JUDGMENT A.U. Khan, Member - The facts are: This second appeal by Sita Ram arises out of a declaratory law suit under Section 229-B Z.A. and L.R. Act. While the appeal layhere, respondent No. 1 Chakauri died on 3.8.88. On 13.9.89 a substitution applications moved by appellant Sita Ram. A motion under Section 3, Limitation Act is along with an affidavit explaining the delay. 2. Whether abatement be set aside Respondent Chakauri expired on 3.8.88. On expiry of 90 days, as Article 171 First Schedule to Limitation Act would have it, Second Appeal abated on 1.11.88. Appellant's burden is to explain delay from 1.11.88 to 12.9.89. This comes to 10 months 12 days. There is a substitution application under Order XXII Rule (4) C.P.C. but not one under Order XXII Rule (9) C.P.C. Also no specific prayer is to set aside abatement that has come by. The reason of delay is illustrated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of affidavit sworn in by Sita Ram. That the deponent was not aware of requirement to move substitution application within ninety days. That the deponent has not avoided to move the substitution application within time because of his lack of knowledge. In sum, the cause pleaded is ignorance of law. It is settled that ignorance of law is no excuse. AIR 1929 Nag. 74 is positive "ignorance of law cannot be sufficient excuse for not filing the application in time and, therefore, the abatement cannot be set aside." Hon'ble D.S. Mathur, J. is exacting in his treatment in 1967 AWF 251. 3. "What the appellant says is that he had come to know of death of Smt. Rani Nanda early in February, 1962, but he being ignorant of law did not inform his counsel that Smt. Rani Nanda was dead; and it was in the end of March, 1962 that he gave the information to his counsel when the present application were made. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Further, if the appellant did not know the law it was necessary for him to communicate all the facts to his counsel so that he may take all the legal steps." 4. Mere, concrete details in 1987 R.D. 276 before Hon'ble K.N. Mishra, J. are: Mata Din died on 27.2.1980. An application for substitution moved on 19.11.82. Further, if the appellant did not know the law it was necessary for him to communicate all the facts to his counsel so that he may take all the legal steps." 4. Mere, concrete details in 1987 R.D. 276 before Hon'ble K.N. Mishra, J. are: Mata Din died on 27.2.1980. An application for substitution moved on 19.11.82. The ground was that petitioner was under the impression that Mata Din is not a contesting party and he did not know that substitution will have to be applied within 90 days. Held, "he acted negligently in not caring to intimate this fact to his counsel and ignorance of requirement cannot be taken to be sufficient ground for condoning delay in moving application for substitution." I govern myself accordingly; and hold that ignorance of procedure is no valid ground for delay of 10 months 12 days. 5. The counsel for appellant calls attention to AIR 1985 (11) SC 171 DB to urge that delay is to condone as appellant is ignorant and illiterate. This needs close scrutiny. AIR 1964 SC 215 LB (2) AIR 1973 SC 204 L.B., (3) AIR 1981 SC 1921 L.B. and (4) AIR 1982 SC 476 L.B. are agreed in demanding that appellant is to show a specific "sufficient" cause" of delay in substitution under Order XXII Rule 4, C.P.C. The Division Bench had narrow choice to exercise in measure with preceding larger Benches. But Hon'ble P.B. Bhagwati, R.B. Mishra, JJ." did not care what was said long as the opinions seemed plausible on it's face if not compared with any other" (Justice Stone's view about C.B. Hughes: The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren by A.T. Mason). It is re-writing premises, recasting larger Benches criteria of judgment and adding uncanoncial qualifications to rules. A wilful delay of six years is to condone because "appellant is from rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time." 6. The outlook is based on allegiance to person rather than to principle. The first requisite of appellant is his ignorance: that simplifies and clarifies: that selects and omits. The outlook is based on allegiance to person rather than to principle. The first requisite of appellant is his ignorance: that simplifies and clarifies: that selects and omits. No less brutely ignorant is respondent who earns a legal right on expiry of limitation." The total suppression of qualitative distinctions, while it makes the arising easy, at the same time makes it totally sterile (Small is beautiful, 39 E.F. Schumacher). Surely, over 40 crore illiterates include respondents. It is important to remember that man is more than a link between causes even if ignorant; he is more than an item within a determined sequence even if illiterate. To be human means to be open to sources of legal obligation. There is more: 7. AIR 1962 361: P.B. Gajendragadkar and K.N. Wanchoo, JJ. have overruled AIR 1966 Nag. 37. Judicial Commissioner has held appellant guilty of negligence because the habit of leaving things to the last moment has it's origin in laxity and negligence and having regard to the increasing pressure of business in the law courts and the many facilities now available for the punctual filing of appeals, it is high time that litigants and their advisers were made to realise the danger of procastination which defers the presentation of appeal to the last day of the limitation prescribed therefore." Hon'ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. Sternly remarks. Such general considerations can have little relevance in construing the provisions of Section 5. The decision of Judicial Commissioner shows that he has based his conclusion more on this a priori consideration and did not address himself as he should have to be construction of the section itself. "That is to say, the unique and particular reasons set forth for contemplation. The exaggerated generalisation will not stand and serve each appellant. I hear Hon'ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. saying to Hon'ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. AIR 1985 SC 171, sitting 23 years later, "you are exceedingly so much more general and abstract than judicial Commissioner we have readily overruled." The Bench did not move in measure with chief past precedents i.e., it's own hinge. It is not for me to refuse to discriminate between a Division and larger Benches. 8. The requirement is stressed to decide, with freedom unrestrained, each case on its own merit. In AIR 1972 SC 749 Hon'ble C.A. Vaidialingam and K.K. Mathur, JJ. are emphatic". It is not for me to refuse to discriminate between a Division and larger Benches. 8. The requirement is stressed to decide, with freedom unrestrained, each case on its own merit. In AIR 1972 SC 749 Hon'ble C.A. Vaidialingam and K.K. Mathur, JJ. are emphatic". Each case ; will have to be decided by the Courts on the facts and circumstances of the case." Hon'ble C.A. Vaidialingam's voice is shrill saying to Hon'ble P.N. Bhagwati, J." Each case has it's own unique selfhood, how a generalised cause will do duty for every case."? When the karnel of each legal precedent is clearly enucleated we see that AIR 1983 (11) SC 171 D.B. and same principle in 1986 ACJ SC 232 DB: P.N. Bhagwati and E.S. Venkataramian JJ. stand apart and alone. Further, later Benches: Allahabad Rent Cases 1987 (2) SC 36 and AIR 1991 SC 263 are not condoning delays on the ground that appellant is illiterate and ignorant. Hon'ble P.N. Bhagwati, J. who sat in two Benches, did not govern himself by criteria of larger Benches and is in turn not followed by subsequent Division Benches. Hon'ble R.B. Mishra, J. concurs in AIR 1985 (11) SC 171 DB to condone wilful delay of six years because appellant is ignorant; he also concurs in AIR 1981 SC 1921 L.B. not to condone delay of three months and a half in the absence of supportable reasons. The ambiguity will not stand if we take that states functionary is never illiterate and ignorant. I conclude with the question open whether AIR 1985 SC 171 and 1986 All.C.J. SC 232 D.B. have authority to bind. At any rate, larger Benches interpretation of 'sufficient cause' for each case is for assimilation. This is consequential. 9. There are two things (1) unique and particular (2) generalization. Let us imagine a crossroads with one sign on the right pointing "to heaven of generalisation" and are then on the left pointing "to earthly unique and particular." I will go on the left road for discrenment of concrete particularities: the historian will go on the right to see what is general in the unique for he is chronic generalises. It will not do to attempt formulation of hypothesis by giving "rein to the passional element of our nature", by courts higher in commission whose exposition binds. It is so because from general proposition one cannot drive an instance. It will not do to attempt formulation of hypothesis by giving "rein to the passional element of our nature", by courts higher in commission whose exposition binds. It is so because from general proposition one cannot drive an instance. A general statement is likely to be so broad as to be abstractly platitudinous. It is wrenched from no involvement. For this reason an adequate theoretical comprehension has to come to terms with particular. We want to see a case concretely illustrated and not a legal position threatically formulated even though relation between them............ is reciprocal. I will turn to see whether there has been equal treatment of litigants in fact? 10. AIR 1988 SC 901 DB Award passed on 17.7.1978. Application for certified copies on 31.8.1971 copies obtained on 5.1.1972 and M.F.A. No. 289 of 1973 lodged before the High Court on 19.1.1972 and other two appeals on 10.4.1972. There were thus substantial delays. Cause of delay is inaction on part of Government Counsel: Sri Datta critised that the delay on the part of Govt, even after 20.1.1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond it's control. The Bench says: "this criticism is not without substance. Even so the delay is condoned. I turn to AIR 1981 SC 1921 L.B. one respondent dies on 10.12.1978. The other respondent on 20.2.79 intimates factum and date of demise. Appellant moves substitution on 29.8.79. Appeal abates on 11.9.1979. An application to set aside abatement found time barred by more than three months and a half. No reason good, bad or indifferent is assigned for the failure right from 20.2.79 to 21.8.79 to move court till 29.8.79. Appeal abated. 11. In both State is appellant. Both of them are resting on "sufficient cause". Unexplained delay of over a year is condoned in AIR 1988 901 D.B. Hon'ble A.D. Koshal, J. in AIR 1981 SC 1921 L.B. will not condone unexplained delay of three months and a half. Equality in the treatment of litigants is the purpose to attain. In conceptualisation there is always organic tightness. 12. When a review of case law is undertaken, it is not generalisations which are set to measure. It is to illustrate how the link or the dialogue is carried on of the unique and particular with "sufficient cause". How the concrete details had squared with the provision? In conceptualisation there is always organic tightness. 12. When a review of case law is undertaken, it is not generalisations which are set to measure. It is to illustrate how the link or the dialogue is carried on of the unique and particular with "sufficient cause". How the concrete details had squared with the provision? It is not to state verbal harmony of various generalisations which show a nudge here, a frown there and a smile in between. 13. Where the authority of rulings are unchallenged it is because acceptance is unquestioning. It is worthwhile to see whether there is inner coherence of thought in doctrines of substitution? Whether "sufficient cause" is to be given liberal treatment: AIR 1972 SC 749 D.B. AIR 1988 SC D.B. and AIR 1987 SC 1383 DB? Or strict construction: AIR 1964 SC 215 F.B.? Whether explanation of delay is to be for the whole period day by day: 1976 Alld. 159; 1981 ALJ 176? Or this requirement is needless: AIR 1987 SC 897? Whether appellant's concern includes a care to continuingly enquire about respondent's existence: AIR 1964 215; 1963 AIR Alld. 255, 1960 AIR Pun. 355, AIR 1924 Pat. 607, AIR 1978 Cal. 2977. Or he is not to enquire searchingly: AIR 1983 Pat. 125 , AIR 1985 SC F.B., AIR 1957 Raj. 3307 This perplexes. What immediately impinges is the basis of a subjective assessment. 14. "There is a recurrent tendency in eastern thought to erect speculative systems by forcing a logical argument to excessive lengths. Starting from a given concrete premise, the argument is carried forward by successive syllogism until, "a theory of all things in heaven and earth, would be developed from a single idea." (Modern Trends in Islam, 18 HAR, Gibb). 15. There be only one voice on any legal doctrine though many may clamour for an echo. A discordent note is to submerge for the sake of a stable principle. My obligation is only to decide a specific case: to scrutinise what is it's concrete content. Nonetheless, if I am to incorporate gratuitously to reduce the chaos of diverse concern to a generalised pattern or to make a meaningful formulation, the burden is to more in measure with all past formulated doctrines so that they are complimentary and re-enforcing each other. Nonetheless, if I am to incorporate gratuitously to reduce the chaos of diverse concern to a generalised pattern or to make a meaningful formulation, the burden is to more in measure with all past formulated doctrines so that they are complimentary and re-enforcing each other. Still so, a 'healthy sort of distrust' is to be shown to formulation based on 'disembodied' reasoning' because a decision consists in what is done, not what is said by the court in doing it. We recall justice O.W. Homles: general propositions do not decide concrete cases. "The sweeping generalizations which are the stock-in-trade are based on a small number of particular instances which are assumed to be typical but which cannot be the whole of complicated truth. 16. One criterion of a "sufficient cause", one standard of intimate appraisa to entail similar consequence: diverse abstract notes are pulsating for recognition. "It is all confusion, all coherence gone." One might almost say with poet Donne, echoing different bewilderments. Perhaps, amid the tumults and the tensions, the pleas and the advocates, it would have to be confessed by appellant Sita Ram with old Lear, beyond all his passionate comings and goings." "O I have taken To little care of this" 17. The appeal is dismissed as abated for non-substitution of heirs within limitation.