JUDGMENT P.P. Gupta 1. The petitioner is a practicing Advocate at Aligarh. In the year 1982, he was appointed as Notary Public by the U. P. Government. In, February 1987. he was also appointed as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling at Aligarh by the State Government. On 24th October, 1989, the State Government through the District Judge, Aligarh, required the petitioner to give option as to which of the two posts namely Notary Public and Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling he wanted to retain (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). This latter was received by the petitioner on 9-11-1989. 2. Before the petitioner could send reply to the aforesaid communication, the State Government by another letter dated 7th November, 1989 terminated the services of the petitioner as Special Counsel Urban Land Ceiling A copy of the said order is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. This latter was, however, not received by the petitioner as it was addressed to the District Judge, Aligarh and no copy thereof was sent to him. Subsequently, when the District Magistrate, Aligarh invited applications for fresh appointments, the petitioner came to know of this letter. The contention of the petitioner is that the work and conduct of the petitioner was throughout very satisfactory and there were no complaints against him. He had given very good results. There was absolutely no bar in holding the posts of Notary Public and Special Counsel. Urban Land Ceiling together. Instances were given where these two posts were held together by other persons in other districts. His grievance is that the impugned order dated 7-11-89 was passed with undue haste without waiting for the reply of the petitioner He moved several representations to the: State Government but no reply thereof was received by the petitioner. Surprisingly, he received another letter dated 23-12-1989 in which the District judge, Aligarh was asked by the State Government that the option asked for in earlier letter dated 24th October, 1989 from the petitioner had not been received (Annexure 5 to. the writ petition). It was. therefore, contended by the petitioner that the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989 was passed without application of mind. He was not afforded any opportunity of hearing It was arbitrary and against the principles of equality. the writ petition). It was. therefore, contended by the petitioner that the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989 was passed without application of mind. He was not afforded any opportunity of hearing It was arbitrary and against the principles of equality. In its counter affidavit, the State Government has averred that the petitioner was appointed as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling in 1987 and he was asked to submit details in Form No. 2 L. R. Manual. He never complied with it, In the appointment letter, the petitioner was asked to resign from other posts including that of Notary Public The petitioner made several representations to the Government to allow him to continue on both the posts. After considering the matter, the State Government terminated the services of the petitioner as Special Counsel. Urban Land Ceiling. There was no haste as alleged; The petitioner had no claim on the said post. No documents were annexed with the counter affidavit. The petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit has denied all these averments. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel were heard at length. 3. The main argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the services of the petitioner as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling could not be terminated unless the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence. Recently in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P., 1990 (2) UP LB EC 1174, the Honourable Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the: question as to whether office held by the Government counsel (Civil, Criminal and Revenue) in all the districts of the State is a public office or not. After examining the various authorities, the Honourable Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the District Government Counsel holds a public office and the arguments advanced on behalf of the State Government that it is only a professional engagement like that between private clients and a lawyer was not accepted. The Honourable Supreme Court has further laid down that even otherwise without public element so obvious in the appointments of District Government Counsel, the appointment and its concomitants viewed as purely contractual matters after the appointment is made also attracts Article 14 and exclude arbitrariness permitting judicial review of the impugned State action. 4. The Honourable Supreme Court has further laid down that even otherwise without public element so obvious in the appointments of District Government Counsel, the appointment and its concomitants viewed as purely contractual matters after the appointment is made also attracts Article 14 and exclude arbitrariness permitting judicial review of the impugned State action. 4. In order to consider the question as to whether the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989, terminating the engagement of the petitioner as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling is arbitrary, it is necessary to look into the order itself A copy of the order is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It shows that the State Government hats terminated the appointment of the petitioner by one stroke of pen arbitrarily without assigning any reason and also without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner In the case of Kumari Shrilekha (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the appointment of a District Government Counsel cannot be terminated without assigning any cause though it is not necessary that the reason for which the termination is made should also be communicated to the petitioner. It means that the appointment of a District Government Counsel cannot be terminated at the sweet-will of the State Government. There must be valid reasons for that. The termination cannot be wholly arbitrary. As has already been observed above, no reason has been given in the order dated 7th November, 1989 terminating the engagement of the petitioner as Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling. However, the learned Standing Counsel submitted that the cause for which termination was made was because the petitioner was holding two posts simultaneously, namely, the post of Notary Public and the post of Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling. He, however, could not place before the Court any such rule prohibiting a person to hold two posts simultaneously. On the contrary, the petitioner in para 29 of the writ petition has given the names of District Government Counsel working in other districts who held two or more than two posts simultaneously. One Sri Madho Prasad Sharma, Advocate of Garuta, Jhansi is said to have holding the posts of Notary, Penal Lawyer and Addl. District Government Counsel (Civil) simultaneously. This para has not been specifically denied in the counter affidavit. In reply to para 29 it is said that the contents of paragraphs 22 to 33 are matters of record. One Sri Madho Prasad Sharma, Advocate of Garuta, Jhansi is said to have holding the posts of Notary, Penal Lawyer and Addl. District Government Counsel (Civil) simultaneously. This para has not been specifically denied in the counter affidavit. In reply to para 29 it is said that the contents of paragraphs 22 to 33 are matters of record. Thus the averments of the petitioner as contained in para 29 of the writ petition go unrebutted. If other State counsel are working on two or more than two posts, there was no occasion, to pick up the petitioner alone and to terminate his services as Special counsel, Urban Land Ceiling merely on the ground that he could not simultaneously hold two posts of Notary Public and Special counsel, Urban Land Ceiling. This shows that the impugned order has been passed on a mere whim and fancy of the State Government. The State Government has merely picked up arbitrarily the petitioner and has terminated his engagement while the engagement of the similarly placed persons, especially engagement of Sri Madho Prasad Sharma who is holding simultaneously the post of Notary Public, Penal Lawyer and Addl. District Government Counsel (Civil) at Jhansi, has not been terminated. Thus the petitioner has been given unequal treatment which shows arbitrariness on the part of the State Government. 5. It is not disputed that the petitioner by letter dated 24th October, 1989 (Annexure 1) was given an opportunity to opt either of the |two posts, namely, Notary Public or Special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling. This letter was received by the petitioner on 9th November 1989. This has not been controverted by the State Government in its counter affidavit. It is not the case of the State Government that the petitioner received this letter earlier than 9-11-89. Without waiting for a reply from the petitioner, the State Government passed another order or; 7-11-89 (Annexure 2) by which his engagement as special Counsel, Urban Land Ceiling was terminated. This shows that the State Government was conscious of the fact that the engagement of the petitioner could not be (terminated without an opportunity of hearing being given to him. It was for this reason that he was asked to opt for either of the two posts. This shows that the State Government was conscious of the fact that the engagement of the petitioner could not be (terminated without an opportunity of hearing being given to him. It was for this reason that he was asked to opt for either of the two posts. It was, therefore, necessary for the State Government to have ascertained as to when this letter was received by the petitioner and only after waiting for a reasonable time, it should have passed the order terminating the services of the petitioner. But in this case the State Government did not do so. Showing undue haste the State Government passed the impugned order on 7th November 1989. It is, therefore, obvious that no opportunity was given to the petitioner of putting his case before the State Government. Since no opportunity was given to him, the order dated 7th November, 1989 terminating the engagement of the petitioner as Special counsel, Urban Land Ceiling is invalid in law and cannot be sustained. It may also be pointed here that the impugned order appears to have been passed by the State Government in a routine manner without application of mind. By another letter dated 23rd December 1989 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition), the State Government reminded the District Judge, Aligarh that the option called for from the petitioner by letter dated 24th October, 1989 (Annexure 1) had not yet been received. It was about one and half months after the services of the petitioner as Special counsel were terminated by letter dated 7th November 1989. This clearly indicates that the earlier impugned order dated 7th November 1989 was passed by the State Government without application of mind on its mere whim and fancy the proper course to be adopted by the State Government would have been to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner after his option was received. There appeared to be no hurry for terminating the engagement of the petitioner when he was already working on the two posts. In these circumstances, there is no option left but to quash the impugned order. There appeared to be no hurry for terminating the engagement of the petitioner when he was already working on the two posts. In these circumstances, there is no option left but to quash the impugned order. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 7th November, 1989 passed by the State Government (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed resulting in restoration of the status-quo ante as on 7-11-1989, the date on which engagement of the petitioner as special counsel, Urban Land Ceiling was terminated. He shall be entitled to payment of remuneration till today at the rates applicable to him as on 7th November, 1989 and from time to time thereafter. The arrears shall be paid to the petitioner within two months from today. However, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made.