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1992 DIGILAW 59 (MAD)

State by the Food Inspector, Pallapatti Panchayat v. Serajudeen and another

1992-01-28

PADMINI JESUDURAI

body1992
Judgment : This appeal by the State challenges the acquittal of the respondents by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kuzhithalai, in C.C.No.58 of 1982 of offences under Secs.7(i) and 16 (1)(a)(i) read with Sec.2(ia), (b) and (m) and Rules 44(g) and 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in that the sample of milk ice-cream sold by the first respondent and manufactured by the second respondent, was found to be deficient in total solids to the extent of 72% milk fat to the extent of 93% and milk protein to the extent of 51% and the sample contained 140 parts of saccharin per million parts in violation of Rule 47 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 prohibiting addition of saccharin. 2. P.W.1, the Food Inspector, lifted the sample from the first respondent on 1. 1982 at 6.30 p.m. in the Weekly Shandy at Sandaipettai Street, Pallapatti Village. The ice-cream was manufactured by the second respondent. 3. During trial, on behalf of the prosecution, the Food Inspector was examined as P.W.1 and Exs. P-l to P-10 marked. The respondents denied having committed any offence. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents on the only ground that the complaint had been sent to court on 2. 1982, received in court on 12. 1982 and taken on file on the same day, but that the notice under Sec. 13(2) of the Act, had been sent to the respondents even on 12. 1982, i.e., before the institution of the prosecution and the notice sent to the first respondent was returned unserved and the prosecution did not take any steps to servea fresh notice and all this was in violation of Sec.13(2) of the Act. Challenging the ground, the State has filed this appeal. 4. Though the appeal has been filed even in the year 1983 and several notices had been sent to the respondents, all the notices have been returned unserved. Notices sent to the address given by the appellant have been returned. The present whereabouts of the respondents are not known. This judgment therefore is pronounced on hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and on perusing the records. 5. The question that arises for consideration is whether the acquittal of the respondents for the reasons given by the learned Magistrate can he sustained. 6. It is seen that though the complaint had been sent to court by registered post on 2. This judgment therefore is pronounced on hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and on perusing the records. 5. The question that arises for consideration is whether the acquittal of the respondents for the reasons given by the learned Magistrate can he sustained. 6. It is seen that though the complaint had been sent to court by registered post on 2. 1982 and had been received in court on 12. 1982 and taken on file on the same day notice under Sec.13(2) of the Act had been set to the respondents on 12. 1982, but has actually been received by the respondents only on 12. 1982. The object of requiring notice under Sec.13(2) of the Act to be served on the accused after the institution of the prosecution, is in view of the fact that under the above provision the ac:used is given an option to apply to the trial court to send another set of sample to the Central Food Laboratory. Unless therefore, prosecution has been instituted and the records are available in Court, it would not be possible for the Court to pass any orders in the event of the accused c pting exercise his right under Seel 3(2). This being the object of requiring the notice under Sec.13(2) to be served after the institution of the prosecution, the fact that the notice was actually despatched on 12. 1982, when the case had been taken on file only on 12. 1982, would be of no significance. The respondents had received the notice only on 12. 1982 and would have been in a positior to exercise their right only from 12. 1982. it had not been the case of the respondents during trial, that they received the notice before the institution of the prosecution and made a futile attempt by applying to the trial court to exercise their right under Sec.13(2). The acquittal cannot therefore be legally sustained. However, in view of the fact that the whereabouts of the respondents are not known and the occurrence had taken place ten years ago, it would not be in the interests of justice to set aside the acquittal to convict the respondents. While therefore setting the law right, this appeal is dismissed.