JUDGMENT V. K. Mehrotra, J.—This is a landlords petition in revision under the proviso to section 16 (8) of the H. P Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 ("the Act", for short) though in the memorandum of revision it has erroneously been described as petition under section 24 (5) of the Act. 2. Section 16 of the Act provides for a special procedure for disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 14 (3) (a) (iii) and section 15. The former is for a landlord who is a member of the armed forces and requires the accommodation for the occupation of his family and produces a certificate of the prescribed authority referred to in section 7 of the Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925, that he is serving in special conditions within the meanings of section 3 of that Act or is posted in a non-family station. Section 15 gives the right of recovery of immediate possession of premises to certain categories of persons who are mentioned therein Sub-section (2) of section 15 relates to a "specified landlord" who is defined in section 2 (i) as a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of a building on his own account and who is holding or has held an appointment in a public service or post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. 3. A specified landlord is given a right to apply to the Rent Controller alongwith a certificate from the authority competent to remove him from service indicating the date of his retirement and his affidavit to the effect that he does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside, at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement or after his retirement but within one year of the appointed day, which means the 18th day of August, 1987, in section 2 (a), to recover possession of one residential building, for his own occupation. On and from the date of such application, there shall accrue to him, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act (whether expressed or implied), custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediate possession of such residential building or any part or parts of such building if it is let out in part or parts. 4. Under section 16, on receipt of an application from a specified landlord, the Controller is to issue summons to the tenant and on its service on the tenant the Controller is to make an enquiry by following the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence. Leave can be given by the Rent Controller to the tenant to contest the application of the landlord if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the specified landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in section 15. Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable. Section 16 (8) says : "(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section : Provided that the High Court may, for the purposes of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such orders in respect thereto as it thinks fit." 5. The scope of the powers of High Court under the proviso afore said is different and narrower than its power when it considers a case under section 24 (5) of the Act which says: "24 (5). The High Court may at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or "on its own motion call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit……….." 6. The words according to law occurring in the proviso to section 16 (8) occur also in section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The words according to law occurring in the proviso to section 16 (8) occur also in section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Their scope was considered by Beaumont C. J. in Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223. The learned Chief Justice observed thus: "The object of section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at." These observations received the concurrence of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698, while it was dealing with the phrase according to law occurring in section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. The section reads as follows: "35(1). The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit." Likewise, in Malini Ayyappa Naicker {dead) by his legal representatives etc. The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit." Likewise, in Malini Ayyappa Naicker {dead) by his legal representatives etc. v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas firm by Managing Partner, Chathurbhuj Chhabildas (dead) by his legal representatives and others etc., AIR 1969 SC 1344, where the Supreme Court, dealing with the question about the scope of the power of the High Court under the first proviso of section 75 (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 which provided that: "Provided that the High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made in any appeal decided by the District Court was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit " Said (in paragraph 7) that : “………………….It is neither desirable nor possible to give an exhaustive definition of the expression "according to law". The power given to the High Court under the 1st proviso to section 75 (1) of the Act is similar to that given to it under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Explaining the scope of the latter provision, Beaumont, C. J. (as he then was) in Belland Co , Ltd. v. Woman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223, observed...." (These observations, quoted earlier, need not be repeated). 7. It was urged before the Supreme Court that a different decision was given by it in Official Receiver Kanpur v, Abdul Shakur, AIR 1965 SC 920. Referring to that case the Supreme Court said (in paragraph 9) that: "It may be remembered that Shah, J. was also a party to the decision in Hari Shankars case, AIR 1963 SC 698 (supra). We see no conflict between the two decisions... All that it laid down in Abdul Shakurs case is that the High Court is not com petent to disturb a finding of fact reached by the District Court even if in j eaching that finding it was required to take into consideration a statutory presumption…………" 8. We see no conflict between the two decisions... All that it laid down in Abdul Shakurs case is that the High Court is not com petent to disturb a finding of fact reached by the District Court even if in j eaching that finding it was required to take into consideration a statutory presumption…………" 8. Before noticing some more decisions of the Supreme Court reference may be made, with advantage, to a Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Namidwar and others v. Dash- rath Narayan Chilwelkar and others, AIR 1943 Nag 117. The observations of Vivian Bose, J., one of the Judges constituting the Full Bench, are trite. It was he who had made a reference to the Full Bench. What he said about the words "according to law" (at page 126) was: "………… I agree that the meaning of these words standing by them selves is not free from difficulty, but viewed in the background I have suggested they do not, in my opinion, empower the High Court to interfere on questions of law, still less on questions of fact, except in the limited circumstances which I shall define……."According to law" does not therefore, in my opinion, mean "according to the opinion of law which the revisional Judge reaches", because he is not asked "to determine the case", "but according to the usual forms and usages which prevail in Courts of justice". It is more procedural than anything else " And, (at page 128) : "………….."According to law" does not mean an error of law in the opinion of the High Court but a conclusion which no Judge could reasonably reach either in law or in fact. That, in my opinion, is the test: not whether the High Court, or the particular Judge presiding over the Court in revision would have reached the same conclusion, but whether a Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached it..............." The Full Bench concluded by saying that: "…………..We are agreed that there should be no interference on a question of fact or of law, even though the decision may appear to be erroneous, unless the conclusion of the Small Cause Court is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably reach." 9. A case under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 reached the Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanaji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel and others, (1974) 1 SCC 661. Section 29 (3) of that Act enabled the High Court to examine whether the decision of the District Judge was according to law. It was urged before the Supreme Court that the High Court could not interfere under section 29 (3) with findings of fact recorded by the District Judge unless it could be shown that they disclose an error of law in arriving at them. The Supreme Court, after referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bell and Co, AIR 1938 Bom 223. and to its own earlier judgment in Hari Shankar, AIR 1963 SC 698 and Pooran Chand v. Mortal, AIR 1964 SC 461, concluded (in paragraph 6) that: "………..The High Court can, therefore, interfere with the decision of the lower Court under section 29, sub-section (3) only if there is miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The High Court cannot reassess the value of the evidence and interfere with a finding of fact merely because it thinks that the appreciation of the evidence by the lower Court is wrong and the lower Court should have reached a different conclusion of fact from what it did: in other words, the High Court cannot re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusions of fact in place of those reached by the lower Court………." Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act is in these terms: "29 (2). No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under subsection (I) but the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal was according to law, call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit." 10. In Helper Girdharbhai v. Salyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and others, (1987) 3 SCC 538, the Supreme Court, while dealing with this provision and after noticing several of its earlier decisions as well as decisions of various High Courts, said (in paragraph 16) that : "…………As we read the power, the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant……... " And, (in paragraph 18) that : “…………..The High Court could not substitute its own finding for the one reached by the courts below on a reappraisal of evidence…………" 11. Section 25 (B) (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is akin to section 16 (8) of our Act. The scope of the power of the High Court under the aforesaid provision of the Delhi Act came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury, (1988) 2 SCC 172. What was said about it by the Supreme Court (in paragraph 8) is: "………….Though under section 25 (B) (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are somewhat wider than similar powers of revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is well established by a series of decisions of this Court that the power of revision under the Rent Control Acts does not entitle the High Court to enter into the merits of the factual controversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard…………." 12. The power of interference by the High Court under proviso to section 16 (8) would undoubtedly embrace the power to interfere where there is misappreciation of evidence amounting to the finding being perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would arrive at it on the material on record as held in Motiram Kalaram v. Rama Mukundi, AIR 1953 MB 158. It would certainly permit the High Court to interfere if there is miscarriage of justice in a case, judged on the anvil of the various grounds held permissible by judicial pronouncements, as said by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar, AIR 1963 SC 698. To this extent there can be no difficulty in accepting the submission made by Shri H. K. Bhardwaj, appearing for the applicant-landlord. But the power of interference would not, in any case, extend to interference with a conclusion of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller, on reappraisal of the evidence, on the ground that a different view of evidence was possible. To borrow the words, as was done by N. D. Ojha, J. in Sohan Lal v. VIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr and others, 1981 (2) RCJ 513, of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Laxmi Kishore and another v Har Prasad Shukla, 1979 AWC 746, while dealing with the scope of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act : "……………If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will the case where the finding is based only on inadmissible evidence. In such cases, the court will be justified (?) the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz, validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact…………" 13. The scope of enquiry by the High Court under the proviso to section 16 (8) of the Act being so defined, the facts of the present case be seen. 14. Petitioner Amar Singh retired from service on 31st August, 1983. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact…………" 13. The scope of enquiry by the High Court under the proviso to section 16 (8) of the Act being so defined, the facts of the present case be seen. 14. Petitioner Amar Singh retired from service on 31st August, 1983. He is the landlord of the premises in possession of the respondent, also a Government servant, who retired sometime in the year 1971 or 1972. In May, 1980 an application was made by the landlord seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he had ceased to occupy the accommodation let out to him and was also in arrears of rent. After trial before the Rent Controller the petition was dismissed on 28th February, 1985. These proceedings had been taken under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. That Act was replaced by the 1987 Act which was given retrospective operation with effect from 17th November, 1971, the date of enforcement of the 1971. Section 15 (2) of 1987 Act was to come into force on the appointed day, namely, 18th August, 1987, as mentioned in section 2 (a) This is to be found in section 1 (3) (i) of the Act. 15. The petition out of which the present revision arises was filed by the landlord within one year of the appointed day as permissible under section 15 (2). 16. Sections 15 (1) and 15 (3) are substantially akin to section 14-A which was introduced in the 1971 Act by the H. P. Urban Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1977 (Act No. 9 of 1978) sometimes in Feb., 1971. The special procedure, now envisaged by section 16 of the 1987 Act, was pro vided for by the Amending Act No. 9 of l978 through introduction of 14-B in the 1971 Act. Section 15 (2) is a provision which was enacted for the first time when the 1987 Act was enacted by the State Legislature in place of the 1971 Act. 17. Section 15 (2) is a provision which was enacted for the first time when the 1987 Act was enacted by the State Legislature in place of the 1971 Act. 17. The plea of the tenant is that taking advantage of the introduction of section 15 (2) the landlord made a fresh effort to evict him by taking recourse to an application under that sub-section, having failed in an earlier attempt to evict him by applying therefor in the month of May, 1980 on the ground that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises and was in arrears of payment of rent. That application had been dismissed on 28th February, 1989. 18. The case of the landlord is that there was a family settlement under which the portion in occupation of respondent Ram Lal Mohindru fell to his exclusive share. The family settlement has been brought on the record as Ex. PF and apart from the statement made by the landlord Shri Amar Singh as PW 1 there is a statement of PW 7 Ranbir Singh, as brother of petitioner Amar Singh about it. 19 In the order of the Rent Controller under challenge it has been found, as a fact, that the alleged family agreement, which is characterised as inadmissible in evidence for want of registration on behalf of the tenant, did not appear to have been acted upon by the parties. Amar Singh, the landlord, put forward before the Rent Controller the plea that he was in bona fide need of the accommodation in possession of the tenant on the ground floor not only having regard to the size of his family but also his status in life as a retired officer of the rank of Executive Engineer in the Central Government. According to him, an officer of his status should have separate drawing room, dining room, study room for children, two bed rooms, a guest room, a kitchen, bathroom and toilet. Some documentary and oral evidence was brought on the record by him in this regard. 20. The Rent Controller considered evidence and came to the conclusion that it could not be held that the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was not suitable for his requirement. He also concluded that the requirement put forward by the landlord was not genuine either. 21. 20. The Rent Controller considered evidence and came to the conclusion that it could not be held that the accommodation in occupation of the landlord was not suitable for his requirement. He also concluded that the requirement put forward by the landlord was not genuine either. 21. Counsel for the petitioner tried to assail the aforesaid conclusions by inviting the attention of this Court to the evidence on record. It is not possible, however, to take the view, inspite of the impassioned plea of the learned Counsel for the landlord, that the view of evidence taken by the Rent Controller was perverse in the sense that no reasonable person would take it on the material on record. The view taken by the learned Rent Controller is a plausible one. It is also difficult to discern any legal infirmity in the approach of the Rent Controller while evaluating the evidence on the record. 22. Since the scope of interference by this Court, while examining the matter under the proviso to section 16 (8) of the Act, is circumscribed to the extent discussed earlier, it is not possible to intervene in the matter by taking the view that the decision of the Rent Controller was not according to law. 23. In sum, the revision has no merit. It is dismissed but parties are left to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.