JUDGMENT : R.A. SHARMA, J. 1. Petitioner was appointed by order dated 24-4-1991 as Stenographer in the office of S D.M. (Pargana Adhikari), Sadar, Mahrajganj District Mahrajganj, for a period upto 30-6-1991 with the conditions that the appointment is purely temporary and it can be terminated at any time without any notice. After the expiry of the above period the appointment of the Petitioner was extended from time to time but always for fixed period on the same terms and conditions. The last order whereby, the Petitioner was again appointed was for a fixed term from 2-7-1992 to 31-8-1992 on the same conditions. After the expiry of the term Petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the Government Circular dated 2-9-1992 and praying for writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to appoint him as Stenographer on regular basis. Further prayer for treating him as Class III employee on the pay scale of 1200-2040 has also been made. 2. From the perusal of the appointment letter it is apparent that the appointment of the Petitioner was contractual for a fixed term with the conditions that his services can be terminated at any time without any notice. Supreme Court in the case of Director, Institute of Management Development, Uttar Pradesh Vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 , relevant extract of which is reproduced below, has laid down that where appointment is contractual for a fixed term, employee has no right to continue after the expiry of the term; The appointment was purely adhoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end. xxx xxx xxx To our mind, it is clear that where the appointment is contractual and by efflux of time, the appointment comes to an end, the Respondent could have no right to continue in the post. Once this conclusion is arrived at, what requires to be examined is, in view of 'he services of the Respondent being continued from time to time on 'ad hoc' basis for more than a year whether she is entitled to regularisation? The answer should be in the negative. 3. In view of the position as laid down by Supreme Court the Petitioner has no right to continue after expiry of his term which came to an end on 31-8-1992. The answer should be in the negative. 3. In view of the position as laid down by Supreme Court the Petitioner has no right to continue after expiry of his term which came to an end on 31-8-1992. Question of termination of his service after the above date does not arise because he has ceased to be in service thereafter. So far as the Circular dated 2-9-1992 is concerned it has not terminated the Petitioner's service. His appointment came to an end by efflux of time. 4. By Circular dated 2-9-1992 the appointments in future have been frozen by the State Government. Ordinarily no person can compel the State to appoint him or to continue him in service after expiry of his term, as it is for the Government to decide whether to fill up or not to fill up any vacancy. In this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha AIR 1990 SC 170 where in it was laid down as under : One fails to see how the existence of vacancies gives a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. 5. Same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jatinder Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and others (2), by holding that, But it is open to the Government to decide how many appointments will be made. The process for selection and selection for the purpose of recruitment against anticipated vacancies does not create a right to be appointed to the post which could be enforced by a mandamus. * * * The notification made by the Board in this case was only an invitation to candidates possessing specified qualifications to apply for selection, for recruitment for certain posts. It did not hold out any promise that the selection would be made or if it was made the selected candidates would be appointed. * * * The notification made by the Board in this case was only an invitation to candidates possessing specified qualifications to apply for selection, for recruitment for certain posts. It did not hold out any promise that the selection would be made or if it was made the selected candidates would be appointed. The candidates did not acquire any right merely by applying for selection or for appointment after selection. 6. A division Bench of this Court in the case of R. K Sharme v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1990 (61) following the above decisions of Supreme Court has also laid down as follows : Government has the power to determine how many appointments are to be made and it is open to the Government not to fill up a vacancy even after advertisement. A person, who has applied in pursuance of the advertisement, cannot claim to be appointed to the post applied for and principle of promissory estoppel will not apply. Government has the power to fill up or not to fill up any vacancy even after the advertisement unless there is some express or implied prohibition by law. 7. Merely because there are vacancies and a candidate is eligible he cannot claim any post. Petitioner as such cannot challenge the Circular dated 2-9-1992 unless it is proved that the Government Order is arbitrary, malafide or suffers from manifest error of law which the Petitioner has failed to prove. That apart as mentioned above, by the Government order dated 2-9-1992 the Petitioner's appointment has not been terminated. It has come to an end automatically by efflux of time. As observed earlier Petitioner cannot claim to be appointed against, the vacancy even if he is eligible as it is for the State to fill or not to fill that vacancy. 8. Relying upon the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975 (here in after referred to as the Rules), learned Counsel has however, submitted that service of the Petitioner cannot be terminated except by way of notice of thirty days or payment of salary in lieu thereof. It is not possible to agree with the learned Counsel. In the instant case Petitioner was appointed on contractual basis for a fixed term. Appointment being on contractual basis for a limited period, came to an end automatically by efflux of time on the expiry of the term. It is not possible to agree with the learned Counsel. In the instant case Petitioner was appointed on contractual basis for a fixed term. Appointment being on contractual basis for a limited period, came to an end automatically by efflux of time on the expiry of the term. In such a case the order of termination is not required to be passed. The Petitioner's appointment has come to an end after the expiry of the term. In the case of the Petitioner there was also the condition in the appointment letter to the effect that his appointment can be terminated at any time even without any prior notice. Petitioner cannot be said to be in the "Temporary Service" of the State within the meaning assigned to it under the Rules. The Rules as such are not applicable to him. 9. In the end learned Counsel has raised an apprehension that Respondents may make appointment in future without considering the Petitioner's case. In this connection it is sufficient to observe that if and when the Respondents want to make any appointment, they may consider the case of Petitioner also, provided that he applies in time and is eligible for the post. 10. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.