JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---The appellants had challenged by way of this L.P.A. originally only the order of the learned single Judge dismissing their application for restoration of the writ petition dismissed in default. However, by amendment they have also challenged the order dismissing the writ petition itself in default. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant L.P.A. are that the respondent/landlord filed an application before the learned Rent Controller under Clause 13(3)(vi) (vii) of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Act) seeking permission to give quit notice to the original tenant Gangadhar who died after the appellate judgment in the above Rent Control Case. According to the respondent/landlord there was partition of the family house amongst the brothers and the block in possession of the original tenant Gangadhar was allotted to his share in the said family partition. Further, according to him, his brother Sunil in whose block he was living along with his family gave him notice to vacate his block because according to him there were 15 members residing in the said block. It is for this reason that the respondent/landlord has pleaded his bona fide need and sought permission of the learned Rent Controller to give quit notice to the original tenant Gangadhar. 3. The original tenant Gangadhar filed his written statement in the said Rent Control case. He has also engaged a Counsel to represent him in the said Rent Control case. However, it appears that after filing the written statement he nor his Counsel attended the Court. He was thus proceeded ex parte by the learned Rent Controller. Since the proceedings were ex parte, the learned Rent Controller asked the respondent/landlord to file his affidavit which he had filed. Thus on the material before him, the learned Rent Controller granted permission to the respondent/landlord under Clause 13(3)(vi) (vii) of the Rent Control Order. 4. The original tenant Gangadhar thereafter filed an appeal before the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority on 10-6-1988, against the aforesaid order of the learned Rent Controller rendered on 20-10-1986. There was thus an inordinate delay of about more than one year in filing the said appeal which is required to be filed under Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order, within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the order of the learned Rent Controller. There was thus an inordinate delay of about more than one year in filing the said appeal which is required to be filed under Clause 21 of the Rent Control Order, within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the order of the learned Rent Controller. A preliminary objection was, therefore, raised on behalf of the respondent/landlord, that the appeal was hopelessly delayed and there was no cause made out by the tenant for condonation of delay. In the application for condonation of delay, the original appellant Gangadhar had stated that he was a heart patient and had taken treatment from Dr. Chorghade and Dr. Mahorkar in his clinic and also in the Government Medical College and Hospital, Nagpur and that because of his ill health be could not attend to the above Rent Control case. He had further stated that his Counsel did not communicate to him the decision rendered by the learned Rent Controller on 20-10-1986. It is his case that he came to know about it after the receipt of the notice from the respondent/landlord about his eviction from the suit premises. It is on these grounds that the original Gangadhar sought condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 5. The learned Appellate Authority by its order dated 6-12-1988 held that no sufficient cause was made out by the original tenant to explain the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. Hence he dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The original tenant then preferred a review against the above order of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority but the same was also dismissed. He, therefore, preferred a writ petition registered as Writ Petition No. 1908 of 1990 in this Court on 11-7-1990. On 26-4-1991, the said writ petition was listed for hearing and was dismissed since none appeared for the petitioners though the case was called twice as it appears from the order of this Court dated 26-4-1991, in the above writ petition. According to the original tenant his Counsel learnt about it after 2.30 p.m. on the said date and since there was intervening holidays, he filed the application for restoration of the said writ petition on or about 29-4-1991. 6. According to the original tenant his Counsel learnt about it after 2.30 p.m. on the said date and since there was intervening holidays, he filed the application for restoration of the said writ petition on or about 29-4-1991. 6. When the above application for restoration of the writ petition came up for hearing on 26-8-1991, it was urged before the learned single Judge that the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants was informed that the case would reach for hearing after 2.15 p.m. on 26-4-1991 and therefore he was not present when the case was called in the forenoon on that date. The learned Counsel for the appellants had sent his junior in the High Court at about 2.30 p.m. and thus after learning about dismissal of the writ petition, he filed the application for restoration immediately on the next working day. The learned single Judge of this Court was not satisfied about the reason given by the appellants as sufficient for restoration of the writ petition. He, therefore, dismissed the same with costs of Rs. 500/-. The appellants have challenged in this L.P.A. the above order of the learned single Judge dismissing their application for restoration of the writ petition. During the pendency of the LP.A. the amendment is made challenging also the original order of the learned single Judge dismissing the appeal in default. 7. The first question which arises for consideration in the instant L.P.A. is whether it is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent since the challenge in the instant writ petition originally filed (i.e. before amendment) is to the order passed upon Miscellaneous Civil Application dismissing the application of the appellants for restoration of the writ petition. In other words, what is to be considered is whether the said order is judgment within the meaning of the said expression used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. The learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayben D. Kania and another)1, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786, in support of his submission that the instant L.P.A. is maintainable. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayben D. Kania and another)1, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786, in support of his submission that the instant L.P.A. is maintainable. 8. It is held by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects the valuable rights of one of the parties, it must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. It is further held that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgment which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. The Supreme Court has then given certain illustrations of interlocutory or intermediate orders which have the quality of finality in para 113 of its judgment. Perusal ofsub-para (3) of para 113 xhosx that the interlocutory orders specified in Clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 of C.P.C. contain the quality of finality and are held by it to be judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. An application for setting aside the order of dismissal in default covered by Clause (c) of Order 43, Rule 1 of C.P.C. is therefore judgment within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 9. The learned Counsel for the appellants has thus urged before us that in the instant case also the application for setting aside the order dismissing in default the writ petition is covered by Order 43, Rule 1(c) of C.P.C. which refers to the application for dismissal in default under Order 9, Rule 9 of C.P.C. The submission therefore is that against the order passed upon such an application for setting aside the order of dismissal in default L.P.A. is maintainable particularly when such an application is dismissed because it then finally disposes of the vital and valuable rights of the parties. Although it is true that as provided in section 104 of C.P.C. the provisions of C.P.C. and thus of Order 43, Rule 1 are not applicable to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is pertinent to see that the basic test laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra is whether the impugned interlocutory order affects the vital and valuable rights of the parties and the case falling under Order 43, Rule 1 are only illustrative cases which according to the Supreme Court satisfy the above basic test. 10. It may then be seen that an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 C.P.C. are, although not in terms applicable to the proceedings in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in view of section 104 of C.P.C., this would not mean that the L.P.A. is not maintainable against the interlocutory order passed in the said proceedings. If the interlocutory order passed upon a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is otherwise judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appeal against such order would be maintainable. Therefore, applying in the instant case the above basic test laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra, it is clear that when the writ petition is dismissed whether on merits or in default, it concludes the rights of the parties therein and therefore, when an application is filed for setting aside the order of dismissal in default and for restoration of the writ petition, in our view, the dismissal of such application would affect the vital and valuable rights of the parties and would work serious injustice to the party concerned. The Letters Patent Appeal, in these circumstances, has thus to be held as maintainable, apart from the fact that the appellants have also challenged the original order itself dismissing the writ petition in default. 11. The next question which needs consideration is whether on merits the impugned order of the learned single Judge dismissing the application of the appellants for restoration of the writ petition to file is liable to be set aside. 11. The next question which needs consideration is whether on merits the impugned order of the learned single Judge dismissing the application of the appellants for restoration of the writ petition to file is liable to be set aside. In this regard the factor, which is highlighted by the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord is that the original tenant and thereafter his legal representatives are only trying to delay these proceedings thereby prolonging the agony of the respondent land-lord whose need is genuine and bona fide. Even otherwise, according to him as hereinafter shown the proceedings for eviction of the tenant are in its nature dilatory and therefore the question of restoration of writ petition should be viewed strictly. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord has brought to our notice the fact that the application for permission to give quit notice to the original tenant Gangadhar was filed in July, 1984 before the Rent Controller and the original tenant protracted the said proceedings before him for two years as the learned Rent Controller passed his order upon the said application on 20-10-1986. The appeal preferred by the tenant was then decided in 1988 and on failure in the say, the writ petition preferred by him was decided in 1991. Since the Rent Control Order does not empower the Rent Controller to direct eviction of the tenant against whom permission is granted by him, the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord has brought to our notice the fact that the landlord has to take recourse to the remedy of a civil suit in the civil Court for evicition of the original tenant against whom permission was granted which remedy is also time consuming. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord has then drawn our attention to the conduct of the appellants in trying to protract the proceedings because according to him, when the learned single Judge, during the hearing upon the application for restoration of the writ petition to file, asked the learned Counsel for the appellants to argue the matter on merits, he was told by him that he had no instructions to argue the matter on merits. The above submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord is supported by the observation of the learned single Judge in his impugned order. The above submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord is supported by the observation of the learned single Judge in his impugned order. The learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord has then urged that there was an inordinate delay in filing the appeal against the order of the learned Rent Controller granting permission to the respondent/landlord to give quit notice to the original tenant and, therefore, the appeal has dismissed as barred by time. He has also urged that in the meanwhile after the permission was granted by the learned Rent Controller, although the respondent/landlord had filed the suit for eviction and has obtained a decree for possession against the appellants/tenants, the said decree cannot be executed against them only because the instant Rent Control proceedings are being prolonged by them. He has, therefore, urged that since the appellants were and are not diligent in prosecuting the proceedings but on the contrary are interested only in delaying these proceedings, we should not exercise our discretion in L.P.A. to set aside the order of the learned single Judge, and to restore the writ petition to file. 14. On merits the learned Counsel for the appellants/tenants has urged before us that even assuming that there was fault on the part of the Counsel for the appellants in not attending to the case when it was called, the appellants should not be penalised for his fault because they would ultimately suffer by reason of dismissal of the writ petition. In support of his above submission he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and other)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1400. He has also relied upon two unreported judgments of this Court in L.P.A. No. 76 of 1986 (Yellayya Jattinga v. Tarachand Agrawal)3, decided on 6-6-1988 and L.P.A. No. 64 of 1990 (M/s. Pulgaon Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Second Labour Court, Nagpur and 39 others)4, decided on June 21st, 1991. 15. He has also relied upon two unreported judgments of this Court in L.P.A. No. 76 of 1986 (Yellayya Jattinga v. Tarachand Agrawal)3, decided on 6-6-1988 and L.P.A. No. 64 of 1990 (M/s. Pulgaon Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Second Labour Court, Nagpur and 39 others)4, decided on June 21st, 1991. 15. In the face of these rival submissions and in order to avoid injustice to both sides bearing in mind the fact that the proceedings in the instant Rent Control case are protected, we have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants on merits, more so because giving effect to his submission, means that there would be further delay by remand to the learned single Judge of the writ petition which may further result in further L.P.A. if the decision were to go against the appellants or remand to the learned Appellate Court if the decision were to go in their favour because the learned Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal only on the ground of limitation. 16. As regards the submission on merits, the first hurdle in the way of the appellants is that they have to show that there was sufficient cause for condoning delay in preferring the appeal before the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, particularly when the delay is enormous i.e. of more than two years. It is only if the delay in filing the said appeal is condoned that the matter can go back to the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority for decision on merits. As regards the said question much capital is sought to be made out by the learned Counsel for the appellant/tenants of the alleged fact that the original tenant Gangadhar was suffering from eschemic heart disease. It may be seen that merely because a party to the proceeding is suffering from even some serious ailment, it does not mean that the proceeding is suffering from even some serious ailment, it does not mean that the proceedings should be adjourned indefinitely. Moreover, the original tenant was represented in all these proceedings by an Advocate. It may be seen that if the ailing litigant wants to prosecute the proceedings diligently, it is open to him to examine him on commission. It does not absolve him at any rate from not keeping informed about the progress of the case. 17. Moreover, the original tenant was represented in all these proceedings by an Advocate. It may be seen that if the ailing litigant wants to prosecute the proceedings diligently, it is open to him to examine him on commission. It does not absolve him at any rate from not keeping informed about the progress of the case. 17. In the instant case, the learned Appellate Authority has found that besides himself, the original appellants wife and his two major sons were living with him who could have made an inquiry about the progress of the instant Rent Control case before the learned Rent Controller. In the fact it is clear from the application for condonation of delay itself that on 4-2-1986, the wife of the original tenant Gangadhar had herself applied for adjournment on the ground of ill-health of the original tenant, which would show that his wife who was admittedly living with him could inquire about the progress of the case and do the needful. Because the case is handed over to an Advocate, it does not mean that no duty is cast upon the client to inquire about his/her case in the Court. 18. As regards the principal ground of ill-health of the original tenant Gangadhar, it is not disputed that he was hospitalised in the Government Medical College and Hospital, Nagpur from 24-6-86 to 22-7-1986. Prior to this, it appears that he was taking treatment as an out-door patient from Dr. Chorghade and Dr. Baxi. During the period when the original tenant was not actually hospitalised, he could make enquiry about the progress of the instant Rent Control case at least by addressing a letter to his Counsel if he could not arrange to contact him personally. Nothing is done by the original tenant admitedly till he received the notice of eviction on 13-1-1988. It is thus clear that the original tenant is negligent in prosecuting the instant Rent Control case and he cannot be allowed to make capital out of the alleged heart-disease from which according to him he was suffering. Nothing is done by the original tenant admitedly till he received the notice of eviction on 13-1-1988. It is thus clear that the original tenant is negligent in prosecuting the instant Rent Control case and he cannot be allowed to make capital out of the alleged heart-disease from which according to him he was suffering. Although the learned Counsel for the appellants has urged before us that his major sons were outside Nagpur, the Certificate which he has brought to our notice and which is filed along with the review application is in respect of his only one son which would mean that his another son and his wife were in Nagpur who could have made inquiries about the Rent Control case, if the original tenant was not in position to move out of bed. It is clear that no sufficient cause is shown by he original tenant Gangadhar as to why he did not make any inquiry in regard to the proceedings in the instant case before the learned Rent Controller after 22-7-1986 till the date he received the eviction notice in 1988 i..e. for a period of about 2 years although the appellant might have been taking treatment as an out door patient during the said period or even might have been admitted in the hospital for observation for some time as is sought to be shown from the medical card of Dr. Mahorkars clinic. (see Ann. 9). 19. The finding rendered by the learned Appellate Authority that no sufficient cause is made out by the original tenant to explain the long delay in filing the appeal is thus justified and has to be upheld. He has rightly pointed out that the Rent Control Order contemplates expeditious proceeding for which reason, a period of 15 days only is provided for filing the appeal against the order of the learned Rent Controller. Moreover, as pointed by us, there is two tier proceeding for eviction of the tenant because after the permission is granted by the Rent Controller to give quit notice to the tenant, the landlord has to file a separate civil Suit for actual possession of the tenanted premises. The learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has rightly held that the original tenant was negligent in prosecuting the Rent Control proceedings. The learned Rent Control Appellate Authority has rightly held that the original tenant was negligent in prosecuting the Rent Control proceedings. Looking at it from another angle such delay can be intentional also to prolong the proceedings so as to delay the actual eviction from the suit premises as long as possible. 20. The learned Counsel for the appellants has however relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag another v. Mst. Katiji and others)5, A.I.R. 1987, Supreme Court 1353, in support of his submission that the question of delay should be liberally construed in favour of the applicant. The fact in the above case before the Supreme Court would show that it arose out of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. It is true that the Supreme Court has held in the above judgment that the question of delay in filing the appeal should be liberally construed because normally no litigant would allow the period of limitation in filing the appeal to expire because it would be against his interest to allow the order against him to remain without challenge. It is true that by the above judgment, the old rule that the applicant must explain day to day delay, has been diluted to a certain extent but none-the-less it does not mean that there is no need for the applicant to make out any sufficient cause in claiming condonation of delay. The Supreme Court has itself obsered in the said case that if there is negligence on the part of the applicant in preferring the appeal, such delay cannot be condoned. The question of delay has therefore, to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the instant case as found by the learned Appellate Court which finding does not appear and cannot be said to be perverse, the original tenant has been totally negligent in prosecuting the Rent Control case against him. It cannot be believed that even though the original tenant may be suffering from heart-disease he would not make any enquiry for a long time about the progress and the decision in his Rent Control case particularly when his wife and one son who could make such enquiry were living with him. It cannot be believed that even though the original tenant may be suffering from heart-disease he would not make any enquiry for a long time about the progress and the decision in his Rent Control case particularly when his wife and one son who could make such enquiry were living with him. There is thus no proper explanation given by him as to why for this long period of delay in filing the appeal no inquiry was made by him as to what had happened to the Rent-Control case against him. It needs to be again emphasised that the delay in decision of the Rent Control case means harassment and injustice to the landlord who may need the premises for his own purpose within a reasonable time. In the absence of any proper explanation about the abnormally long delay in filing the appeal, particularly in the context of only 15 days period of limitation being provided under the Rent Control Order with a view to expeditious disposal of appeal as hereinbefore shown, the instant case cannot be brought within the ratio of the above judgment of the Supreme Court. 22. It may be seen that the jurisdiction of this Court in a writ petition is limited and if the finding of fact rendered by the learned Appellate Rent Control Authority is not shown to be perverse, or contrary to law, it cannot be interfered with by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. In this view of the matter since the appeal preferred by the original tenant is barred by time, although it is not necessary to pronounce upon the merits of the case, it must be said that the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord arises because after family partition, his other brother in whose premises he was living, wants that he should live separately in his own premises because there are about 15 members staying in his block. An affidavit is filed by the landlord to that effect with a sketch map showing the blocks or protions allotted to each of the brothers. 23. The learned Counsel for the appellants has however, urged before us that even in an ex-parte proceeding, it is not necessary that the Court should accept the evidence adduced by affidavit. An affidavit is filed by the landlord to that effect with a sketch map showing the blocks or protions allotted to each of the brothers. 23. The learned Counsel for the appellants has however, urged before us that even in an ex-parte proceeding, it is not necessary that the Court should accept the evidence adduced by affidavit. In support he has relied upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (Smt. Anjula v. Milan Kumar)6, A.I.R. 1981 Allahabad 178. It may be seen that the question whether to allow evidence by affidavit in ex-parte proceedings is in the discretion of the Court. In the instant case, the affidavit filed by the landlord is supported by documentary evidence i.e. the deed of family partition. There is, therefore, no illegality committed by the learned Appellate Authority in accepting the evidence by affidavit. Once such evidence by affidavit is allowed, it cannot be held that the need pleaded by the landlord is not proved or is not bona fide or genuine. There is thus no case for the appellants either on merits or on the question of condonation of delay. 24. The learned Counsel for the appellants has sought to cast aspersions upon either the respondent/landlord or upon the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority indirectly alleging that the order passed in review is suspicious, although there is no such specific averment made by him in the writ petition. The learned Counsel for the appellants has brought to our notice the order sheet dated 16-10-1989 in review which states that there was no appearance on that date on behalf of the appellant i.e. the review applicant. He has then brought to our notice the main order of the learned Lower Appellate Authority itself in the review petition in which it is stated that on the date of hearing the Counsel for the review-applicant was not present and he did not appear till the time of the passing of the order. He has challenged the said observation made by the learned Judge on the ground that the original tenant has signed the order sheet dated 16-10-1989 which would show his presence on that date. 25. He has challenged the said observation made by the learned Judge on the ground that the original tenant has signed the order sheet dated 16-10-1989 which would show his presence on that date. 25. Perusal of the averments in the writ petition made in para 5 or in para (viii) of the grounds, do not show that the appellant was actually present at the time of arguments in the review application. It is, therefore, possible that he might have noted the order after the case was closed for orders by the learned Judge on 16-10-1989. It is then urged that although the order sheet dated 1-11-1989 shows that the order was passed on that day and came to be noted by the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord on 7-11-1989 the order was passed in the review application actually on 18-11-1989. It is true that there is no explanation for this but it is possible that the operative order might have been passed on that date which might have been noted by the learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord. In the absence of any specific allegations of mala fide or collusion against the Judge concerned and the respondent/landlord, no serious notice of such discrepancy can be taken by this Court. The above submission made on behalf of the appellant, therefore, cannot be given effect to. 26. In the result, the instant L.P.A. fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances there would be so order as to costs. Letters Patent Appeal dismissed.