AGRAWAL, C.J. — This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been filed by the petitioner challenging the validity of the order dated 20-3-1985 cancelling the allotment of land to the petitioner given to it for construction of a hospital on the ground that the petitioner Trust had not taken steps to build the hospital within two years and thus violated the conditions of allotment order. (2) In pursuance of the State Governments decision dated 16.07.1970 to allot a piece of land measuring 4000 square yards at one fourth price of the reserve to the petitioner, the Jaipur Development Authority issued the allotment order dated 5.10.1972 to the petitioner on the condition that the petitioner would construct the hospital within two years of allotment. The period of allotment was extended from time to time and ultimately through letter dated 12-5-1982 extended two years further time to the petitioner. It was, however, mentioned that in the event of the petitioner did not complete the construction within two years, the allotment would stand cancelled. The petitioner did not start the construction of the hospital and requested for further extension. The Jaipur Development Authority wrote a letter dated 21-7-1984 to the petitioner, which reads as under :— ^^mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr ys[k gS fd mikklu lfpo] uxjh; fodkl ,oa vkoklu foHkkx jktLFkku ljdkj ds i= dzekad ,Q&3 ¼80½ u-fo- vk@70 fnukad 12-5-82 dh vuqikyuk esa vkidks izkf/kdj.k ds i= dzekad tfoizk@eqjkv@83@35 78&80 fnukad 16-11-83 }kjk 5@& ds uku T;wfMfk;y LVkEi isij ij ,d vUMjdsfVax izLrqr dj Hkou fuekZ.k laca/kh izkFkZuk i= fu/kkZfjr izk:i djus gsrq fy[kk x;k Fkk fdUrq vki }kjk bl ckjs esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZ A vc ekeys esa ijh{k.k dj fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gS fd vki d`i;k bl i= izkfIr ds rhu ekg dh vof/k esa fu/kkZfjr izkFkZuk i= Hkj dj Hkou ekufp= izkf/kdj.k ls vuqeksfnr djok dj fuekZ.k dk;Z izkjEHk dj nsosA (3) In pursuance of the aforesaid letter, an undertaking was given by the petitioner to the following effect :— "I, Mannalal Soorana, son of late Shri Milap Chandji Surana, resident of Surana House, D-32 Subhash Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur, Chairman of the Soorana Charitable Trust, Hanuman ka Rasta, Jaipur, do hereby undertake to construct the hospital building within a period of two years, provided no hindrance is caused due to unforeseen circumstances. I hereby further undertake to abide by the terms and conditions contained in letter no. 16304 dated 8-10-1972 of Urban Improvement Trust." The petitioner again defaulted and despite the time having been granted it did not construct and build the hospital. Hence, by the letter dated 20-3-1985 (Annex.8) the petitioner was informed : ^^mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr fuosnu gS fd lqjkuk psjhVscy VªLV ds vkW[kksa ds vLirky gsrq vkoafVr Hkwfe ij VªLV us Hkou fuekZ.k djus ds laca/k esa dksbZ Bksl dne bruh yEch vof/k O;rhr gks tkus ds mijkUr Hkh ugha mBk;s gS ,oa vkoaVu i= dh krksZa dk Li"V mYya?ku fd;k gSA vr% mi kklu lfpo] uxjh; fodkl ,oa vkokl foHkkx] jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqj ds i= dzekad i- 3@80@;w- Mh- ,p-@ 70 ikVZ II fnukad 12-3-85 ds vuqlj.k esa vkoafVr Hkwfe ,rn~}kjk jí dh tkrh gS ,oa Hkax U;kl ds i= dzekad 163048 fnukad 5-10-85 ds }kjk vkoafVr Hkw[k.M ,rn~}kjk jí fd;k tkdj vf/kxzfgr fd;k tkrk gSA (4) Having realized the consequences of not completing the construction of the hospital within the period allowed, the petitioner filed a civil suit on 23.4.1985 in the court of Munsif Magistrate (East), Jaipur alongwith an application for temporary injunction praying that the Jaipur Development Authority should not interfere with the possession of the aforesaid plot of the petitioner. The Munsiff Magistrate rejected the application on 29-4-1989. The petitioner withdrew the suit on 12-7-1989 without taking the liberty to file a fresh suit. Thereafter, on 4-4-1991 the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the order of the Jaipur Development Authority dated 20.03.1985 and directing it to approve the plan submitted by the petitioner on 5th Oct. 1984 for construction of a charitable hospital. (5) There is a dispute in between the parties about the submission of the plan for construction of the hospital. The petitioner has claimed that the plan was submitted, whereas the Jaipur Development Authority has denied its receipt. The version of the petitioner appears to be unfounded and not established. (6) The main objection of the respondent No. 2 was that the petitioner had not completed the construction of the hospital within the time allowed and , as such, it was within its right to cancel the allotment order. The version of the petitioner appears to be unfounded and not established. (6) The main objection of the respondent No. 2 was that the petitioner had not completed the construction of the hospital within the time allowed and , as such, it was within its right to cancel the allotment order. (7) I have noted above that allotment order to the petitioner was issued in the year 1972 and the condition mentioned in that allotment order was that the petitioner would complete the construction of the hospital within two years. It, however, did not do so. Even after the re-allotment of the plot by the Jaipur Development Authority vide letter dated 12-5-1982, the petitioner failed in getting the hospital constructed. The petitioners request for further time was turned down by the Government of Rajasthan on 12-3-1985. It was informed that the Government considered over the matter and since no effective steps were taken to construct the hospital and conditions were violated, therefore, allotment of land had been cancelled. The State Government called upon the respondent No. 2 to take possession of the land immediately. (8) Having not been able to persuade the State Government and the Jaipur Development Authority for extension of time, the petitioner filed the civil suit alongwith an application for temporary injunction. The trial court rejected the application. Having realized that the only purpose of the petitioner which was to get an injunction order could not be fulfilled, it withdrew the suit without seeking liberty to file a fresh suit. What would be the effect of withdrawal of the suit is a question which need not be considered as the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on other grounds. The petitioner had not acquired any right by virtue of allotment of the land for construction of the hospital. It did not construct the hospital. It has been stated by the petitioner that it built boundary walls over the land allotted to it, but that has been disputed by the respondent No. 2. (9) Mr. Lodha, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the land having been allotted to the petitioner, the State Government as well as the Jaipur Development Authority were estopped from cancelling the allotment order. The learned counsel relied on the principal of promissory estoppel for getting the relief in the present writ petition. (9) Mr. Lodha, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the land having been allotted to the petitioner, the State Government as well as the Jaipur Development Authority were estopped from cancelling the allotment order. The learned counsel relied on the principal of promissory estoppel for getting the relief in the present writ petition. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is enough to show that the promisee has, acted in reliance on the promise, altered his position. In the instant case, nothing had been shown that the petitioner had altered its position. (10). Reliance had been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills vs. State of U.P. (1). My attention was drawn to the following passage of that judgment :— "The State, however, contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application in the present case because the appellant did not suffer any detriment by acting on the representation made by the Government, the Vanaspati factory set up by the appellant was quite a profitable concern and there was no prejudice caused to the appellant. This contention of the State is clearly unsustainable and must be rejected. We do not think it is, necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promise should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. This position was impliedly accepted by Denning. J., in the High Trees Case when the learned Judge pointed out that the promise must be one which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact acted on." (11) If a promise is "acted on", such action, in law as in physics, must necessarily result in an alteration of position. This was again reiterated by Lord Denning in W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. V. El. Nasar Export and Import Co., (2) at p. 140 where the learned Law Lord made it clear that alteration of position : "only means that he (the promisee) must have been led to act differently from what he would otherwise have done. This was again reiterated by Lord Denning in W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. V. El. Nasar Export and Import Co., (2) at p. 140 where the learned Law Lord made it clear that alteration of position : "only means that he (the promisee) must have been led to act differently from what he would otherwise have done. And, if you study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied, you will see that all that is required that the one should have acted on the belief induced by the other party." (12) The equity lies in the fact that one party has by his conduct led the other to alter his position. This requirement has been emphasized by Lord Diplock in Kammins Ballrooms Ltd. vs. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (3). (13). To succeed in a plea of promissory estoppel it is indispensable to prove that the promisee has altered his position in reliance on an assurance which he has received. This requirement is implicit if not expressed in the earliest statements of the doctrine. Bowen L.J. in Birmingham and District Land Co. vs. London and North Western Rail Co. refers to the requirement directly when he says :— "those persons will not be allowed by a court of equity to enforce the rights . . . .. without at all events placing the parties in the same position as they were before." (14) Denning J. may be thought to have accepted this in his judgment in Central London Properties Ltd. vs. High Trees House Ltd. The promisee will be precluded from exercising his original rights, he says, in cases where:— "a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on." (15) In the instant case, the petitioner could not establish any alteration in its position because of which it could invoke the principle of promissory estoppel. Either the principle of promissory estoppel or the judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case. I have seen above that the petitioner had been given two years to complete the construction of the hospital, but it did not do so. Either the principle of promissory estoppel or the judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case. I have seen above that the petitioner had been given two years to complete the construction of the hospital, but it did not do so. (16) By placing reliance on clause (C) of paragraph 17 of the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that two years time given finally to the petitioner was to commence from the date of approval of the plans which had been submitted on 5th October 1984. The Jaipur Development Authority did not pass any order either approving or disapproving the plans. Hence, the period of two years did not commence. Consequently, the cancellation order dated 20.03.1985 was in violation of the terms of the agreement. (17) The Jaipur Development Authority has denied the receipt of the plans in paragraph 14(b) of the counter affidavit. It has further called upon the petitioner to produce the original record to show that the plans had been submitted by it to the Jaipur Development Authority. The petitioner has not done so. The affidavit of the petitioner does not inspire any confidence. In the absence of any evidence, the conduct of the petitioner has been throughout to avoid constructing the hospital within two years and for the purpose of making a ground in its favour this plea of submission of plan was taken by it. This was a false and unreliable stand. The petitioner itself has written in its letter dated 5th Dec. 1983 about the paucity of funds as one of the grounds on account of which the construction of the hospital could not be completed. (18) The cases relied on by the petitioners counsel in Zorawar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Raj. (4) and Smt. Reeta Sharma vs. University of Raj. (5) have no bearing on the controversy in question. (19) The allotment itself did not create any right inasmuch as it was coupled with the condition that the hospital had to be constructed within two years. If, therefore, that condition is not complied with, the allotment fall down. It was a binding stipulation or in other words it was pre-requisite for obtaining the fruits for allotment. (20) The allotment order has to be read alongwith the conditions which were part and parcel of the allotment order. If, therefore, that condition is not complied with, the allotment fall down. It was a binding stipulation or in other words it was pre-requisite for obtaining the fruits for allotment. (20) The allotment order has to be read alongwith the conditions which were part and parcel of the allotment order. It could be effective and binding on the parties only when the petitioner had completed construction within two years, but where as here the construction was not even undertaken or started, the same lapsed and no right accrued to the petitioner to get the relief prayed for. I have also held above that the petitioner could not submit the plans as was required, hence, the agreement failed and could not be acted upon. (21) The writ petition was filed on the ground of promissory estoppel which has no application in the present case. (22). Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed with costs.