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1992 DIGILAW 593 (BOM)

Jagannathappa Bhujappa Ganjiwale and others v. State of Maharashtra and another

1992-12-10

N.W.SAMBRE, V.A.MOHTA

body1992
JUDGMENT - V.A. MOHTA, J:---This judgement shall dispose of all these 11 writ petitions by which the following common question is raised :- "Whether section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the `L.A. Act') applies to the awards made by the Collector under section 11 prior to the date when section 28-A was brought into force." 2. The basic facts not in dispute are - The Collector had passed various awards in the cases of the petitioners and others under section 11 of the L.A. Act before 24-9-1984, when section 28-A was inserted in the L.A. Act by the Act No. 68 of 1984. The petitioners had not applied for reference under section 18, but the other persons interested in the lands covered by the same notifications under section 4(1) had. The Civil Courts passed awards at enhanced rates on various dates after 24-9-1984. Within three months of making of those awards the petitioners applied to the Collector for redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the courts. The Collector rejected the applications on the sole ground that section 28-A of the L.A. Act is not retrospective and hence cannot apply to the awards of the Collector made prior to 24-9-1984. Hence these petitions. 3. We reproduce section 28-A for ready reference :- "28-A(1). Wherein an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, nothwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court required that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18." 4. Orders passed by the Collector are not correct. There is no question of applying section 28-A retrospectively. Occasion to apply under section 28-A arises only after the award is made by the Court in a reference under section 18 and that too in case the compensation is enhanced thereby. Cause of action for making application under section 28-A arises on the date of the award of the Court and not before. Period of three months prescribed to make the application also runs from that date. Admittedly in all these matters Courts have made award after 24-9-1984. No doubt amount determined in the awards passed by the Collector under section 11 earlier to 24-9-1984 is the basis for claiming the difference, but that feature by itself is not determinative of the question of retrospectivity. A statute does not become retrospective in operation only because of part of the requisites for its operation is drawn from the time antecedent to its passing. The real decisive factor in each case is the scope of particular provision having regard to its language as well as the object discernible for it read as a whole. 5. Object of section 28-A as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of (Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana)1, 1986(4) S.C.C. 151 is to give benefit to the inarticulate and poor people who by reason of their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right of reference to the Civil Court under section 18 of the L.A. Act. It postulates redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court made in favour of the other. It postulates redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court made in favour of the other. The right accures to a person whose land was acquired by the same notification under section 4(1) who may have been aggrieved by the award of the Collector and may not have been made an application to the Collector under section 18. Section 28-A is a beneficial legislation keeping a social point of view and must therefore, receive object oriented approach and not the approach which will nullify the new right and remedy. Perhaps taking into consideration the above object, the Delhi High Court in the case of (Ram Mehar v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1987 Delhi 130, has gone to the extent of applying the principle behind section 28-A even to cases not strictly covered under that section, by invoking inherent jurisdiction under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It may incidentally be mentioned that the Punjab and Haryana High Court has in the case of (Suresh Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and another)3, A.I.R. 1990 Punjab and Haryana 310, granted benefit of section 28-A with relation to awards made by the Collector in the year 1971. 6 Our attention was invited by the respondents to the controversy at present pending before the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court pertaining to the retrospectively of section 30 of the Act No. 60 of 1984. Section 30 of the said Act does not speak about section 28-A and hence the said pendency need not detain us in the present cases. 7. In the result, the petitions are allowed and the impugned orders passed by the Collector are quashed and set aside. All the matters are remitted back to the Collector for proceeding in accordance with law. Rule made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed.