ORDER S.K. Dubey. J. -- 1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner who is working as an Office Assistant at the Branch Sales Office, Gwalior, of the respondents, on daily wages from 10.1.1979, prays for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other suitable writ, direction or order for regularisation and seniority on the post of Office Assistant and for the benefits of the post. 2. Brief facts leading to this petition are thus: The petitioner was appointed purely on temporary basis against a temporary post of Office Assistant at the Branch Sales Office, Gwalior, of the respondents vide Annexure P/1 on daily wages at the rate of Rs. 13/- per day. Petitioner's services were terminated vide order dated 23.8.1980. Petitioner raised a dispute. The appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication of the Labour Court No.1, Gwalior. In that, the Labour Court vide award dated 15.10.1984 declared the order of termination as non est, as petitioner's services were terminated without complying with the prerequisites of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the 'Act"). The respondents challenged this award before this Court in M.P. No. 491'1 of 1984, which was dismissed on 29.8.1989 vide order (AnnexureP/3). After the decision of this Court, the respondents allowed the petitioner to join her duties from 20.2.1990 and paid increased rate of wages at Rs. 26/- per day with effect from June 1984. The petitioner made a demand that she is continuously working on the post and has acquired the status of a permanent employee under the Standard Standing Order applicable to all the undertakings in the State of Madhya Pradesh, which arc enumerated in Annexures of Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963, framed under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1961, which govern the terms and conditions of the employees working at Branch Sales Office, Gwalior; therefore, the petitioner he absorbed on the regular post of Office Assistant and he paid at least the minimum pay scale of Rs. 1425-2205 plus dearness allowance, house rent allowance and city allowance. As the demand was not met, petitioner served a notice for demand of justice (Annexure P/6) dated 24.3. 1990, and, having failed to get her due, approached this Court by the petition on 24.1.1991 for seeking the reliefs. 3. 1425-2205 plus dearness allowance, house rent allowance and city allowance. As the demand was not met, petitioner served a notice for demand of justice (Annexure P/6) dated 24.3. 1990, and, having failed to get her due, approached this Court by the petition on 24.1.1991 for seeking the reliefs. 3. The respondents in their return contended that the Personal Department of respondent No.1 through its Section known as 'Office and Methods' (in brief O& M) assesses the need of every branch through out the country and fixes the requirement of permanent post in each cadre. In the cadre of Office Assistant/Senior Office Assistant, the number of posts sanctioned is specified from time to time, and in the cadre of Office Assistant at no relevant time, any permanent post was vacant which could he filled by petitioner; as petitioner was appointed against a temporary post purely on temporary basis, as is evident from the appointment order, petitioner is not entitled to claim regularisation or the status of a permanent employee, because there is no vacant post. In case the petitioner feels that she is entitled to regularisation on the permanent post of Office Assistant, petitioner has to approach the Labour Court by raising an appropriate dispute for seeking a declaration to that effect. It was also contended that an Office Assistant who holds a permanent post, has more work and responsibility to discharge than the petitioner who holds a temporary post of Office Assistant. The permanent Office Assistant docs not get pay on daily basis. The work of a temporary Office Assistant is invariably very much less than the work of a permanent Office Assistant. 4. Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the return stating that the petitioner is in employment since 10.1.1979, and the respondent No.1, a Government of India Undertaking, is practising an unfair Labour practice by continuing the petitioner as a temporary Office Assistant on daily wages for such a long time. It was also submitted that a number of other new hands have already been appointed as Office Assistants by the respondents on regular posts. To demonstrate that petitioner is discharging the same duties and function as is discharged by a regular Office Assistant, petitioner filed Annexures P/8 to P/10, of which P/8 is an Office order, allocating duties of receipt and despatch; P/9 and P/10 are the job allocation amongst the staff employed at the Branch Sales Office. To demonstrate that petitioner is discharging the same duties and function as is discharged by a regular Office Assistant, petitioner filed Annexures P/8 to P/10, of which P/8 is an Office order, allocating duties of receipt and despatch; P/9 and P/10 are the job allocation amongst the staff employed at the Branch Sales Office. In the job allocation order (Annexure P/9), dated 4.10.1990, petitioner was placed in group of administration and establishment matters, i.e., to work with Senior Assistant, which was revisable on quarterly basis. Annexure P/10 dated 8.10.1990 is another job allocation order, whereby petitioner was directed to assist S.C. Choudhury, Sr. O.S. along with other Sr. Assistant B.S. Dave. 5. In the return filed, the respondents did not dispute the duties assigned and the job allocated to petitioner from time to time; the respondents also did not place any material to show that the duties and work assigned to a temporary Office Assistant and a regular Office Assistant is not similar in nature. The respondents in para 4 of the additional return, filed in reply to rejoinder, stated that respondent No.1 had long ago switched over to almost complete com-puterisation. The result is that there are already very many surplus hands and the respondent does not have much work to offer. It would also be worthwhile to mention here that neither in the return nor in the additional return the respondents took the stand that petitioner's work was, at any point of time, not satisfactory. 6. At the time of hearing it was conceded that the Branch Sales Office at Gwalior is a registered establishment under the M.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 195X, and the terms and conditions of employment at the Branch Sales Office, of the employees, are governed by the Standard Standing Orders, framed under the Standing Orders Act. 7. Shri J.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent", at the outset, contended that as the petitioner claims to have acquired the status of a permanent employee, it requires an investigation. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction for seeking the relief of regularisation or of declaration of the status of a permanent employee, as the availability of vacant post is disputed. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction for seeking the relief of regularisation or of declaration of the status of a permanent employee, as the availability of vacant post is disputed. It was also contended by the learned counsel that for 'equal pay for equal work' the duties assigned to an employee under the same employer should be the same which is a disputed question; therefore also, the petitioner has to resort to appropriate proceedings before the Labour Court. Learned counsel further contended that earlier when petitioner's services were terminated, petitioner raised a dispute, wherein petitioner did not claim the relief of regularisation and/or of payment of the scale; therefore, petitioner now is not entitled to claim the relief which is barred by the principle of res Judicata/estop-pel or on the principle or relinquishment of the relief. 8. In our opinion, this petition involves two important question: (1) relating to the constitutional goal of' equality and social justice, enshrined in Articles 14, 16 and 39 (d) of the Constitution and the regularisation of the services of the petitioner, who works as temporary Office Assistant for years together, and (ii) pertaining to acquisition of the status of a permanent employee under Standard Standing Orders 2 (vi) which we will deal with presently one by one, as also the preliminary objections raised by Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent". 9. The petitioner claims regularisation and asserts that the action of respondent No.1, which is an instrumentality of the State, carrying on industrial activity, is not fair but is arbitrary and violative of Articles 39 (d), 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Shri H.N. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for petitioner, placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in case of Daily Rated Casual Labour, P & T Department v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 2342 , contended that the action of the respondents in not regularising the petitioner and not paying the minimum pay scale amounts to exploitation of Labour. In our opinion, the contention has got a merit in the facts which are borne out and not disputed. In our opinion, the contention has got a merit in the facts which are borne out and not disputed. It is clear that there is no difference in the nature of duties and work which is being performed by petitioner as temporary Office Assistant from that performed by a regular Office Assistant; therefore, there is no reason to deny the claim of 'equal pay for equal work.' The Apex Court has deprecated the practice. of non-regularisation of temporary employees or casual labourers for a long period in case of Daily Rated Cause! Labour., P&T Department (supra) and observed that managements and the Governmental agencies in particular should not allow workers to remain as casual Labourers or temporary employees for an unreasonably long period of time. Where there is any justification to keep persons as casual labourers or temporary employees for years? Is it for paying the lower wages? Then it amounts to exploitation of labour. 10. In case of H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 19R6 SC 132, the Apex Court has observed that to employ workers by giving them intermittent breaks amounts to unfair labour practice, so as to attract the 5th Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, which contains a list of unfair labour practices as defined in section 2 (ra). Item 10 reads as follows: "To employ workmen as 'badlis', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen." 11. Recently, in case of Grill Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 619 , the Apex Court after reviewing the whole law observed in para 6 thus: "6. Equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a fundamental right hut in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Article 39 (d) of the Constitution "Equal pay for equal work" has assumed the status of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual employment within a reasonable period has been accepted by this Court as a constitutional goal to our socialistic pattern. Equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual employment within a reasonable period has been accepted by this Court as a constitutional goal to our socialistic pattern. it has ceased to he judge made law as it is the part of the constitutional philosophy which ensures a welfare socialistic pattern of a State providing equal opportunity to all and equal pay for equal work for similarly placed employees of the State. This Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal pay for equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal or equality and social justice in a number of decisions. See: Randhir Singh v. Union of India (19R2) 1 SCC 61R; Daily Rated Casuel Labour Employed under P & T Department v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 122 ; Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986) 1 SCC 637 ; Surinder Singh v. Engineer in-chief, CPWD (1986) 1 SCC 639 ; R.D. Gupta v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration (1987) 4 SCC505; Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana (1987) 4 SCC 634 ; Jaipal v. State of Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 354 ; Dharwad District P.W.D. Literate Daily Wage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 396 . Therefore, the principle of equal pay for equal work even in an establishment which is an instrumentality of a State is applicable to its full vigour." 12. This Court also in case of Ashok Kumar v. Industrial Court, Indore, 1998 MPLJ 729, following the Supreme Court decisions referred therein, has taken the view that if two classes of persons under the same employer working with similar responsibility under similar working conditions, discharging similar duties, the doctrine of' equal pay for equal work' cannot he ignored on the ground of the employment being temporary or permanent in nature or because of different modes of selection. 13. In our opinion, the petitioner was and is being treated unfairly by the respondent/employer, who is taking advantage of the dominant position, It may he that the petitioner being of weaker section of the society, having no other choice, had agreed to work temporarily against a temporary post on the low rate of daily wages in the hope that she will get her due, but the respondents instead of acting as a model employer, terminated the services, and that action was set aside. But, even thereafter the employer did not regularise the petitioner and pay the minimum pay scale, which is an infringement of Articles 14, 16 and 31.) (d), which recognises the principle of "Equal pay for equal work," and for enforcement of that, the petitioner was forced to approach this Court. 14. Now, coming to the claim of petitioner under Standard Standing Order, admittedly, the terms and conditions of employment are governed by the Standard Standing Orders which are statutory. Standard Standing Order 2 deals with classification of employees, as "permanent," "permanent seasonal," "probationer," "badli," "apprentice" and "temporary." For the purposes of the present petition, clauses (i) and (vi) which respectively define "permanent" employee and "temporary" employee, arc relevant and arc .extracted in extenso: "2.Classification of Employees. -- Employees shall be classified as -- (i) permanent, (ii) permanent seasonal, (iii) probationer, (iv) "badlies" (v) apprentice and (vi) temporary: (i) A "permanent" employee is one who has completed six months satisfactory service in a clear vacancy in one or more posts whether as a probationer or otherwise, or a person whose name has been entered in the muster roll and who is given a ticket of permanent employees; Explanation. -- In computing the period of six months the days on which employee was absent due to authorised leave, sickness, maternity \cave, accident, lock out and strike (which are not illegal) or Closure of the undertaking-shall he included; (ii) . . . . . . . . (iii) . . . . . . . . (iv) . . . . . . . . (v) . . . . . . . . (vi) "temporary" employee means an employee who has been employed for work which is essentially of a temporary character, or who is temporarily employed as an additional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work of a permanent nature; provided that in case such employee is required to work continuously for more than six months he shall he deemed to he a permanent employee, within the meaning of clause (i) above." 15. It he made clear that the petitioner is not claiming under clause (i). But, as submitted by Shri Upadhyaya, learned counsel for petitioner, the petitioner claims the relief under 2 (vi) of acquiring the status of a "permanent" employee within the meaning of Standard Standing Order 2 (i). 16. It he made clear that the petitioner is not claiming under clause (i). But, as submitted by Shri Upadhyaya, learned counsel for petitioner, the petitioner claims the relief under 2 (vi) of acquiring the status of a "permanent" employee within the meaning of Standard Standing Order 2 (i). 16. In our opinion, the contention has got a force. From a hare look of the definition of "temporary" employee it is a clear that a "temporary" employee is an employee who has been employed for work which is essentially of a temporary character, or who is temporarily employed as an additional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work of a permanent nature. The proviso to this clause provides that in case such employee is required to work continuously for more than six months he shall he deemed to he a permanent employee within the meaning of clause (i) above. The petitioner under the proviso claims permanency and seniority on the post of Office Assistant and the benefits thereof. Though the appointment order, passed as long as back in the year 1979, speaks that the appointment was against a temporary post purely on a temporary basis, the said temporary post on which petitioner continues to work till date, is existing since last thirteen and a half years and the temporary work has not come to an end. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, the work which the petitioner is doing, cannot he said to be essentially of a temporary character. 17. As the proviso to the definition of "temporary" employee contained in clause (vi) carves out an exception to the general provision in the Standard Standing Order 2 (vi), in our opinion, an employee who works continuously for more than six months in connection with the increase in the work of a permanent nature, would be deemed to he a "permanent" employee within the meaning of Standard Standing Order 2 (i). 18. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statue only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. 18. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statue only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to accept and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. See Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1955 SC 765 , Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v Gujrat Revenue Tribunal, AIR 1991 SC 1538 - and A.N. Sehgal v. Raje Ram Sheoram AIR 1991 SC 1406 . 19. Under the exception clause a fiction has been created. For operation of the legal fiction a Court has to ascertain its purpose and to assume all the facts. On assumption of facts, an employee who has been engaged as a temporary employee and continues to work continuously for more than six months in the increase of temporary nature of permanent work, on giving full effect to the legal fiction in its logical conclusion, acquires the status of a "permanent" employee under, Standard Standing Order 2 (i). 20. This Court in case of M.P.S.R. T. Corporation v. Blwgiram Yadav, 1990 MPLJ 328 while considering the effect of Standard Standing Order 2 (vi) in a case where the employee worked as "temporary" employee continuously for more than six months, repelled the contention advanced that there was no post. It was observed that the contention raised is self-contradictory; if there was no post, then, why the respondent/employee was allowed to work. The Court further observed that the pica so raised was merely with a view to debar the rightful claim of the respondent/employee, which amounted to unfair labour practice, i.e., to take work of a higher post or cadre and not to pay him the wages of the said post and also not to classify him under Standard Standing Order 2 in the status of a "permanent" employee. 21. 21. Recently, this Court in case of K.K. Krishnan v. Industrial Court of M.P. Indore (decided at Indore Bench) (1992 M.P.L.J. 570) has observed that the proviso to Standard Standing Order 2 (vi) applies only to temporary employees, as defined in Standard Standing Order 2 (vi) and, on fulfilling the requirement of the proviso, such temporary employees get the status of a permanent employee. Therefore, in the facts of this case and the view of this Court in Bhagiram Yadav and K.K. Krishnan's cases (supra), we are of the opinion that the petitioner has not only made out a case of regularisation under Arts. 14, 16 and 39 (d) of the Constitution hut has also successfully established her claim under the proviso to Standard Standing Order 2 (vi). 22. True, where an alternative and efficacious remedy is available, as a practice of self-discipline, this Court could have directed the petitioner to resort to the remedy by raising an industrial dispute, hut considering the facts of this case, which are not in controversy, and the reliefs sought under Arts. 14,16 and 39 (d), on interpretation and application of Standard Standing Order 2 (vi) and hearing the petition finally on merits, we are not inclined to throw out the petition only because of availability of the alternative remedy. Hence, the preliminary objection is rejected. For that we rely on the decision of this Court in Surendra Sohana v. Dr. Hari Singh Gour Vishwavidyalaya, 1991 JLJ 307 =1991 (1) MPJR 398; Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai v. Special Area Development Authority, 1992 (1) MPVB 14 = 1991 (1) MPJR 375, and Ashok Kumar ;s case (supra). 23. During the course of hearing Shri Gupta also raised a contention that in the earlier reference of the dispute, the petitioner did not raise the claim of 'eyual pay for equal work' or of her regularisation, and therefore, no relief can be granted on principle of estoppel and res judicata and also in view of Order 2, R.2, CPC. In our opinion, the contention has no merit, as the act of the respondents in not giving petitioner regular pay scale and not classifying her as a "permanent" employee is a recurring cause of action; therefore, neither 0.2, R.2, CPC, nor the principle of res judicata or estoppel applies in the case. 24. Coming to the question of grant of relief. 24. Coming to the question of grant of relief. as the petitioner for the first time raised the demand of grant of regular pay scale of Office Assistant on 12.9.1990, we arc not inclined to grant the relief of pay scale from 31.10.1984, hut from the date when petitioner was allowed to join her duties on 20.2.1990 after the decision of this Court in the petition filed by the respondents, whereby the award of the Labour Court, declaring petitioner's termination as void, was confirmed. 25. In the result, the petition is allowed with costs. The petitioner is declared as a regular and permanent employee, who shall he entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 1425-2205 from 20.2.1990 with regular increments and all ancillary benefits attached to the post. The difference of salary shall be payable to petitioner only from 20.2.1990. Respondents to pay the costs of petitioner in this petition. Counsel's fee Rs. 1000/- if already certified. Per R.C. Lahoti, J. 26. I have had the benefit of going through the order proposed by my learned brother S.K. Dubey, J. Though I agree with the ultimate conclusion recorded by my learned brother, vide para,25 of his order, yet I wish to place on record that I am in respectful disagreement with some of the views expressed by my learned brother. 27. Several as pacts touching the law as to regularisation have been exhaustively dealt with and laid down by Division Bench of this Court in M.P. No. 467/89 (Suresh Chandra & others v. State of M.P. & others) decided on 30.6.92, wherein the Division Bench has noticed several Apex Court decisions and crystalised the law relating to "equal pay for equal work" doctrine also. 28. One of the pleas taken by respondents opposing the petitioner's claim for regularisation is that there is surplus staff with the respondent and the respondent cannot, therefore, afford to accommodate the petitioner; there being no vacancy available against which the petitioner might be 'regularised'. 28. One of the pleas taken by respondents opposing the petitioner's claim for regularisation is that there is surplus staff with the respondent and the respondent cannot, therefore, afford to accommodate the petitioner; there being no vacancy available against which the petitioner might be 'regularised'. In Suresh Chandra's case (supra), the Division Bench has said: "When there is no job left to be performed and the regular stall is enough to satisfy the regular requirements of the Department, forced entry or workers in the department in the name of regularisation, by compelling retention of such workers as were brought in casually to fulfill casual needs of the department is sure to bring inefficiency and demoralisation in the public services for there would be a number of persons being paid without any work being taken from them. Surplus stall is sure to be counter productive in the department spoiling the work- culture, also entailing heavily on the public exchequer. No doubt, employees in the public sector must have security of tenure and the feeling of safety by permanence in employment but at the same time in the larger interest of society, weighty considerations on the other side cannot just be blinked at" [Para 46 "There can be no regularisation if there arc no vancancies." [Para 49 29. As to the relief of "equal pay for equal work" I find it difficult to subscribe to the proposition that it is for the employer to raise pleadings and demonstrate how the petitioner is not entitled to relief. In Suresh Chandra's case (supra) the Division Bench has noted the law laid down by the Apex Court in V. Markendeya v. State of A.P. ( AIR 1989 SC 1308 ) in the following terms: "It is for the aggrieved employee to demonstrate discrimination practiced by State in prescribing two different scales for two classes of employees, for principle of equal pay forequal work cannot be enforced by Court in abstract." 30. Entitlement to 'equal pay' depends on proof of 'equal work' which would always be a subject matter of pleadings and inquiry. Such questions arc not ordinarily fit to be adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. Entitlement to 'equal pay' depends on proof of 'equal work' which would always be a subject matter of pleadings and inquiry. Such questions arc not ordinarily fit to be adjudicated upon in writ jurisdiction. The Labour Court would be an appropriate forum where the parties should be left to have their rights decided ordinarily, I would have taken the view that in this case too the petitioner should be diverted to have recourse to the Labour Court. However. I am not inclined to take that view in this case due to very peculiar facts as the petition has been finally heard and on the material brought before the Court there does not appear to be a dispute on the work performed by the petitioner on the post of Office Assistant being similar in nature with that of the regular office assistants. 31. I have also not been able to persuade myself to subscribe to the view that an employee can he classified as 'permanent" merely by counting 'six months continuous work' without regard to any other factor, within the meaning of Standing Orders referred to hereinafter. 32. The relevant definitions extracted from clause (2) of M.P. Industrial Employment Standing Order Rules, 1963 read as under:- "2. Classification of Employees :-- Employees shall be classified as -(i) permanent, (ii) Permanent seasonal, (iii) probationers,(iv) badlies (v) apprentices, and (vi) temporary: .. "(i) A 'permanent' employee is one who has complete six months' satisfactory service in a clear vacancy in one or more posts whether as a probationer or otherwise, or a perosn whose name has been entered in the muster roll and who is given a ticket of permanent employee." (vi) 'temporary employee' means an employee who has been employed for work which is essentially of a temporary character, or who is temporarily employed as an additional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work of a permanent nature; provided that in case such employee is required to work continuously for more than six months he shall he deemed to he a permanent employee, within the meaning of clause (i) above." Vide clause (i) to he a permanent employee, the employee should have (a) completed six months' (b) satisfactory service; and (c) in a clear vacancy. If the proviso to clause (vi) is read in isolation, a temporary employee employed for work essentially of a temporary character would he deemed to have been confirmed with the status of a permanent employee without regard to the considerations whether the services were satisfactory or not and whether or not there was a clear vacancy. Such an interpretation would not only violate the celebrated rule of harmonious construction hut would also lead to absurdity Reference to clause (i) in the proviso to clause (vi) obliges the proviso being read with clause (i); meaning thereby that the temporary employee as defined under clause (vi) would remain a temporary employee without regard to the period of work done by him unless and until it is found that there was a clear vacancy available and the services of the employee were satisfactory. If this test is applied to the petitioner, she cannot he classified as 'permanent", for there is no material available to hold that the petitioner's performance was satisfactory and there was a clear vacancy available. 33. In spite of the view which I have taken hereinabove, I am inclined to agree with my learned brother in the ultimate relief allowed by him to the petitioner, on account of law laid down by the Apex Court recently in N.S.K. Nayar and other v. Union of India and others (AIR 11)92 SC 1574). It was a case of certain Class II officers appointed with a forgs leap to Senior Time Scale, by passing the Junior Scalers in between, under Rule 27 (h) of Telegraph Engineering Services Rules, which rule provided a source of appointment to meet the administrative exigency of short tenure. Such appointees later on served for 10 to 15 years. Their Lordships held -- "The appointment made under R. 27 (b) if continued for such a long period cannot he considered to he purely temporary/officiating or to hold charge. Taking work from persons so appointed in the STS posts for 10/15 years and denying them the right of regularisation and the consequent benefits in the said grade would he wholly arbitrary and is voilative of Art. 16 of the Constitution of India." 34. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed on daily wages on 10.1.79. She has been continuously working as an Office Assistant at Gwalior Branch Sales Office of the respondents. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed on daily wages on 10.1.79. She has been continuously working as an Office Assistant at Gwalior Branch Sales Office of the respondents. A period of more than 12 years had lapsed when this petition came to he filed. The petitioner rendering service for such a long period cannot he called a 'temporary' or 'holding charge' employee. She has earned the right of regularisation and consequent benefits attaching with the post held by her, in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in N.S.K. Nayar's case (supra). 35. For the sole and singular reason stated in paras 33 and 34 above, I express my agreement with the view taken by my learned brother vide paras 22 to 25 of his order.