity with the provisions of U.P. Municipalities Act and the Government Orders issued from time to time. Although there existed no vacancy or the post upon which the petitioners could be appointed, but they were appointed, by the President of the Board who had no authority to appoint them. The posts were never advertised. No Selection Committee was appointed. Neither any test nor interview ever took place and hence the appointments were irregular and non est and the same could be validly terminated after giving them notice, He further submitted that after being appointed, sometime latter the petitioners were issued letters of confirmation, but the file indicated that they were confirmed subject to the approval of the State Government, hence in the eye of law they could not be confirmed firstly for the reason that there existed no post upon which they could be confirmed and secondly that the confirmation order was subject to the approval of the State Government. 4. Section 70 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 reads as under:70 Temporary servants required for emergency: The power to appoint and fix the salaries of temporary servants in cases of emergency shall vest in the President subject to the following conditions, namely: (a) the president, in exercise of such powers, shall not act in contravention of: (i) any general or special directions as the State Government may from time to issue; (ii) an order of the Board prohibiting the employment of temporary servants for any particular work; and (b) each appointment under this section by the President shall be reported at the next meeting of the Board following the appointments. Section 71 of the said Act further provides that except as provided by Sections 57, 66, 68 and 70 and subject to any general or special directions as the State Government may from time to time issue a board may, by special resolution determine what servants are required for the discharge of the duties of the board and their qualifications and conditions of service. 5. 5. It was further submitted by Mr. H.P. Srivastava that one Sri Humayun Raza Zaidi who is the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 2160 of 1991 was appointed on 19989 on the post of Octroi Inspector which is a Centralised Service and the president had no power to appoint him on the centralised post, in view of the provisions contained in section 74 of the aforesaid Act. Section 74 of the said Act reads as under: Subject to the provisions of Sections 57 to 73, servants on posts in the noncentralised services, carrying scale of pay equal to or higher than the lowest scale of pay admissible to the clerical staff shall be appointed and may be dismissed, removed or otherwise punished or the services of a probationer may be terminated by the President, subject to the right of appeal except in the case of the termination of the service of a probationer, to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that appointments on the posts of Tax Superintendent, Assistant Tax Superintendents, Inspectors, Head Clerks, Sectional Head clerks, Sectional Accountants, Doctors, Vaids, Hakims and Municipal Fire Station Officers, shall be subject to the approval of the Board. In the light of the aforesaid provision it was submitted that Humayun Raza Zaidi was not appointed in accordance with Rules governing the conditions of the services of the Centralised cadre. It was further urged that as far as the appointment of permanent inferior staff is concerned some of the petitioners who were appointed on inferior posts, the appointing authority of them is the Executive Officer in accordance with section 75 of the Act which provides that in case where there is no Executive Officer, the said appointment shall be made by the President. It has been submitted that the Government of Uttar Pradesh by means of various G.Os. which have been annexed as Annexures C1, C2, C3, C3A had put an embargo in making appointments in Municipalities. It has been submitted that the Government of Uttar Pradesh by means of various G.Os. which have been annexed as Annexures C1, C2, C3, C3A had put an embargo in making appointments in Municipalities. The Municipal Board itself in its meeting held on 30.6.89 had passed a resolution to the effect that in view of the financial constraints the posts which have not been sanctioned by the State Government and for which the State has not sanctioned any grant, be placed before the next meeting of the Board and in future and without the permission of the Board no appointment be made and without obtaining sanction no post be created. On 25.9.90 the Joint Secretary of the State Government in its letter to all the District Magistrates of the State directed them to terminate the services of those employees who had been appointed in contravention of the Government Orders passed earlier and send an information regarding the same to the Director, Local Bodies with immediate effect. The District Magistrate thereafter on October 29, 1990 directed the President of Municipal Board, Nanpara, Bahraich to strictly comply with the order passed by the State Government and send a report regarding the same. Similar orders were again issued by the District Magistrate, Bahraich to all the President of the Municipalities in the District. On 30889 the Board in its special meeting resolved not to make any future appointment and if any appointment had been made without the sanction of the Board, the Board would cancel such appointment. 6. In support of his contention that the Board in view of the various Government Orders as well as the resolutions passed by the Board itself, terminated the service of the petitioners as their appointments were found to be void, Mr. H.P. Srivastava submitted that the services of the petitioners were validly terminated and in this regard placed reliance on the case of Rajendra Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others (1991 Selected Civil Decisions295) in which Hon'ble S.C. Mathur, J. indicated as under: The impugned order of cancellation of promotion and consequent reversion has not been passed on any allegation of misconduct against the petitioners and, therefore, there was no question of giving the petitioners opportunity of hearing. In this Court the petitioners had opportunity to show that they had been appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statutory rules. In this Court the petitioners had opportunity to show that they had been appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statutory rules. The petitioners merely allege their promotion to be legal but are unable to show that the procedure prescribed in the rules was actually followed. On the disputed facts the petitioners' promotion was illegal. As Such it would be an exercise in futility to quash the impugned order and require the concerned authority to pass fresh order after giving the petitioners opportunity of hearing The facts of the aforesaid case are entirely different in comparison to the facts which are involved in these petitions. In the case of Rajendra Kumar and others (supra) the petitioner was promoted on the post of clerkcum typist on 5987. The promotion orders were passed by Dr. K.N. Seth who at that time was posted as Additional Director, Medical and Health and family Welfare, Agra Division, Agra. He retired on 3091988. Thereafter from the afternoon of the said date one Dr. U.P. Singh took over as officiating Additional Director. After taking over charge to the post of Additional Director Dr. U.P. Singh wrote to the Director General of the Department pointing out that promotion orders passed by his predecessor in respect of the petitioners were illegal inasmuch as neither the post had been advertised nor any selection had been held in accordance with Rules. The Director General thereafter cancelled the promotion orders of the petitioners and directed their reversion from Class III post to Class IV post. Thereafter the impugned orders of reversion were passed. 7. The order of termination does not stand on the same footing as the case of reversion from government service. In a country like ours which groans under the tyranny of unemployment, when a person gets an employment he has to remain as such till his services come to an end either by the attainment of age of superannuation, or his services are terminated or he is removed from service or he is compulsorily retired in accordance with law and the procedure established by law. 'Right to live' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes right to livelihood. It does not mean that life cannot be extinguished or taken away, but one can be deprived of such a right to livelihood according to just and fair procedure established by law (Olga Tellis & ors. 'Right to live' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes right to livelihood. It does not mean that life cannot be extinguished or taken away, but one can be deprived of such a right to livelihood according to just and fair procedure established by law (Olga Tellis & ors. v. Vayyapuri Kuppusami & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 ). The procedure established by law' in the present context would mean the principles of 'audi alterampartem' which is the essence of the principles of equality enshrined In Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. One would have thought that after the decision of Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India ( 1970 (1) SCR 457 ) the administrative authority would have followed the law underlined by the supreme Court that in every administrative action where there is a lis in the order meaning thereby when the substantive rights are involved, the State cannot snatch away that right without adhering to the principles of natural justice, meaning thereby that he must be given an opportunity to show cause against such an action. The principle was enlarged in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( 1978 (2) SCR 621 ) where the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that the law by means of which right of a person can be taken fairly, in a just manner and reasonably and it should not be fanciful, hence the dictum as enlarged by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) must be adhered to. Every Judge of the High Court is bound by the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court. Not only a Judge, but all the administrative authorities are bound to follow the same and any deviation from the same would be not sustainable in any Court of law. Mr. H.P. Srivastava further relied upon a decision of Hon'ble S.C. Mathur, J. in the case of Nand Lal Prasad v. State of U.P. and others (1991 Selected Civil Decisions 451) where the petitioner was appointed, although he was overage at the relevant time, in accordance with Rules, his services were latter on terminated. A perusal of the observations of the Hon'ble Judge would itself indicate that the precedent would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. A perusal of the observations of the Hon'ble Judge would itself indicate that the precedent would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Hon'ble S.C. Mathur, J. indicated as under: When ineligible candidate is appointed an eligible candidate who could have been appointed in his place suffers prejudice. Such a candidate could have approached this court to challenge the appointment of the petitioner. If such a candidate had approached this Court, the court would have quashed the order of appointment of the petitioner on the ground that he did not possess the eligibility qualification prescribed by statutory Rules. If petitioner's appointment could have been quashed by this Court in the circumstances mentioned herein there is no occasion to quash the order passed by the administrative authority itself thereby doing justice to the person who could not be appointed in view of the illegal appointment of the petitioner. It may be that the petitioner did not suppress any material fact but if eligibility qualifications have been prescribed by statutory Rules the said qualifications will have to be fulfilled by the candidate selected for appointment. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not invited my attention to any Rule whereunder the eligibility qualification could be waived. In the absence of any provision for waiver and in the absence of any order waiving the prescribed qualification the appointment of the petitioner was itself invalid and declaration of that invalidity by the impugned order cannot be faulted. 8. In the present writ petitions it was neither submitted nor argued that the petitioners were ineligible for the posts. It is not the case of the opposite parties that the petitioners lack the educational qualifications or were overage, hence the ratio of the judgment in the case of Hand Lal Prasad (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. Mr. H.P. Srivastava further relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Raghottam Shukla v. State of U.P. (1983 UPSC 178) wherein certain persons who were officiating on certain posts had to be reverted for making room for the selected candidates. Such persons challenged the selection and their reversion by the first set of writ petitions and obtained stay orders from the Court. Consequently, tome of the selected officers had to be reverted. These officers challenged their reversion by the second set of writ petitions. Such persons challenged the selection and their reversion by the first set of writ petitions and obtained stay orders from the Court. Consequently, tome of the selected officers had to be reverted. These officers challenged their reversion by the second set of writ petitions. Meanwhile a Supreme Court decision invalidated Rules 7A and 7B of the aforesaid Rules. Hence, the State Government set aside the selection of 197980, which had been held on the assumption of the validity of those rules. Moreover, the State Government ordered that the officers included in the select list of 1966 and confirmed in pursuance of the selection, be deconfirmed. Such persons challenged their reversion by the third set of writ petitions. Writ Petitions of the fourth set challenged the eligibility list on the ground that no Sadar Qanoongo was included in it. The Government further ordered that Naib Tahsildars promoted from the posts of Supervisor Qanoongos and confirmed on the basis of Rules 7A and 7B be deconfirmed. These Naib Tahsildars by fifth set of writ petitions challenged their deconfirmation. The High Court dismissed all these writ petitions the first, second and fourth sets on the ground of being in fructuous and the third and fifth sets on merits. In view of the facts that orders were passed after the Supreme Court invalidated Rules 7A and 7B of the U.P. Promotion by Selection (in Consultation with Public Service Commission) Rules. 1970 and on the basis of the said judgment the State Government set aside the selection which had been held on the assumption of validity of these Rules the Division Bench decided that the principle of natural justice was not involved. The facts of the present case are totally different and hence the precedent which has been placed has no relevance with the facts of the present case. 10. Several other authorities were cited to support the contention that if the post does not exist, no appointment or order of confirmation could be made and if any such appointment has been made the same is irregular and void. The context in which the observations were made are totally different and hence those authorities have no relevance. 11. Mr. 10. Several other authorities were cited to support the contention that if the post does not exist, no appointment or order of confirmation could be made and if any such appointment has been made the same is irregular and void. The context in which the observations were made are totally different and hence those authorities have no relevance. 11. Mr. H.P. Srivastava further relied upon certain observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel ( 1987 UPLBEC 1241 ) wherein it was indicated that audialterampartern rule can be excluded when it is established that where right to prior notice and an opportunity to hear before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action. This right can be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the Scheme of the relevant statutory provision warrant its exclusion, nor can the audialteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need of promptitude or the urgency of taking action, so demands. This Court fails to understand how the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) can be made applicable to the present case as it was a case of removal from service under the second proviso of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It may be in a situation where it is established that by invoking audialteram partem rule the administrative process may be paralysed due to use of force, coercion or intimidation, witnesses are unable to depose against a delinquent in the inquiry, the inquiry can be dispensed with and order of removal can be passed, but if the situation changes Hon'ble Supreme Court rightly came to the conclusion that at the appellate stage that opportunity can be given. Thus in the case of Tulsi Ram (supra) the principle of equality or natural justice in audialterampartem rule was not abrogated, but it was suspended under certain circumstances, but the same could be claimed, when the appeal or revision is heard, if the situation has changed. Thus in the case of Tulsi Ram (supra) the principle of equality or natural justice in audialterampartem rule was not abrogated, but it was suspended under certain circumstances, but the same could be claimed, when the appeal or revision is heard, if the situation has changed. A corollary has been deduced from audiaherampartem rule, namely, qui aliquid staturerit, parte in audita altera aequum licet dexerit haud aequum facerit, that is, he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard although he may have said what is right, will not have been done what is right, or in other words, as is now expressed justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. Hon'ble Supreme Court, about more than a decade back, in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others ( 1980 (4) SCC 379 ) ruled; The requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. This does not suggest that the opportunity need be a double opportunity that is, one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met, 12. Relying upon the said judgment a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble K.N. Singh and Hon'ble A. Banerjee in the case of Govind Saran Dwivedi and others v. Union of India (1984 (2) LCD 243) held as under: Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the result of the cancellation of the appointment order was that the petitioners' services stood terminated without giving them any opportunity of hearing. We find considerable force in the contention. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is asserted that the petitioners' appointment has been cancelled, as a number of irregularities were found in the selection, some of which have been mentioned in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit. We find considerable force in the contention. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is asserted that the petitioners' appointment has been cancelled, as a number of irregularities were found in the selection, some of which have been mentioned in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit. The petitioners have, however, asserted that they were not given any opportunity at any stage either during the enquiry or before the issue of the impugned order. Since the petitioners had been appointed after their selection and they had been working for more than two years, they had acquired a right to continue in service unless the same was terminated in accordance with service Rules. If there was any irregularity committed in the selection and if the authorities proposed to cancel the selection the petitioners should have been given opportunity of hearing. Admittedly, no opportunity was given to the petitioner as a result of which principle of natural justice was clearly violated. An order passed in breach of the principles of natural justice is rendered null and void, and it is not necessary to demonstrate any prejudice. (See S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & others ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ). 13 In case of Shridhar Son of Ram Dular v. Nagarpalika, Jaunpur and others AIR 1990 SC 307 Hon'ble K.N. Singh. J. held as under: The High Court committed serious error in upholding the order of the Government dated 1321980 in setting aside the appellant's appointment without giving any notice or opportunity to him. It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation pf principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, therefore, the order was illegal and void. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the Commissioner's order setting aside the appellant's appointment. In this view, Orders of the High Court and the Commissioner are not sustainable in law. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, therefore, the order was illegal and void. The High Court committed serious error in upholding the Commissioner's order setting aside the appellant's appointment. In this view, Orders of the High Court and the Commissioner are not sustainable in law. In the case of Sharvan Kumar Jha and others v. State of Bihar and others (1991 SCC (L & S) 1078 it has been held as under; In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments. Admittedly, no such opportunity was afforded to them. It is well settled that no order to the detriment of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rules of natural justice. We set aside the impugned order of cancellation dated November 3, 1981 on this short ground. As suggested by the learned Solicitor General, we direct that the Secretary (Education), Government of Bihar, or to other person nominated by him should give an opportunity of hearing to the appellants and thereafter give a finding as to whether the appellants were validly appointed as Assistant Teachers. He shall also determine as to whether any of the teachers joined their respective schools and for how much duration. In case some of them joined their schools and worked, they shall be entitled to their salary for such period. 14. Relying upon the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) Mr. H.P. Srivastava submitted that if it is assumed that audialterampartem rule was flouted, even then, the petitioners by filing appeals before the Commissioner of the Division could avail that right before the appellate Court, but as the petitioners have not availed alternative remedy available to them, they cannot be permitted to raise the plea of audialterampartem rule before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As stated earlier, the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon which the reliance has been placed pertains to the cases failing in the first and second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and have no relevance to the facts and circumstances of these cases. 15. The writ petitions were filed about nine months back. As stated earlier, the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon which the reliance has been placed pertains to the cases failing in the first and second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and have no relevance to the facts and circumstances of these cases. 15. The writ petitions were filed about nine months back. After the notices were accepted by the counsel for the opposite parties, interim orders were passed by the Court. Latter on affidavits were also exchanged. The plea of availability of alternative remedy could be raised at the initial stage, but it appears that either it was not raised initially and if the same was raised it was ignored by the Court while passing the interim orders. After the affidavits were exchanged and the case came up for hearing the said plea was again agitated. At this stage, the petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground of availability of alternative remedy for the reason that the plea was raised at a belated stage and secondly that the order impugned is non est for the reason that it is violativeof audialteram partem Rule as well as Qualiquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera aequum licet dixerit, baud aequum facerit rule. 16. Assuming that there existed no post upon which the appointment could be made and the president of the Municipal Board had no authority to make appointments, it cannot be said that the appointments were nonest. The pertinent question which requires consideration is as to whether before declaring a particular act void, the person affected has a right to show that the order was perfectly valid. Even while declaring a particular action as void, the requirement of principles of natural justice has to be observed. If without affording any opportunity to the person affected the administrative action, which kills certain right to a person is declared void, it would suffer from arbitrariness. It is true that the origin of public service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case, but once appointed to a post or office, the public servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by the consent of both the parties, but statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the public bodies. There is an offer and acceptance in every case, but once appointed to a post or office, the public servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by the consent of both the parties, but statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the public bodies. It has long been held in the case of Raushan Lal Tandon v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 ) the legal of government servant is more one of status than of contract. The haul mark of status is an attachment to legal relationship to the rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. 17. The petitioners were initially appointed on adhoc basis and were confirmed later on. The question as to whether their confirmation was valid or not was also agitated before this Court by counsels for the respective parties. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that as they were appointed on adhoc basis having no lien on the post, their services were terminated in accordance with rules governing their conditions of service. There is no dispute between the parties on this point that their services were terminated only for the reason that the Municipal Board in its wisdom thought that the action of the President of the Board in appointing the petitioners was against various provisions of the Municipalities Act, the Rules framed there under, the directions of the Board and the State Government. Even from the averments made in the counter affidavit it is evident that the order of termination although innocuously worded was actually an order of removal as it was found by the authorities that their appointment was improper. The reasons indicated for the termination of the services of the petitioners leave no doubt, in the mind of this Court that although innocuously worded, the order was actually an order of removal. Such an order cannot be sustained as it is violative of principles of natural justice. 18. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned orders of termination of the services of the petitioners. Such an order cannot be sustained as it is violative of principles of natural justice. 18. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned orders of termination of the services of the petitioners. A writ in the nature of mandamus is also issued commanding the opposite parties to reinstate the petitioners with all consequential benefits arising out of the quashing of the impugned termination orders. However, it will be open for the opposite parties to proceed against the petitioners in accordance with law. No order is made as to costs. (Petitions allowed)