JUDGMENT P.K. Shamsuddin, J. 1. The defendants are the appellants. 2. The respondent filed O.S. 620 of 1984 for a permanent injunction restraining the appellants or their men from evicting the plaintiff from the plaint schedule building in execution of the decree in R.C.O.P. 238/71 and also for a declaration that he is a tenant under the appellants. According to the plaintiff, he took shop room No. 2/678 on oral lease stipulating Rs. 90/- per mensem as rent and paid a sum of Rs. 1000/- as advance and subsequently from 1-6-1984 the rent was enhanced to Rs 225/- and recently the appellants demanded enhancement of the rent to Rs.400/- to which he was not willing. It was further averred that prior to that entrustment, his brother Chemeri Krishnan was in possession of the plaint schedule shop and plaintiff was conducting business therein. In R.C.O. P. 238/1971 filed by the defendant an order of eviction passed. Plaintiff further averred that he obstructed and filed O. S.294/1974 for a declaration that he was tenant and for injunction restraining the defendant from evicting him. According to him, eventually the matter was settled in a mediation and the property was entrusted to him on lease. 3. The suit was resisted by the defendants. It was contended that the present suit is barred by res judicata by reason of judgment and decree in O. S.294/1974. They also denied the oral entrustment set up by the plaintiff and payments of rent alleged to have been made by the plaintiff. 4. The Trial Court, after consideration of the evidence in the case found that the suit is not barred by res judicata since the plaintiff was not litigating under the same title in the previous suit. The Trial Court held that in view of S.41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, no order of injunction restraining the defendants from taking delivery of the property in execution of the decree in R.C.O.P. 238/71 can be issued. As regards entrustment, I do not find any specific finding entered by the Trial Court, though from the discussion it would appear that the Trial Court was not prepared to act upon the alleged entrustment pleaded by the plaintiff. Ultimately, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the plaintiff filed A. S.87/1986. Ultimately, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the plaintiff filed A. S.87/1986. The appellate court also held that the prayer for issue of a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the decree in R.C.O.P. 238/71 cannot be granted in the light of the provisions contained in S.41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The appellate court took the view that the mere fact that the decree in R.C.O.P. 23/71 remained unexecuted will not bar the defendants from making a new entrustment in favour of the plaintiff. It also held that the suit is not barred under S.47 and O.21 of the CPC. It also negatived the contention of the defendants that in view of proviso to S.34 of the Specific Relief Act no relief for declaration without the consequential prayer of injunction can be granted. Ultimately, the lower appellate court remanded the matter to the Trial Court directing it to enter a finding on issue No. 2 and additional issue No. 1. 6. In this appeal, learned counsel for defendants has challenged the above findings. Learned counsel submitted that in view of Proviso to S.34 of the Specific Relief Act, the court ought to have held that this is not a case where the court could grant discretionary relief of declaration. 7. In order to appreciate the contention, it would be profitable to a quote S.34 of Specific Relief Act. It reads: "34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so." 8. S.41(b) states that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person instituting or presenting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought: In the instant case, the plaintiff prayed for relief of injunction, but in view of S.41(b) no such relief can be granted. S.41(b) states that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person instituting or presenting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought: In the instant case, the plaintiff prayed for relief of injunction, but in view of S.41(b) no such relief can be granted. S.34 of Specific Relief Act enables a plaintiff to seek a relief of mere declaration without asking for any further relief and the Proviso to S.34 would come into play only if the plaintiff omits to seek further relief in a case where there is no legal bar to seeking such relief. In view of the legal bar mentioned above, it cannot be said that the court is not competent to make a mere declaration that there was entrustment as alleged by the plaintiff. I do not find anything in S.47 and O.21 of the CPC. which would prohibit a suit being entertained for declaration of the status of the plaintiffs as a tenant. Learned counsel pointed out that the remedy of the plaintiff, if any, is only to resist the delivery in execution of order of eviction or file an application under O.21 R.99, after he is dispossessed. It has been held that no application for adjudication of the right, title and interest of an obstructor who is not a party to the suit would lie before he is dispossessed in execution of a decree to which he is not a party and the only remedy of an obstructor is to apply under O.21 R.99 to the execution court to have his claim adjudicated upon after dispossession or file a separate suit before dispossession (See Devassia Joseph v. Vysya Bank Ltd. ( 1990 (2) KLT 339 ). Also see 1985 KLT 225 ; 1978 KLT 901 , 1983 KLT 953 , 1984 KLT 1071 ; 1955 KLT 413 , and AIR1980 MP 146). In the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention that no suit would lie for a declaration of plaintiff's status as a tenant and his remedy is only to seek his claim adjudicated by the execution court. 9. It was lastly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that in any event, the lower appellate court itself ought to have adjudicated upon the question of oral tenancy set up by the plaintiff rather than remanding the matter. 9. It was lastly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that in any event, the lower appellate court itself ought to have adjudicated upon the question of oral tenancy set up by the plaintiff rather than remanding the matter. The plaintiff also filed a cross objection in which also such a contention has been raised. Though there is no specific finding by the Trial Court about the entrustment, the discussion in the judgment would indicate that the Trial Court was not prepared to believe the entrustment set up by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, it was unnecessary to remand the matter. The lower appellate court itself should have considered the question of status in the light of the materials already on record. I, therefore, set aside the order of remand and direct the lower appellate court to consider the question of oral entrustment pleaded by the plaintiff and enter definite findings on issue No. 2 and also on additional issue No. 1. The appeal and cross objection are disposed of as above. The parties will bear their respective costs.