JUDGMENT - KAMAT V.V., J.:---The plaintiffs-petitioners filed Regular Civil Suit No. 242 of 1980 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chalisgaon against the respondent-defendant. At this stage of the proceedings the plaintiffs-petitioners are the decree holders and the defendant-respondent is the judgment debtor. The suit came to be decreed on the basis of consent terms. The decree is passed on November 17, 1983 in a suit for possession on the basis of title and ownership with a prayer for removal of temporary sheds constructed thereon by the defendant-J. Dr. and for mesne profit for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980. 2. The following are the terms of the consent decree :- 1½ nkO;krhy feGdr Eg.kts pkGhlXkkao ;sFkhy uXkjikfydsps gn~nhrhy 'ksr l- u- 509 v iSdh 0 14 XkaqBs ¼pkSnk XkqaBs½ tehu izfroknhps izR;{k dCT;kr vlysyh 'ksrhph feGdr gh oknhuh izfroknhl jDde :i;s 24]000@ pkSohl gtkj #i;kaoj dk;eph [kkyhy vVhoj fodk.;kps Bjys vkgs- 2½ ojhyizek.ks lnj tehuhph Bjysyh fadaer ,dw.k :i;s pkSohl gtkj gs izfroknhus oknhauk [kkyhy izek.ks rhu gIR;kus fu;ehr |koh- ifgyk gIrk #i;s vkB gtkjkpk rk- 31 12 1983 jksth vXkj R;k iwohZ |kok o nqljk gIrk #i;s vkB gtkjkpk rk- 31 12 1984 jksth vXkj R;k iwohZ |kok o frljk gIrk #i;s vkB gtkjkpk rk- 31 12 1985 jksth vXkj R;k iwohZ dsOgkgh |kok- ;kizek.ks izfroknhus oknhauk ,dw.k :i;s 24]000@ fnys Eg.kts oknhauh izfroknhl ojhy feGdrhps [kjsnh[kr izfroknhps [kpkZus izfroknhl d:u |kos- 3½ dye ua- 2 ;kr fyghys izek.ks gIR;kph jDde :i;s 24]000@ fu;ehr o BjysY;k rkj[kkaps vkr izfroknhus oknhauk u fnY;kl o [kjsnh[kr d:u u ÄsrY;kl oknhauh izfroknh dMwu lnj feGdrhpk izR;{k dCtk ekydh gDdkus dksVkZekQZr ?;kok- 4½ izfroknhus ojhyizek.ks jDde :i;s 24]000@ oknhauk nsÅu lnj feGdrhps [kjsnh[kr d:u ÄsrY;kl oknhauh izfroknhl nkO;kpk [kpZ o ekXkhy uqdlkuhph jDde o iq<hy njE;kups mRiUukph jDde lwV |ko;kph vkgs- 5½ ;s.ks izek.ks oknh o izfroknh ;kaph vklikl rMTkskM gksÅu Bjys vkgs o R;kizek.ks gqdqeukek dj.;kr vkyk vls- 3. The terms of the consent decree obviously therefore, are that the price of the property in question is Rs. 24,000/- and out of this payment is to be done in 3 equally annual instalments of Rs. 8,000/- each to be paid on December 31 of 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. The terms of the consent decree obviously therefore, are that the price of the property in question is Rs. 24,000/- and out of this payment is to be done in 3 equally annual instalments of Rs. 8,000/- each to be paid on December 31 of 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. It is further provided that in the event of non-payment of the instalments on due dates, the plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain the possession of the suit property under ownership through the Court. It is also provided that on payment of Rs. 24,000/- as per the terms, the plaintiffs have to bear the cost of the suit, mesne profits and damages as claimed. 4. Thereafter, the proved facts are that the defendant-J. Dr. paid Rs. 3,000/- on November 27, 1983, Rs. 1920/- on December 3, 1983 and Rs. 12,070/- on January 2, 1985. 5. The petitioners-plaintiff as D. Hs. filed Regular Darkhast No. 58 of 1986 on April 14, 1986 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division Chalisgaon praying that as the defendant has failed to make the payment of Rs. 24,000/- on due dates the possession of the property, namely Survey No. 509-A of 14 gunthas thereof as described to be awarded. It is stated in the Darkhast that the amount of Rs. 16,990/- is received as stated above. 6. Thereafter the learned Civil Judge by an order dated November 3, 1988 directed that if the plaintiffs want to prosecute the Darkhast for possession, they shall first deposit the abovesaid amount in the Court, then only Darkhast shall proceed further. The record shows that this order is complied with and the amount is deposited in the Executing Court. 7. Thereafter, it appears that the defendant-J. Dr. deposited the amount in the Court of Rs. 3,010/- on November 24, 1986, Rs. 2,000/- on December 24, 1986 and Rs. 2,000/- on January 27, 1987. In this state of the situation the defendant-J. Dr. though his Advocate on February 19, 1987 made an application that the payment due to the plaintiffs-D. Hs. amounting to Rs. 24,000/- is paid before the Court in deposit and, therefore, order be passed that the decree is satisfied. 2,000/- on December 24, 1986 and Rs. 2,000/- on January 27, 1987. In this state of the situation the defendant-J. Dr. though his Advocate on February 19, 1987 made an application that the payment due to the plaintiffs-D. Hs. amounting to Rs. 24,000/- is paid before the Court in deposit and, therefore, order be passed that the decree is satisfied. On the basis of this material on record, the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chalisgaon by the impugned order dated January 31, 1990 dismissed the Darkhast holding that there is full satisfaction of the decree and it is this order that is under challenge. 8. The learned trial Judge taking into consideration the payments dated November 27, 1983, December 3, 1983 and January 2, 1985 before the Darkhast and dated November 24, 1986, December 24, 1986 and January 27, 1987 in the Executing Court, making a total of Rs. 24,000/-, and the decree holders receiving this amount, by conduct or implied consent in accepting this amount have waived their right to obtain the possession. The learned Judge has also held that the terms of the consent decree are in the nature of an agreement of contract and not order of the Court. The learned Judge has also, resorted to the provisions of section 148 of Civil Procedure Code and held that although the dates of payment are terms of the decree, the Court has powers therein to extend the time and as such held that by such extension there is satisfaction of the decree. 9. It is this order that is sought to be challenged by the plaintiffs-D. Hs. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-petitioners submitted that the suit ended in a consent decree by the Court. The terms provided payment of Rs. 24,000/- in 3 annually instalments of Rs. 8,000/- each, to be paid on December 31, 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. The learned Counsel submitted that terms also provided for consequences on failure as well as on compliance of the terms. The learned Counsel submitted that the terms can never be considered in the nature of an agreement or contract. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction in holding said terms as agreement or contract. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned Judge has also erred in referring to the contract amounting to waiving of the right to enforce the decree. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to exercise jurisdiction in holding said terms as agreement or contract. The learned Counsel submitted that the learned Judge has also erred in referring to the contract amounting to waiving of the right to enforce the decree. The learned Counsel submitted that the consent decree is a final decree in the suit and, therefore, the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to exercise powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, had no jurisdiction even to extend the time which has been fixed as per the agreed terms. 10. The learned Counsel contended that in order to attract the provisions of section 148 of Civil Procedure Code what is necessary is to find out as to whether the matter has been finally disposed of by the Court or the concerned Court is seized of the matter and has control over it. The learned Counsel submitted that if the order is not final and the Court retains its control over and is seized of the matter, it has full power to make any just or necessary order therein including in appropriate cases the extension of the time under this section. On the other hand, submitted by the learned Counsel, if the effect of the order is that in the event of non-compliance, it operates automatically and without further intervention of the Court, this section cannot be applied for the obvious reasons that the Court ceases to be seized of the matter and becomes functus officio. The learned Counsel submitted, in other words, what is required is the pendency of the proceedings in regard to which the Court is thinking of extending time. When a decree is passed directing the payment on specified dates, after passing of the decree the Court becomes functus officio and is no longer seized of the matter. So as per the provisions of section 148 of Civil Procedure Code there is nothing like anything prescribed or allowed by the Court which is the essence of the section. 11. In support of the submission the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court 1976 Mh.L.J. 561, (Pandurang and another v. Saraswatibai and another)1, and two decisions A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 50 (Naguba Appa v. Namdev)2, and A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1957, (Sulleh Singh and another v. Sohan Lal and another)3, of the Supreme Court. 11. In support of the submission the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court 1976 Mh.L.J. 561, (Pandurang and another v. Saraswatibai and another)1, and two decisions A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 50 (Naguba Appa v. Namdev)2, and A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1957, (Sulleh Singh and another v. Sohan Lal and another)3, of the Supreme Court. In Pandurang's case this Court had an occasion to consider the ambitant scope of section 148 of Civil Procedure Code to observe that section is not to apply where time is allowed for doing the act by the decree in a suit. In this connection the provisions of section 148 of Civil Procedure Code can have no application whereby the Court acting under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code can enlarge or alter the time which is initially fixed in the nature of decree of the Court. 12. On the basis of these decisions the learned Counsel submitted that the Executing Court is not the Court having essence relating to the matter and passing the consent decree. The Executing Court has to execute the decree and if it is found that certain time is the part of the decree of the Court, the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to extend it by resort to section 148 of Civil Procedure Code. 13. The learned Counsel submitted that the consent decree cannot be understood to be an agreement between the parties. 14. On the other hand the learned Counsel Shri V.J. Dixit, appearing in support of the impugned order for the defendant-J. Dr. contended that the power of the Court as is envisaged under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code is much wider. It is not applicable only to the Court having seisin over the proceedings in question but even the Executing Court has power to resort to the said provisions. The learned Counsel submitted that what is necessary is the satisfaction of the interest of interest of justice. The learned Counsel submitted that in this matter the learned Judge has taken into consideration the conduct of the plaintiffs-D. Hrs. not only in accepting the amount but also in receiving the same for further period of years. The learned Counsel while supporting the impugned order further contended that for justifiable reasons if the Court has exercised the jurisdiction, this Court will have no occasion to interfere under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. not only in accepting the amount but also in receiving the same for further period of years. The learned Counsel while supporting the impugned order further contended that for justifiable reasons if the Court has exercised the jurisdiction, this Court will have no occasion to interfere under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. The learned Counsel also submitted that by the time the impugned order was passed the entire deposit was made in the Court and there was no balance. The interests of justice are held to be satisfied by the learned trial Court and it need no interference. 15. The learned Counsel relied on the decision A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 428, (Smt. Periyakkal and others v. Smt. Dakshyani)4, of the Supreme Court where the Court has extended time by resort to section 148 of Civil Procedure Code and in doing so it is observed that ordinarily time would not be extended. I have gone through the decision. It would appear that in Smt. Periyakkal's case the compromise was entered into in executing proceedings which were pending and it was the Executing Court which had the seisin of the matter, certain time was extended. 16. The learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision A.I.R. 1985 H.P. 5, (Jindu and others v. Mahant Ram)5, of Himachal Pradesh High Court wherein the said High Court while relying upon the decision of Smt. Periyakkal's case has exercised the powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code for extension of time and in the same proceedings compromise was entered into. The Court has held that the compromise was in the nature of agreement of sale. I have carefully considered the judgment. I prefer to follow the judgment of this Court referred to above. It is not possible to agree with the reasonings, because of the first principle relating to the exercise of powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code relating to seisin and the form granting extension of time. However, it must be noted that even in this case the Court had seisin but, it is not possible to agree with the reasoning that the compromise in a suit is an agreement or a contract. 17. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the decision A.I.R. 1984 Mad. 147 (G. Rangaraju Chettiar v. Meenakshi Ammal and others)6, of Madras High Court. 17. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the decision A.I.R. 1984 Mad. 147 (G. Rangaraju Chettiar v. Meenakshi Ammal and others)6, of Madras High Court. It is also not possible to agree with the reasoning of the Court, where the terms of the consent decree have been spelt out as a contract between the parties getting merged in the order of the Court giving freedom to the Court to extend time. 18. The learned Counsel lastly relied on the decision A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 199, (Jadabendra Nath Mishra v. Manorama Debya)7, of Calcutta High Court wherein it is held that the Court has ample powers to grant relief against forfeiture even without consent of the parties. It must be noted that in said case of Jadabendra Nath the compromise was entered into in the proceedings under Order 9, Rule 13 of Civil Procedure Code wherein under the terms of the compromise certain facts were agreed upon. Although the proceedings were for restoration of the suit, the Court continued to have seisin over the proceedings. The case is distinguishable on facts. 19. Thus taking overall view and position of the law represented before me by the learned Counsel, in my judgment, the position appears to be quite crystallized. The position is that the Court exercising the powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code must have the seisin over the proceedings in regard to which the Court is understood to be exercising powers under said section. When the Court accepting the terms agreed upon by the parties passes a decree in terms thereof, the terms get the legal character and a decree of the Court cannot be considered to be an agreement or contract between the parties when the terms bear the impression of the Court and character of a decree of the Court, the Executing Court gets no power to exercise powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code because the Court has no jurisdiction to touch what is in the nature of final decree between the parties and only thing left to the Court is to proceed with legal consequences in the execution proceedings. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge could not have decided the decree to be an agreement and could not have resorted to exercise the powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code. In this view of the matter, the learned trial Judge could not have decided the decree to be an agreement and could not have resorted to exercise the powers under section 148 of Civil Procedure Code. The Court had no alternative but to pass the necessary orders which are inevitable as a consequence of non-compliance of the terms of the consent decree. 20. The result therefore is that revision application stands allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated January 31, 1990 of the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Chalisgaon on Exhibit 1 in Regular Darkhast No. 58 of 1986 is quashed and set aside and the learned trial Court is directed to take necessary and legal steps for handing over the possession of the suit property in terms of the consent decree. The amount deposited shall be paid to the defendant judgment debtor on the plaintiffs decree holders obtaining the possession. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. 21. Shri V.J. Dixit, learned Counsel for the defendant judgment debtor prayed for stay of the order. Application rejected. Revision application allowed. -----