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1992 DIGILAW 63 (RAJ)

Nalin Kumar v. State of Rajasthan

1992-01-16

G.S.SINGHVI

body1992
Honble SINGHVI, J.—An important question which arises for determination in this writ petition is about the right of a temporary appointee to continue in service against the vacancies which remain available after regular selections for substantive appointment has been made. (2) The factual metrix of this case lies in the very narrow compass. The petitioner is a Graduate in Civil Engineering. In pursuance of a short term advertisement issued by the Director, Technical Education Directorate, Rajasthan, Jodhpur, on 4.1.90, the petitioner made an application for being considered for appointment as Superintendent in the Industrial Training Institute. He was called for interview alongwith other eligible persons and was selected for the purpose of temporary appointment. He was appointed as Superintendent, Industrial Training Institute and was posted at Khetri against a vacant post by order dated, 29.6.1990 issued by the State Government under Rule 26 of the Rajasthan Technical Education Service Rules, 1975 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules of 1975). This appointment was for a period of four months or till the availability of the candidates selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, whichever was earlier. The term of temporary appointment of the petitioner was continued from time to time by different orders passed by the Government. The last order for extension in the term of appointment of the petitioner was passed on 15.5.1991. The date of extension mentioned in this order was 31.8.1991 or till the availability of the candidate selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, whichever was earlier. The service of the petitioner has however, been terminated by an order of the Government dated, 2.8.1991. (3) The petitioner has stated in Para-7 of his writ petition that atleast 10 clear vacancies in the cadre of Superintendents are available in the Department. These vacancies have become available on account of promotion of ten persons by order dated, 2.8.1991 against the promotion quota of the years 1989-1990 and 1990-1991. He has further stated that as per the provisions contained in the Rules of 1975, the post of Superintendent is required to be filled by promotion and by direct recruitment in the ratio of 50-50. Since, the vacancies have become available there can be no justification of termination of his service. He has further stated that as per the provisions contained in the Rules of 1975, the post of Superintendent is required to be filled by promotion and by direct recruitment in the ratio of 50-50. Since, the vacancies have become available there can be no justification of termination of his service. The case of the petitioner is that even if the candidates selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission have become available, the petitioner cannot be removed from service till the availability of the vacancies which have remained unfilled even after appointment of all persons who have been selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. (4) After admission of the writ petition and grant of interim order when the matter was taken up on 18.1.1991, learned Dy. Government Advocate sought time to file reply. No reply was however filed. On 4.10.1991 the Court felt that it will be proper to finally dispose of the matter in view of the mature of controversy involved in the writ petition and it was made clear that the parties should come prepared for final hearing. On 31.10.1991 time was again sought by the parties to advance their arguments and the case was fixed for 28.11.1991. On that day arguments were heard. Learned Deputy Government Advocate who was present on behalf of the Government was directed to furnish information regarding the year of vacancies for which regular selection has been made through the agency of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, year-wise determined vacancies for direct recruitment as well as promotion between the years 1986-87 to 1991-92 and, whether short term advertisement has been issued for the purpose of making fresh selections in order to make appointment by direct recruitment on temporary basis. These informations have, however, not been furnished by the respondents. (5) Rule 9 (1) (a) of 1975 Rules imposes an obligation on the appointing authority to determine on 1st April every year actual number of vacancies occurring during the financial year. Rule 9 (1) (c) provides that, where a post is to be filled in by more than one methods as prescribed under the rules or Schedule, the apportionment of vacancies, determined under clause (a) above, to each such method shall be done maintaining the prescribed proportion for the over-all number of posts already filled in. Rule 9 (1) (c) provides that, where a post is to be filled in by more than one methods as prescribed under the rules or Schedule, the apportionment of vacancies, determined under clause (a) above, to each such method shall be done maintaining the prescribed proportion for the over-all number of posts already filled in. If any fraction of vacancies is left over, after apportionment of the vacancies in the manner prescribed above, the same shall be apportioned to the quota of various methods prescribed in a continuous cyclic order giving precedence to the promotion quota. (6) Part-IV of 1975 Rules contains the procedure for direct recruitment, whereas, Part-V contains the procedure for recruitment by promotion. Part-VI deals with the appointments, probation and confirmation. Rule 25 provides that, appointment to the post by direct recruitment or by promotion shall be made by the appointing authority on occurrence of substantive vacancies by selection of persons in the manner indicated in rule 22 or from the list prepared under rule 24. Rule 26 empowers the Government or the appointing authority to make urgent temporary appointments. This rule is quite relevant for the purpose of decision of the controversy involved in this writ petition and, therefore, it is proper to reproduce it. This rule is as under: — "R. 26. Rule 26 empowers the Government or the appointing authority to make urgent temporary appointments. This rule is quite relevant for the purpose of decision of the controversy involved in this writ petition and, therefore, it is proper to reproduce it. This rule is as under: — "R. 26. Urgent Temporary appointment — (1) A vacancy in the service which cannot be filled in immediately either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the rules may be filled in by the Appointing Authority by appointing in an officiating capacity thereto an officer eligible for appointment to the post by promotion or by appointing temporarily thereto a person eligible for direct recruitment to the Service, where such direct recruitment has been provided under the provisions of these Rules: Provided that such an appointment will not be continued beyond a period of one year without referring the case to the Commission for concurrence where such concurrence is necessary and shall be terminated immediately on its refusal to concur: Provided further that in respect of a post in the Service for which both the methods of recruitment have been prescribed, the Appointing Authority, or the authority competent to make appointment, as the case may be, shall not, save with the specific permission of the Government in the Department of Personnel, fill the temporary vacancy against the direct recruitment quota by a whole time appointment for a period exceeding three months, otherwise than out of persons eligible for direct recruitment and after a short term advertisement." (7) The obligation to make year-wise determination of the vacancies has been held by this Court to be mandatory in Dr. M.P. Agrawal vs. State of Rajasthan (1), H.K. Hingorani vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (2). In Prakash Chand vs. State of Rajasthan and Another (3), the Division Bench had the occasion to examine the scope of Rule 9 of Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1974 and Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989, which are pari-materia with rule-9 of the 1975 Rules. After examining the Rules the Division Bench observed as under : — "It is thus clear from a perusal of rule 9 of 1974 Rules as well as Rule 10 of 1989 Rules that the rule making authority has intentionally laid strong emphasis on year-wise determination of vacancies and regular recruitment by the prescribed mode against yearly determined vacancies. After examining the Rules the Division Bench observed as under : — "It is thus clear from a perusal of rule 9 of 1974 Rules as well as Rule 10 of 1989 Rules that the rule making authority has intentionally laid strong emphasis on year-wise determination of vacancies and regular recruitment by the prescribed mode against yearly determined vacancies. Regarding promotion quota vacancies, a further mandate has been given that the appointing authority shall also determine the vacancies of earlier year year-wise, which are required to be filled in by promotion, if such vacancies were not determined and filled earlier in the year in which they were required to be filled in. Rule 9 (1) (c) contains a solutary provision intended to maintain balance of quota between the direct recruitment and promotion. It is borne out by this rule that with reference to the posts already filled in, prescribed promotion specified in the rules has to be maintained. This rule lays down that where a post is to be filled by more than one method, apportionment of vacancies determined under clause (a) to each such method shall be done maintaining prescribed proportion for the over all number of posts already filled in. This means that if direct recruitment has been made in excess of the quota prescribed for direct recruitment, efforts have to be made to bring about a balance by making promotions. Similarly, if the promotion quota has been filled in excess, more direct recruitment posts have to be filled to bring about a balance." (8) This decision has been quoted with approval on the question of determination of vacancies by another Division Bench in, Rajasthan Council of Diploma Engineers vs. State of Rajasthan and Another (4), decided on 3rd may 1991 at Jodhpur and by making reference to the decision of another Division Bench in L.N. Maheshwari vs. State of Rajasthan (5), decided on 28.9.1988, it has been held that the provisions of rule-9 are mandatory and not directory. (9) It is, thus, evident from the various decisions that it is the obligation of the State Government or the appointing authority to make year-wise determination of vacancies meant to be filled by direct recruitment as well as by promotion. This leads to further logical extension that selection for direct recruitment and promotions must be made with reference to the vacancies of every year as determined under Rule-9. This leads to further logical extension that selection for direct recruitment and promotions must be made with reference to the vacancies of every year as determined under Rule-9. However, at times even after the determination of vacancies regular selections are not made. Likewise, Departmental Promotion Committees do not meet for making recommendations for the purpose of regular promotions. Such situations necessitate use of the power by the appointing authority for making urgent temporary appointment. Therefore, most of the service rules including 1975 Rules contain provision for urgent temporary appointment. A perusal of Rule-26 which has been quoted hereinabove, shows that vacancies in the service which cannot be filled in immediately either by direct recruitment or promotion may be filled in by the Government or the authority competent to make appointment, as the case may be, by appointing in officiating capacity thereto an officer eligible for appointment to the post or by appointing temporarily thereto a person eligible for direct recruitment to the service. Such appointment cannot be continued beyond a period of one year without referring the case to the Commission for concurrence, where such concurrence is necessary, and shall be terminated immediately on its refusal to concur. Further more, appointment against the direct recruitment vacancy cannot be made for a period exceeding three months except after considering persons eligible for direct recruitment and after a short term advertisements. This rule can be used by the appointing authority where inspite of determination of vacancies, it is not possible to make appointment by direct recruitment or by promotion in immediate future or where the vacancies become available by new creation of posts or on account of death of existing employee or where the existing employee leaves the service for good. While giving power to make appointment on urgent temporary basis to meet with the contingencies as specified above, rule making authority has intentionally put restrictions on the power of appointing authority. The first restriction is that against the direct recruitment quota vacancy if an appointment is required to be made for more than three months, the appointing authority has to issue a short term advertisement and consider the cases of persons who are eligible. The first restriction is that against the direct recruitment quota vacancy if an appointment is required to be made for more than three months, the appointing authority has to issue a short term advertisement and consider the cases of persons who are eligible. The second restriction is that the appointment cannot be continued beyond a period of one year without concurrence of the Commission, where the post falls within the purview of the Commission and such urgent temporary appointment is to be terminated immediately in case the Commission refuses to concur. (10) Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Rule-9 which are mandatory in character, in a number of departments regular recruitments have not been made for years together. This is particularly so in the College Education Department. On the one hand regular recruitment is not made for filling the direct recruitment quota vacancies, on the other hand, the appointing authority/Government has resorted to the methodology of making temporary appointments for few months or say for a period of one year or for one academic session and making such exercise afresh after expiry of the specified time of three to four months or say after expiry of one year or for one academic session. In the process, the services of number of temporary appointees are terminated, because, they are not given appointment in the next term or session. (11) In Shashi Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (6), the question which arose for consideration before the Division Bench was, as to whether the Government was justified in terminating the services of temporary appointees despite the availability of the vacancies and despite the fact that the candidates selected by regular mode of recruitments were not available. After considering the scheme of the Rajasthan Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1971, the Court held that the practice of giving short term appointments or re-appointments under rule 29 of 1971 Rules does not amount to hire and fire. After referring to Rule 29 the Division Bench observed as under: — "A bare reading of the aforesaid Rule 29 will show that the Rule can only be attracted into service in case vacancy in the service cannot be filled immediately either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the Rules. After referring to Rule 29 the Division Bench observed as under: — "A bare reading of the aforesaid Rule 29 will show that the Rule can only be attracted into service in case vacancy in the service cannot be filled immediately either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the Rules. In that eventuality the power has been vested in the Government or the competent authority to make appointments by appointing in an officiating capacity thereto an officer by appointing thereto a person eligible for direct recruitment in the service. Under the proviso urgent temporary appointment cannot be continued beyond a period of one year without referring the case to the Commission for concurrence where such concurrence is necessary; and shall be terminated immediately on its refusal to concur. Prior to the aforesaid amendment there was a provision in rule 29 for making urgent temporary appointments upto the end of academic session or till a candidate selected by the Commission is made available, whichever is earlier. But even under the amended Rule 29 under which urgent temporary appointments may be made in case a vacancy of Lecturer in the service cannot be filled in immediately by direct recruitment or by the competent authority, urgent temporary appointments can be made for a period not exceeding one year, one year being the outer limit and even if an appointment is made for an academic session, it will fall within the outer limit of one year. In our opinion, no urgent temporary appointment therefore, under Rule 29 can be continued beyond a period of one year without referring the case to the Commission for concurrence and shall be terminated immediately on its refusal to concur. It will, therefore, be clear that before an urgent temporary appointment under Rule 29 can continue beyond a period of ,one year, a reference has to be made to the Commission for concurrence, because recruitment to the post of Lecturer is within the purview of the Commission and if the Commission did not give its concurrence, the appointment has to be terminated. Two courses therefore, are open for the appointing authority in case of urgent temporary appointments under Rule 29, the first is that either it can refer the case of the appointee appointed under Rule 29 of the Rules to the Commission for its concurrence and on the refusal of the Commission to give its concurrence to terminate the service immediately; the second is that such an appointment could only be terminated by efflux of time, the appointment being made for academic session and as such coming to an end on the last day of academic session. It appears that the appointing authority is adopting the second of the above referred two courses open to it. It is in accordance with the merit formula in inviting applications each year, making appointments re-appointing such of them whose names again appear in the merit list. Can it be said that the second method being adopted by the authority is arbitrary and is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." (12) A somewhat similar question arose for consideration before another Division Bench in Ms. Anita Kothari vs. State of Rajasthan and Others (7). The Division Bench took notice of the failure of the appointing authority and the Commission to make regular selections after making reference to the orders passed by the Supreme Court in Rajbala vs. State of Punjab (8) and Rajbinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Others (9). The Division Bench held that the temporary appointees shall be allowed to continue in service till regularly recruited candidates are made available through Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Paras-9 and 11 of that judgment can appropriately be reproduced for the purpose of proper appreciation of the ratio of the judgments: — "9. According to sub-rule (1) (a) of Rule 7A the Appointing Authority has to determined the vacancies of every year which are required to be filled in. It lays down a mandate on Appointing Authority to determine the vacancies as soon as after 1st April of every year, the actual number of vacancies occurred as on 1st April and also likely to occur during the financial year. Against these vacancies recruitment has to be made as per Part IV of Rules. The direct recruitment in the service under these Rules, has to be made through the Public Service Commission. Against these vacancies recruitment has to be made as per Part IV of Rules. The direct recruitment in the service under these Rules, has to be made through the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the combined reading of the Part II and Part IV of the Rules is that a duty has been cast under these Rules on the Appointing Authority to determine the vacancies every year and make the recruitment through the Public Service Commission. But, we regret to say that duty has not been discharged by the Appointing Authority. The resultant position is that the adhocism is continuing since 1980 till this date. Mr. Joshi has filed a chart before us in which he has pointed out that the Public Service Commission did make the recruitment in some subjects in the year 1984, 1986 and 1988. But, only one recruitment was made by the R.P.S.C. in the law in the year 1988. In subject like English no recruitment against general quota has been made since 1984. Be as, it may, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing this line of approach because the fact remains that today there are number of subjects in which the R.P.S.C. has not been able to make recruitment for the last 4 to 5 years. On account of the R.P.S.C. not being able to make the recruitment more than 211 Lecturers are working on temporary and adhoc basis. So much so that this Court while disposing of the writ petition of Smt. Shasi (supra) directed the State Government to complete the process of recruitment by filling substantive vacancies- in various subjects expeditiously. That mandate has not been complied with till this date. It was directed in aforesaid case that: — "For the reasons aforesaid we find no merit in any of the writ petitions and they all are dismissed. We, however, direct the non-petitioners to fill all substantive vacancies and vacancies which are likely to continue for years in various subjects under Part IV of the rules and to resort to rule 29 of the rules only when making urgent temporary/adhoc appointments become necessary." "11. We, however, direct the non-petitioners to fill all substantive vacancies and vacancies which are likely to continue for years in various subjects under Part IV of the rules and to resort to rule 29 of the rules only when making urgent temporary/adhoc appointments become necessary." "11. Therefore, in order to meet this situation we adopt the same course as was adopted by Honble Supreme Court in aforesaid two cases and direct the respondents-State to allow petitioners to continue in service till the regularly recruited candidates become available from R.P.S.C. Those persons who have been appointed to post in leave vacancies will continue in those posts untill the employees who have proceeded on leave returned and joined the post. It is further directed that the State would not terminate the services of the petitioners by transferring a regularly recruited from another institution to any institution where any of the petitioner may be serving. Termination of these incumbents will only be followed when directly recruited R.P.S.C. recruites are made. We further direct that in the event of the regularly selected candidates are available then the temporary persons should be terminated according to last come first go." (13) In State of Rajasthan vs. Rajendra Kumar Rawat and Others (10), the Honble Supreme Court while modifying the decision of Rajasthan High Court held that, making of a provision in the budget will not make it obligatory for the State Government to fill up the vacancies and even if, there be failure on the part of the State Government to do so, no writ can be issued to the Government to fill up the vacancies. Their Lordships further held that the services of a person appointed temporarily in officiating capacity under the Rules can be validly terminated pursuant to the regular selections made through the Public Service Commission. The Court further held that rules do not contemplate regularisation of recruitment made under Rule 30 and under that rule appointments are bound to terminate in the event provided in the proviso of the Rule. Therefore, the temporary appointees could not continue and their continuance was not correct. The Court further held that on the basis of determination of exact number of vacancies, the State Government will have to require the Public Service Commission to recruit for the remaining vacancies and until such recruitment is made, temporary appointees may continue. Therefore, the temporary appointees could not continue and their continuance was not correct. The Court further held that on the basis of determination of exact number of vacancies, the State Government will have to require the Public Service Commission to recruit for the remaining vacancies and until such recruitment is made, temporary appointees may continue. (14) In Rajbalas case (supra) and Rajbinders case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the adhoc appointees to continue in service until persons regularly selected by the P.S.C. are appointed to the posts. (15) In Ratan Lal vs. State of Haryana (11) their Lordships of the Supreme Court decried the practice of the Government of Haryana of making adhoc appointments and continuing them for years together by giving short breaks. The Court gave the following direction: — "We, therefore, direct the State Government to take immediate steps to fill up in accordance with the relevant rules the vacancies in which teachers appointed on an adhoc basis are now working and to allow all those teachers who are now holding these posts on adhoc basis to remain in those posts till the vacancies are duly filled up. The teachers who are not working on such adhoc basis if they have the prescribed qualification may also apply for being appointed regularly in those posts. The State Government may also consider sympathetically the question of relaxing the qualification of maximum age prescribed for appointment to those posts in the case of those who have been victims of this system of adhoc appointments. If any of the petitioners in these petitions has under any existing rule acquired the right to be treated as a regularly appointed teacher, his case shall be considered by the State Government and an appropriate order may be passed in his case." (16) The position which emerges from the perusal of the above decisions is that there is an apparent conflict or contradiction in the two decisions of this Court rendered in Shashi Sharmas case (supra) and Anita Kotharis case (supra). However, Mrs. Anita Kotharis case, the Division Bench which decided the case after Shashi Sharmas case, did take notice of Shashi Sharmas case and then gave direction for continuance of adhoc appointees in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajbalas case and Rajbinder Singhs case (supra). However, Mrs. Anita Kotharis case, the Division Bench which decided the case after Shashi Sharmas case, did take notice of Shashi Sharmas case and then gave direction for continuance of adhoc appointees in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajbalas case and Rajbinder Singhs case (supra). (17) Nevertheless, in none of these decisions of the two Division Benches or of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, to which reference has been made hereinabove, the question of right of the adhoc appointees to continue against new vacancies has been examined. In the scheme of the rules which has been noticed earlier, it is clear that the State Government or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, is under an obligation to make year-wise determination of vacancies meant to be filled by direct recruitment as well as by promotion. However, to meet with different contingencies which have been illustrated in the earlier part of the decision, the competent authority is vested with the power to make urgent temporary appointments. The exercise of this power is hedged with the conditions specified in the rules empowering the competent authority to make urgent temporary appointments. At times, the appointments made by the competent authority in exercise of its powers under the relevant rules are described as adhoc appointments. Some times, the appointments are described as officiating and sometimes temporary. But, in reality, the distinction lies in the fact that an appointment made otherwise than after following the procedure prescribed for regular recruitment have to be treated as urgent temporary appointment and person appointed by the competent Authority in exercise of its powers to make urgent temporary appointments, does not get a right to hold the post. In number of services, the power to make urgent temporary appointment is literally misused by continuing such urgent temporary appointment for years together. Of course, sometimes, on account of unforeseen eventualities specified above or due to stay order passed by the Courts, competent Authority is prevented from making regular recruitment. Such cases are however, for and few. Making of adhoc appointments and continuing them for years together leads to several complications and gives rise to immense litigation in the courts of law. This is evident even from the two decisions of the Division Bench referred to above. Such cases are however, for and few. Making of adhoc appointments and continuing them for years together leads to several complications and gives rise to immense litigation in the courts of law. This is evident even from the two decisions of the Division Bench referred to above. In Shashi Sharmas case the Division Bench had before it the claim of the adhoc appointees in the back-ground of the fact that regular selections have not been made through the agency of Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Similar question was involved in Anita Kotharis case. However, in none of these cases, the Court was called upon to consider the comparative rights of the temporary appointees with reference to the fresh vacancies . While making urgent temporary appointments the Competent Authority takes into consideration the possible vacancies and against such vacancies persons who are available at a particular point of time are considered. Those who do not fulfil the qualification at that time or are otherwise not eligible, can have no right of competition or right of consideration for the purpose of urgent temporary appointment at a particular point of time; and even though, they may become subsequently eligible, they cannot have a right of consideration against the vacancies which were available at a particular point of time prior to their becoming eligible. If regular selections are not made against the vacancies which were available at a particular point of time and against which urgent temporary appointments had been made, such urgent temporary appointees will have a right to continue in service in the same capacity. This principle can be deduced from the case of Ratan Lal (supra), Rajbalas case (supra) and Rajbinder Singhs case (supra). Once the selection is made against such vacancies by the regular mode of recruitment prescribed under the rules, the temporary appointees have to make a room for the regularly selected persons and if all the vacancies are filled by appointing regularly selected persons the temporary appointees who are not selected and who are not eligible for regular selection can claim no right to continue in service. Under no circumstances, the appointing authority can continue the temporary appointee in service and deny appointment to regularly selected persons. Under no circumstances, the appointing authority can continue the temporary appointee in service and deny appointment to regularly selected persons. However, if all the vacancies are not filled by regular selection, the temporary appointees will have to be continued in the same capacity and their retention will be determined on the basis of seniority with reference to the length of service in temporary appointment. The problem however, arises where after making particular temporary appointment, regular selections are made and regularly selected persons become available for appointment, but, before the completion of process of regular selection more vacancies become available and such vacancies are not taken into consideration for the purpose of regular selection and the appointing authority/competent authority is required to again make temporary appointment. Can the erstwhile temporary appointees have a right to be continued against such vacancies which become available after their initial temporary appointment. As already noticed, the persons who are not eligible for temporary appointment and who are otherwise not qualified cannot claim that they should be considered for temporary appointment against the vacancies which were available prior to their acquiring requisite qualification/ eligibility. However, they have a right to be considered for appointment on temporary basis against the vacancies which become available after they have acquired qualification/eligibilities. Therefore, if after making of regular selections, new vacancies become available a temporary appointee cannot claim an absolute right to continue in service to the exclusion of the other persons who become eligible after the earlier temporary appointment. The erstwhile temporary appointees cannot claim that the persons who become eligible subsequently should be denied right of consideration for temporary appointment against the fresh vacancies. That in my opinion, will be complete negation of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Against the fresh vacancies, the fresh open market candidates who become eligible will have a right to be considered for appointment qua previously appointed temporary appointees. In such cases, the appointing Authority/Competent Authority is under an obligation to make a fresh exercise for making urgent temporary appointment against such fresh vacancies and it cannot continue the temporary appointee in service by sheer inaction or omission. In such cases, the appointing Authority/Competent Authority is under an obligation to make a fresh exercise for making urgent temporary appointment against such fresh vacancies and it cannot continue the temporary appointee in service by sheer inaction or omission. If a person earlier appointed is again selected for temporary appointment certainly he can be continued, but, if he is not selected for such temporary appointment and some other candidate is selected the newly selected person will have a right of temporary appointment. (18) The above principles can be illustrated in the following manner :- (i) A is appointed in the year 1990 on temporary basis against the then available vacancies, B who is not eligible in 1990 has no right to compete or to be considered for temporary appointment qua A. A has a right to continue on temporary basis till regularly selected candidates become available for appointment. (ii) If the regular selection is made in the year 1991 and A is not selected he will have to make room for regularly selected persons and his service is liable to be terminated if no vacancy remains available after appointing the regularly selected persons. (iii) If after appointing regularly selected persons some of the vacancies which were available earlier remain unfilled A will have a right to be continued in service on temporary basis. In that event also B cannot claim that fresh temporary appointments be made, because vacancy against which A was appointed relate to a period when B was not even eligible or was found suitable for appointment. (iv) If, on the other hand, fresh vacancies become available, B as also others who have by now acquired eligibility will have a right of consideration for temporary appointment and A cannot claim exclusive right of continuance in service on temporary basis. The competent authority is then under an obligation to undertake a fresh exercise for making temporary appointment under the rules which empowers it to make such temporary appointment. (19) In the present case, it is clearly borne out from the facts which have come on record, that the petitioner had been appointed on urgent temporary basis on the basis of short term advertisement. Regular selection has been made and in the regular selection the petitioner has not been selected. As per petitioners own saying fresh vacancies have become available. Regular selection has been made and in the regular selection the petitioner has not been selected. As per petitioners own saying fresh vacancies have become available. The competent authority has so far not undertaken exercise for making fresh urgent temporary appointment under Rule 26 of 1975 Rules and it has straight away terminated the services of the petitioner. In the light of the principles which have been discussed earlier, it must be held that the petitioner does not have a right to continue in service to the exclusion of other persons who may have become eligible for the purpose of consideration for appointment on urgent temporary basis against the new vacancies. The competent Authority ought to have undertaken exercise for making the temporary appointment if against the newly created vacancies regular selections have not been made so far. The termination of the service of the petitioner without undertaking exercise for regular recruitment or even for fresh urgent temporary appointment cannot, however, be justified in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ratan Lals case, Rajbalas case, Rajbinder Singhs case and Mrs. Anita Kotharis case (supra). (20) The Writ Petition is, therefore, allowed to the extent that the order dated 2.8.1991 is quashed. However, the respondents are directed to make exercise for regular selection against such vacancies which have become available after previous regular selection. In the meantime, the respondents shall undertake exercise for urgent temporary appointment under Rule 26 by considering all eligible persons including the petitioner. If the petitioner is not selected for regular/temporary appointment his right to continue in service will cease. (21) Parties are left to bear their own costs.