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1992 DIGILAW 61 (KER)

Rajalekshmi v. State of Kerala

1992-02-12

SREEDHARAN

body1992
Judgment :- Petitioner joined service as Lower Division Typist in the Panchayat Department on 13-2-1967. She had the prescribed general qualification and the special qualification of Account Test, which were required for a Lower Division Clerk to be promoted to the cadre of Upper Division Clerk. She became an Upper Division Typist on 14-11-1973. On completion of 10 years service as Typist, she sought for category change as Upper Division Clerk. She was appointed as Upper Division Clerk in the Panchayat Department on 11-6-1979. She was confirmed in that cadre on completion of period of probation. In 1984, she was appointed as First Grade Executive Officer and she became Panchayat Inspector in 1987. While so, Ext. P1 notice dated 2-8-1989 was served on her informing her that she was not eligible for appointment as Upper Division Clerk since she had not passed the departmental test in M.O.P. Accordingly, she was called upon to show cause why her appointment as Upper Division Clerk should not be reconsidered She filed a detailed reply. After considering the reply, second respondent, Ext. P3 order dated 1-11-1990, reverted her to the post of Upper Division Typist in the office of Deputy Director of Panchayat, Ernakulam. That order was challenged in appeal before the Government. As there was delay in the disposal of that appeal, she approached this Court by filing O.P. 1056/1991. This Court, by Ext. P5 judgment dated 28-1-1991, directed the Government to pass final order on the appeal preferred by the petitioner. In compliance with that direction, Government issued Ext. P6 order dated 4-3-1991 dismissing the appeal. Hence this Original Petition. 2 A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the first respondent. The stand taken therein is that as per G.O.(MS) 301/68/PD dated 26-9-1968 read with G.O.(MS) 292/PD dated 29-6-1969, Upper Division Typists and Stenographers, who possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment as Upper Division Clerk/Assistant Grade-I and who have put in 10 years of service, will be eligible for appointment as Upper Division Clerk/ Assistant Grade-I in every 6th vacancy arising in the concerned department. Pass in test in M.O.P. and Account Test (Lower) are obligatory for appointment as Upper Division Clerks. Petitioner passed only the Account Test (Lower). By mistake, she was appointed as Upper Division Clerk, when she did not pass the test in M.O.P. This fact was noticed by the appointing authority only on 24-2-1989. Pass in test in M.O.P. and Account Test (Lower) are obligatory for appointment as Upper Division Clerks. Petitioner passed only the Account Test (Lower). By mistake, she was appointed as Upper Division Clerk, when she did not pass the test in M.O.P. This fact was noticed by the appointing authority only on 24-2-1989. Consequently she was reverted as Upper Division Typist, since her appointment as Upper Division Clerk was not in order. Petitioner was not confirmed in the post of Upper Division Clerk. On these basis, it is contended that petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs asked for. 3. From the facts, it is clear that petitioner did not acquire the test in M.O.P, when she was allowed category change on 11-6-1979. As per G.O.(MS)301/68/PD dated 26-9-1968, Upper Division Typists and Stenographers, who have the prescribed qualifications and have put in 10 years of service, are eligible for appointment as Upper Division Clerks/ Assistants Grade-I in every 6th vacancy arising in the concerned department. On the basis of this provision, petitioner was posted as Upper Division Clerk on 11-6-1979. Respondents have no case that petitioner misrepresented to the appointing authority regarding her qualification when she claimed category change. According to the respondents, they came to know of the mistake only when the service book of the petitioner was verified on 24-2-1989, i.e. nearly 10 years after she was appointed as Upper Division Clerk. The Head of Office, in which petitioner was working, was bound to verify the service book periodically. So also, the higher authorities were duty bound to scrutinise the service records. From the counter affidavit, it is clear that no authority discharged this duty properly. But, for no fault of hers, she is being penalised by reverting her to the post of Upper Division Typist, after a lapse of more than 10 years. 4. A test in M.O.P. was made obligatory for promotion from the cadre of Lower Division Clerk to Upper Division Clerk by G.O.(P) 22 dated 14-1-1963. Clause-3 of that G.O. provides that in cases where probation has not already been prescribed, a person concerned should be required to pass the test within a period of two years from the date of order or from the date of appointment, whichever is later. Clause-3 of that G.O. provides that in cases where probation has not already been prescribed, a person concerned should be required to pass the test within a period of two years from the date of order or from the date of appointment, whichever is later. In the case of the petitioner, the appointing authority should have required her to pass the test within a period of two years because, according to her, no period of probation was prescribed for her in the category of Upper Division Clerk. This was also not done. On the facts and circumstances of this case, I have no hesitation in holding that the entire mistake, if there was any, was committed by the respondents. The result was that the petitioner was allowed to continue in the cadre of Upper Division Clerk, First Grade Executive Officer and Panchayat Inspector for more than 10 years. At this distance of time, is it proper on the part of the Government and Head of the Department to revert her to the cadre of Upper Division Typist? In Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank v. Narayan (AIR 1977 SC 112), validity of an order passed by the Registrar of a Co-operative Society directing the termination of service of a Secretary to one of the Societies, after 13 years of appointment, on the ground that he had no qualification at the time of the appointment, was under challenge. Their Lordships took the view that it was not open to the Registrar to set aside the appointment as Secretary after having acquiesced in it and after having for all practical purposes, accepted the appointment as valid. Their Lordships observed: "It is undesirable that appointments should be invalidated in this manner after a lapse of several years". In the instant case, petitioner was given category change on 11-6-1979. After more than 10 years, by Ext. P-1 dated 2-8-1989, action was initiated to set at naught the category change effected on 11-6-1979 on the ground that she had not passed the test in M.O.P. This is highly arbitrary and unsustainable. In H.C. Puttaswamyv. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, (AIR 1991 SC 295), Their Lordships considered the fate of certain employees who were appointed against the provisions of law. Supreme Court did not interfere with the appointments, observing. In H.C. Puttaswamyv. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka, (AIR 1991 SC 295), Their Lordships considered the fate of certain employees who were appointed against the provisions of law. Supreme Court did not interfere with the appointments, observing. - "The human problem stands at the outset in these cases and it is that problem that motivated us in allowing the review petitions. It may be recalled that the appellants are in service for the past 10 years". Their Lordships went on to observe. "The precedents apart, the circumstances of this case justify an humanitarian approach and indeed, the appellants seem to deserve justice ruled by mercy". In this view, Their Lordships allowed the candidates to be treated as regularly appointed with all the benefits of past service. On the facts and circumstances of this case, I feel that the above course must be adopted in the case of the petitioner as well. 5. The decisions referred to above apply on all fours to the facts on hand. Petitioner got category change in terms of the G.O. governing the issue. She had all general qualifications for holding the post of U.D. Clerk. It is not clear from the G.O. that for category change a typist should pass the tests required to be passed by a Lower Division Clerk for getting promotion to U.D. Cadre. She was not required by any authority to pass the test in M.O.P. either. In such a state of affairs, it was not proper or legal on the part of the respondents to revert her to the cadre of U.D. Typist after over 10 years. Further, she has passed the test in M.O.P. subsequent to the impugned order. 6. Admittedly petitioner was allowed category change on 11-6-1979. She was promoted to the cadre of First Grade Executive Officer on 20-6-1984 and then as Panchayat Inspector onll-2-1987. In that capacity, she worked for more than 21/2 years. Thereafter she was issued Ext. P1 notice. In such a circumstance, even conceding the entire case set up by the respondents to be true, petitioners appointment can only be treated as irregular and not void. Petitioner is not to be blamed for what had happened. There was no misrepresentation on her part. The entire mistake, if there was any, appears to have been committed by the respondent. For such a negligent conduct, the petitioner is not to be penalised. Petitioner is not to be blamed for what had happened. There was no misrepresentation on her part. The entire mistake, if there was any, appears to have been committed by the respondent. For such a negligent conduct, the petitioner is not to be penalised. So, at this distance of time, she cannot be reverted back to the cadre of Upper Division Typist. This is more so because she has passed the test in M.O.P. In view of what has been stated above, I quash Exts. P3 and P6 orders and direct the respondents to re-admit the petitioner to the cadre of Panchayat Inspector. This must be done as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Original Petition is allowed in the above terms. Issue photo copy of the judgment to the parties on usual terms.