JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. B. P. SARAF, J. - By this application under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 61 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 ("the Act"), the Food Corporation of India seeks a direction to the Tribunal to refer the following two questions of law to this Court for opinion : Question (1). "Whether on a true and correct interpretation of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Tribunal was justified in holding that activity of fumigating and treating of foodgrains with insecticides, fumigants and similar chemicals did not amount to manufacture ?" Question (2). "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and on a correct interpretation of rule 43 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1959, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the applicant was not entitled to the set-off under that rule of taxes paid on the purchases of fumigants, insecticides and similar chemicals transferred to branches outside the State for fumigating and treating foodgrains in that State ?" 2. The facts are not in dispute. The Food Corporation of India ("FCI") deals in foodgrains. The foodgrains are stored in godowns and warehouses to protect the same from deterioration and damage due to natural causes such as weather conditions or on account of pests and rodents and to keep it in good condition fit for human consumption. As required by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, it used fumigation and took such other steps as were necessary for the purpose. Some fumigants, insecticides, pesticides and other chemicals were purchased by it for the purpose during the relevant period. 3. In its assessment under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, it claimed set-off in respect of the taxes paid on its purchases of such chemicals, fumigants, insecticides, pesticides, etc., which were required for fumigating and treating the foodgrains to protect the same from deterioration and damage from rodents and pests. The claim was made on the plea that treating of foodgrains by these chemicals amounted to a process of manufacture for the purpose of rule 43 of the Rules framed under the Act and hence, it was entitled to set-off under the provisions of the said Rules. The claim was made on the plea that treating of foodgrains by these chemicals amounted to a process of manufacture for the purpose of rule 43 of the Rules framed under the Act and hence, it was entitled to set-off under the provisions of the said Rules. The claim was rejected by the Tribunal and it was held that treating of foodgrains with chemicals, etc., could not be held to be manufacture of goods within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act so as to entitle the dealer to claim set-off under rule 43 of the said Rules. Application for referring the questions of law to this Court under section 61(1) of the Act was also rejected. Hence this reference. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the applicant-Corporation as well as counsel for the respondent-State of Maharashtra. The submission of counsel for the applicant is that the Tribunal did not take into consideration the definition of expression "manufacture" as given in section 2(17) of the Act, which is very wide and unrestricted and takes within its sweep the process of fumigation, etc., undertaken by the applicant. 5. Section 2(17) of the Act reads as follows : "'manufacture' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed. 6. This definition came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt & Sons [1992] 84 STC 497 where a similar contention was advanced on behalf of the State. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the definition of "Manufacture" contained in section 2(17) was very wide and unrestricted and any process with reference to the goods would, according to the definition, amount to process of manufacture and consequently render the processed goods, goods of a different class altogether. Particular reference was made to the words "altering, processing, treating and adapting" used in the definition. This contention did not find favour with the Supreme Court. Repelling the contention, it was observed : "Prima facie, this argument looks very attractive. But, on careful consideration, we are of the opinion that the terms of section 2(17) should not be given such a wide interpretation. This contention did not find favour with the Supreme Court. Repelling the contention, it was observed : "Prima facie, this argument looks very attractive. But, on careful consideration, we are of the opinion that the terms of section 2(17) should not be given such a wide interpretation. If such a wide interpretation is given there may be very absurd results flowing as a consequence thereof. For instance, the definition includes the word 'ornamenting'. If a dealer purchases certain goods and merely adds some decorative material thereto, according to the State's interpretation, there will be a 'manufacture'. For instance, if a car is purchased and some lights or some special gadgets are added thereto, the interpretation will result in rendering the resale of the same car the resale of a different commodity. Again, if a piece of furniture is sold in a dismantled condition and the distributor puts the parts together and sells it, the definition, if construed as widely as interpreted by the State, can be said to amount to manufacture and render the furniture sold a different item of goods from the furniture purchased. This clearly is not the intention of the Legislature. The purpose of section 8 is that, where substantially the goods purchased are resold, there should be a deduction of the turnover on which purchase tax has already been paid. This provision should be interpreted in a practical and workable manner. The mere fact that the words used in the definition of 'manufacture' are very wide should not lead us to so widely interpret them as to render the provision practically meaningless and so as to treat the goods sold as different merely because some slight additions or changes are made in the goods which are purchased before they are sold. It is true that under the section it is not necessary that there should be 'manufacture' in the sense that a new commodity has been brought into existence as would have been required if that word is interpreted in its literal sense. But, at the same time, the section should be so interpreted to mean only such of the various processes referred to in the definition and applied to the goods as are of such a character as to have an impact on the nature of the goods. But, at the same time, the section should be so interpreted to mean only such of the various processes referred to in the definition and applied to the goods as are of such a character as to have an impact on the nature of the goods. This is indeed made clear by the closing word of the definition which refer to 'manufacture or manufacturing processes'." 6A. The Supreme Court also referred to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Co. [1975] 35 STC 493 and in Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. v. State of Bombay [1959] 10 STC 500 and quoted with approval the following passage from Niligiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. [1959] 10 STC 500 : "In our view, the quantities of tea purchased by the assessees cannot, since the date of the purchases, be regarded as processed within the meaning of the proviso to clause (a) of section 8 of the Act. There is not even application of mechanical force so as to subject the commodity to a process, manufacture, development, or preparation. The commodity has remained in the same condition. It is true that in the preparation of the tea mixture which is marketed, there may be some skill involved. But that, in our judgment, cannot be regarded as processing within the meaning of the proviso. ............ It cannot however be said that in the preparation of the tea mixture there is any alteration in the goods. Undoubtedly by mixing up the different varieties of tea purchased by the assessees there resulted a mixture in which the individuality of the components was obscured, but that, in our judgment, is not alteration within the meaning of the Act. The alteration contemplated by the Legislature is some alteration in the nature or character of the goods." 7. The Supreme Court observed that in the aforesaid cases though the words used by the statute, viz., "processed or altered in any manner after such purchase" were very wide, the High Court read down the scope of this expression and considered that for the purpose of the definition there should be some alteration in the nature or character of the goods. Approving this approach of the High Court it was held by the Supreme Court (at page 504) : "In our opinion, the interpretation of section 2(17) calls for a like limitation on the words used by the statute. As we have already pointed out, that if a very wide interpretation is given, it may lead to impractical consequences." 8. We find that the controversy sought to be raised in this reference is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. It is now the settled position that the activity of fumigating and treating of foodgrains with insecticides, fumigants and similar chemicals does not amount to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. In that view of the matter, the questions of law sought to be referred are purely academic. No reference is, therefore, called for. Consequently this application is rejected. 9. We make no order as to costs.