Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE short facts giving rise to the present revision are as under:1. 1 The present petitioner, as plaintiff, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 250/84 in the court of a Civil Judge (Junior Division), jetpur. The present respondent was the defendant in the said suit, who is alleged to be a senior Advocate of the court where the suit was filed. 1. 2 The petitioner-plaintiff thereafter filed Civil Misc. Application No. 225/86 in the District Court at Rajkot under section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code for transfer of the said suit from the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jetpur, on the ground that the defendant was a senior Advocate practising in the court, and that he is likely to overawe the trial court on that account, and that the petitioner-plaintiff had filed other proceedings which were handled by that court, both as a civil court and as a criminal court in an unsatisfactory manner, which required the plaintiff to approach the Sessions Court for relief. Various similar contentions were also raised by the plaintiff in that application. 1. 3 This application was heard and disposed of by the District Judge, Rajkot by his judgment and order dated 5th january 1987 whereby the same was dismissed. ( 2 ) IT is this order which is challenged in the present revision application. ( 3 ) IN the first instance it must be appreciated that this is a revision under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, and only jurisdiction errors can be corrected. It is conceded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the District Court had jurisdiction to deal with the application under Section 24 of Civil procedure Code. It is, however, contended that in deciding the said application the lower court has committed various errors which in substance would amount to an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Presiding Officer of the court where the Civil Suit is pending, functions both as Civil Judge (J. D.) and as Judicial Magistrate, and that on this account, has occasion to deal with both civil and criminal matters as between the present parties. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Presiding Officer of the court where the Civil Suit is pending, functions both as Civil Judge (J. D.) and as Judicial Magistrate, and that on this account, has occasion to deal with both civil and criminal matters as between the present parties. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that when the petitioner had occasion to file a crimal complaint against the present respondent under sections 448 and 453 of the Indian Penal code, the same was not satisfactorily dealt with by the Presiding Officer of the Court functioning as Judicial Magistrate. It is contented on behalf of the petitioner that when the police asked for a c Summary, and the present petitioner objected against the same by preferring an application at Exh. 8 in the said criminal inquiry case No. 4/83, the Presiding officer of the Court, while functioning as Judicial Magistrate, was seen to have succumbed to the influence of the respondent, whereby he passed an order that the petitioner should appear without an Advocate in the matter of that criminal inquiry. The petitioner submits that the said order was required to be set aside by the Sessions Court, Gondal, in a revision preferred by the present petitioner. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, in short, seeks to rely upon an earlier order passed by the Presiding officer, before whom the present civil suit is pending, which happened to be an illegal order and which was set aside by the Sessions Court. To my mind this is neither here nor there inasmuch as all judicial officers are expected to pass correct and legal orders, and in case they err in doing so, the errors are corrected by the superior court. There is nothing on the record of the case, nor is any suggestion made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Presiding officer of that Court was in any manner personally interested in the present respondent. In fact, the learned Counsel for the petitioner made it amply clear that no personal allegations have been made nor are intended to be made against the Presiding Officer of that Court. In fact, the learned Counsel for the petitioner made it amply clear that no personal allegations have been made nor are intended to be made against the Presiding Officer of that Court. The mere fact that some judicial officer happened to pass a wrong order in a criminal proceeding between the parties is no reason to suppose either that he would again pass wrong orders in the civil matter between the parties or that he would succumb to the so-called influence of the respondent merely because the respondent happens to be a senior advocate practising in that Court. 5. 1. The learned Counsel for the petitioner seeks to make much out of the fact that the respondent is a senior advocate practising before that Court. It is suggested that on this account the court is bound to be biased in favour of the respondent. To my mind, this submission is without any foundation of fact, and also without any allegations on supporting facts. On the other hand, this submission is merely argumentative and also seeks to draw inferences without any rational basis. There cannot be any general proposition that the court is bound to be influenced by a senior Advocate, and consequently is bound to be biased in favour of such senior Advocate. This proposition cannot possibly be accepted. In this context it is pertinent to note that the learned Counsel for the petitioner has made it amply clear that it is not intended to make any personal allegation against the Presiding Officer of the court nor is it the intention of the petitioner to suggest that the court is bound to be influenced by the respondent on account of any factor other than seniority. In view of the aforesaid specific clarification and the specific ground sought to be made out in the present petition, I am of the opinion that the petitioners application made to the district Court under Section 24 of the civil Procedure Code is clearly misconceived and or based on misapprehension. The application is clearly not justified by the facts of the case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that one of the cardinal rules of justice and fairplay is that "justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to have been done". The application is clearly not justified by the facts of the case. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further contended that one of the cardinal rules of justice and fairplay is that "justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to have been done". According to him, therefore, the dispensation of justice must be such, and must be under such circumstances, as would not shake the faith of the parties in the court. According to him, in view of the prevailing circumstances, the petitioner has ample justification in apprehending that he would not get justice at the hands of a particular court. To my mind this is again a misconception of the abovesaid principle. No doubt, the said principle must be accepted in the general sense. However, this principle cannot be interpreted to mean that justice must be done in a manner which would satisfy both the sides, or in a manner which would satisfy even a doubting mind, which is clearly seen to be suffering from misapprehensions and misconceived notions. This principle also cannot be interpreted to mean that justice can only be done by removing such misapprehensions or misconceptions from the doubting mind. If these contentions were to be accepted, it would almost amount to giving the petitioner a choice of the Presiding Officer, which choice is likely to vary from time to time depending its own personal view and its own personal faith in the Presiding officer. Clearly, this is not permissible and such a contention cannot be countenanced. The District Court was, therefore, entirely correct in rejecting the said application. ( 6 ) IN the premises aforesaid, this revision deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. .