Judgment :- 1. The defendants are the appellants. The suit filed by the respondent, who is the Secretary and Correspondent of Sourashtra Middle School, Nilakottai is for a declaration that the respondents school is a minority school as per the provisions of Act 29 of 1974, viz., the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and Rules framed thereunder and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing certain specific provisions of the abovesaid Act and Rules, on the respondents school. The Trial Court granted only the abovesaid declaration prayed for, but dismissed the suit with reference to the abovesaid injunction relief prayed for. As against the said decision of the Trial Court, there were two appeals, viz., A.S. Nos. 207 and 208/1980 before the lower appellate court one by the defendants State of Tamil Nadu and its authorities and the other by the plaintiff. The 1st appeal by the defendants is against the declaration granted and the other appeal by the plaintiff is against the refusal of the injunction relief. The lower appellate court, which heard the said two appeals together, dismissed both the appeals. As against the dismissal of A.S. No. 207/1980 filed by the defendants, this Second Appeal has been preferred and in this Second Appeal, the Cross Objection has been filed by the plaintiff seeking the abovesaid injunction relief. 2. Quite similar to the question involved in this second appeal, there were also two other second appeals, viz., S.A. Nos. 15 and 25 of 1981. There also, the question was whether the institutions therein were minority institutions, entitled to the benefits of the protection under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India and for consequential injunction. There also, as in the present case, the question was, whether the institution in question was founded by a linguistic minority, viz., the Sourashtra Community. Those Second appeals were disposed of by judgment dated 14.3.1988. The learned Additional Government Pleader fairly represents that the said decision would govern the present case also and that accordingly this second appeal also may be dismissed. Therefore, pursuant to the said representation and after going through the said judgment dated 14.3.1988, this second appeal is dismissed. 3. Those Second appeals were disposed of by judgment dated 14.3.1988. The learned Additional Government Pleader fairly represents that the said decision would govern the present case also and that accordingly this second appeal also may be dismissed. Therefore, pursuant to the said representation and after going through the said judgment dated 14.3.1988, this second appeal is dismissed. 3. In so far as the abovesaid Cross Objection in this second appeal is concerned the learned counsel for the Cross Objector points out that the Court below has erred in stating that it is only the High Court, that can decide as to whether any one of the impugned provisions of this Act would violate the constitutional rights guaranteed to the minority institution. On that reasoning, the lower appellate Court has refused the injunction relief. 4. The injunction that is prayed for is to restrain the defendants from enforcing certain specified provisions of the abovesaid Act and Rules, since they are said to violate the Constitutional rights guaranteed under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution of India. It is not correct to say that only the High Court can decide such a question. S. 113 of the Civil Procedure Code also gives an indication in this aspect. The Proviso therein says that when such validity question arises, the subordinate Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court, if in its opinion, the relevant Act or Rule is invalid, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which that court is subordinate, or by the Supreme Court. It has also been held in Subbaraja Mudaliar v. C.I.T., Madras 71 L.W. 133 = (1958)1 M.L.J. 431 that such a reference could be made only after the Court records its prima facie finding that the impugned Act or Rule is bad. Further, where the abovesaid High Court or the Supreme Court had already declared an Act or Rule as invalid or inoperative, there is no bar for the subordinate Court, to apply the said decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court to the case in hand before it. So, the lower appellate court is clearly in error in having proceeded on the footing that there is a complete bar for the Subordinate Courts to go into such a question. 5. So, the lower appellate court is clearly in error in having proceeded on the footing that there is a complete bar for the Subordinate Courts to go into such a question. 5. However, whether really the application of the abovesaid specified provisions will be consequential to the declarative decree that has been granted, has not been found by the Courts below. At any rate, I do not think it is necessary to decide that question since an injunction could be granted generally as a consequence of the declaration decree granted. Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men and officers from enforcing any statutory provision which would affect the plaintiffs Schools character as a minority institution. 6. Therefore, the Cross Objection is partly allowed, granting the permanent injunction, only as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs, both in the second appeal and in the Cross Objection.