JUDGMENT R.R.K. Trivedi 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondents. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Both the learned counsel for parties have agreed that this petition may be disposed of finally at this stage. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are that petitioner Balwant Singh filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) far release of shop no. T/63-B, situate in Mohalla Taakan, Qasba Gangoh, district Saharanpur in which respondent No. 2 Janeshwar Prasad was continuing as tenant, on the allegations that he needed the shop to provide employment to his two sons who had no aptitude for studies and could not study beyond Class X. It was stated that both the sons are sitting idle and are unemployed. The age of the sons stated in the application was 22 years and 19 years respectively of Sudhir Kumar and Sanjiv Kumar. This application for release was contested by respondent no. 2 by filing a written statement which has been filed as Annexure III to the writ petition. 3. I have gone through the written statement filed by the respondent no 2 The application for release was opposed mainly on the ground that both the sons of the petitioner are not unemployed as alleged as they are doing agriculture work along with their grand-father and thus are gainfully engaged in farming business. The age of the sons was also disputed and it was stated that Sanjiv Kumar is less than 15 years of age and Sudhir Kumar is less than 20 years of age. It was also alleged that both are students. Respondent no. 2 also stated that the petitioner tried to evict him from the accommodation in dispute with the help of undersirable elements, by use of muscle power. However, as the district authorities intervened, he could not be evicted from the shop in dispute. Thereafter, a notice was given on 7-10-1985 and two years thereafter this application for release was filed. It has also been stated that he has no alternative accommodation for doing the business of motor winding. His newly constructed house is in narrow lane. It is still not complete and several necessary things to make it habitable could not be provided. This house is situate near bus stand of the town. The respondent no. It has also been stated that he has no alternative accommodation for doing the business of motor winding. His newly constructed house is in narrow lane. It is still not complete and several necessary things to make it habitable could not be provided. This house is situate near bus stand of the town. The respondent no. 2 has also given the number of bis family members and has stated that in case he is evicted from the shope in dispute, he shall suffer irreparable loss and injury as the business of motor winding, which he is doing from the shop in dispute, is the only source of income. In case evicted, he shall be deprived of valuable goodwill earned by him. On these facts it has been asserted that comparative hardship lies in his favour. 4. The prescribed authority by his judgment and order dated 6-12- 1988 allowed the application and released the shop in dispute in favour of petitioner. The order of the prescribed authority was challenged in appeal No. 375 of 1988 which has been allowed by learned 6th Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and the application for release has been dismissed, hence this writ petition. The learned counsel for petitioner placed before me the finding recorded by the appellate authority on questions of bona fide need of the petitioner as well as the finding on comparative hardship. Learned appellate authority has agreed with the finding of the prescribed authority that sons of the petitioner are unemployed and they are not engaged with their grandfather in farming business However, the learned appellate authority has not accepted the bona fide need of petitioner on three grounds which are mentioned in seriatim : (1) firstly, that the petitioner purchased the shop in dispute in 1973 with full knowledge that it was occupied by a tenant. If he had an idea to use the disputed shop for employing his sons, he should have preferred to purchase a vacant shop. (2) secondly, that a notice was given to the tenant on 7-10-1985 but the application for release was filed on 2-7-1987. (3) The third ground is that petitioner resorted to extra legal methods to get the shop vacated by use of muscle power through undesirable elements. 5. (2) secondly, that a notice was given to the tenant on 7-10-1985 but the application for release was filed on 2-7-1987. (3) The third ground is that petitioner resorted to extra legal methods to get the shop vacated by use of muscle power through undesirable elements. 5. Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior advocate, appearing for petitioner, has submitted that all the three grounds mentioned by learned appellate authority are extraneous and irrelevant for determining the bona fide need of the landlord. So far as the finding of comparative hardship is concerned, the learned counsel has submitted that question of comparative hardship has also not been determined in his favour as relevant considerations have been ignored Learned counsel has submitted that as the petitioner his own shop, there was no question of his taking any shop on rent for engaging his sons The poverty of the tenant could not be a ground for depriving petitioner of opportunity to employ his sons in the shop in dispute. It has also been submitted that respondent no. 2 has his own accommodation near bus stand where he could run his business of motor winding without any loss in income 6. Learned counsel for respondent submitted that both the findings are findings of fact and cannot be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further, he has stated that the tenant has no alternative accommodation The appellate authority has taken into consideration all the questions of law and fact and then has answered the finding in favour of respondent no. 2. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for parties. In my opinion, the appellate authority has committed a manifest error of law in reversing the order of the prescribed authority on the question of bona fide need as well as comparative hardship The factors which weighed with the appellate authority for not accepting the bona fide need of petitioner in my opinion were not very relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate authority has committed a manifest illegality as he was influenced more by extraneous and irrelevant facts in arriving at his conclusion. 7. One ground on which the appellate authority has not accepted the bona fide need is that the petitioner tried to resort to extra legal methods for dispossession of the respondent. The appellate authority has committed a manifest illegality as he was influenced more by extraneous and irrelevant facts in arriving at his conclusion. 7. One ground on which the appellate authority has not accepted the bona fide need is that the petitioner tried to resort to extra legal methods for dispossession of the respondent. In my opinion, though it could not be appreciated and was not proper for the landlord to resort to such acts but on this basis alone it could not be said that his need was not genuine. Under pressing need and under an anxiety to get early possession, one may resort to such methods, if not properly advised. Long delay in disposal of rent cases is a great motivating factor for seeking help of undesirable elements and resorting to extra-legal methods It is made clear here that Court does not mean to approve such acts, but the purpose of discussion is that conduct of the party should be assessed in this back-ground. Admittedly, authorities intervened and petitioner gave an undertaking not to harass tenant respondent no. 2 There is nothing to show that thereafter petitioner resorted to such acts and harassed respondent no. 2 in any manner. In my opinion, after this the appellate authority was not justified in recording a finding against petitioner on question of bone fide need on this ground. 8. Another factor which weighed with the appellate authority is that the landlord cannot be said to have bona fide need of the shop, as he purchased it in 1973 fully knowing that it was occupied by tenant. In my opinion, this ground too is not correct and is wholly immaterial for assessing the bonafide need. The application for release of shop in question was filed in 1987 after 14 years of its purchase the petitioner could legally make provision for the future. There is nothing wrong if as a prudent man he thought of purchasing shop for future need of the family. Thus while deciding question of bona fide need, in my opinion, appellate authority committed a manifest error of law. The third ground that the application was moved about two years after serving the notice and from this it is clear that the landlord has no bona fide need is also not correct. Thus while deciding question of bona fide need, in my opinion, appellate authority committed a manifest error of law. The third ground that the application was moved about two years after serving the notice and from this it is clear that the landlord has no bona fide need is also not correct. No notice is required to be given ordinarily for moving an application under section 21 of the Act for release of the building. However, in case the building was purchared a six month's notice is required under the First proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act before moving the application. In my opinion, the period elapsed could not be said to be an unreasonable delay so as to render the bona fide need doubtful. In my opinion, the authority were not justified in drawing such an inference from the facts of the case. 9. So far as the comparative hardship is concerned, the tenant has an alternative accommodation near the 'bus stand which according to him was under construction then and required 'certain furnishing. The business of motor winding could be carried out in this accommodation but the appellate authority has not adverted himself to this alternative accommodation available to tenant. Since about four years have passed by this time the circumstances of both the sides must have; changed the tenant must completed the construction of his house. For the reasons stated above, in my opinion, the writ petition deserves to be allowed as the matter requires a reconsideration by the appellate authority. However, it is made clear that the appellate authority shall decide the appeal afresh on merits without being influenced by the observations made in this order. The parties shall be allowed opportunity to bring such facts, which came in existence during this period and are relevant for deciding the dispute between parties. 10. Consequently, this writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated ! 8-10-1989 passed by learned 6th Additional District Judge, Saharanpur is hereby quashed. Appeal No. 375 of 1988 Janeshwar Prasad Sani v. Balwant Singh shall stand restored to its original number. The appellate authority shall decide the appeal afresh after hearing the parties. The appellate authority shall also permit the parties to file affidavits mentioning the changed circumstances. 8-10-1989 passed by learned 6th Additional District Judge, Saharanpur is hereby quashed. Appeal No. 375 of 1988 Janeshwar Prasad Sani v. Balwant Singh shall stand restored to its original number. The appellate authority shall decide the appeal afresh after hearing the parties. The appellate authority shall also permit the parties to file affidavits mentioning the changed circumstances. Since the matter is pending since 1987 the appellate authority shall decide the appeal as far as possible within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before him. There will be no order as do costs. Petition allowed.