Judgment S. B. Sinha & N. P. Singh, JJ. These two writ applications involving common questions of fact and law were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners of Cr. W. J. C. No. 518/87 are practicing Advocates of Danapur. The sole petitioner in Cr.W.J.C. No. 553/87 Surendra Sharma was a tenant under respondent no. 3 who filed an application for fixation of rent in respect of a building situated at Bailey road in the town of Patna. On 5.11.1985 Shri Sharma sworn an affidavit to the effect that the report submitted by D.C.L.R. Sri D.N. Prasad was not prepared at the spot. The said affidavit is contained in Annexure-I to the writ petition. Petitioner no. 2 of Cr. W. J. C. No. 518/87 identified the deponent Surendra Sharma. It is stated that petitioner no. 1 of Cr. W. J. C. No. 518/87 has nothing to do with the said affidavit. On 18.1.1986 respondent no. 3, however, filed an application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Danapur praying therein to take action against the petitioner and his advocates under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as allegedly false statements have been made in the said affidavit. Petitioners were directed to file show causes by the Sub-divisional Magistrate. The Petitioner Surendra Sharma in the show cause inter alia, contended that he had not, made any false statement. By the order dated 19.7.1986 which is contained in Annexure-4 to Cr. W. J. C. No 553/87, the said proceeding was dropped. On 11.8.1986 respondent nos. 3 & 4, however, filed another application praying therein that action be taken against the petitioners wherein inter alia it was stated that the aforementioned order dated 19.7.1986 was an ante dated one. The said application was registered as Case no. 1244 M/86. A show cause was filed by the petitioner alleging inter alia therein that the learned magistrate has no power to review his earlier order dated 19.7.1986. The petitioners were of the view that the learned Sub divisional Magistrate was biased against them and as such they filed three applications for transfer before the learned Sessions Judge, Patna in relation to the aforementioned proceeding as also two other proceedings arising out of Case no. 1774 M/86 and 1808 M/86. By an order dated 24.4.1987 the learned Sessions Judge called for the records of the case. 1774 M/86 and 1808 M/86. By an order dated 24.4.1987 the learned Sessions Judge called for the records of the case. On 27.4.87/28.4.87, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Danapur directed the Public Prosecutor to take action against the petitioners. The said transfer applications eventually was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge On the ground that the Sub-divisional Magistrate being a 'controller' within the meaning of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is not a criminal court. Thereafter, two applications, one on 6.10.1987 and another on 9.10.1987 were filed by the petitioners of both the writ applications respectively to the effect that the court had no power to review its earlier order. It was further pointed out that the House Controller is not a Court in view of the provisions of Section 2 (d) of the said Act. By order dated 9.10.1987 the learned Magistrate affirmed his order dated 27.3.87/28.4.87 and thus dismissed the applications filed on behalf of petitioners for dropping the proceedings. 3. Mr. Chittranjan Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised two contentions in support of this application. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the Sub-divisional Magistrate being House Rent Controller is not empowered to direct filing of complaint petition in terms of Section 195 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4, It was next contended that in any event the petitioners of Cr. W. J. C. NO. 518/87 being Advocates could not have been prosecuted. According to the learned counsel, petitioner no. 2 of the said writ application merely identified the deponent, whereas petitioner no.1 thereof had nothing to do with the affidavit sworn by Surendra Sharma. 5. 'Controller' has been defined in the said Act, to mean in respect of any local area comprised within the limit of subdivision, the Sub-divisional Officer Incharge of the Subdivision, and includes any other officer appointed in this behalf by the State Government to perform the functions of a Controller under this Act. 6. 'Court' has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the said Act, to mean the court having jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908), to entertain a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession of building in respect of which a suit or application is filled under this Act. 6. 'Court' has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the said Act, to mean the court having jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908), to entertain a suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession of building in respect of which a suit or application is filled under this Act. The controller under the said Act, has a limited jurisdiction to entertain, inter alia, applications for determination of fair rent, for giving direction for repairs of the building, to see that the amenities enjoyed by the tenant are not interfered with by the landlord etc. As noticed hereinbefore, however, in terms of the provisions of the said Act, the court has been defined to mean only a Civil Court in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, a House Rent Controller is not a 'court' within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3, however, submitted that is the House Rent Controller has also power under the Code of Civil Procedure in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the said Act, it is also a court. learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Chandra pal Singh and others Vs. Maharaj Singh and another, A.I.R 1982 Supreme Court 1238. 8. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to whether a Controller under the said Act, is a court within the meaning, of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 195 (1) (b) (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows ;- "No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, Ss. 193 to 196 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to any proceeding in any court, or". Sub-section 3 of S. 195, Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in Cl. (b) of sub-section (1), the term 'court' means a civil, revenue or criminal court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act, to be a Court for the purpose of the section. 9. Sub-section 3 of S. 195, Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in Cl. (b) of sub-section (1), the term 'court' means a civil, revenue or criminal court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act, to be a Court for the purpose of the section. 9. A plain reading of the aforementioned provisions leaves no room of doubt that a House Rent Controller who is merely statutory tribunal cannot be a court for the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it was not so declared by the terms of the said provision for the purpose of the said section. In Chandrapal Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 which empowered the authorities to entertain certain applications. Sub section (2) of Section 34 of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, provides that the district magistrate, prescribed authority or appellate authority would be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Section 480 and 482 Cr. P. C. and any proceeding before him or it to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 of Indian Penal Code. In that situation the Supreme Court held "the grievance is that a false affidavit was filed by the appellants which was receivable as evidence in the allotment proceedings before the Rent Control Officer which as a Tribunal would be as hereinabove discussed comprehended in the expression 'court'. if false evidence in the form of affidavit filed by appellant." 10. Such is not the position here. Sub-Section (2) of Section 22 of the said Act, does not provide that House Rent controller shall exercise all powers conferred upon a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. It merely provides that the controller shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents by the same means and, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Court by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It merely provides that the controller shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents by the same means and, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Court by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It is, therefore, clear that in terms of Subsection (2) of Section 22 of the said Act, merely limited procedural powers contained in the Civil Procedure Code has been conferred the House Rent Controller. Such a limited power conferred upon a 'controller' cannot clothe him with the powers of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure nor does it become a 'court' by reason thereof. In terms of the provisions of the said Act, the proceeding before the Controller has also not been declared to be judicial proceeding. A 'controller' under the said Act, therefore, although has some of the trappings of a court by is not a 'court' stricto sensu within the meaning of Section 195 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. In Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray Vs. Mr. Justice Lentia and others, A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 2267, it was held by the Supreme Court that a court of enquiry is not a court within the meaning of Sub-section (3) of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision of the Supreme Court in Chandrapal Singh's case (supra) was also considered in Dr. Baliram's case. In this view of the matter, it has to be held that controller is not a court within the meaning of Sub-section (3) of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal procedure although, it may be a Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. 12. So far as second contention raised by Sri Sinha is concerned, the same has also substance. Petitioner no. 2 of Cr. W. J. C. No. 518/87 merely identified the deponent of the said affidavit. Petitioner no. 1 was only appearing on behalf of Surendra Sharma as his Advocate. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, they can be proceeded against for commission of an offence for swearing false affidavit. They evidently have been acting as advocates and have been taking steps on behalf of Surendra Sharma in persuit of their professional duties. Advocates Act, on the basis of instructions received by them from their clients. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, they can be proceeded against for commission of an offence for swearing false affidavit. They evidently have been acting as advocates and have been taking steps on behalf of Surendra Sharma in persuit of their professional duties. Advocates Act, on the basis of instructions received by them from their clients. They have no personal interest in the subject matter of litigation. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, both the writ applications have to be allowed and the impugned orders as contained in Annexures 5 & 7 are liable to be and, accordingly, are quashed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. I agree. Application allowed.