JUDGMENT 1. - This judgment would decide DB Civil Special Appeals Nos. 53 & 136 of 1992, as in both of them, the same point of law in involved. 2. DB Civil Special Appeal No. 53 of 1992 arises from an order dated 15th Jan., 1992, passed by a learned Singl Judge of this Court, in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 5945 of 1991, filed by appellant Dahra Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Dahra, Tehsil Kumar, in District-Bharatpur. The other DB Civil Special Appeal No. 136 of 1992 arises from order dated 20th Feb., 1992, passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 6969 of 1991, filed by appellant Tara Singh & Ram Avtar. Respondent No. 1 in both these writ petitions was The Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Limited (for short, hereinafter, "the IFFCO"). While in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 5945 of 1991, respondents Nos. 2 & 3 were Election officers, in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 6969 of 1991, respondent No. 2 was the Returning officer of the IFFCO. In both these writ petitions, the learned Single Judges of this Court held that the IFFCO was not "the State" as that expression has been defined by Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the two writ petitions filed by the respective appellants were not maintainable. 3. Article 12 of the Constitution of India, finding place in its Part-III, reads as under; "12. Definition-in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." 4. For Part-IV of the Constitution also, the expression, "the State" has the same meaning as in Part-Ill by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 36 of the Constitution. 5. The first decision of the Supreme Court on the point is in the case of Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India ( AIR 1956 SC 479 ) , wherein, S.R. Das, C.J., had held that Income-Tax Department was "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 5. The first decision of the Supreme Court on the point is in the case of Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India ( AIR 1956 SC 479 ) , wherein, S.R. Das, C.J., had held that Income-Tax Department was "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. So also Hidayatullah, JI, in Ujjain Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1621 , at p. 1666, para-118 stated, "the taxing departments are instrumentalities of the State. They are not apart of the legislature nor are they a part of the judiciary. They still (as tribunals which play the dual role of assessment and collection of taxes) are instrumentalities of Government and hence "the State" in Ujjain Bai's case (supra), Mr. A.S.R. Chari, appearing for intervener No. 2, had urged that "State" action which involves the violation of a fundamental rights does not include that resulting from what he termed "the judicial authority of the State". Rejecting the contention of Mr. Chari, his Lordship Ayanagar, J. (at pp. 1678-79, para 152) observed: "In the first place, it has to be pointed out that the definition is only inclusive, which itself is apt to indicate that besides the Government and the Legislature there might be other instrumentalities of State action which might be comprehended within the expression, "State ". That this expression "includes" is used in this sense and not in that in which it is very occasionally used as meaning "means and includes" could be gathered not merely from other provisions of Part-Ill but also from Article 12 itself.... Article 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the definition by referring to "other authorities" within the territory of India which cannot obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude and capable of comprehending every authority created under a statute and functioning, within the territory of India. There is no characterisation of the nature of the "authority" in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws.... There is no characterisation of the nature of the "authority" in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority set up under a statute for the purpose of administering laws enacted by Parliament or by the State including those vested with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws.... In the face of these deductions following from the Constitution itself, I find it wholly impossible to accede to the submission that what is termed as judicial power of the State which, '; is submitted, would include quasi-judicial authorities created under statutes do not fall within the definition of the "State". 6. In K.S. Ramomurthy Reddiar v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry and Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1464 , the question for determination was whether the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry acting as quasi-judicial appellate authority under the Motor Vehicle Act at a time when Pondicherry was not within the territory of India was or was not "Local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." His Lordship Wanchoo, J., speaking for the Court, held: "All local or other authorities would thus be of two kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India-whether under the control of the Government of India or the Government of various States or even autonomous authorities which may not be under the control of the Government at all, and (ii) those under the control of Government of India-even though are not within the territory of India." 7. As to the content, import and sway of the word "control" appearing in the expression "Control of the Government of India", his Lordship expressed himself as follows: "It follows from these observations in the majority decision in that case Masthan Sahib's case AIR 1962 SC 797 that the control envisaged by the words "under the control of the Government of India" in Article 12 is not the control which arises out of mere appointment, payment and the right to take disciplinary action; the control envisaged under Article 12 is a control of the function of the authorities concerned, and the right of the Government of India by virtue of that control to give directions to the authority to function in a particular manner with respect to such functions. Now, if the authorities were administrative or executive, the control of the Government of India would not only be by virtue of appointment, payment and disciplinary action, but, it would also extend to directing the authority to carry out its functions in a particular manner and purely executive or 'administrative authority can always be directed by the Government of India under which it is functioning to act a particular manner with respect to its functions. This, however, cannot be said of a quasi-judicial or Judicial authority even though the Government of India may have appointed the authority and may be paying it and may have the right to take disciplinary action against it in certain eventualities. It was not open to the Government of India to control the functions of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority and direct it to decide a particular matter before it in a particular way.... Such control is possible in the case of a purely executive or administrative authority; it is impossible in the case of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority, for in the very nature of things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to the Government, be it the Government of India or the Government of a State, to direct a quasi-judicial or judicial authority to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner.... We are, therefore, of opinion that the Appellate Authority being quasi judicial...cannot be said to be an authority under the control of the Government of India." 8. As to the Rajasthan State Electricity Board V Mohanlal, his Lordship Bhargava, J., speaking for the majority in the decision , observed, as follows: "These decisions of the Court support our view that the expression "other authorities" in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities. Under the Constitution, the State is itself envisaged as having the right to carry on trade or business as mentioned in Article 19(1)(g). In Part-IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Article 12 and one of the Directive Principles laid down in Article 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. In Part-IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Article 12 and one of the Directive Principles laid down in Article 46 is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The State, as defined in Article 12, is this comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people. The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under Article 298 to carry on any trade or business. The circumstances that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that he Board must be excluded from the scope of the word "State" as used in Article 12. On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government. The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part-Ill of the Constitution were applicable." 9. His Lordship referred to the meaning of the word "authority" given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which could be applicable, namely, "a public administer agency or corporation having quasi-governmental powers and authorised to administrator a revenue-producing public enterprise. He held that this dictionary meaning of the word "authority" is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions. 10. His Lordship J.C. Shah, J., did not agree with the majority view that "every constitutional or statutory authority on whom powers are conferred is "other authority." According to Shah, J.: "Authorities constitutional or statutory invested with power by law not sharing the sovereign power do not fall within the expression "State" as defined in Article 12. Those authorities which are invested with sovereign power, i.e., power to make rules or regulations and to Administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and Ors. Those authorities which are invested with sovereign power, i.e., power to make rules or regulations and to Administer or enforce them to the detriment of citizens and Ors. fall within the definition of "State" in Article 12, and constitutional or statutory bodies which do not share that sovereign power of the State are not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." 11. Viewing in the light of the restrictive meaning also, Shah, J. held that the Rajasthan State Electricity Board is invested by statute with extensive powers. Thus, in the Rajasthan State Electricity Board's case (supra), a statutory body carrying on commercial activities for the promotion of economic interests of the people and having powers to give directions (the disobedience of which was punishable as a criminal offence) was held to be "other authority", and hence "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 12. Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1331 and Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1329 were decided on the same date by the same Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. In the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, there was deep and pervasive, administrative and fiscal control over the affiairs of the Commission of the Central Government apart from the flow of finances in the form of capital incurred by the Central Government as non-recurring expenditure in connection with the existing organisation with a provision for further advancement of capital. The Oil & Natural Gas Commission had the exclusive privilege of extracting petroleum. The exploration of the resources was by the Union through the agency of statutory Commission. Its employees had the statutory power of entry upon any land or premises for the purpose of lawfully carrying out works by the Commission and members and employees of the Commission were "public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India, the structure of the Corporation indicated that it was an agency of the Central Government carrying on the exclusive nationalised business of life insurance. Each and every provision of the Life Insurance Corporation Act showed in no uncertain terms that the voice was that of the Central Government and the hands were also of the Central Government. Each and every provision of the Life Insurance Corporation Act showed in no uncertain terms that the voice was that of the Central Government and the hands were also of the Central Government. The Life Insurance Corporation was owned by the Government. The Life Insurance business was nationalised and vested in the Corporation. No other insurer could carry on life insurance business. The management was by the Government. The dissolution of the Corporation could be only by the Government. 14. The Industrial Finance Corporation was under the complete control and management of the Government. Citizens could not be its share-holders of the capital of ten thousand shares of the total value of five crores of rupees, of five thousand rupees each, the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India had each to subscribe for two thousand shares. Scheduled banks could subscribe for two thousand five hundred shares. Insurance Companies, investment trusts and other like financial institutions could have two thousand five hundred shares and cooperative banks one thousand shares of the Corporation. All shares of the Corporation held by the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India were to stand transferred to and vest in the Development Bank. The Central Government could acquire shares held by share-holders other than the Development Bank. After such acquisition, the Central Government could direct that the entire undertaking of the Corporation shall be vested in the Development Bank. The Corporation could not be dissolved except by the Government. The Industrial Finance Corporation Act stated that whoever, in any bill of lading, warehouse receipt or other instrument given to the Corporation whereby security is given to the Corporation for accommodation by it, wilfully makes any false statement shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or with both. These statutory bodies were held to be "authorities" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 15. Mathew, J., took a concurring more wider view and he observed: "A finding of state financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterise an operation as state action." 16. Alagiriswami, J. gave the dissenting Judgment and he observed: "In order that an institution must be an "authority" it should exercise part of the sovereign power or authority of the State." 17. Alagiriswami, J. gave the dissenting Judgment and he observed: "In order that an institution must be an "authority" it should exercise part of the sovereign power or authority of the State." 17. He referred to the case in British Broadcasting Corporation v. Johns (1965(1) Ch.2) , wherein, Willmer, L.J., quoted with approval, the remarks of Wilbeiforce, J. against whose judgment the Court of Appeal was being heard, to the effect: "So, I come to the conclusion that however widely one may be inclined to extend the conception of an act or function of government, the Crown has not taken the path of engaging itself in a broadcasting service or of entrusting in to any agent. It has deliberately chosen the alternative of an independent instrument." 18. His Lordship remarked, "there can be no doubt that is the position in respect of the three Corporations.... It is clear that Article 296 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to for supporting the proposition that when the State enters into nongovernmental activities that should also be considered to be a governmental function. It is wrong to consider the word "other authorities" in Article 12 as including any corporation which does not exercise part of the Governmental functions of the State. 19. In Sobhajit Tewari's case (supra), all that appeared in relation to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was that all that was established was that the Government took special care in the promotion, guidance and cooperation of scientific and industrial research and in the utilisation of the research conducted under the auspices of the Council, which was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, towards the development of industries in the country, so that, the same may be carried out in a reasonable manner. The Council was neither a statutory body, nor a department of the Government. It had existence independent of the Government though the Prime Minister was the President, and the Government appointed nominees to the Governing Body and could terminate their membership. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was held not to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 20. It had existence independent of the Government though the Prime Minister was the President, and the Government appointed nominees to the Governing Body and could terminate their membership. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was held not to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 20. Mysore State Road Transport Corporation was, in the General Manager, Mysore State Transport Corporation v. Devraj Ors, AIR 1976 SC 1027 , held to be "other authority" as it was statutory corporation and the State Government had power under Section 34 of the Act to give directions to be followed by the Corporation relating to recruitment, conditions of service, training of its employees, wages to be paid, reserves to be maintained and disposal of its profits or stocks and the directions given by the State Government were binding. 21. Then came the decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628 . It would be useful to extract the relevant observations made by Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Court: "If Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public law limitations, it must follow a fortiori that Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of corporations should equally be subject to the Same limitations. But, the question is how to determine whether a corporation is acting as instrumentality or agency of Government. It is a question not entirely free from difficulty. A corporation may be created in one of two ways. It may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860. When a corporation is wholly controlled by Government not only its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. But, ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. So also a corporation incorporated under law is managed by a board of directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government? Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case, a corporation established by statute may have no shares or shareholders, in which case, it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a board of directors appointed by Government, though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions. What then are the tests to determine whether a corporation established b y statute or incorporated under law is instrumentality or agency of Government. It is not possible to formulate an all-inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question. There is no cut and dry formula which would provide the correct division of corporation into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not. If extensive and unusual financial assistance is given and the purpose of the Government in giving such assistance concedes with the purpose for which the corporation is expected to use the assistance and such purpose is of public character, it may be relevant circumstance supporting an inference that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.... It may, therefore, be possible to say that where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. It may, therefore, be possible to say that where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. But, where financial assistance is not so extensive, it may not by itself, without anything more, render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government, for there are many private institutions which are in receipt of financial assistance from the State and merely on that account, they cannot be classified as State agencies. Equally, a mere finding of some control by the State would not be a determinative of the question, "since a State has considerable measure of control under it police power over all types of business operations". But, a finding of State financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characterise an operation as State action. So also the existence of deep and pervasive State Control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. It may also be a relevant factor to consider where the corporation enjoys monopoly status which in State conferred or State protected. There can be a little doubt that State conferred or State protected monopoly status would be highly relevant in assessing the aggregate weight of the corporations ties to the State. There is also another factor which may be regarded as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the operation of the corporation is an important public function.... It may be noted that besides the so-called traditional functions, the modern State operates a multitude of public enterprises and discharges a host of other public functions. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. This is precisely what was pointed out by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) .... Perhaps, the distinction between governmental and nongovernmental functions is not valid anymore in a social welfare State where the laissez fair is an out-model concept and Herbert Spencer's social statics has no place. The contrast is rather between governmental activities which are private and private activities which are governmental.... Perhaps, the distinction between governmental and nongovernmental functions is not valid anymore in a social welfare State where the laissez fair is an out-model concept and Herbert Spencer's social statics has no place. The contrast is rather between governmental activities which are private and private activities which are governmental.... But, the public nature of the function, if impregnated with governmental character, 'tied or entwined with Government' or fortified by some other additional factor, may render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference. It will thus be seen that there are several factors which may have to be considered in determining whether a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government. We have referred to some of these factors and they may be summarised as under : Where there is any finance/ assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance, where there is any other form of assistance given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control, whether the corporation enjoys Sate conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by the corporation are public functions closely related to governmental functions. This particularisation of relevant factors is, however, not exhaustive and by its very nature it cannot be, because, with increasing assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of management and administration and the necessity of continuing adjustment in relations between the corporation and Government calling for flexibility, adaptability and innovative skills, it is not possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of the tests which would invariably and in all cases provide an unfailing answer to the question whether a corporation is governmental instrumentality or agency. Moreover even amongst these factors which we have described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised enquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case.... Moreover even amongst these factors which we have described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised enquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case.... It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a corporation is claimed to be an instrumentality or agency of Government and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding to that effect. It is the aggregate or cumulative effect of all the relevant factors that is controlling." As to Sabhajit Tewari's case (supra), his Lordship Bhagwati, J., observed: "The court no doubt took the view on the basis of facts relevant to the constitution and functioning the council that it was not an "authority" but we do not find any discussion in this case as to what are the features which must be present before a corporation can be regarded as an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12. This decision does not lay down any principle or test for the purpose of determining when a corporation can be said to be an "authority". If at all any test can be gleaned from the decision, it is whether the Corporation is 'really an agency of the Government." 22. After considering all the relevant factors, his Lordship, in relation to the International Airport Authority of India, held: "the 1st respondent is an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and falls within the definition of "state" both on the narrow view taken by the majority in Sukhdev v. Bhagat Ram (supra) as also on the broader view of Mathew, J., adopted by us." 23. In Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 , the Corporation was constituted under the Madhya Pradesh State Warehousing Corporation Act, 1956 (replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Act 58 of 1962) and was a statutory body wholly controlled and managed by the Government. Ratio of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (supra) squarely applied, and the Corporation was held to be "the State". 24. Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. was statutorily taken over by force of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976. Ratio of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (supra) squarely applied, and the Corporation was held to be "the State". 24. Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. was statutorily taken over by force of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976. Thereafter, the Central Government, acting under the statute took necessary steps for the visting of the undertaking in the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and the Corporation became the statutory successor of Burmah Sheel. His Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., after referring to various provisions of the above-said Act of 1976, in Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1981 SC 212 , observed: "This review, though skeletal, is sufficient strikingly to bring home the point that the Corporation we are concerned with is more than a mere Government company. Whatever its character antecedent to the Act, the provisions we have adverted to have transformed it into an instrumentality of the Central Government with a strong statutory favour super-added and clear indicia of power to make it an "authority". Although registered as a company under the Indian Companies Act, the second respondent is clearly a creature of the statute, the undertaking having vested in it by force of Section 7 of the Act. The various provisions to which our attention was drawn...emphasises the fact that the second respondent is not a mere company but much more than that and has a statutory favour in its operation and functions, in its powers and duties, and in its personality itself, apart from being functionally and administratively under the thumb of Government. It is a limb of government, an agency of the State, a vicarious creature of statute working on the wheels of the Acquisition Act.... A careful study of the features of the Airport Authority (AIR 1979SC 1628) and a Government company covered by Section 7, 9, 10 & 12 of the Act before us discloses a close parallel except that the Airport is created by a statute while Bharat Petroleum (notified under Section 7 of the Act) is recognised by and clothed with rights and duties by the statute." 25. The Regional Engineering College, Srinagar is one of the fifteen Engineering Colleges in the country sponsored by the Government of India. The College is established and its administration and management are carried on by a society, registered under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies Act. The Regional Engineering College, Srinagar is one of the fifteen Engineering Colleges in the country sponsored by the Government of India. The College is established and its administration and management are carried on by a society, registered under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies Act. The object of the Society, amongst other things, was establishment of the college with a view to providing instruction and research in such branches of engineering and technology as the college may think fit and knowledge in such branches. The society was empowered to make rules for the conduct of its affairs with the approval of the State Government and the Central Government. It could acquire and hold property in the name of the State Government. Monies for running the college were to be provided by the State and Central Governments and they could be invested in such manner as the society might, with the approval of the State Government decide. The accounts of the society were to be certified by a duly appointed auditor and were to be forwarded annually to the State and Central Governments. The working and progress of the society of the college could be reviewed and enquired into by one or more persons appointed by the State Government and the State Government could, with the approval of the Central Government, take such action and issue such directions as might be considered necessary, and the society or the college was bound to comply with such directions. In case, the society or the college was not functioning properly, the State Government had the power to take over the administration and assets of the college with the prior approval of the Central Government. The founding members of the society were the Chairman appointed by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government, two representatives of the State Government, one representative of the Central Government, two representatives of the. All India Council for Technical Education to be nominated by the Northern Regional Committee, one representative of the University of Jammu & Kashmir, one non-official representative of each of the Punjab, Rajasthan, U.P. and Jammu & Kashmir States to be appointed by the respective Governments in consultation with the Central Government and the Principal who was also to be the ex officio Secretary. The general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the society and its income and property vested in the governing body of the society called the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors was to consist of the Chief Minister of the State as Chairman, three nominees of the State Government, three nominees of the Central Government, one representative of the All-India Council for Technical Education, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jammu & Kashmir, two industrialists/technologist in the region to be nominated by the State Government, one nominee of the Indian Institute of Technology of the region, one nominee of the University Grants Commission, two representatives of the Faculty of the college and the Principal of the college as ex officio member-secretary. The State Government had the power to remove any member of the society other than a member representing the Central Government from the membership of the society with the approval of the Central Government. The society was empowered to alter, extend or abridge any purpose or purposes for which it was established subject to the prior approval of the State and Central Governments. Rules of the society could be altered by a resolution passed by a majority of ⅔ of the members present at the meeting, but, such alteration could be with the approval of the State and the Central Government. In this back-drop, the question that arose in Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Seliravardi and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 487 , before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, was whether the society registered under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898 and administering and managing the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar was "other authority" contemplated in the definition of "State" in the definition of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. His Lordship Bhagwati, J. summarised the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority's case as follows: 1. One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality of agency of Government; 2. Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character; 3. Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character; 3. It may also be a relevant factor...whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State projected; 4. Existence of "deep and pervasive State control" may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality; 5. If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government; 6. Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of the inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. 26. His Lordship observed: "It is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the justice person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory corporation, or it may be a Government company, or a company formed under the Companies Act, 1956, or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other similar statute whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of relevant factors." 27. His Lordship distinguished the decision in Sabhqjit Tewcuy's case (supra) stating that the Court in that case, did not rest its conclusion on the ground that the council was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 but proceeded to consider various other features of the council for arriving at the conclusion that it was not an agency of the Government and, therefore, not an "authority". On facts, the society was held to be an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Government, and therefore, an "authority" and "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 28. On facts, the society was held to be an instrumentality or agency of the State and the Central Government, and therefore, an "authority" and "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 28. Similarly, the Indian Statistical Institute was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, and following the decision in Ajay Hasia's case (supra), it was held to be an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12, the case of B.S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, AIR 1984 SC 363 . The Indian Council of Agricultural Research came into existence as a department of the Government, continued to be attached office of the Government even though it was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act. ICAR was held to be almost an inseparable adjunct of the Government of India having an outward from of being a society. It was held to be styled as society set up by the State, and therefore, an instrumentality of the State see P.K. Ramchandra Iyer and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 541 . 29. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. since is formation in 1971, was wholly owned as a subsidiary company of State Trading Corporation, a Government of India undertaking, upto 1976, when it was separted. Since then, it functioned as a Government of India undertaking. On the basis of the concession given by the respondent in the affidavit and in the written submission and on the basis of test collected in Ajaxj Hasia's case (supra), the above corporation was held to be an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of the expression "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution see A.L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1361 . 30. Gujarat State Financial Corporation was a corporation set up under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. It was an instrumentality devised to provide medium and long term credit to the industrial concerns inter alia hotel-industry. It was not disputed in that case that the corporation which was set up under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporation was an instrumentality of the State (see The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., 1983 SC 848 . 31. It was not disputed in that case that the corporation which was set up under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporation was an instrumentality of the State (see The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., 1983 SC 848 . 31. The Food Corporation of India was set up under the Food Corporation Act, 1964, for the purpose of trading in foodgrains and other food-stuffs. The initial capital and for acquiring power to increase the capital in such a manner as the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be, determine, initial capital being provided by Central Government. The management of the corporation was to vest in a Board of Directors and the Board of Directors in discharging its functions were to act amongst other according to the instructions on questions of policy as may be given by the Central Government. The annual net profit of the corporation had to be paid to the Central Government. The annual report had to be submitted to the Central Government and laid before the Houses of Parliament. From the perusal of the scheme of the Food Corporation Act, 1964, it was undeniable that the Food Corporation of India was an instrumentality of the State comprehended in the expression "other authority" see Workmen, Food Corporation of India v. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1985 SC 670 . 32. Guru Nanak Khalsa High School was an aided school and hence was governed by the Punjab Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1969. The School received 95% of its expenses as grant from the Government and its own contribution was 5% of the expenses. Their Lordship relied upon the decision in Ajay Hasia's case (supra), and with respect to the observations made therein, stated: "Substituting the words, "public trust" in place of the "corporation" the reasons will mutatis mutandis apply to the school." 33. The School was held amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India see Manmohon Singh Jaitla v. Commissioner, Union Territory of Chandigarh AIR 1985 SC 346 . 34. In Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 251 , it was held that Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a public sector undertaking, and therefore, was "other authority", within the meaning of Article 12. 35. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. 34. In Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 251 , it was held that Hindustan Steel Ltd. was a public sector undertaking, and therefore, was "other authority", within the meaning of Article 12. 35. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Tarun Kanti Sengupta and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1571 , Madon, J. observed: "If there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, it does not follow that it thereby ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. For the purposes of Article 12, one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State. The corporation, which is the appellant in these two appeals before us, squarely falls within these observations, and it also satisfies the various tests which have been laid down. Merely because it has so far not the monopoly of in/and water transportation is not sufficient to divert it of its character of an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is nothing but the Government operating behind a corporate veil, carrying out a governmental activity and Government functions of vital public importance. There can thus be no doubt that the corporation is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." 36. It may be stated that the Central Inland Water Corporation Ltd. was incorporated as a private company and the shares of the Corporation were held by the different Governments, namely, the Government of India and the Governments of West Bengal and Assam. The Corporation was not only a Government company as defined by Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, but, was a company wholly owned by the Central Government and two State Governments. 37. The Bench of three Judge permitted Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries (hereinafter referred to as "Shriram") to re-start its power-plant as also plants for manufacture of caustic soda, chlorine including its by-products and recovery plants like soap, glycerine and technical hard oil, subject to the conditions set out in the judgment. 37. The Bench of three Judge permitted Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries (hereinafter referred to as "Shriram") to re-start its power-plant as also plants for manufacture of caustic soda, chlorine including its by-products and recovery plants like soap, glycerine and technical hard oil, subject to the conditions set out in the judgment. That would have ordinarily put an end to the main controversy raised in the writ petition which was filed in order to obtain a direction for closure of the various units in Shriram on the ground that they were hazardous to the community and the only point in dispute which would have survived would have been whether the units of Shriram should be directed to the removed from the place where they were then situate and re-located in another place where there would not be much human habitation, so that, there would not be any real danger to the health and safety of the people. But, while the writ petition was pending, there was escape of oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram on 4th/6th Dec.,'85, and applications were filed by the people. But, while the writ petition was pending, there was escape of oleum gas from one of the units of Shriram on 4th/6th Dec, 85, and applications were filed by the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board and by the Delhi Bar Association for award of compensation to the persons who had suffered harm on account of escape of oleum gas. When applications for compensation came up for hearing, it was felt that since the issues raised involved substantial questions of law relating to the interpretation of Articles 21 & 32 of the Constitution, the case should be referred to a larger Bench of five Judges and that it is now the case came before the Constitution Bench. 38. During the course of arguments, counsel for Shriram cautioned against expanding Article 12, so as to bring within its ambit private corporations. It was contended that control or regulation of a private corporation's functions by the State under General statutory law such as the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, was only in exercise of police power of regulation by the State. Such regulation did not convert the activity of the private corporation into that of the State. It was contended that control or regulation of a private corporation's functions by the State under General statutory law such as the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, was only in exercise of police power of regulation by the State. Such regulation did not convert the activity of the private corporation into that of the State. His Lordship Bhagwati, CJ referred to the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, and stated that the policy resolution made mention of certain basic industries of Importance the planning and regulation of which by the Central Government was found necessary in national interest. Among the eighteen industries so mentioned as requiring such control, Central Heavy Chemicals and Fertilisers stood included. 39. Under the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956, industries were classified into three categories having regard to the part which the State would play in each of them. The first category was to be the exclusive responsibility of the State. The second category comprised those industries which would be progressively State owned and in which the State would therefore generally take the initiative in establishing new undertakings but in which private enterprise would also be expected to supplement the effort of the State by promoting and developing undertaking either on its own or with State participation. The third category would include all the remaining industries and their future development would generally be left to the initiative and enterprise of the private sector. His Lordship, dealing with Shriram, observed: "It is true that control is not exercised by the Government in relation to the internal management policies of the company. However, the control is exercised on all such activities of Shriram which can jeopardise public interest. This functional control is of special significance as it is the potentiality of the fertilizer industry to adversely affect the health and safety of the community and its being impregnated with public interest which perhaps dictated the policy decision of the Government to ultimately operate this industry exclusively and invited functional control. Alongwith this extensive functional control, we find that Shriram also receives sizeable assistance in the shape of loans and overdrafts running into several crores of rupees from the Government through various agencies. Moreover, Shriram is engaged in the manufacture of caustic soda, chlorine etc. Its various units are set up in a single complex surrounded by thickly populated colonies. Chlorine gas is admittedly dangerous to life and health. Moreover, Shriram is engaged in the manufacture of caustic soda, chlorine etc. Its various units are set up in a single complex surrounded by thickly populated colonies. Chlorine gas is admittedly dangerous to life and health. If the gas escapes either from the storage tanker from filed cylinders or from any other point in the course of production, the health and well-being of the people living in the vicinity can be seriously affected. Thus Shriram is engaged in an activity which has the potential to invade the right to life of large sections of people. The question is whether those factors are comulatively sufficient to bring Shriram within the ambit of Article 12. Prima facie it is arguable that when the State's power as economic agent, economic entrepreneur and allocator of economic benefits is subject to the limitations of fundamental rights (vide Eurasian Equipment and Chemical Ltd. v. State of West Bengal ( AIR 1975 SC 266 ) ; Rashbihari Panda v. State of Orissa ( (1969) 1 SCC 414 ) ; R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 162 & Kasturi Lal Reddy v. State of J & K, AIR 1980 SC 1992 , why should a private corporation under the functional control of the State engaged in an activity which is hazardous to the health and safety of the community and is imbibed with public interest and which the State ultimately proposes to exclusively run under its industrial policy, not be subject to the same limitations. But we do not propose to decide this question and make any definite pronouncement upon if for reasons which we shall point out later on in the course of this judgment.... Before we part with this topic, we may point out that this Court has throughout the last few years, expanded the horizon of Article 12 primarily to inject respect for human rights and social conscience, in our corporate structure. The purpose of expansion has not been to destroy the raison d'etre of creating corporations but to advance the human rights jurisprudence. The purpose of expansion has not been to destroy the raison d'etre of creating corporations but to advance the human rights jurisprudence. Prima facie we are not inclined to accept the apprehensions of learned Counsel for Shriram as well-founded when he says that our including within the ambit of Article 12 and thus subjecting to discipline of Article 21, those private corporations whose activities have the potential of affecting the life and health of the people would deal a death-blow to the policy of encouraging and permitting private entrepreneurial activity. Whenever a new advance is made in the field of human rights apprehension is always expressed by the status quoists that it will create enormous difficulties in the way of smooth functioning of the system and affect its stability. Similar apprehension was voiced when this Court in R.D. Shetty's case (supra) brought public sector corporations within the scope and ambit of Article 12 and subjected them to the discipline of fundamental rights. Such apprehension expressed by those who may be affected by any new and innovative expansion of human rights need not deter the Court from widening the scope of human rights and expounding their reach and ambit, if otherwise it is possible to do so without doing violence to the language of the constitutional provision. It is through creative interpretation and bold innovation that the human rights jurisprudence has been developed in our country to a remarkable extent and this forward march of human rights movement cannot be allowed to be halted by unfounded apprehensions expressed by status quoists. But, we do not propose to decide finally at the present stage whether a private corporation like Shriram would fall within the scope and ambit of Article 12, because, we have not had sufficient time to consider and reflect on this question in depth. The hearing of this case before us concluded only on Dec. 15, 1986 and we are called upon to deliver our judgment within a period of four days, on 19th Dec, 86. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a question on which we must make an y definite pronouncement at this stage. But, we would have it for a proper and detailed consideration at a later stage if it becomes necessary to do so." 40. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a question on which we must make an y definite pronouncement at this stage. But, we would have it for a proper and detailed consideration at a later stage if it becomes necessary to do so." 40. Thus, in view of paucity of time between the conclusion of the hearing and date for delivery of the judgement, the Court left the above question open for a proper and detailed consideration in future. It may be stated that his Lordship Bhagwati, CJ, who delivered the judgment of the Court, was to retire on 20th Dec, 1986. 41. In Miss Lena Khan v. Union of India and Ors., ((1987) 2 SCC 402) , Air India was held to be "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. 42. Children's Aid Society, Bombay, was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and had also been treated as a Public Trust, under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The Chief Minister of Maharashtra State was the ex officio President and the Minister for Social Welfare was the Vice-President of the Governing Council of the Society. The society received grants from the State. It had set up a Remand-Home at Umer Khadi within Bombay are and it was then run as an observation-home under the provisions of the Bombay Children's Act. The Society ran three observation-homes. The Society was held to be an instrumentality of the State on the basis of the test laid down by the Supreme Court. Uttar Pradesh State Handloom Corporation, a public sector undertaking, was not disputed to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12 in Ravbidra Kumar Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation Ltd. 1987 Supp. SCC 739 . Gramin Banks were constituted under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. Having regard to the Constitution and nature of its legal entity and the measure of State control, it was held as an instrumentality of the State as being made of latter's own "flesh and bones", (see M.K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank 1987(Supp.) SCC 643 ). The Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, was itself held to be instrumentality of the State (see Prathama Bank, Moradabad v. Vijay Kumar Gael and Anr.( 1984 (4)SCC 441 ) ) following the decision in AJay Hasia's case (supra). The Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, was itself held to be instrumentality of the State (see Prathama Bank, Moradabad v. Vijay Kumar Gael and Anr.( 1984 (4)SCC 441 ) ) following the decision in AJay Hasia's case (supra). In establishing Rural Banks the Central Government acted in discharge of its obligations under Articles 38 & 48 of Part-IV of the Constitution through them. The Regional Banks were under deep and pervasive control of the Central Government. 43. In relation to Sainik School Society, it was held in All India Sainik Schools Employee's Association v. Sainik Schools Society 1989 Sup. (1) SCC 205 that the entire funding was by the State Government and the Central Government, and the overall control vested in the governmental authority. The main object of the society was to run schools and prepare students for the purpose of feeding the National Defence Academy. Defence of the country was one of the legal functions of the State. In was, therefore, "State" within the meaning of Article 12. 44. The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (ICPS) was born as a voluntary organisation to give rise to a feeling that the people's representatives in the legislatures required the acquisition of the appropriate democratic bias and spirit. At the inception it was certainly not a governmental organisation. The society was born out of a feeling that there should be a voluntary association mostly consisting of members of the two Houses of Parliament with some external support to fulfill the objects which were adopted by the society. To start with, the society was accommodated in the Parliament House, but, in due course, it shifted out. The Speaker of the Lok-Sabha became its first President and three Ministers, a former Chief Justice of India and a former Attorney General joined as its Vice-President. Some of the public offices were also associated in the administrative set-up of the society. Services of some of the employees of Parliament were lent to the society. Dealing with this society, Rangnath Misra, J. (as he then was), in Tekraj Vasandi v. Union of India and Ors., ( (1988) 1 SCC 236 ) , held: "Individual members of Parliament and corporate body known as Parliament are certainly two different concepts. Services of some of the employees of Parliament were lent to the society. Dealing with this society, Rangnath Misra, J. (as he then was), in Tekraj Vasandi v. Union of India and Ors., ( (1988) 1 SCC 236 ) , held: "Individual members of Parliament and corporate body known as Parliament are certainly two different concepts. While Article 12 refers to Parliament as such, a few members of Parliament cannot be considered as Parliament, so as to constitute that body as referred to in Article 12. The Speaker and Ministers who joined as Vice-Presidents of the society were there in their individual capacities and not as Ministers. In the category of Vice-Presidents, Executive Chairman, Treasurer and members, there were many people who were really not a part of Government and as such some of them did not belong to Parliament. The objects of the society were not governmental business but were certainly the aspects which were expected to equip members of Parliament and the State Legislatures with the requisite know/edge and experience for better functioning. Many of the objects adopted by the society were not confined to the two Houses of Parliament and were intended to have an impact on society at large. The memorandum of the society permitted acceptance of gifts, donations and subscriptions. There is material to show that the Ford Foundation, a U.S. based Trust had extended support for some time. Undoubtedly, the annual contribution from the Government has been substantial and it would not be wrong to say that they perhaps constitute the main source of funding, yet, some money has been coming from some other sources. In later years, foreign funding came to be regulated and therefore, it became necessary to provide that without Government clearance like any other institution, ICPS was not to receive foreign donations. Since Government money has been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants have been applied and enforced. The accounts of the society are separately maintained and subject to audit in the same way as the affairs of societies receiving Government grants are to be audited.... Since Government money has been coming, the usual conditions attached to Government grants have been applied and enforced. The accounts of the society are separately maintained and subject to audit in the same way as the affairs of societies receiving Government grants are to be audited.... We have several cases of societies registered under Societies Registration Act which have been treated as "state", but, in each of those cases, it would appear on analysis that either governmental business has been undertaken by the society or what was expected to be the public obligation of the "State" had been undertaken to be performed as a part of the society's function. In a welfare State, as has been pointed out on more than one occasion by this Court, Government control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In the absence of a fair application of the tests to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality. A broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experience in view so as to reach a reasonable conclusion. Having given our anxious consideration to the facts of this case, we are not in a position to hold that ICPS is either an agency or instrumentality of the State so as to come within the purview of "other authorities" in Article 12 of the Constitution. We must say that ICPS is a case of its type-typical in many ways and the normal tests may perhaps not properly apply to test its character. 45. In Bank of India P.A. Stalin and Ors. (1988) 3 SCC 105 , it was held that even though the State Bank of India and the nationalised banks, having corporate structure and freedom in the matter of day to day administration, may not be owned as such by the Central Government, they certainly fall within the purview of the expression "under the Central Government", for purposes of the Acts dealing with Shops and Commercial Establishments in view of the existence of deep and pervasive control of the Central Government over these banks. It was further observed that even if the decisions dealing with Article 12 of the Constitution are not made the foundation for deciding the point in issue, but the salient principles which have been laid down in those decisions, with regard to the authorities having a corporate structure and exercising autonomy in certain spheres will certainly be useful for determining as to whether the State Bank of India and the nationalised banks are establishments under the Central Government. 46. Port Trust was held to be an organ of the State under Article 12 vide Dwarkadas Marfalia & Sons v. Bombay Port Trust, ( (1989) 3 SCC 293 ) . 47. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. was a Government company and it had been constituted as the New Town Development Authority under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act. It was empowered to dispose of land vested in it and it had formulated with the approval of the State Government under Section 159 of the said Act, a Code for regulating disposal of lands by putting to auction or considering the individual application. It was held to be "State" within the meaning of Article 12 in the decision . 48. Indian Oil Corporation was a statutory body incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It had a monopoly in the supply of lubricants and it was held to be an organ of the State or an instrumentality of the State as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, ((1990) 3 SCC 750) . 49. In Civil Writ Petition No. 256 of 1979, it was conceded that the School of Buddhist Philosophy, Leh, managed by a society called Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, Leh, was a "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution see Chairman, School of Buddhist Philosophy, Leh v. Makhan Lal Matoo and Anr., (1990) 4 SCC 6 . 50. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1990 SC 101 , it was observed by Ray, J. that Government carries on various trades and business activity through the instrumentality of the State such as Government company or public corporations and they are "State" within the meaning of Article 12. 51. 50. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1990 SC 101 , it was observed by Ray, J. that Government carries on various trades and business activity through the instrumentality of the State such as Government company or public corporations and they are "State" within the meaning of Article 12. 51. Whether the National Council of Education Research and Training (NCERT) is "State" as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution, came up for consideration in Chander Mohan Khanna v. N.C.E.R.T., AIR 1992 SC 76 , NCERT was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The Memorandum of Association of the Society was subscribed to by seven officers of the Government of India on 6th June, 1961. The object of the Council is to assist and advice the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in the implementation of its policies and major programmes in the field of education, particularly, school education. The council is empowered to undertake several kinds of programmes and activities which include coordination or research, extension services and training, dissemination of improved educational techniques and practices in schools, collaborations of ideas and information, preparation and publication of books, materials, periodicals and other literature and allied activities. The Council is free to apply the income and property towards its objectives in such manner as it may think fit. It is subject to the limitations placed by the Government of India in this regard only in respect of the expenditure of grants made by the Government. Government of India could review the work and progress of the Council and take appropriate action to give effect on the reports received on inquiries. In addition, Government could at any time issue directions to the Council consists mainly of various Government officials but also includes the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, four Vice-Chancellors and a number of nominees, four from school teachers and several others. The Government could fix the period of appointment of the members and to extend it from time to time. The Executive Committee of the Council includes various Government servants but it also includes four educationsts and three Professors and Heads of Department who may be nominated by the President. It there was any difference of opinion, the view of the majority will prevail subject to a veto which could be exercised by the Government of India within a month. The Executive Committee of the Council includes various Government servants but it also includes four educationsts and three Professors and Heads of Department who may be nominated by the President. It there was any difference of opinion, the view of the majority will prevail subject to a veto which could be exercised by the Government of India within a month. The President could refer any question for the decision of the Government. Funds of the Council consist of-(i) grants made by Government; (ii) contributions from other sources; (iii) income from the assets of the Council; and (iv) Receipts of the Council from other sources. His Lordship Jagannatha Shetry, J. observed: "The activities of NCERT are not wholly related to governmental functions. The Government control is confined only to the proper utilisation of the grant. The NCERT is thus largely an autonomous body." 52. NCERT was held to be a body more or less similar to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) death with in Sabhajit Tewari's case (supra) and Institute of Constitutional and Parliament Studies (ICPS) dealt with in Tekraj Vasandhi's case (supra), and was held not to be "State". His Lordship observed: "Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the Government within the sweep of the expression "State". A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of welfare State independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as "State" under Article 12. The State control, howsoever vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State and coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "State ". If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." 53. The above review results in the following conclusions: 1. If the Government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." 53. The above review results in the following conclusions: 1. The definition of the term, "State" in Article 12 of the Constitution, is an inclusive definition. The words, "other authorities within the territory of India" cannot be read as ejusdem generis with either the Government and the legislature or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude. The local or other authorities can be under the control of the Government of India or the Government of various States, but, that is not a must. Even autonomous authorities which are not under the control of the Government at all, can be "local or other authorities." The control envisaged by the words, "under the control of the Government of India" in Article 12, is not the control which arises out of mere appointment, payment and the right to take disciplinary action; the control envisaged under Article 12 is a control of the functions of the authorities concerned, and the right of the Government of India by virtue of that control to give directions to the authority to function in a particular manner with respect to such functions. Quasi-judicial or judicial authority cannot be said to be under the control of Government of India for in the very nature of things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to the Government of India or the Government of a State to direct such authority to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner. Control is possible in the case of a purely executive or administrative authority. 2. It is immaterial for the purpose of Article 12 whether the "authority" is created by statute or under a statute, or it is a Government Company, or a company formed under the Companies Act. 1956, or that it is a society formed under the Cooperative Societies Act, or registered under the Societies Registration Act. If the functions of the "authority" are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it is a relevant factor in classifying the "authority" as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 3. 1956, or that it is a society formed under the Cooperative Societies Act, or registered under the Societies Registration Act. If the functions of the "authority" are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it is a relevant factor in classifying the "authority" as an instrumentality or agency of Government. 3. The State, as constituted by the Constitution, has specifically been empowered under Article 298, to carry on any trade or business and also under Article 19(1)(g). In Part-IV, the State has been given the same meaning as in Article 12, and one of the Directive Principles of the State Policy laid down in Article 46, is that the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. The expression, "other authorities" would this include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities or to promote the educational and economic interests of the people. Thus, the words, "other authorities" are wide enough to include all bodies created by or under a statute, on which powers are conferred to carry out Government or quasi governmental functions. The public nature of the function, is, impregnated with governmental character or tied or entwined with Government or fortified by some other additional factor, may render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of Government. 4. If the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. In the case of statutory corporations, which may have no shares or share-holder, it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a board of directors appointed by the Government, though this consideration may not be determinative. If expensive and unusual financial assistance is given and the purpose of the Government, in giving such assistance concedes with the purpose for which the corporation is expected to use the assistance and such purpose is of public character, it may be relevant circumstance supporting an inference that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. If there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company, it does not follow that it thereby ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. If there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government company, it does not follow that it thereby ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. The combination of State-aid, coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory Junctions of the State may largely point out that the body is "State." 5. It may also be a relevant factor to consider whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected. State-conferred or State-protected monopoly status would be highly relevant in assessing the aggregate weight of the corporation's ties to the State. 6. There is no cut-and-dry formula which would provide the correct division of corporations into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not, so as to provide an unfailing answer. No one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the Court would have to consider the cumulative effect of the above various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particular inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case. It is the aggregate or cumulative effect of all the relevant factors that is controlling. 7. Horizon of Article 12 of the Constitution has been expanded by the Supreme Court to inject respect for human rights and social conscience in our corporate structure. As said by Bhagwati, J., in Shriram's case (supra): "It is through creative interpretation and bold innovation that the human rights jurisprudence has been developed in our country to a remarkable extent and this forward march of human rights cannot be allowed to be halted by unfounded apprehensions expressed by status quoists." 54. It appears from the by-laws of IFFCO that It had its principal office at New Delhi. The objects of this cooperative society extended to whole of India and were not confined to one State. At the relevant time when IFFCO was established, the Multi-unit Cooperative Societies Act, 1942 was in force. That Act applied to all cooperative societies with objects not confined to one State whether incorporated before the commencement of this Act or to be incorporated after its commencement. At the relevant time when IFFCO was established, the Multi-unit Cooperative Societies Act, 1942 was in force. That Act applied to all cooperative societies with objects not confined to one State whether incorporated before the commencement of this Act or to be incorporated after its commencement. IFFCO, as a Multi-Unit Cooperative Society, was registered under Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1923, which applied to the Union Territory of Delhi, by the Central Registrar of Cooperative Societies, on November 3, 1967 and the registration number assigned to it was CR-1. Later on, the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 had been enacted in order to consolidate and amend the law relating to the cooperative societies with the objects not confined to one State and serving the interests of members in more than one State. This Act applies to various Multi-State Cooperative Societies, including those to which Multi-Unit Cooperative Societies Act, 1942 was applicable. Chapter-4 of 1984 Act contains provisions regarding direction and management of Multi-State Cooperative Societies. Section 41 empowers the Central Government or State Government to nominate on the Board of the cooperative society such number of persons as may be prescribed. This provision is attracted where the Central or State Government has subscribed to the share capital of the Multi-State Cooperative Society or has guaranteed the repayment of the principal and payment of interest on loans and advances to a Multi-State Cooperative Society. Section 47 authorises the Central Government to give directions in public interest. 55. The object of the IFFCO is to promote the economic condition of its members by undertaking manufacture of chemical fertilisers and allied products/by-products and their conversion, storage, transportation and marketing. Section 47 authorises the Central Government to give directions in public interest. 55. The object of the IFFCO is to promote the economic condition of its members by undertaking manufacture of chemical fertilisers and allied products/by-products and their conversion, storage, transportation and marketing. In order to achieve the above objects, IFFCO may undertake one or more of the following activities: (a) set up plant or plants for manufacture of chemical fertilisers and allied products/by-products; (b) acquire, establish, construct, provide and maintain and administer factories, townships, estates, railway-sidings, builtyards, wells, water-reservoirs, channels, pumping installations, purification-plants, pipelines, carriage, storage-sheds and accommodation of all description for facilitating the business of IFFCO; (c) manufacture, store, maintain, sell, buy, repair, alter, exchange, let or hire, export, import and deal in all kinds of articles and things which may be required for the purpose of any of the business of IFFCO or are commonly supplied or dealt in by persons engaged in any such business or which may seem capable of being profitably dealt in connection with any of the business of IFFCO; (d) subscribe to the shares of cooperative and other institutions; (e) enter into contract for purchase and sale of raw material and finished product; (f) enter into collaboration with cooperative or others in India or in foreign countries for machinery and equipment, and for designing, engineering, construction, erection, operation and maintenance of fertilisers and chemical plants; (g) establish branch offices and sales depots; (h) carry on agency business of every kind and description connected with the business of IFFCO; (i) undertake research and such other activities as are incidental and conducive to the development of the industry as well as IFFCO; and (j) undertake such other activities as are conducive or incidental to the attainment of main objects of IFFCO. As per Clause 4 of the by-laws, the following Institutions can obtain the membership of IFCO, namely: (i) Agricultural credit/Marketing/Processing/Supply Cooperative Federations of natural level and other agriculture cooperative societies; (ii) Agricultural Credit/Marketing/Processing/Supply Cooperative Federations of State-level and other agriculture cooperative societies; (iii) Cooperative Credit/Marketing/Supplies Societies of District, Regional and primary level; (iv) Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Services, multipurposes, sugarcane, irrigation, agriculture societies and other village agriculture societies; (v) National Cooperative Development Corporation; (vi) Government of India. As per Clause 5 of the by-law, the share capital of IFFCO is to be of Rs. As per Clause 5 of the by-law, the share capital of IFFCO is to be of Rs. 700 crores, and it shall be divided into three categories of shares, namely: (i) 63,000 shares of the face-value of rupees one lac each, which shall ordinarily be allocated to Government of India, National Cooperative Development Corporation/National/State/Regional level Federations and big cooperative processing societies, e.g., cooperative sugar mills etc.; (ii) 35,000 shares of the face-value of rupees ten thousand each, which shall ordinarily be allocated to District and primary level marketing/ processing/supply cooperative societies and other cooperative societies, including sugarcane unions; and (iii) 3,50,000 share of the face-value of rupees one thousand each, which shall ordinarily be allocated to village level primary cooperative societies. Thus, a total capital of Rs. 630 crores is to be subscribed by category (i), 35 crores by category (ii) and 35 crores by category (iii) share-holders referred to above. 56. IFFCO can return the share capital subscribed by the Government of India and National Cooperative Development Corporation at such time or in accordance with such method, as the case may be, which may be decided between IFFCO, Government of India and National Cooperative Development Corporation, by mutual consent. It is obligatory for a member to subscribe to at least one share. 57. Clause-21 deals with the fund of IFFCO, which may be raised from one or more of the following sources: (i) Admission fee; (ii) share Capital; (iii) loans and deposits (iv) grant-in-aid and donation; and (v) profits. In the event of dissolution of the IFFCO, the liability of its members to make up any deficiency, arising in the assets of IFFCO, will be limited to the extent of the unsubscribed amount of the shares allocated to them. The General representative body of IFFCO will be composed of: (i) Members of the Board of Directors; (ii) one representative from each member society, having share of the value of rupees one lac or more; (iii) one representative of every 200 cooperative societies in each State and Union Territory, but, the total number of representative from particular State or Union Territory will not exceed 25. The Board of Directors of IFFCO shall consist of: 1. The Board of Directors of IFFCO shall consist of: 1. President or nominated member of highest Cooperative Marketing Federation of a State, all the cooperative societies there-of which have made a joint contribution to the share capital of IFFCO to the extent of more than one crore rupees; 2. Five directors elected by the general body; 3. At least five members nominated by the Government of India; 4. Managing Director of National Cooperative Development Corporation; 5. Managing Director, Financial Director and Marketing Director of IFFCO, by virtue of their office; 6. Each financial institution, if any, advancing long-term credit to IFFCO can each nominate one Director; 7. Board of Directors will co-opt an additional Director from each State, the cooperative societies whereof have subscribed to the share-capital of IFFCO at least to the extent of ten crore rupees; and 8. One representative nominated by Indian National Cooperative Sangh. 58. Clause- 42 of the by-laws contains transitional provisions which authorised the Government of India to nominate the Board of Directors and its President upto the maximum period of ten years. In terms of Clause-43 (vi) of the by-laws, the IFFCO has the powers to appoint and remove the Managing Director, Financial Director and the Marketing Driector, subject to the prior approval of the Government of India. The Board of Directors has to constitute an Executive Committee, and it has the powers detailed in Clause-46 'ka' of the by-laws. The Board of Directors has to chalk out every year the extent of allotment of its products to each State and Union Territory proportionate to the share contribution by societies in each State, or, as the case may be, Union Territory. 59. It would thus appear that the aims and object of the IFFCO is to manufacture chemical fertilisers and its other products and by-products in cooperative sector of economy and to market and distribute its products for the benefit of members of agricultural cooperative societies all over the territory of India. It is a cooperative project on a grand scale for the benefit of agriculturists and country's agricultural economy and production. It is quite true that it is immaterial for the purpose of Article 12 that the corporation should be created by or under a statute. It is a cooperative project on a grand scale for the benefit of agriculturists and country's agricultural economy and production. It is quite true that it is immaterial for the purpose of Article 12 that the corporation should be created by or under a statute. A multi-unit cooperative society registered under the Multi-Unit Cooperative Societies Act can also be "State" within the meaning given to the term by Article 12 of the Constitution. It is also true that IFFCO is discharging functions of great public importance. It cannot, however, be said, by any stretch, that its functions are closely related to governmental functions. Production and distribution of chemical fertilisers to agriculturists at economic rate may be a matter of concern for the Government, but, by its only nature, it is not a governmental or quasi-governmental function. In the case of IFFCO, the public nature of the function is not impregnated with governmental character. The Government, through its agency or instrumentality, has not itself entered into the carrying of commercial activity. Entire share capital of IFFCO is not subscribed by the Government of India. It is not obligatory for the Government of India to subscribe to the share capital of IFFCO and Government of India is only eligible for allocation of shares of the face-value or rupees one lac each, along with other cooperative bodies. IFFCO does not enjoy any monopoly status-State-conferred or State-protected-in the matter of production and distribution of chemical fertilisers and its products. There is no deep and pervasive State control of the Government over the IFFCO, which might afford an indication that it is State agency or instrumentality. The mere fact that the Government of India has given impetus to the production and distribution of chemical fertilisers in cooperative sector, is not pointer of any deep and pervasive State control over the affairs of the IFFCO. Even the financial assistance through share subscription by Government of the India is not so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the IFFCO. There is no veil covering the IFFCO needing to be seen through or to be teared to see behind it. The relevant factors to constitute a corporation as an agency or instrumentality of Government as laid down by hosts of decision of the Supreme Court are not present. There is no veil covering the IFFCO needing to be seen through or to be teared to see behind it. The relevant factors to constitute a corporation as an agency or instrumentality of Government as laid down by hosts of decision of the Supreme Court are not present. We hold that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that IFFCO was not "State" within the meaning assigned to the term by Article 12 of the Constitution for purposes of Part-in and Part-IV of the Constitution. 60. We would, therefore, like to observe that the maintainability or otherwise of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution does not solely depend upon answer to the question whether a particular "authority" is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution or not. The language used in Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide, and the powers of the High Court extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari, as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose. The directions, orders or writs can be issued by the High Court to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within the territories to which it exercises jurisdiction. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution, the Court need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English Law, nor feel oppressed by any differences or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by-English Judges. It can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari, mandamus etc., in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as it keeps to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English Law. The High Courts, however, cannot function arbitrarily under Article 226. There are some limitations implicit in the article as well as self-imposed to direct Article 226 through defined channels see Basappa v. T. Nagappa ( AIR 1954 SC 440 ) ; and Dwarka Nath v. Income-Tax officer, Special Circle, O-Ward, Kanpur ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) ). 61. The High Courts, however, cannot function arbitrarily under Article 226. There are some limitations implicit in the article as well as self-imposed to direct Article 226 through defined channels see Basappa v. T. Nagappa ( AIR 1954 SC 440 ) ; and Dwarka Nath v. Income-Tax officer, Special Circle, O-Ward, Kanpur ( AIR 1966 SC 81 ) ). 61. In the writ petition filed by Tara Singh and Ram Avtar Choudhary, the case of the petitioners was that in connection with the election for general body of IFFCO for the years 1992- 94, the Returning officer had sent ballot-papers. Ram Avtar received the envelope from the Returning officer, but, in the envelope, he did not find the ballot-papers. So far as Tara Singh was concerned, his case is that he had sent his ballot-paper for exercising his franchise, but, the same was lost and fresh ballot-paper was not supplied to him despite request. 62. In the other writ petition, filed by Dehra Gram Sewa Sahakari Samiti Ltd., its case is that election notification had not been sent by the Election officer, to the Samiti, and therefore, the Samiti and other societies were deprived of their right to participate in the election. Firstly, it has not been shown that the elections for the general body of the IFFCO and its procedure, is regulated by any statute or statutory rules. Secondly, the by-laws of IFFCO at bests constitute as an agreement between the share-holders of IFFCO and matters like this, which raise disputed questions of facts, can, in a proper manner, be adjudicated, in a civil suit. When the petitioners raise complex questions of fact, which may, for their determination, require, oral evidence to be taken, the High Court may decline to try the writ petition. Rights and obligations arising out of contract can also be better adjudicated by the civil court. For these weighty reasons, it was quite proper for the learned Singly Judge to have refused to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 63. For reasons discussed above, we do not find any force in these two special appeals, and do hereby dismiss them. 64. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.Special appeal dismissed. *******