JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - In these connected writ petitions the counsel appearing for all the petitioners have addressed us only on the question of the validity of the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 issued by the State Government under the Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990. To fully appreciate the controversy raised in the present writ petitions on the aforesaid question it will be necessary to have certain relevant facts. 2. For the purposes of distribution and sale of food grains and other essential commodities, the State Government used to authorise the District Magistrate/District Supply Officer/Town Rationing Officers to appoint agents called the Authorised Retail Distributors. The appointments were made by means of written agreement. At that time the orders of appointment of these Authorised Retail Distributors was not provided by any statutory Order but was solely governed by the terms and conditions entered in the Agreements. In the year 1989 the State Government to improve the system of distribution of essential commodities at fair price shops passed Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order, 1989. Thereafter the Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Commodities (Regulation of Distribution) Order 1989 was rescinded and the Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 1990 was issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Various Government orders were issued by the State Government providing guidelines for appointing agents to run the fair price shop under the Order, 1990. The order under challenge has been passed on 20th December, 1991 contained in Annexure 14 to the writ petition of Sri Devi Prasad Gupta v. District Supply Officer and others. The aforesaid order specifically deals only with the question of filing an appeal against the order passed by the District Magistrate appointing agents, suspension, cancellation and non-renewal of the authorisation certificates. It may be noticed that by an order dated 3rd July 1990 the State Government had given direction to the District Magistrates in respect of the public distribution system applicable to the fair price shops situated in rural areas. Clause 11 of the aforesaid Order provided that order passed by the District Magistrate in connection with appointment/suspension/cancellation/non-renewal an appeal would be before the concerned Commissioners of the Division. It was made clear that there would be no provision of a second appeal. Clause 11 of the aforesaid Order provided that order passed by the District Magistrate in connection with appointment/suspension/cancellation/non-renewal an appeal would be before the concerned Commissioners of the Division. It was made clear that there would be no provision of a second appeal. The aforesaid Government Order dated 3rd July 1990 which had application for the rural areas had been applied to the Urban area also by the Government Order dated 13th March, 1991. 3. In view of the provisions of Class II of the Government Order dated 3rd July 1990, appeals had been filed before the concerned Commissioner of the Division and along with the appeal stay applications had also been filed. The Commissioner of the Divisions before whom the stay applications had been filed had granted interim orders in appropriate cases staying the operation of the orders passed by the District Magistrates either appointing/suspending/cancelling etc. of the authorisation certificates to run a fair price shop. The impugned Government order dated 20th December, 1991 is only in connection with the filing of the appeals before the Commissioner of the relevant Divisions and their powers to grant the stay. Clause 2 of the aforesaid Government Order gives out the reason for passing the order. It has been stated that the distribution of essential commodities through fair price shops is an administrative arrangement and the proceedings taken in that connection were not under any statutory provision but were only for ensuring that the decisions of administrative nature should satisfy the test of fairness. The State Government came to know that the Commissioners for the purposes of hearing the appeals are adopting the same procedure as was being adopted in a statutory appeal. This was against the intention of the Government. The purpose of filing an appeal before the Commissioner was that he should satisfy himself that the decision taken by the District Magistrate in that connection was independent and fair and after taking into account the interest of the consumers and the purpose was not to make the procedure unnecessarily cumbersome. In Clause 3 of the Order it was specifically said that the State Govt. had taken a decision on reconsideration in this connection. The decision contained in Clause 3 consisted of 2 parts. The 1st part that the Commissioner of the Divn. In Clause 3 of the Order it was specifically said that the State Govt. had taken a decision on reconsideration in this connection. The decision contained in Clause 3 consisted of 2 parts. The 1st part that the Commissioner of the Divn. will have a right to hear the appeal as before but he will not be able to pass any stay order in such matters. The second part for the decision states that it is also clarified that all the stay orders which had been passed by the Commissioners prior to the passing of the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 will be treated to be ineffective. 4. In these writ petitions we have heard S/Shri R. H. Zaidi, Shahid Masood, S. P. Agarwal, Namwar Singh, Dhan Prakash and Shri Ramendra Asthana for the petitioners and Shri Vinay Malviya Standing Counsel for the State. 5. Shri R. H. Zaidi, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, has urged that the State Government has no power to issue the Government Order dated 3rd July 1990 as under Clause 4 of the Order, 1990 such a power has not been conferred on the State Government. A bare perusal of the Government Order of 1990 shows that under Clause 4(1) a fair price shop shall be run through such person and in such manner as the Collector subject to the directions of the State Government, may decide. Suchclause (2) of Clause 4 of the aforesaid Order says that a person appointed to run a fair price shop under sub-clause (1) shall operate it as the agent of the State Government. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the State Government has been specifically conferred powers to issue direction to the Collector regarding the mode of selection of persons who will be appointed agents to run the fair shops and also to lay down the manner in which the shops will be run. State Government has thus got full powers to give appropriate directions to the Collector regarding the manner of selection of the agents and also directions in incidental matters connected therewith. It is not disputed that the State Government has laid down guidelines for the Collectors to select the persons as its agent. The State Government, therefore, had the power to make provision that the aforesaid selection was in accordance with the guidelines and also an independent and fair selection. It is not disputed that the State Government has laid down guidelines for the Collectors to select the persons as its agent. The State Government, therefore, had the power to make provision that the aforesaid selection was in accordance with the guidelines and also an independent and fair selection. The State Government could thus provide for filing an appeal before the Commissioners of the Division to get the order of the Collector scrutinised by a higher authority. The argument raised has, therefore, no force. 6. It has then been urged by Sri Zaidi Here the Government Order has been that if there is a power of appeal, the power of passed under clause (4) of the 1990 Order granting stay order could not be withdrawn which has no such requirement, specially in view of Section 19-A of the General Clauses Act. The right to file an appeal is a creature of either a statute or could also be created under an administrative order. The authority which gives the right of appeal can lay down conditions for filing the appeal. There is no law which says that whenever a right of appeal is confirmed, the right to grant stay should also be there with the right of filing an appeal. It is for the authority conferring the right of appeal to decide as to whether the right to grant stay during the pendency of the appeal will also be available to the authority which had been conferred with the power of hearing the appeal. It is true that in case a right of appeal has been granted and there is no prohibition of granting stay order, the right of granting stay may be culled out by necessary implication and the Appellate Authority without there being any specific provision of granting stay can grant a stay order during the pendency of an appeal. However, in case when the right to appeal itself contains a condition that no stay would be granted; then in such a situation by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the stay could still be granted as the same is available from the mere fact that there is a right of appeal. In our State there are certain statutes which specifically prohibit granting of stay order. In our State there are certain statutes which specifically prohibit granting of stay order. Section 5(b) of the Public Service Tribunals Act specifically provides that no stay can be granted by the Tribunal during the pendency of the claim petition. The argument raised, in our opinion, thus has no force. 7. Sri S. P. Agarwal has mainly urged that as the Government Order dated 3rd 1991 and the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 have not been published in the Gazette they will have no force in view of the provisions of Section 3(5) of the Essential Commodities Act. In our opinion, this argument is without any substance inasmuch as Section 3(5) of the Essential Commodities Act will only have application to a case where the order is passed under Section 3. 8. Shri Ramendra Asthana has urged that there is a power of stay and has relied upon two decisions of this Court under Section 7(f) of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 it was held that the State Government has power to pass stay order. The cases are clearly not applicable inasmuch as there was no prohibition contained in Section 7-F of the Act that no stay order can be granted by the State Government. This Court in the decided cases held that from the provisions of Section 7-F it was clear that the State Government could during the pendency of the revision under Section 7-F grant interim relief. As has been stated above in our case there is a specific prohibition that stay order cannot be granted, as contained in clause (3) of Government Order dated 20th December, 1991. 9. Shri Nambar Singh has urged that right of appeal is a vested right and could not be taken away retrospectively. A bare perusal of the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 would show that the right of appeal has not been taken away and thus the question raised does not arise. 10. Shri Prabhu Kant, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has urged that as no time limit has been provided for deciding the appeal, power of stay has to be granted. 10. Shri Prabhu Kant, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has urged that as no time limit has been provided for deciding the appeal, power of stay has to be granted. We are unable to accept this submission inasmuch as there is no such principle that if there is no time limit for deciding the appeal, the power of stay will automatically arise even if there may be prohibition that no stay order may be granted. The only thing which can be urged is that in such circumstances the appeal which has been filed may be decided within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 10 : 1990 Lab IC 398 in connection with disposal of appeals and revisions have held that they should be normally decided within a period of three to six months which has been treated to be a reasonable period during which the power should normally be exercised. 11. We are thus of the opinion that so far as the first part of the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 which provides that the Commissioner will have no power to grant stay cannot be said to be suffering from any vice requiring interference by this Court. A person now filing an appeal before the Commissioner of the Division on or after 20th December, 1991 will have no right to get a stay order from the Commissioner as now there is no power available with the Commissioner to grant a stay order. 12. The next important question which arises in these cases is regarding the second part of Clause 3 of the Government Order dated 20th December, 1991 by which the State Government has made all the stay orders which had been granted prior to the passing of the Government Order ineffective. Counsel for the petitioners have urged that the exercise of the power by the State Government, in annulling those stay orders is arbitrary and is liable to be struck down. Reliance has been placed on the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537 . 13. Counsel for the petitioners have urged that the exercise of the power by the State Government, in annulling those stay orders is arbitrary and is liable to be struck down. Reliance has been placed on the case of Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537 . 13. The first thing which becomes evident from the order dated 20th December, 1991 is that all the stay orders which had been passed by the Commissioner in pending appeals prior of the issue of the Government order dated 20th December, 1991 would be treated to be ineffective. Stay orders by the Commissioner in the pending appeals have been granted in individual cases after considering the stay applications moved in the appeals. In our opinion the Commissioners while passing stay orders have examined individual cases on merits and after considering the points put forward by both the contesting parties before them have passed appropriate orders on the stay applications. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the State Government has, however, urged that the agreements executed by the District Magistrate in favour of the petitioners to run fair price shops are only contractual agreements. Thus there could not be any question of applying the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. 15. This very question was raised before the Supreme Court in the case of Srilekha Vidyarthi (supra) and it was held :- "34. In our opinion, the wide sweep of Art. 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold the' impugned circular issued by the State of U.P. in exercise of its executive power, irrespective of the precise nature of appointment of the Government counsel in the districts and the other rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. It is for this reason that we base our decision on the ground that independent of any statutory right, available to the appointees, and assuming for the purpose of this case that the rights flow only from the contract of appointment, the impugned circular, issued in exercise of the executive power of the State, must satisfy Art. 14 of the Constitution and if it is shown to be arbitrary, it must be struck down......... 43. Non-application of mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments through out the State of U.P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness, writ large on the face of the circular. 43. Non-application of mind to individual cases before issuing a general circular terminating all such appointments through out the State of U.P. is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness, writ large on the face of the circular. It is obvious that issuance of the impugned circular was not governed by any rule but by the whim or fancy of someone totally unaware of the requirement of rule of law, neatly spelled out in the case of John Wilkes (1770) 4 Burr 2528 more than two centuries back and quoted with approval by this Court almost a quarter century earlier in Jaisinghani's case AIR 1967 SC 1427 (supra). We have considered it necessary to reemphasise this aspect and re-iterated what has been said so often by this Court only because we find that some persons entrusted with the task of governance appear to be unaware of the fact that the exercise of discretion they have must be governed by rule, not by humour, whim, caprice or fancy or personal predilections......." "46. Viewed in any manner, the impugned circular dated 6-2-1990 is arbitrary. It terminates all the appointments of Government Counsel in the districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh by an omibus order, even though these appointments were all individual. No common reason applicable to all of them justifying their termination in one stroke on a reasonable ground has been shown. The submission on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh at the hearing that many of them were likely to be re-appointed is by itself ample proof of the fact there was total non-application of mind to the individual cases before issuing the general order terminating all the appointments........" In the present case the Government circular itself gives the reasons due to which the Government had passed the omibus order making all the stay orders granted by the Commissioner as ineffective. We have to see whether the reasons for which such an omnibus order was passed by the Government can be said to be reasonable. The order recites in Clause 2 that the distribution of essential commodities through fair price shops is an administrative arrangement. Objection to the granting of the stay orders by the Commissioners has been taken on the ground that they are adopting the same procedure as are taken in statutory appeals and that the procedure before them has become unnecessarily cumbersome. 16. Objection to the granting of the stay orders by the Commissioners has been taken on the ground that they are adopting the same procedure as are taken in statutory appeals and that the procedure before them has become unnecessarily cumbersome. 16. There cannot bean iota of doubt that the action of the Government in providing an appeal against the decision of the District Magistrates either appointing/suspending or cancelling of the authorisation certificate to run a fair price shop was a decision which clearly ensures that any arbitrariness or illegality in passing the orders by the District Magistrates should be corrected by the Commissioner in appeal. The omibus cancellation of the stay orders by the State Government without application of mind to individual cases is itself eloquent of the arbitrariness writ large on the face of the Government Order. The basis on which those stay orders had been made ineffective by an omibus order does not provide for any justification to the Government to pass such an order. The Commissioners while considering the stay applications could form prima facie opinion in individual cases that the charges levelled against the authorised dealers were either not proved or were of such a nature that it may not call for a very harsh action of either suspension or cancellation of the authorisation certificate. In such circumstances the Commissioner would be justified to stay the operation of the orders which had been appealed before them. How can granting of the stay order make the procedure cumbersome. In case in the opinion of the State Government the stay order in some cases had been passed mechanically or without applying the mind or for any other reasons required recalling of the stay order, the proper remedy available to the State Government was to get those orders vacated by moving appropriate applications before the Commissioner. Annulling of all stay orders given by the authorities in pending appeals without applying mind to the individual cases leads to the conclusion that the impugned order to that extent is arbitrary and there was no justification for passing such an omnibus order. No material has been brought before us to show that either the procedure before the Commissioner had become cuber some or that in any way the public interest had been adversely affected. No material has been brought before us to show that either the procedure before the Commissioner had become cuber some or that in any way the public interest had been adversely affected. The second part of Clause 3 of the order dated 20th December, 1991 which provided annulment of the stay orders already granted by the Commissioner prior to 20th December, 1991 is thus liable to be struck down. 17. For the reasons stated above we are of the opinion that :- (i) There will be no power of stay with the Commissioner on or after 20-12-1991 and no stay order can be granted in an appeal which has been filed before the Commissioner on or after 20-12-1991. (ii) The stay orders granted prior to 20th December, 1991 by the Commissioner will remain operative unless they are set aside on an application moved by the State Government by the Commissioner after considering the cases put forward by the parties. (iii) The appeals filed before the Commissioner will be disposed of as far as possible within a period of three to six months. 18. For the reasons stated above the present writ petitions are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no orders as to costs.