JUDGMENT Plaintiffs have come up in appeal, aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, directing their suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession to be dismissed, in reversal of the decree of the trial Court which had decreed the suit. Vide order dated 19.3.1991, this appeal was admitted for hearing parties on the following substantial question of law:- "Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court negativing the title of the plaintiffs is based on misreading and misconstruction of the document.. Ex. P/1 to P/3 and hence is liable to be set aside?" During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellants read out the statement of the plaintiff and also carried the Court through the contents of the documents Ex. P/1 to P/3. There is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate Court has committed a serious error of law in reversing the finding of the trial Court as regards the relevancy of these three documents without making a serious effort at determining the identity of the suit property with reference to the contents of the three documents. A perusal of para 9 of the judgment under appeal shows that the lower appellate Court has observed that the plaintiffs' own statement spelled out that documents Ex. P/1 to P/3 were not relating to the suit property. The Court did not proceed any further and assign any reason as to what was the process of reasoning for arriving at that finding. In the leading authority of Ramarao and others v. Shantibai and others ( 1979 JLJ 385 ), this Court has pointed out the duty expected to be performed by a Court of first appeal writing a judgment of reversal:- "The appellate Court is bound to consider the reasons on which the trial Court arrives at a finding of fact and in case after appreciating the oral evidence produced by parties, the appellate Court comes to a different conclusion though bearing in mind that it has not had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, it can certainly record its own findings holding that those recorded by the trial Court were erroneous. In such a case three things must appear from the judgment of the appellate Court (1) that it applied its mind to reasons given by the trial Court; (2) that it was present to its mind that the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses which the appellate Court did not have and (3) the appellate Court must give cogent reasons for disagreeing with the trial Court. If this is not done, it must be said that the order of appellate Court is contrary to law. The appellate Court has undoubted jurisdiction to reappreciate oral evidence and reach a finding contrary to that arrived at by the trial Court but this it can do only if its order satisfies the above three conditions." The judgment of the learned appellate Court demonstrates failure on its part in discharging its that obligation. Inasmuch as a re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence would be required, it is thought fit to leave that exercise to be performed by the lower appellate Court, which is a final Court of facts and law too, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law alone. The appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The case is sent back to the rower appellate Court for re-hearing and disposal afresh of the appeal. Before parting, it may be made clear that the documents Ex. P/1 to P/3 are certified copies secured from the record of the Court. The copies are totally torn and it has been indeed difficult to read them. The plaintiff/appellants would do well to secure fresh certified copies and place them on the record of the lower appellate Court, so as to enable a just hearing. The lower appellate Court would, of course, be at liberty to call for the originals and peruse them in the ends of justice. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Costs before this Court shall be borne by the parties as incurred. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the lower appellate Court on 23.11.1992. 1979 JLJ 385 relied on.