ORDER S. K. Dubey, J. -- 1. This revision under section 397/401, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, by the complainant, is against the judgment of acquittal dated 12.8.1987, recorded by First Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, in Criminal Appeal No.36 of 1986, preferred against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed on 17.7.1986 under section 323, IPC, by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, in Criminal Case No.2261 of 1985. 2. The prosecution case in brief is thus: At about 5 p.m. on 22.2.1985, Sanjai Tiwari (P.W.2), the complainant, was going to his shop situated near Jamnalal Market, when he was in the midst of Jamnalal Market, the four accused/respondents, who were on inimical terms with PW.2, wrongfully restrained him from going ahead and gave a beating by leg and fist blows; accused Ramkumar inflicted an injury on the left hand's fourth finger of the complainant. On it, the accused persons went away threating PW.2 to kill. PW.210 dged the report (Ext.P/1) at 5.50 p.m. at Huzrat Kotwali, where a case under sections 341, 323, 324 and 506, IPC, was registered. P.W.2 was sent for medical examination and, after investigation, the 'Challan' under the aforesaid sections was filed. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, framed charges against the accused persons on 24.9.1985 for offences under sections 324, 324/34 and 506, Part 1, IPC. The accused persons denied the charges. During trial the prosecution did not produce the injury report and the X-ray nor examined the Doctors to prove the nature of the injuries. The prosecution also did not examine the investigation officer. After appreciating the evidence, the trial Court acquitted the accused persons of the charges framed against them, but convicted under section 323, IPC, and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 250/- in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. Aggrieved of the conviction and sentence, the four accused persons preferred appeals. The appellate Court having found that no separate charge was framed under section 323 or 323/34, IPC, and the offence under section 323 being not a minor offence nor a cognate offence of S.324, IPC, therefore, acquitted all the accused/respondent". Against this judgment of acquittal, the State has not preferred any appeal but the complainant has come up in revision. 3. Against this judgment of acquittal, the State has not preferred any appeal but the complainant has come up in revision. 3. Shri B.L. Bhargava, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 323, IPC, is a general section prescribing punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, section 324, IPC, deals with the same offence committed under certain aggravating circumstances providing a severe punishment. As the main ingredients of both offences are common and the respondents/accused, who were charged with major offence, were rightly convicted by the trial Court for the minor offence under S. 323 even in the absence of a charge as the facts found proved did not constitute an offence under the said section. Therefore, it was submitted by Shri Bhargava that in view of section 222 (2), Cr. P.C., the respondents/accused who were not charged for the offence under S. 323, were rightly convicted, as the facts proved constituting the offence reduce it to a minor offence under S.323, IPC. 4. This revision involves a question which may be stated; whether a person charged with an offence under S.324, IPC, can be convicted of an offence under S. 323, IPC, on application of section 222, Cr.P.C. 5. To appreciate the question, section 222, Cr.P.C. (corresponding to S.238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) is reproduced as under: "222. When offence proved included in offence charged -- (1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. (2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. (3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence although the attempt is not separately charged. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied." 6. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied." 6. A bare reading of section 222 shows that if all the particulars of an offence are proved to exist, they will constitute the main offence, while a combination of only some of those particulars are proved, that will constitute a minor offence, and for that a person can be convicted even in the absence of a charge provided the accused is not in any way prejudiced. The section is an exception to the general rule that a person cannot be convicted of an offence with which he is not charged. See W. Slaney v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116 , Para 30 at p. 125. 7. An offence will be treated as "minor" within the meaning of section 222 with reference to the main or major offence referred to therein, and not independently of it. Consequently, the minor and the major offences must be cognate offences which have the main ingredients in common, and a man charged with an offence which is entirely of a different type from the offence which he is proved to have committed, cannot in the absence of a proper charge, be convicted of that offence, merely on the ground that the facts proved constitute a minor offence. That is the generly principle laid down by various judicial pronouncements of different High Courts. If any authority is needed, see Makkhan v. Emperor, AIR 1945 AIl.81, and Raghunath Singh v. State, AIR 1950 All. 471 . 8. In order that the conditions prescribed under section 222, Cr.P.C., may be fulfilled for convicting a person of a minor offence in relation to the offence with which he is charged, which may be called a major offence, the first requisite that an offence may be minor in relation to the offence charged, is that the punishment provided for committing the minor offence must be, in all cases, less than provided by law for committing the major offence. The expression 'minor offence' is not defined any where in the Cr. The expression 'minor offence' is not defined any where in the Cr. P.C. But, the first test is not the sole test of a minor offence in relation to the major offence under sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 222, as it would be evident that under sub- sec.(1) all the particulars which constitute a minor offence, must be present in the major offence, though the particulars may be in aggravated form. It is further clear from the reading of this section that there might be other particulars which might be present in the major offence and which are not present in the minor offence, and it is not necessary to prove the charge in the indictment to the whole extent provided the fact proved constitute a complete offence. Similarly, it is not necessary to prove the charge in the same aggravated form provided what is proved constitutes a complete offence, of which the main ingrediants in common are not entirely different. 9. Sub-section (2) of S. 222 points out that the additional facts must be such as reduce the offence charged to a minor offence, meaning thereby that the particulars of the offence referred to in sub-section (2) need not be a combination or part of the particulars of the major offence. The sub-section indicates that the minor offence must be more or less a cognate offence, and it is the proof of certain additional facts, brought before the Court either by the prosecution or by the defence which reduce the offence to a minor offence. 10. Looked with that angle, the question arises whether the offence under section 323 can be said to be a minor offence of section 324, IPC, and for that we have to trace the origin of the two offences in the Indian Penal Code. Chapter XVI of IPC deals with the offences affecting human body; sections 299 to 311 relate to offence affecting life; offences of causing miscarriage, of injuries to unborn children, of the exposure of infants and of the concealment of births, are dealt with in sections 312 to 318, IPC. Offences of "hurt" are dealt with from S.319 to 338.'319 defines 'hurt' and S.320 defines 'grievous hurt'. S.321 speaks of 'voluntarily causing hurt and S. 322 of "voluntarily causing grievous hurt". Offences of "hurt" are dealt with from S.319 to 338.'319 defines 'hurt' and S.320 defines 'grievous hurt'. S.321 speaks of 'voluntarily causing hurt and S. 322 of "voluntarily causing grievous hurt". S. 323 provides punishment for voluntarily causing hurt and S.324 provides punishment for voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means S.325 provides for punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt, while S.326 speaks of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means and provides for punishment there for. 11. A look to these provisions clearly shows that section 323 is a general section providing punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. Ss.324, 327, 328 and 329 deal with the same offence committed under certain aggravating circumstances. By reading the two sections, i.e., 323 and 324, it is clear that S. 324 makes simple hurt more grave .and liable to more severe punishment, as the differentia' in the two sections is one of the modes of infliction of voluntarily causing hurt described in S.324. Thus, it is clear that the ingredients of the two sections are in common, except the mode of infliction of injuries by dangerous weapons or means described in S. 324, and that is the distinction between the two sections, making section 324 more severe in punishment. See Jagjiwandas v. State of M.P., 1978 JLJ N-72. As the two offences have a common origin or source, which relates to 'voluntarily causing hurt', the offence under S. 324 being more severe in punishment because of the mode of infliction of voluntarily causing hurt, while section 323 provides for a lesser punishment, the offence under S. 323 becomes minor as compared to the offence under S.324, See Alsingh v. State of M.P., 1983JLJ N-63. 12. Shri J.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.116 of 1983 (Hardayal v. State of Madhya Pradesh), decided on 6.1.1986, wherein though charges were framed under sections 325 and 323 read with S.34, IPC, accused were convicted under section 324 read with S. 34, IPC. In that case this Court observed that the conviction u/s 324 read with S.34 cannot be sustained because the ingredients of S.325 and S.324 are distinctly different from each other, and a prejudice is likely to be caused if the conviction is maintained. In that case this Court observed that the conviction u/s 324 read with S.34 cannot be sustained because the ingredients of S.325 and S.324 are distinctly different from each other, and a prejudice is likely to be caused if the conviction is maintained. ,But, the said case is of no help, as it does not deal with the two offences in question, viz., 323 and 324, IPC, nor the court had considered the earlier decisions rendered in Jagjiwandas' case and Alsingh's case (supra) or the exceptional provisions of S.222, Cr. P.C. 13. Alternatively, Shri Gupta contended that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, invoked by the private complainant against the judgment of acquittal, should not be lightly exercised, as, against the judgment of acquittal, the State had a right of appeal under S. 378, Cr.P.C., to this Court, of course, with the leave of the Court, but had not exercised that right, presumably, because it is not a case of exceptional nature, where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction should also not be exercised merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. Reliance was placed on decisions of the Apex-Court in D.Stephens v Rosibolla. AIR 1951 SC 196 ; Legendranath Jha v. Polai Lal, AIR 1951 SC 316 ; Dhirendra Nath v. Mukanda Lal, AIR 1955 SC 584 ; Mehendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; K.C. Reddy, d v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1962 SC 1788 and Ba1lSi lal v. Laxmana Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721 . 14. There is no dispute to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, in respect of the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court or the appellate Court. It is settled, therefore, that where there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice, or there is a glaring legal defect in the procedure or manifest error on point of law, which has resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice, the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised. It is settled, therefore, that where there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice, or there is a glaring legal defect in the procedure or manifest error on point of law, which has resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice, the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised. In the case in hand, in the opinion of this Court, the appellate Court acted with manifest illegality in holding that section 323, IPC, for the purpose of section 222, Cr.P.C. Therefore, the judgment of acquittal has to be set aside. In the circumstances, the only course open to this Court is to direct the appellate Court to the accused persons to challenge the conviction and sentence passed under S. 323, IPC on all grounds which 'may be legally available to them. 15. In the result, the revision is allowed. The judgment of acquittal passed by the appellate Court is set aside and the case is sent back to that Court (First Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior) to rehear the appeal afresh and then to dispose it of in accordance with law.