A. Haleem v. M. S. Tajudeen — 1992 DIGILAW 603 (MAD)

Judgment :- 1. Disappointed by non-selection as hereditary trustees and non-nomination as non-hereditary trustees in the matter of selection/nomination of trustees to Mathurasatul Salathi Fi Adrabil Falahi Trust (hereinafter called ‘the trust’), petitioners 1 to 6 and petitioners 7 to 11 respectively, have filed this Civil Revision Petition, under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, challenging the Order of the learned District Judge, West Thanjavur, in O.S. No. 6 of 1970 dated 25.9.1992. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this Revision Petition arc the following:—The Trust was founded in the year 1900 and after the death of the founders, when disputes arose, a scheme suit was filed and the administration of the Trust thereafter was being carried on in terms of the Scheme decree as modified from time to time. It is common ground that as per the modified Scheme, for the administration of the Trust, there must be six hereditary trustees to be selected from three main branches, two from each main branch. In addition to that, there should be three non-hereditary trustees to be nominated by the District Judge, West Thanjavur. The selection of hereditary trustees is also made by the District Judge, West Thanjavur. In all, there should be nine trustees. It appears, when the selection was made on an earlier occasion, disputes arose about the correctness of the selection which went upto the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court passed the following Order:— “Special leave granted. We are not inclined at this stage to set aside the order of the District Judge. Let the present set of trustees work upto May 31, 1992. The District Judge, however will take steps in the month of January 1992 for making advertisements in the newspapers inviting applications for the posts of trustees and those applications will be considered by him and objections made thereto will also be considered by the District Judge and the entire matter will be completed by March 31, 1992. While selecting the new set of trustees, the District Judge will not take into consideration any observations that have been made previously and consider the matter independently on merits. The present set of trustees will function till the end of May 1992. While selecting the new set of trustees, the District Judge will not take into consideration any observations that have been made previously and consider the matter independently on merits. The present set of trustees will function till the end of May 1992. If any objection is made against the selection of any of the trustees and the same goes to the High Court, the High Court will also look into all those objections and dispose of the same and complete the selection by May 31, 1992 so that the new set of trustees can take up their trusteeship and manage from the beginning of June 1992 for a period of three years, as has been provided in the scheme. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and order rendered by the High Court in the Civil Revision Petitions and uphold the judgment of the District Judge made in O.S. 6 of 1970. The appeal is disposed of with the above observations.” 3. Pursuant to the above Order of the Supreme Court, the learned District Judge called for applications for selection and nomination of hereditary and non-hereditary trustees. In view of certain proceedings pending in this Court staying the proceedings before the District Judge, West Thanjavur, it appears, he could not adhere to the schedule given in the above said Order of the Supreme Court. The stay was vacated on 7.7.1992, and, after collecting the applications, the learned District Judge posted the matter for appearance of the applicants on 25.8.1992. On that date, he gave time till 3.9.1992 to file objections, if any, to the applications already received. As the District Judge was on leave on 3.9.1992, the objections were received on 4.9.1992, and time to file reply to the objections was given till 15.9.1992. After receiving the reply, the learned District Judge heard arguments on 15.9.1992 and 16.9.1992 and passed orders on 25.9.1992 selecting the respondents 1 to 6 herein as hereditary trustees and nominating the respondents 7 to 9 herein as non-hereditary trustees to the Trust. Aggrieved by the above selection and nomination, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioners, as mentioned at the outset. 4. Though the matter lies in a narrow compass, elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, inviting equally lengthy arguments from the learned counsel for the respondents by way of reply. Aggrieved by the above selection and nomination, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioners, as mentioned at the outset. 4. Though the matter lies in a narrow compass, elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, inviting equally lengthy arguments from the learned counsel for the respondents by way of reply. It may be mentioned that though the learned counsel for the respondents initially raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Civil Revision Petition, when the matter was taken up for final disposal, that preliminary objection was given up. 5. At the outset, Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the order, dated 18.9.1991 (extracted supra), the scope of the enquiry by this Court in this Civil Revision Petition is wider than the scope under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Specifically he placed reliance on the following sentence:— “If any objection is made against the selection of any of the trustees and the same goes to the High Court, the High Court will also look into an those objections and dispose of the same and complete the selection by May 31, 1992. .. .” 6. On the other hand, Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1, 3 and 5, who advanced leading arguments on the side of the respondents, submitted that when the Supreme Court gave a direction to dispose of the matter that direction for disposal must be taken as a disposal in accordance with law, which means, in accordance with S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the objections raised by the disappointed petitioners should be considered in the light of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On this aspect, I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. As a matter of fact, the petitioners have quoted S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing this Civil Revision Petition. 7. Let me now proceed to deal with the arguments on merits. 8. Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners advanced the leading arguments, which were adopted and added by Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, who appears for petitioners 3, 4, 8 and 11. 9. The main argument of Mr. 7. Let me now proceed to deal with the arguments on merits. 8. Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners advanced the leading arguments, which were adopted and added by Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, who appears for petitioners 3, 4, 8 and 11. 9. The main argument of Mr. N.T. Vavamamalai, learned senior counsel, was that the failure on the part of the learned District Judge to formulate a sort of guidelines before selecting/nominating the trustees resulted in application of different yardsticks to different individuals. In other words, he submitted that no uniform standard was applied either in the matter of selecting/nominating the trustees or rejecting the applications. As the learned District Judge has failed in the procedure resulting in material irregularity, this Court has every right to set right the same. By way of example, he submitted that in the matter of certain candidates who applied for selection as hereditary trustees, the learned District Judge rejected their applications on the ground that they are not local residents, whereas he has selected certain candidates ignoring the fact that they are not local residents. Similarly, he pointed out that though in respect of hereditary trustees, the property qualification was not a condition precedent, it was put against certain candidates and ignored in respect of certain applicants. He also submitted that though the learned District Judge rejected the applications of existing trustees on the ground that others must be given a chance in the light of the amended Scheme decree, in the case of the second respondent, such bar was not imposed even though the learned District Judge found that the second respondent had acted as hereditary trustee on an earlier occasion. It is his further submission that the learned District Judge failed to bear in mind that the trustees must be generally persons of known reputation, and consumption of liquor being against Islamic principle, it should have been applied strictly and the application of the third respondent ought to have been rejected. Likewise, according to the learned senior counsel, the application of the 8th respondent (non-hereditary trustee) should have been rejected on the ground that he was detained under Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Likewise, according to the learned senior counsel, the application of the 8th respondent (non-hereditary trustee) should have been rejected on the ground that he was detained under Maintenance of Internal Security Act. He also brought to my notice that though certain mismanagement during the period when the second respondent was trustee, was brought to the notice of the learned District Judge, that was not taken serious note of by the District Judge and that it vitiates the selection. Again he pointed out that in the case of the 7th respondent (M.M.S. Abdul Wahab), a charge under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code was levelled against him, and in spite of that he was selected. 10. In support of his arguments, Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai placed reliance on the following judgments:— Venkatagiri v. H.R.E. Board, Madras A.I.R. 1949 Privy Council 156 = 62 L.W. 374 (P.C), Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137, D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P). Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and others A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2324 = 84 L.W. 57 (S.N.) and Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration ). A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1791 the respondents 1, 11. Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for petitioners 3, 4, 8 and 11, while adopting the arguments of Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, submitted that so far as the hereditary trustees are concerned, they have a legal right and, therefore, before rejecting any of their claims on the basis of the objections, they should have been given an opportunity, and according to him, the failure to do so, vitiates the selection/nomination. According to the learned counsel, the learned District Judge has not at all applied his mind, and no uniform yardstick was applied in the matter of selection/nomination. He also stressed that guidelines should have been formulated prior to the commencement of the selection/nomination process. He placed reliance on the decision in Shoorji Vllabdas & Co. v. ITEPT Commissioner, Bombay A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1166, to contend that even in revisional proceedings, this Court can go into the question of facts. 12. Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, learned counsel appearing for 3 and 5, who advanced the leading arguments, submitted that it is not open to the petitioners to advance arguments to the effect that the learned District Judge ought to have formulated guidelines in the first instance before proceeding with the selection and nomination of trustees. 12. Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, learned counsel appearing for 3 and 5, who advanced the leading arguments, submitted that it is not open to the petitioners to advance arguments to the effect that the learned District Judge ought to have formulated guidelines in the first instance before proceeding with the selection and nomination of trustees. Because, when the matter was earlier pending in this Court in C.R.P. 3127 of 1989, an identical point was raised on the side of the respondents herein, but that was seriously opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners herein, staling that the formulation of any guidelines will amount to adding something to the scheme which cannot be done. He pointed out a portion of the order in the said Civil Revision Petition, which reads as follows:— The learned counsel further argues that the guidelines asked for by the revision petitioners, if framed, cannot be valid in law, that the very same procedure which has been adopted for all these years has been followed in this year also and that there is no reason to evolve the guidelines.” He also pointed out that when the matter was pending before the learned District Judge, an application was taken out for framing guidelines before proceeding further. But that application was not pressed and both sides did not evince any interest. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to raise that point after participating in the proceedings and after taking a chance before the learned District Judge. Even otherwise, according to Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, no uniform guidelines can be applied while selecting persons from three different groups, haying different qualifications and different criteria, apart from nomination of non-hereditary trustees. It is the contention of Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian that the learned District Judge has fully applied his mind, and on the basis of the materials placed before him, has arrived at certain conclusions, and this Court, sitting in revision, may not interfere with such conclusions even if there is a possibility of taking a different view, unless the conclusions reached by the learned District Judge were so shocking or arbitrary or without any basis. He also submitted that it is not as if all the disappointed applicants have come to this Court or that they have been made parties to this Civil Revision Petition. He also submitted that it is not as if all the disappointed applicants have come to this Court or that they have been made parties to this Civil Revision Petition. Except the existing trustees in the hereditary trustees group, only one who was not selected, has joined as petitioner. Petitioners 1 to 4 and 6 are existing trustees, and they want to continue during their lifetime, which is against the spirit of the Scheme decree and, therefore, the learned District Judge has rightly rejected their applications, is the contention of the learned counsel. As a matter of fact, according to the learned Counsel, one existing trustee, though he has applied but was not selected, has not chosen to challenge his non-selection. 13. So far as the non-hereditary trustees are concerned, they have no right as such. It is only the nomination by the learned District Judge, and if the nominated applicants satisfy the qualifications prescribed for non-hereditary trusteeship, their nominations cannot be challenged on the ground that other applicants for non-hereditary trusteeship also possessed the same qualifications and therefore, they must have been preferred. He also submitted that the learned District Judge has considered threadbare the age and other qualifications of each and every applicant and has given reasons for selection as well as non-selection. While selecting or rejecting an applicant, the learned District Judge has taken into account the cumulative factors and not any particular requirement, such as residence or property Qualification. According to the learned counsel, the existing trustees were not selected not only on the ground that they are existing trustees, but on various other grounds given by the learned District Judge, in particular, in view of a direction given by a Division Bench of this Court in A.S. No. 992 of 1978. He contends that the arguments on the side of the petitioners would amount to inviting this Court to go into the question of fact and give a different finding on re-appreciation of the facts, which is not the scope of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. He contends that the arguments on the side of the petitioners would amount to inviting this Court to go into the question of fact and give a different finding on re-appreciation of the facts, which is not the scope of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. So far as the second respondent against whom a contention was put forth, stating that though he held office earlier, he has been selected again, learned counsel submitted that no personal allegation was made against the second respondent to disqualify him from being selected again, and apart from that, after a comparison of his application with the other competing applicants in that branch, the learned District Judge selected him. 15. Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, in support of his contention that in the matter of selection, the scope for interference is very limited, cited the following judgments — Keshavdeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria and others A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 23 = 66 L.W. 188 (S.C), Manick Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Nandy and others , A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 4473, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2324(supra), Johri Singh v. Sikh Pal Singh and others A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2073 = 1990-1-L.W. 520 and Santokh Singh Arora v. Union of India and others A.I.R. 1992 S.C 1806. He also submitted that the learned District Judge had in mind, apart from the terms of the Scheme decree, Ss. 10 and 73 of the Trusts Act. He, therefore, submitted that in the light of his submissions, there is no case for interference. 16. Mr. R. Muthukumaraswami, learned counsel for the 6th respondent, has filed an affidavit which inter alia supports the stand taken by the petitioners. He submitted that in the event of this Court accepting the arguments of the learned senior counsel tor the petitioners, all selections and nominations must be set aside, and the matter must be remitted back to the learned District Judge. 17. Mr. R. Sundaravaradan, learned senior counsel appearing for the 7th respondent(non-hereditary trustee), submitted that in the case of nomination of non-hereditary trustees, the learned District Judge had wide discretion and, according to him, ‘nominate’ means ‘to name to his subjective satisfaction’. Learned senior counsel further submitted that though as against the 7th respondent, an allegation was made that he was involved in a murder case, it was a false one as could be seen from the dates. Learned senior counsel further submitted that though as against the 7th respondent, an allegation was made that he was involved in a murder case, it was a false one as could be seen from the dates. According to the learned senior counsel, the nominations were filed on 19.2.1992, the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 14.5.1992 at 7.30. pm, and the F.I.R. was laid on 15.5.1992 at 9.00. pm. The 7th respondents name was not mentioned even by eye witnesses, and he was falsely implicated. Subsequently, when the charge-sheet was laid, his name was omitted. He produced before me a certified copy of the charge-sheet in which the respondents name does not find a place. Therefore, the objection raised against the 7th respondent on the basis that he was involved in a murder case cannot be taken into account at all. 18. Mr. K. Govindarajan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, submitted that the selection of the 2nd respondent under the hereditary trustee category cannot be found fault with as the learned District Judge has found him to be the best suited person. 19. Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the 9th respondent(non-hereditary trustee), adopted the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for the other respondents. 20. Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, in his reply, reiterated the arguments based on guidelines and submitted that advancing the interest of the Trust alone should have been considered as the criterion for selecting and nominating trustees. If that had been borne in mind, the learned District Judge would not have dropped all the existing Trustees as they were working to advance the interest of the Trust. He also pointed out the various improvements made by them. According to the learned senior counsel, though reply to the objections were filed in the case of the sixth respondent, it has not been referred to in the order, and that it vitiates the proceedings. He again pointed out that no uniform yardstick was applied, that the existing Trustees were working as a team, and that the respondents are only an opportunistic group and their only aim is to see that the existing Trustees are not re-selected. He also submitted that the decision reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1806(supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents will not apply to the facts of this case. He also submitted that the decision reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1806(supra) and relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents will not apply to the facts of this case. He also placed reliance on the decisions in Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 271 and India Carat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and another A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 885. 21. Before considering the rival submissions, it is better and advantageous to bear in mind the essential requisites that are necessary to become eligible to be selected as hereditary trustee and to be nominated as a non-hereditary trustee. 22. So far as the hereditary trustees are concerned, the fundamental requirement is that the applicant must be a male member from one of the three main branches. He must be between the age of 25 and 65. The selection will be by the District Judge, West Thanjavur. The term of the hereditary trustee is for a period of three years. (Be it noted, no other qualification such as property or residence, as in the case of non-hereditary trustee is prescribed for selection of hereditary trustee.). 23. So far as the non-hereditary trustees are concerned, the requirements are, that they must be residents of the panchayat area of Adhiramapattinam and they should not be in the male line of the three branches of the Founders (who will be entitled only for selection as hereditary trustees). They must be persons of known reputation and character, must be of the age group between 35 and 70, must have public interest, and they must also possess one or more of the following qualifications:— (a) Assessed to income-tax for more than Rs. 100/- per year in the year next preceding the year of nomination; (b) They must be assessed to kist, water charges, etc., as pattadars under the Government in the year preceding the year of nomination; (c) They must pay by way of property tax to the value of Rs. 25/- or more in respect of a building registered in their name in the panchayat during the half year preceding the year of nomination. 25/- or more in respect of a building registered in their name in the panchayat during the half year preceding the year of nomination. Apart from the above qualifications prescribed in the scheme decree, the observations made by the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench which modified the decree are also relevant, and they read as follows:— “When there is a provision for re-appointment, any trustee, who acquits himself well or who has rendered noteworthy service, is eligible for re-appointment.” The fact that a particular trustee renders commendable service for the trust does not mean that he should be retained for life as a matter of right. It has been rightly contended on behalf of the appellants that there are nearly 100 persons in these three branches eligible for appointment as hereditary trustees and if six hereditary trustees dominate for life, the rest of them would be totally excluded from participating in the administration of the Trust.” xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xx The main intention seems to be that all the heirs in the line of succession should have an opportunity to serve in the trust. Such an intention cannot be achieved if six persons are allowed to occupy the office for their lifetime. We are unable to see how the interest of the. Trust will suffer by restricting the period of office to a shorter period.” 24. Apart from the above, on an earlier occasion, another Division Bench, in A.S. 531 of 1954, has accepted the reason given in the Scheme decree in O.S. No. 21 of 1952, which reads as follows:— “Probably a chance once in three years may be conducive to fresh blood coming in so that there may not be any monopolising and consequent mal-administration.” 25. Again, in C.R.P. 2025 of 1960, in the same matter, this Court has observed as follows:— “The principle of rotation and change in the personnel of the trustees was also accepted as a sound one by this Court in A.S. No. 531/54 arising out of O.S. 51/52.” 26. I also consider that at this stage it is advisable to refer to the decisions cited at the Bar on the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 27. I also consider that at this stage it is advisable to refer to the decisions cited at the Bar on the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 27. In A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 23 = 1953 S.C.R. 136 (supra), on the scope of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:— “S. 115, Civil Procedure Code, applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it, and if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it has made and not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, the High Court has no power to interfere, however profoundly it may differ from the conclusions of that court on question of fact or law.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. Again, in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2073(supra), the Supreme Court has held as follows:— “Consequently, the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge only — (i) if the said Judge had no Jurisdiction to make the order it has made, and (ii) had acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which was material and may have affected the ultimate decision. If neither of these conditions was met the High Court had no power to interfere, however profoundly it may have differed from the conclusion of the Senior Subordinate Judge on questions of fact or law. Coming to the question as to whether the Senior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to make the order made by him it may be pointed out that S. 148, C.P.C., as seen above, conferred ample jurisdiction on him in this regard. Apart from the cases cited above in support of the provision we may refer to a Full Dench decision of the Allahabad High Court succinctly laying down the law on the point in Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, 1972 All L.J. 169 = A.I.R. 1972 All. 246. Apart from the cases cited above in support of the provision we may refer to a Full Dench decision of the Allahabad High Court succinctly laying down the law on the point in Gobardhan Singh v. Barsati, 1972 All L.J. 169 = A.I.R. 1972 All. 246. Relying on a decision of this Court in Mahanth Ram Das v. GangaDas, 1961-3-S.C.R. = A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 882 it was held (para 7 at p. 249 of A.I.R.):— “Even in cases where an order is made by the court for doing a thing within a particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thine is not done within the time fixed, the court has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out, to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of the time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under S. 148, C.P.C. to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction.” (Para 21) 29. In A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 446 (supra), the Supreme Court has held as follows:— “We are constrained to observe that the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the two revisional applications was one not warranted by law. The High Court treated these two applications as if they were first appeals and not applications invoking its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The nature, quality and extent of appellate jurisdiction being exercised in first appeal and of revisional jurisdiction are very different. The limits of revisional jurisdiction are prescribed and its boundaries defined by S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that Section revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the High Court if it appears to it that a subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction is thus confined to questions of jurisdiction. While in a first appeal the court is free to decide all questions of law and fact which arise in the case in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction the High Court is not entitled to re-examine or re-assess the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on facts for those of the subordinate court. In the instant ease, the Respondents had raised a plea that the Appellants application under R. 13 of O. IX was barred by limitation. Now, a plea of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries a proceeding, for a finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would not cost the jurisdiction of the court. In determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate court on such a plea, the High Court may at times have to go into a juridictional question of law or fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral questions upon the ascertainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the subordinate court has decided such a col lateral question rightly, the High Court cannot, however, function as a court of first appeal so far as the assessment of evidence is concerned and substitute its own findings for those arrived at by the subordinate court unless any such finding is not in any way borne out by the evidence on the record or is manifestly contrary to evidence or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand, would result in grave injustice to a party.” (para 5) 30. In A.I.R. 1949 Privy Council 156 (supra) = 62 L.W. 374 (P.C), it has been held as follows:— “S. 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final. In A.I.R. 1949 Privy Council 156 (supra) = 62 L.W. 374 (P.C), it has been held as follows:— “S. 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters;(a) That the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) That the case is one in which the Court ought lo exercise jurisdiction; and (c) That in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, iii breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error or procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate Court upon questions of fact or law. No such matters arose in this case, and the order of the High Court upon the petition was without jurisdiction.” 31. In A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2324 (supra) = 84 L.W. 57 (S.N.), it has been held thus:— “The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under S. 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this Section on their plain reading do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words ‘illegally’ and ‘with material irregularity’ as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision under S. 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision petition virtually as if it was an appeal.”(Para 8) 32. In A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137 (supra), the Supreme Court has held thus:— “We have noticed that in the application to the High Court the respondents asked that Court to exercise its power of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution by the method of issuing a writ of certiorari or any other suitable writ. Art. 227 corresponds to S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. The scope of that section has been discussed in many decisions of Indian High Courts. However, wide it may be then the provisions of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under that section assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure or any breach of any rule of natural justice. If anything it may merely be an erroneous decision which, the error not being apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Art. 227.” (para 18) 33. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 271 = 22 I.T.R. 73 (supra) was cited by Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, to support his contention that the learned District Judge has taken into consideration certain irrelevant factors and omitted to consider certain relevant factors, and that it is not possible to find out to what extent the mind of the learned District Judge was affected by the irrelevant factors, and that therefore, it must be held that the conclusion reached by the learned District Judge was vitiated. 34. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I. R. 1992 S.C. 1805 (supra), cited and relied on by Mr. K.T. Paul Pandian, learned counsel for the respondents 1, 3 and 5, does not appear to be apposite, as in this case, the selection as well as nomination are to be on the basis of the Scheme decree as modified from time to time. Unlike in the case of the Supreme Court, the selection was without any statutory guideline. 35. I would like to state that I have been taken through the orders of the learned District Judge both by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners and also by the learned counsel for the respondents. Apart from that, I have myself independently and carefully gone through the said orders. After this, I entertained a feeling that the learned District Judge has done his best in assessing the merits and demerits of each and every candidate before him and while selecting and nominating the Trustees, and has also considered certain applications before rejecting them. It is well known that perfection is not given to man. It is, therefore, possible to find fault with each and every candidate on one ground or the other. The learned District Judge has sincerely attempted to select/nominate the best suited persons by applying his mind, and has also given reasons for his conclusions. 36. It is well known that perfection is not given to man. It is, therefore, possible to find fault with each and every candidate on one ground or the other. The learned District Judge has sincerely attempted to select/nominate the best suited persons by applying his mind, and has also given reasons for his conclusions. 36. We have seen that for selecting the hereditary trustees, it must be done two each from out of the three main branches. In the first branch, six applications were before the learned District Judge. Out of those six he rejected petitioners 1 and 2 not only on the ground that they are existing Trustees but also on the ground that in the light of the observations of the Division Bench of this Court (extracted earlier), representation for others must also be given, if they are otherwise qualified for selection. The Division Bench has observed that there are 100 persons in three branches eligible for appointment as hereditary trustees. That was in the year 1987. Probably, it will be more now. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned District Judge has committed any error of jurisdiction or irregularity in the procedure of selection. We have seen that the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out how the jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be exercised. Applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited above, it cannot be said that the selection of respondents 1 and 2 in any way suffers from error of jurisdiction or material irregularity. 37. The main contention of Mr. N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, was that guidelines should have been formulated before considering the applications. But this contention is not acceptable for more than one reason. For, though there was an opportunity for raising this objection before the learned District Judge; when an interim application was filed for that purpose, that was not availed of. Further, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, that will not work well in the facts and circumstances of the case as, while selecting two hereditary trustees from each of the three main branches, general guidelines cannot be observed. Further, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, that will not work well in the facts and circumstances of the case as, while selecting two hereditary trustees from each of the three main branches, general guidelines cannot be observed. Further, the selection or non-selection of the hereditary trustees was not on the basis of a single criterion, but on the cumulative effect of various factors brought to the notice of the learned District Judge. Therefore, there is no case for interference in respect of selection of respondents 1 and 2. It may also be noted that except the existing trustees, the other two applicants, though not selected, have not come to this Court complaining about the selection. 38. The learned District Judge has also considered the objections raised against the selected candidates and has dealt with the same. I cannot substitute my opinion in the place of the opinion of the learned District Judge, especially when they are based on facts. 39. While selecting respondents 3 and 4 for the second branch, the learned District Judge has considered the merits and demerits of each candidate and has given well-founded reasons which do not call for any interference. Consequently, the selection of respondents 3 and 4 does not call for any interference. 40. Coming to the third branch, there were seven applicants and the sixth petitioner, an existing trustee was not selected. Against the sixth petitioner, there were a number of complaints inter alia that his father was there in the Trust for a period of 40 years, and the 6th petitioner had completed two terms and wanted to continue like his father for life. Apart from that, several personal allegations were also made against the sixth petitioner and those allegations were considered by the learned District Judge. The grievance of the learned counsel regarding the case of the sixth petitioner was that he filed reply to the objections, but that was not considered by the learned District Judge, and that it vitiates the selection. I do not think so. The learned District Judge, though has not expressly mentioned about the reply to the objections, has considered the case of the sixth petitioner in detail. Therefore, I do not think there is any case for interference. 41. As regards the arguments of Mr. I do not think so. The learned District Judge, though has not expressly mentioned about the reply to the objections, has considered the case of the sixth petitioner in detail. Therefore, I do not think there is any case for interference. 41. As regards the arguments of Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners 3, 4, 8, and 11 that the learned District Judge has not considered the objections properly and also has not given them opportunity, I am of the view that the arguments of the learned counsel cannot be sustained. In the beginning, I have pointed out how the learned District Judge invited the applications, gave sufficient opportunity to the applicants to file objections, and equally sufficient opportunity to file reply to the objections, and therefore considered the merits and demerits of each applicant comparing with the merits and demerits of the rival applicants. 42. Regarding the selection of respondents 5 and 6 from the third branch, the learned District Judge has given very good reasons for selecting them. One other factor to be noticed is, that except the sixth petitioner, no one has come to this Court from this branch, challenging the selection of respondents 5 and 6. Even the existing trustee from this branch who has not been selected, has not come to this Court. The discussion made by me earlier for sustaining the selection of hereditary trustees from the first branch will apply to this branch as well. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the selection of respondents 5 and 6, exercising my jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 43. Now, coming to the nomination of non-hereditary trustees, namely, respondents 7 to 9, as rightly contended by Mr. Sundaravaradhan, learned senior counsel for the 7th respondent, the discretion of this Court is wider in this field. It cannot be seriously contended that respondents 7 to 9 do not possess the qualifications prescribed for being nominated as non-hereditary trustees. As a matter of fact, as regards the 8th respondent, there appears to be no objection before the learned District Judge. 44. Now, by filing C.M.P. 15501 of 1992, the petitioners want to raise an objection, by way of raising an additional ground. I do not think, at the revisional stage it is open to the petitioners herein to raise that. 44. Now, by filing C.M.P. 15501 of 1992, the petitioners want to raise an objection, by way of raising an additional ground. I do not think, at the revisional stage it is open to the petitioners herein to raise that. Even otherwise, in the affidavit filed in support of the petition (C.M.P. 15501 of 1992), it was stated that the 8th respondent was detained under the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Again, an affidavit is now filed with an averment that by mistake such a statement was made in that affidavit. The 8th respondent was really detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Smuggling Activities Act. Though an affidavit has been filed as stated above, the petition remains as if the 8th respondent was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Securities Act. On this ground also, I do not think that it must be taken cognizance of, that too, in the absence of any proof. Moreover, there is failure on the part of the petitioners to raise objections earlier, even though ample opportunity was given. Therefore, this C.M.P. is dismissed. 45. Only regarding the 7th respondent, serious objections were raised including his alleged involvement in an offence punishable under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. This has been considered by the learned District Judge, and, as I have stated earlier, the charge-sheet now produced before me does not show that he was in any way connected with the alleged offence, even though his name finds a place in the F.I.R. It must also be mentioned that Mr. R. Sudaravaradan, learned senior counsel, contended that the eye-witnesses have not mentioned the name of the 7th respondent in their statements. The other objections raised were also not established before the learned District Judge. 46. So far as the 9th respondent is concerned, no serious objections were raised, and the learned District Judge has given good reasons for nominating him as one of the non-hereditary trustees. 47. In the result, on an overall consideration of the orders of the learned District Judge, I do not find any ground to interefere with the same. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same shall dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.