Shailendra Singh v. District Judge, Banda — 1992 DIGILAW 600 (ALL)

JUDGMENT M Katju, J. 1. Petitioner was elected as Chairman of Town Area Madauda, district Banda on 13th November, 1988. Respondent no. 4 who had contested the election, filed an election petition on 29-11-88 before the Munsif Banda. The petitioner filed a written statement in this election petition and an issue was framed whether the learned Munsif has jurisdiction to try the petition By the order dated 21-10-1989 the learned Munsif held that he had jurisdiction. Against this order a revision was filed by the petitioner before the learned District Judge and it was allowed by the respondent no. 2 by his order dated 6-3-91 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). In this order the learned Additional District Judge noted that the provisions of U. P. Municipalities Act have been made applicable in respect of election petitions pertaining to Town areas (vide notification dated 9-12-83 published in 1985 LLT 13). It was held that in view of the judgment of this Court in Shiv Narain v D.J.. 1990 ALJ 389, an election petition challenging the election of Chairman of Town Area Committee could only be filed before the District Judge and not to the Munsif. In view of this judgment it was held by the respondent no. 2 in his order dated 6-3-91 that the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the election petition. The learned Addl. District Judge allowed the revision and set aside the order of the learned Munsif dated 21-10-89. 2. On 7-3-91, respondent no. 4 filed an .application before the respondent no 2 praying for a direction that the election petition be returned for presentation to the competent court and this application was allowed and the election petition was ordered to be returned to the petitioner. A true copy of the order dated 13-3-91 of the respondent no. 2 directing the return of the election petition is Annexure 4 to the writ petition. ON the same date i e. 13-3-91 the respondent no. 4 filed the election petition before the District Judge Banda. The petitioner filed an objection that the election petition should be dismissed as time barred. However, the learned District Judge by the order dated 17-2-92 allowed an application for condonation of delay giving the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act to the respondent no. 4. A true copy of the impugned order dated 17-2-92 is Annexure 9 to the writ petition. However, the learned District Judge by the order dated 17-2-92 allowed an application for condonation of delay giving the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act to the respondent no. 4. A true copy of the impugned order dated 17-2-92 is Annexure 9 to the writ petition. Aggrieved the petitioner has filed this petition against the said order. The learned District Judge in his order dated 17-2-92 has relied on section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act which states that sections 4 to 24 will apply to any special law unless expressly provided otherwise. On the basis of section 29 (2) the learned District Judge has held that the respondent no. 4 is entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act which states that the time spent in perusing a legal proceeding in any court bonafide can be excluded. The question which arises before me is as to whether the respondent no. 4 was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record and a proceeding to dispose of this case finally. 4. Section 20 (1) of U. P. Municipalities Act which has been applied to election petitions in respect of the Town Areas states that an election petition shall be presented within 30 days after the election result is announced by the Returning Officer. Section 22 (1) of the said Act states that an election petition not complying with the provisions of section 20 shall be rejected. The only provision of the Limitation Act which has been expressly provided for in relation to election petitions is the proviso to section 23 (2) (i) which states that section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act shall apply. However, there is no express provision in the U. P. Municipalities Act or Town Area Act for application of section 14 of the Limitation Act to election petitions. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has relied on section 29 (2) in support of his argument that since the U. P. Town Area Act and U. P Municipalities Act are special laws hence section 29 (2) applies and consequently respondent no. 4 is entitled to the benefit of section 14. In support of this contention the decision of the Honourable the Supreme Court in 1989 AWC 934 has been cited before me. 6. 4 is entitled to the benefit of section 14. In support of this contention the decision of the Honourable the Supreme Court in 1989 AWC 934 has been cited before me. 6. In my opinion the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to an election petition. Under section 20 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and hence the election petition was clearly time barred. In Hukum Deo Narain Yadav v. L. N. Misra, AIR 1974 SC 480 , it has been held that an election petition filed after the period of limitation under the Representation of People Act is liable to be dismissed, and the delay cannot be condoned as section 5 had no application in Mohd. Iliyas v. District Judge, AIR 1972 Alld 534, a division bench of this court has held that no ground can be added in an election petition under section 20 of the limitation provided in section 20 had expired. This decision has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1957 SC 444 and the bench has held that the provisions of sections 20, 22 and 23 of the U. P. Municipalities Act are similar to sections 80, 81, 82 and 86 of the Representation of People Act My attention has also been invited to the decision of the Patna High Court in Ramnandan Rai v. The District .Judge Sitamarhi, AIR 1980 Patna 180, where it has been held that an Election Tribunal cannot condone the delay in filing the petition and section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application. This decision has also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Misra, AIR 1974 SC 480 (supra) where it has been held that even though the special law does not exclude the provisions of section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of subject-matter and scheme of special law exclude their operation. In K Venkateswara Rao v. B. N. Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872 , it was held that if a necessary party is not joined within limitation for filing an election petition the High Court cannot allow the addition after the limitation period. In K Venkateswara Rao v. B. N. Reddi, AIR 1969 SC 872 , it was held that if a necessary party is not joined within limitation for filing an election petition the High Court cannot allow the addition after the limitation period. It was held therein that the Limitation Act apply to proceeding like an election petition since the Representation of Peoples Act is a complete code. In view of the above discussion, I am clearly of the view that the respondent no 4 cannot get the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act since section 29 (2) of the said Act has no application The scheme of the provisions relating to election petitions, under the U. P. Municipalities Act exclude the operation of section 29 (2) by necessary implication. Moreover, election law being a technical law. the respondent no 4 should have been careful to have filed the election petition before the appropriate forum within time Not having done so he cannot get the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. 7. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the learned District Judge Banda dated 17th February, 1992 is quashed. The election petition is time barred and is liable to be dismissed as such. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.