Judgment : The defendant-Assistant Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administrative) Department is the appellant in this second appeal against the reversing judgment in A.S.No.18 of 1980 on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Tuticorin. The suit O.S.No.135 of 1977 cm the file of the District Munsifs Court, Tuticorin was filed by the five respondents-plaintiffs as representatives of Hindu Nadar Community of Sebathiapuram, hamlet of Sawyerpuram, Srivaikuntam Taluk. It is for a declaration that the suit temples viz., Muthumalai Amman Temple, Narayanaswamy Temple and Ananda Vinayagar temple are denominational temples belonging to the abovesaid plaintiffs’ community and for a consequential permanent injunction. 2. The main defence to the suit is that the said Temples are not such denominational temples. One other defence is that the suit is bad for misjoinder of necessary party viz., the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Madras. The trial court, though held that the suit is not bad for mis-joinder of necessary party as claimed by the defendant, accepted the defence that the suit temples are not denominational temples and so dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs preferred the above referred to first appeal, wherein the lower appellate court though concurred with the trial court on the abovesaid question of mis-joinder, held that the suit temples are denominational temples and decreed the suit as prayed for and allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the said decision of the lower appellate court, the defendant has preferred this second appeal. 3. No doubt, the lower appellate court has found that the suit temples were founded by the above referred to Hindu Nadars of Sebathiapuram from out of their own funds as disclosed by Exs.A-4 to A-8, that the other community people living in Sebathiapuram did not have any right of management in the suit temples and that P.Ws.1 and 2 had spoken to the fact that Kodai Festival was used to be celebrated from out of the contribution collected from the members of Hindu Nadar community of Sebathiapuram and not from Hindu Nadars of other villages and from the members of other community of Sebathiapuram. 4. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant seriously argues the following submission: There is no finding by the lower appellate court as to whether the abovesaid Hindu Nadars are a “religious denomination” There is also no plea or proof regarding the ingredients of the term “religious denomination” as applied to the above referred to Hindu Nadar Community of Sebathiapuram. In this connection, he drew my attention to the decisions in S.P.Mittal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1: (1983)1 S.C.J. 45: (1983)1 S.C.R. 729 : (1983)1 S.C.C. 51 , Acharya Jagdiswaran v. Commissioner of Police and another, 1983Crl L.J. 1872: (1983)4 S.C.C. 522 : 1983 S.C.C. (CrL) 1: A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 51, and Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Salem,etc. v. Nattamai K.S.Ellappa, etc., 100L.W.240. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents made the following submissions in reply: There is plea regarding the necessary ingredients of the term “religious denomination” as it is applied to the above referred to Nadar community. The above referred to Supreme Court decisions explaining the ingredients of religious denomination, will not apply in the present case. The abovesaid S.P.Mittal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1: (1983)1 S.C.J. 45: (1983)1 S.C.R 729 : (1983)1 S.C.C. 51 , related not to a temple, but to a society called Sri Aurobindo Society. The abovesaid Nadar community is a separate sect of Hindus and no further proof is required to establish that they belong to a religious denomination. In Sankara-kumara Nadar v. Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., (1975)1 M.L.J. 12 (D.B.), a particular temple in the village Sivagurnathapuram belonging to Hindu Nadars of that village was held to be a denominational temple. 6. I have considered the rival submissions. To find out whether the suit temple is a denominational temple belonging to the abovesaid Hindu Nadar community of the abovesaid village Sebathiapu-ram, firstly, it has to be seen whether the said community of the said village is a religious denomination by itself. If it is found to be so, then consequently, it has to be seen whether the said community has established the said temple and whether it had exclusive right of management of the said temple. Both these requirements should not be mixed up and it has to be seen whether each of the said requirements is satisfied. This aspect has also been pointed out in the abovesaid Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Salem, etc. Both these requirements should not be mixed up and it has to be seen whether each of the said requirements is satisfied. This aspect has also been pointed out in the abovesaid Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Salem, etc. v. Nattamai K.S.Ellappa, etc., 100 L.W.240, in paragraph 23 thereof. 7. But, I find that the lower appellate court has not given a finding at all regarding the first of the abovesaid two questions to be decided. In fact, the term ‘religious denomination’ according to the decision in S.P.Mittal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1: (1983)1 S.C.J. 45: (1983)1 S.C.R. 729 : (1983)1 S.C.C. 51 , and the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court must satisfy the following three conditions: .(1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith; .(2) Common organisation and .(3) Designation by a distinctive name. Even assuming that there is satisfaction of second and third of the abovesaid three conditions in the present case, it has to be seen whether the first of the-three conditions has been satisfied. Regarding this, first of all, it has to be seen whether there is plea to this effect. If there is plea, we have to see whether there is proof to that effect. The learned Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs points out that the following passages in the plaint would amount to the abovesaid plea relating to the first of the abovesaid conditions: “Hindu Nadars are a minority community with peculiar customs, manners and mode of religious worship, living mostly in Tirunelveli, Ramnad, Madurai Districts, of Tamil Nadu. At Sebathiayapuram, a section of that community is living and their ancestors have put up from out of their own funds, the three temples. ...The Hindu Nadars, whom the plaintiffs represent have a special mode of worship with distinct specific rituals. The plaintiffs collect subscription from among themselves and celebrate ‘Kodai’ festival in the month of Panguni and in Adi every year. The ‘Kodai’ festival itself is evolved by the plaintiffs as a separate cult not ordinarily followed by the recognised Siva and Vishnu Temples. The plaintiffs collect subscription from among themselves and celebrate ‘Kodai’ festival in the month of Panguni and in Adi every year. The ‘Kodai’ festival itself is evolved by the plaintiffs as a separate cult not ordinarily followed by the recognised Siva and Vishnu Temples. The plaintiffs also offer special pujas at the time of Vinayagasadurthi.....” But, even after reading the above passages, I am unable to say that they speak about the abovesaid first condition mentioned in the Supreme Court decision. In the said first condition what is mentioned is that the collective body of individuals concerned must have a “system of beliefs or doctrines”. Such system of beliefs or doctrines is not spoken to in the abovesaid passages. What is mentioned in the said passages is only about the mode or manner of worship and not any system of belief or doctrine, which is conducive to the spiritual well-being of the abovesaid Nadar community. No doubt, while referring to Kodai Festival, it is mentioned that it is evolved by the plaintiffs as a separate cult. The word “cult” may no doubt refer to a system of religious belief. But the celebration of a particular festival would normally represent only a mode of worship and not strictly a system of religious belief. 7-A. Anyway, in having used the word “cult”, if it is assumed that there is the requisite plea, it has to be seen whether there is proof regarding the abovesaid first condition mentioned in the Supreme Court decisions, But, I find that neither of the two witnesses, who have given evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, have spoken to this fact, viz., that the abovesaid Nadar Community of the abovesaid village had any such separate system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual wellbeing. P.W.I, the Accountant of the abovesaid community only spoke about the management of the abovesaid temples being exclusively with the said community. Likewise, P.W.2, the 4th plaintiff also laid emphasis on the abovesaid management aspect. Though he also spoke about the abovesaid Kodai festival, he did not say that the said Kodai festival was evolved by the abovesaid Nadar community of the abovesaid village as a separate cult not ordinarily followed by the recognised Siva and Vishnu Temples. Likewise, P.W.2, the 4th plaintiff also laid emphasis on the abovesaid management aspect. Though he also spoke about the abovesaid Kodai festival, he did not say that the said Kodai festival was evolved by the abovesaid Nadar community of the abovesaid village as a separate cult not ordinarily followed by the recognised Siva and Vishnu Temples. In fact, he also did not speak of any exclusive system of beliefs or doctrines held by the abovesaid Nadar Community of the abovesaid village. There is also no documentary evidence showing and such system of beliefs or doctrines of the abovesaid community. 7-B. In Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Salem, etc. v.Nattamai K.S.Ellappa, etc., 100L.W. 240, also it has been observed thus: “As seen from the decision of the Supreme Court the words ‘Religious denomination’ must take their colour from the word ‘Religion’. It is, therefore, clear that the common faith of the community should be based on religion. It is essential that they should have common religious tenets. The basic chord which connects them should be religion and not anything else. If the aforesaid tests are applied in the present case, it will be seen that Senguntha Mudaliar community of Tharamangalam cannot claim to be a religious denomination. There is absolutely no evidence on record to prove that the members of the community have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than those which are common to the entire Hindu community.......It is well known that communities were formed in this country on account of various reasons under several circumstances. It is not as if religion is the only common bond for the members of the communities found in this country. Instances are not wanting where communities were formed on the basis of profession or business or calling.” While so, it is difficult to hold that the abovesaid community of the abovesaid village in the present case comes under the term “religious denomination”. 7-C No doubt, earlier, the Supreme Court in one other decision, viz., The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954)1 M.L.J. 596: 1954 S.C.J. 335: 1954 S.C.R 1005; 1954 M.W.N. 363.A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282, observed thus: “After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu Religion that we find in India at the present day. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, in many cases it is the name of the founder-and has a common faith and common spiritual organization.” But, I think the above reference to sects and sub-sects which go by the name of founder if the sect or sub-sect is different from the different castes in the Hindu religion, one of which, viz., the Nadars, to which the plaintiffs claim to belong. Further, in the abovesaid observation of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swa-miar of Sri Shirpur Mutt, (1954)1 M.L.J. 596; 1954 S.C.J. 335: 1954 S.C.R. 1005: 1954 M.W.N. 363: A.I.R. 1954 S. C. 282, while noting that one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, the Supreme Court proceeds on the assumption that each of them has a separate system of beliefs or doctrines which is regarded as conducive to its spiritual well-being. 7-D. At any rate, in the subsequent Supreme Court decision, viz., the above referred to S.P.Mittal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1: (1983)1 S.C.J. 45: (1983)1 S.C.R. 729 ] (1983)1 S.C.C. 51 and Acharya Jagdiswaran v. Commissioner of Police and another, 1983 Crl.L.J. 1872: (1983)4 S.C.C. 522 : 1983 S.C.C. (Crl.) l: A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 51, it is specifically reiterated that all the abovesaid three conditions must be satisfied if a group or community could be called a “religious denomination”. I may also state that the decision in K.Eranna v. Commissioner, H.R. andC.E.,A.I.R. 1970 Mysore. 191, cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents will have no application to the present case. There, it was only held that Hindus in the larger sense including all sections of Hindus constitute a religious denomination. In view of the above, I am of the view that the plaintiffs have not established that the abovesaid Hindu Nadar Community of the abovesaid village would come within the definition of the religious denomination. 7-E. In this context I must also point out that the case of the plaintiffs is not that Hindu Nadars in general constitute a religious denomination, but that the Hindu Nadars of the abovesaid Sebathiapu-ram village would constitute a religious denomination. To this effect also, there is no proof in present case. 8. 7-E. In this context I must also point out that the case of the plaintiffs is not that Hindu Nadars in general constitute a religious denomination, but that the Hindu Nadars of the abovesaid Sebathiapu-ram village would constitute a religious denomination. To this effect also, there is no proof in present case. 8. No doubt in Sankarakumara Nadar v. Assistant Commissioner, H.R and C.E., (1975) 1 M.L.J. 12 (D.B.), it was held that the suit temple therein was a denominational temple belonging exclusively to the Hindu Nadars of Sivagurunathapuram village. But, simply because it was held so in that case, it cannot be held in the present case that the suit temples herein are denominational temples exclusively belonging to the Hindu Nadars of Sebathiapuram village, holding that the said Nadars constitute a religious denomination. Each case turns on its facts and unless there is the required plea and proof satisfying the above laid down conditions set out by Supreme Court decisions, the relief prayed for in the present suit, cannot be given. 9. No doubt, the learned counsel for respondents drew my attention to the decision in A.V.Sabha v. H.C. and R.I. and E., Commissioner, Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 475, also and sought to contend that this question regarding religious denomination is a question of fact and the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court should not be disturbed. The said Supreme Court decision, did not say positively that the said question is only a question of fact. The said Supreme Court decision, did not say positively that the said question is only a question of fact. In fact, the Supreme Court, in the abovesaid decision, extracts the following observation from the judgment of the High Court, which earlier decided the case: “Likewise, whether a particular religious or charitable institution is or is not a religious denomination or any section thereof within the meaning of Art.26 of the Constitution, is also a question of fact or, in any event, a mixed question of fact and law which can be more satisfactorily and effectively adjudicated upon in a competent civil court.” Actually, the question before the High Court and the Supreme Court therein was whether the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India could be invoked or whether the proper remedy would be only a suit in a civil court, and the High Court and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that since the matter involved is a disputed question of fact, it could not be appropriately determined under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The said decision has no application to the present case. That apart, here, the lower appellate court did not at all give a finding on the abovesaid question regarding religious denomination, even though the case warrants a finding on the said question. Therefore, it is but proper particularly in view of Sec.103, C.P.C. that this Court goes into that question and gives a finding and dispose of the second appeal accordingly. 10. No doubt, in the present case, there is factual finding by the lower appellate court that the abovesaid temples were established and managed exclusively by the abovesaid Nadar Community of the abovesaid village. However, in view of the other fact, viz., that there is no proof that the said community constitutes a religious denomination, the relief prayed for cannot be given. 10-A No doubt the learned counsel for the respondents also relied on a passage in V.Balakrishnan and others v. The Assistant Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., (Admn.) Department, Tirunelveli and others, (1978) T.L.N.J. 359, saying that “the worshippers of communities other than those belonging to the denomination having access to the temple and offering wordship therein is not conclusive of the question whether it is a denominational temple or not”. This is no doubt true. This is no doubt true. But this passage has no relevance to the abovesaid discussion on the question whether the abovesaid Nadar Community is a religious denomination or not. Likewise,A.Palaniandi Pil-lai v. Commissioner, H.R. and C.E., Madras, 93 L.W. 12, cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, has no relevance to the abovesaid point of discussion. 10-B. The other submission of learned counsel for appellant regarding the above referred to other question of non-joinder has no merit at all and hence is not dealt with in any detail. 11. In the result, the second appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court are restored. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.