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1992 DIGILAW 63 (BOM)

Motandas Nandiram v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay

1992-02-04

D.R.DHANUKA

body1992
JUDGMENT - D.R. DHANUKA, J.:---The petitioner has orally applied for decree in terms of Award herein with reasonable rate of interest from the date of the award till passing of decree and from the date of decree till payment. It is not disputed and is not disputable that the Court can award interest on the amount payable under the award from date of decree till payment by virtue of powers conferred on Court under section 29 of Arbitration Act, 1940. The question which arises for consideration of the Court is as to whether the Court has power to award interest from date of the award till passing of the decree if the award is made prior to 19th August 1981 i.e. the date when Interest Act, 1978 came into force. 2. In (Srikantia Co. v. Union of India)1, A.I.R. 1967 Bombay 347, Tulzapurkar, J., held that Court can award interest while passing decree in terms of the award only from the date of the decree. While delivering this judgment, the learned Judge examined the provisions of Interest Act, 1839, section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 3. In pursuance of the recommendation made by the Law Commission of India in its 63rd Report, the Interest Act, 1978 was enacted. The said Act came into force on 19th August 1981. 4. In (Gujarat Water Supply Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.)2, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 973, the Supreme Court held that the Court has power to grant interest in case governed by the Interest Act, 1978 from the date of the award to the date of the decree. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted interest on the amount payable under the award in exercise of the powers conferred on it under section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 from the date of the award to the date of the decree and under section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 from the date of the decree till actual payment. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Mr. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, speaking for the Bench, observed that so far as the interest for the period from the date of the award till the date of decree was concerned, interest should be awarded for the said period by the Court under the provisions of the Interest Act, 1978, once proceeding under sections 15 to 17 of the Act were initiated. It was also observed in this case that it was doubtful as to whether the Court could grant interest from the date of the award till the date of the decree in cases arising before the Interest Act, 1978 in view of the restricted scope of section 29 of the Arbitration Act. In respect of the matters not covered by the Interest Act, 1978, the judgment of Tulzapurkar, J., in the case of Srikantia Co. (supra) holds field. 5. Section 6(2) of the Interest Act, 1978 provides that the said Act shall not apply to any suit or other legal proceeding pending at the commencement of the Act and the provisions of the corresponding law applicable immediately before such commencement shall continue to apply to such suit or other legal proceeding. The relevant question to be asked by the Court is as to whether an application for decree in terms of the award made by the petitioner to this Court on January 14, 1992 can be considered as a proceeding pending at the commencement of the Interest Act, 1978. This petition seeking to set aside the impugned award dated 31st December 1973 was undoubtedly pending on the date when Interest Act, 1973 came into force. Having regard to the drift of the observations made in paragraph 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Water Supply's case (supra) and the plain language of section 6(2) of the Interest Act, 1978, I hold that the relevant proceeding concerning application of section 6(2) of the Act is the application for decree in terms of the award and not an application for setting aside the award. I have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the submission of Shri Bharucha, the learned Counsel for the respondent, to the effect that the scope and ambit of Interest Act, 1978 need not be examined in this case as Interest Act, 1978 cannot be invoked in cases even where petition seeking to set aside award was pending on the date of coming into force of Interest Act, 1978. In my opinion, the scope and ambit of Interest Act, 1978 would have to be examined. If Interest Act, 1978 is applicable only to awards made after 19th August 1981 for the purpose of award of interest from the date of award till passing of decree, the petitioner would not be entitled to interest from date of the award. 6. In my opinion, Shri Bharucha is right in contending that the Interest Act is not applicable to the old awards i.e. awards made prior to 19th August 1981 on construction of relevant provisions of the Interest Act, 1978. I hold that section 3 of the Act can be invoked only in cases where the award is made after 19th August 1981 and not when the same is made earlier. The petitioner is therefore not entitled to avail of the beneficial provisions of the Interest Act, 1978 as unfortunately for the petitioner in this case the award was made much prior to coming into force of Interest Act, 1978. Several other interesting aspects concerning interpretation of section 3(1) of Interest Act, 1978 were urged before me. I do not propose to deal with the matters which do not strictly arise for purpose of consideration of this case. 7. Accordingly, I pass decree in terms of the award dated 31st December 1973 in favour of the petitioner i.e. inter alia by ordering the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay to pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 1,96,859.39. In exercise of the powers under section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 I direct the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay to pay interest on the said amount at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the decree till payment. The respondent is directed to pay the abovereferred amount within four weeks from today. 8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 9. The respondent is directed to pay the abovereferred amount within four weeks from today. 8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 9. Issue of certified copy of this order as well as the decree is expedited. Order accordingly. -----