JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J—This is a revision petition under section 115 C P. C. It assails an ad-interim injunction granted by Sub-Judge 1st Class (II), Palampur (District Kangra) in civil suit No. 92 of 1990 on 16 June, 1990 which was affirmed by the learned Addl. District Judge (1) Kangra Division at Dharamshala on 29 October, 199 i in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 26 of 1990 (15 of 1991). 2. Respondent Jagat Ram instituted Civil Suit No. 390 of 1989 in which the HP SEB, its Executive Engineer, Electrical Division Lambagaon and the Sub-Divisional Officer, HP SEB, Electrical Sub-Division, Thural are the three defendants. The plaintiffs case is that he had been appointed as a Chowkidar at 330 K. V. Sub-Station, Thural and had worked as such for more than four years. He had completed 240 days of satisfactory service and was liable to be appointed to the post of Chowkidar on regular basis. The defendants, initially in March 1988 and later in December 1989 served the notice for retrenchment of his services. The first notice was assailed in Civil Suit No. 102 of 1988. (The notice was, however, withdrawn as stated in the written statement). The second notice dated 4 December, 1989 was served upon the plaintiff on 16 December, 1989 where after the present suit (390 of 1989) was filed. 3. Amongst the various assertions contained in the plaint it has been emphasised that the retrenchment of the plaintiff was void for non-compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter, "the Act"). It has been characterised as mala fide. 3. Amongst the various assertions contained in the plaint it has been emphasised that the retrenchment of the plaintiff was void for non-compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter, "the Act"). It has been characterised as mala fide. The relief sought is that : "It is, therefore, prayed that a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to continue in service as a Chowkidar after satisfactory and successful completion of 240 days continuous and uninterrupted service and that the order No. 236066/LK/SJ/ 88-89-8288 dated 4-12-1989 but actually served upon him on the afternoon of 16-12-1989 proposing therein to retrench the services of the plaintiff is illegal, mala fide, ultra vires and void with a consequential relief to restrain the defendants to enforce the operation of the impugned order after the expiry of notice period by issuing a prohibitory injunctive order till final disposal of the suit ; may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants ; Costs of the suit may also please be awarded in favour of the plaintiff; Such other relief as this Honble Court may deem fit, be given to the plaintiff in this behalf." 4. In the written statement it has been pleaded, by way of preliminary I objection, that the plaintiff was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate upon the issue whether the allegations made in the plaint made out a case for interference because that function was entrusted to the appropriate authority under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 The various allegations made in the plaint have been traversed and it has been given out. in the written statement, that the work where the plaintiff was initially engaged has been completed and an option was given to the plaintiff, who was one of the thirty-nine workmen employed at that site, among others, for his re-engagement at a different project. Thirty-six workmen accepted the offer but three, including the plaintiff, did not join at that project in the Palampur Division. As such, the services of the plaintiff were terminated by following the provisions of the Act and retrenchment compensation amounting to Rs. 1080 and a months wages amounting to Rs, 558 were paid to the plaintiff through cheque dated 21 December, 1989. As such, the services of the plaintiff were terminated by following the provisions of the Act and retrenchment compensation amounting to Rs. 1080 and a months wages amounting to Rs, 558 were paid to the plaintiff through cheque dated 21 December, 1989. The plaintiff stood retrenched from service with effect from 4 December, 1989. 5. The plaintiff had sought an ad-interim injunction by making an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C P. C. in the case. The defendants opposed the prayer made in the application. After hearing the parties, the trial Judge granted an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the order dated 4 December, 1989 till the decision of the suit. This order» as mentioned earlier, was affirmed by the Addl. District Judge. 6. The plea that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court was raised before the Courts below but was negatived by them. In the present revision application also it has been emphasised that inasmuch as, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the matter, it will not be competent to issue any ad -interim injunction. 7. Shri K. D Sood, appearing for the defendant applicants, has urged that having regard to the definition of "industrial dispute" contained in section 2 (k) of the Act, the facts pleaded by the plaintiff and the relief sought by him on that basis fell within the purview of an ^industrial dispute" which could only be resolved by an Industrial Tribunal Shri Sood has pointed out that the grievance relating to retrenchment of a workmen was a matter within the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal as was apparent from section 7-A of the Act read with Item No. 10 (Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment) in the Third Schedule thereof. In any case, says Shri Sood, the dispute raised by the plaintiff would be covered by residuary item No. 6 in the Second Schedule of the Act which provides that "all matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule", would be within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts. Thus, argues Sbri Sood, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred in a case like the present. He relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. Thus, argues Sbri Sood, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred in a case like the present. He relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and another, AIR 1990 SC 255 in which the question was examined at some length. It was observed (in paragraph 5) that : "It is therefore clear that the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by implication in respect of remedies which are available under this Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided in this Act .....” He also relies upon an order made by Devinder Gupta, J. in Civil Revision Nos. 189 and 191 of 19 1, {Himachal KHadi Mandal and another v. Om Prakash) decided on 11 December, I991. 8. In Himachal Khadi Mandal the learned Judge was examining the question about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for grant of ad interim Injunction in a suit assailing the order of termination of services of a workman Om Prakash, which had been made, according to the employer, in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act- The (earned Judge, after noticing the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath Biswas, AIR 1990 SC 255 and the definition of an industrial dispute in section 2 (k), came to the conclusion that the remedy which the plaintiff was trying to avail by filing the suit was definitely available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act As such, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to pass an ad interim injunction therein. 9. Appearing on behalf of plaintiff Jagat Ram in this case, Shri Ramakant Sharma has urged that a workman like Jagat Ram, had an option to approach either a Civil Court or seek redress through industrial adjudication, as was laid down by the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, AIR 1975 SC 2238 That was a decision by a Bench of three Honble Judges says Shri Ramakant Sharma, which should have precedence over the decision made by two Judges in Jitendra Nath Biswas. 10. 10. In Premier Automobiles the workmen had claimed two reliefs in the suit which were; that a settlement dated 9 January, 1971 was not binding upon the plaintiffs and other concerned daily rated and monthly rated workmen of the Motor Production Department who were not members of the Association ; and the second, that a decree of permanent injunction be granted restraining the Company from enforcing or implementing the terms of the impugned settlement of 9 January, 1971. The Supreme Court, after examining the scheme of the Act and referring to various decisions, laid down four principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute9 by saying (in paragraph 23; that : "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4)If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." 11. In regard to the second principle it proceeded to say further (in paragraph 24) that : "We may, however, in relation to principle 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in section 2-A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle 3 stated above” (emphasis mine) 12. Shri Ramakant Sharma placed reliance on some more decisions in support of the plea that Civil Court had jurisdiction in a case of the present nature. He relied upon Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 21)43 where a two Judge Bench, while detaling with the validity of an order of termination of services of a bus conductor of the Haryana Road ways on the ground of failure of the punishing authority to give any reason for the order under challenge, in violation of the principles of natural justice, noticed (in paragraphs 3 and 4 that the trial Court had upheld the objection taken on behalf of the State of Haryana that the Civil Court bad no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and dismissed it but the Addl. District Judge, on appeal, held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to do so. Shri Ramakant Sharma, laid stress on the observations contained in paragraph 4 that : "On appeal, the learned Addl. District Judge held m dis-agreement with the trial Court and in our opinion, rightly that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit .." 13. Beyond the aforesaid observations there is nothing else in the judgment to show that the question regarding jurisdiction was canvassed before the Supreme Court or was examined by it in any detail. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court passed in a second appeal wherein the High Court had affirmed the finding of the Addl. District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court but had set aside the finding that the order was a eon-speaking order. The High Court had held that the order was quite legal and valid. 14. District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court but had set aside the finding that the order was a eon-speaking order. The High Court had held that the order was quite legal and valid. 14. The two decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court relied upon by Shri Ramakant Sharma are really of no help to him In the first of them, Municipality, Jagadhri v. Ved Par/cash Aggarwal and another, 1988 Shimla Law Journal 438 a learned single Judge dealt with the question of jurisdiction in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his judgment. What was urged before him on behalf of defendant Municipality was that the suit was impliedly barred by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act The learned Judge said that : "...the question of jurisdiction is not purely a legal issue but is a question of law and facts. No plea has been taken in the written statement. It would not only be improper to permit this plea to be taken at this stage, but injustice to the respondent, in particular to send him to the Labour Court after fighting for 16 years..” And, then (In paragraph 5) that as laid down by the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd v. Kamalkat Shantaram Wadke and others AIR 1975 SC 2238 and Sukhi Ram v State of Haryana, 1982 PLR 717, it was for the plaintiff to make a choice out of two remedies available to him, namely, one under the Industrial Disputes Act as well as by way of Civil Suit. 15. In the second decision in Shiam Kumar Moudgil and etc. v. State Bank of India and others, 1990 Lab. and Industrial Cases 1469 it was noticed by the learned Judge deciding the case (in paragraph 7) that : “In other words, this was not a case in which the plaintiffs sought any relief under provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was nowhere stated in the plaint that the Punishing Authority had contravened any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act or the standing orders there under. It was nowhere stated in the plaint that the Punishing Authority had contravened any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act or the standing orders there under. On the other hand, relief was claimed on the ground that the plaintiffs having been released under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, section 12 of the Act gave them the necessary protection in so far as any disqualification attaching to the conviction for an offence is concerned” Also, (in paragraph 8) that ; "During arguments in these appeals, learned Counsel for the appellants, laid great stress on the alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The cases under consideration, therefore, did not seek to enforce any right under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, principle No 2 enunciated by the Supreme Court is attracted and the plaintiffs had the right to choose their remedy either in the Civil Court or before the Labour Court..." 16. It is plain that having regard to the allegations made by the plaintiff and the relief sought by him in this case, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and try the suit was impliedly barred by the pro visions of the Industrial Disputes Act I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Himachal Khadi Mandal by Devinder Gupta, J. 17. In sum, the Courts below had no jurisdiction to grant ad interim injunction of the nature granted by them in the present suit which the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain. The revision Is allowed and the orders passed by them are set aside. The plaintiffs application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C P. C. shall stand dismissed. 18. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, parties are left to bear their own costs of this Court. Revision allowed