Honble TIBREWAL, J. — In all these petitions common questions of law are involved, hence, they are disposed of by a common order. In all the petitions, the petitioners are same and they have prayed to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them u/s 276-B read with section 278-B of Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act). (2). Non-petitioner No.2, viz. Dy. Commissioner Assessment-I, Income Tax, Jaipur filed eight separate complaints against the petitioners on 21.12.88 for the offence u/s 276-B read with S.278-B of the Act, which pertains to the assessment year 1987- 88. The accusation against the petitioners is that they had deducted income tax at source on the interest amount paid by them u/s 194-A of the Act, but, did not pay/deposit the same to the credit of the Central Government within the prescribed time as required u/s 200 of the Act read with rule 30(l)(b)(i) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. As per the said Rules, the tax so deducted should be deposited within two months from the date of the deduction. The details of the cases and the amount of tax deducted at source and the delay in depositing the amount to the account of the Central Government are given in the following chart : S.No. Court CaseNo. Amt. ofTDS Dt.ofdeduction Dt.ofdeposit Late 1. 4/89 34,741/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 2. 5/89 5,000/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 3. 6/89 5,359/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 4. 7/89 71,113/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 5. 8/89 3,170/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 6. 9/89 4,669/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 7. 10/89 5,348/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months 8. 11/89 4,410/- 28.2.87 23.6.87 4 Months Total = 1,33,810/- (3). The prosecution case, as per the complaint, is that the petitioner-Firm M/s Universal Supply Corporation is a registered partnership firm under the Income Tax Act and in the assessment year 1982-83 the firm was re-constituted, whereby the petitioner Nos. 2,3 & 4 were made partners. For the assessment year 1987-88, the returns of income tax were filed on behalf of the firm which were verified by its partner Arun Kumar Sogani on 9.7.87. 2,3 & 4 were made partners. For the assessment year 1987-88, the returns of income tax were filed on behalf of the firm which were verified by its partner Arun Kumar Sogani on 9.7.87. During the course of assessment of tax, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Assessment)-I, Jaipur noticed that the petitioners had paid interest amount exceeding Rs.1000/- to various creditors on which the income tax was deducted at source u/s 194-A of the Act, but, the same was not deposited in the account of the Central Government within two months as required u/s 200 read with Rule 30(1) (b) (i) (ii) of the Rules. Then a notice was given to the petitioners by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Assessment)-I, Jaipur on 17.11.87 to explain as to why interest u/s 201 may not be charged. This notice was replied on 5.1.88. It was stated in the complaint that the explanation given by the petitioners was not accepted by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, who passed aon order at the time of making assessment to charge interest u/s 201 (1A) of the Act. (4). All these complaints were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Jaipur, who took cognizance and issued process against the petitioners. The petitioners, after putting their appearance in the court, moved an application u/s 245(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to drop the proceedings but it was rejected by the learned Magistrate vide order dated July 22, 1989. Feeling aggrieved against the said order, the petitioners filed the present petitions u/s 482 Cr. P.C. with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings. (5). I have heard Mr. Kasliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Amar Singh," learned counsel for the Department at length. Mr. Kasliwal has contended that the criminal proceedings against the petitioners in all the criminal cases deserve to be quashed on the following grounds : (i) the assessing authority, at the time of passing assessment order, was satisfied that charging interest u/s 201(1A) of the Act was sufficient in the present case, as such, he did not think it proper to initiate penalty proceedings u/s 221 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, in a case where charging penalty was not thought proper, launching of criminal prosecution, which is a harsh remedy, is an abuse of the process of the court; (ii) that the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (u/s. 279(1) of the Act, directing prosecution of the petitioners, is invalid as it was done without application of mind and on taking into consideration certain facts which did not exist on the record; (iii) that before launching prosecution against the petitioners, a notice should have been given to explain their position in a case like the present one where the delay in depositing the tax amount in the Central Government Treasury was not abnormal. (6). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Department argued that it was not necessary .to issue any show cause notice to the petitioners before filing a complaint as there is no such statutory requirement either under the Act or the rules. According to the learned counsel, the offence u/s 276-B of the Act was committed by the petitioners as the provisions of section 194-(A) and 200 of the Act, read with rule 30(1) (b)(i)(ii) created an absolute liability on the part of the petitioners to have deposited the tax amount within the stipulated period. It was then contended that in the instant case, the petitioners were given notice by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on 17.11.87 and the assessing authority was not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioners and ordered to charge interest u/s.201(lA) of the Act on the tax amount. Mr. Amar Singh further argued that imposition of penalty by the Assessing Officer u/s 221 of the Act is not a condition precedent for launching prosecution u/s. 276-B read with S. 278-B, in as much as, the prosecution of the petitioners is an independent recourse provided under the Act. It was, then argued that the cognizance was rightly taken by the Magistrate and there are no exceptional circumstances to quash the proceedings by invoking inherent powers u/s. 482 Cr. P.C. Both the learned counsel have referred a number of decisions which I shall refer lateron. (7). To appreciate the above submissions, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. In Chapter XIV of the Income Tax Act procedure for assessment is provided. Chapter XVII deals with collection and recovery of the tax. P.C. Both the learned counsel have referred a number of decisions which I shall refer lateron. (7). To appreciate the above submissions, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. In Chapter XIV of the Income Tax Act procedure for assessment is provided. Chapter XVII deals with collection and recovery of the tax. Section 190 provides that, notwithstanding that the regular assessment in respect of any income is to be made in a later assessment year, the tax on such income shall be payable by deduction or collection at source or by advance payment, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter. Then, section 194-A provides for deduction of tax at source on payment of interest, other than interest on securities. It provides that any person who is responsible for paying to a resident any income by way of interest other than income by way of interest on securities, shall, at the time of credit of such income to the amount of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct income-tax thereon at the rates in force. We are not concerned to the proviso to the section in the present case. Then Section 200 provides as under : "200. Duty of person deducting tax : Any person deducting any sum in accordance with the provisions of sections 192 to 194, section 194-A Section 194-B, Section 194- BB, 194-F, Section 194-G, Section 194-H, Sec. 195, section 196-A and Section 196-B shall pay within the prescribed time, the sum so deducted to the credit of the Central Government or as the Board directs." (8). Then, section 201 provides the consequence of failure to deduct or pay the Tax at source. Then, section 201 provides the consequence of failure to deduct or pay the Tax at source. For the sake of convenience, the relevant parts of the section are reproduced as under : "201(1)— If any such person and in the cases referred to in section 194, the principal officer and the company of which he is the principal officer does not deduct or after deducting fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, he or it shall, without prejudice to any other consequence which he or it may incur, be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax: Provided that no penalty shall be charged u/s.221 from such person, principal officer or company unless the Assessing Officer is satisfied that person or principal officer or company, as the case may be, has without good and sufficient reasons fails to deduct and pay the tax. (1A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1;, if any such person, principal officer or company as is referred to in that sub-section does not deduct or after deducting fails to pay the tax as required by or under this Act, he or it shall be liable to pay simple interest at (fifteen) percent per annum on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was deductible to the date on which such tax is actually paid." (9). Rule 30(l)(b)(i)(ii) provides a period of two months for making payment to the credit of the Central Government of such tax deducted at source u/s 194A. In addition to the amount of interest as provided u/s. 201 (1A) of the Act, penalty can also be charged u/s. 221 of the Act. However, before levying any such penalty, the assessee is to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard and in case the assessee proves to the satisfaction of the assessing officer that the default was for good and sufficient reason, no penally shall be levied under this section. Then, Chapter XXII provides offences and prosecutions for the various contraventions committed by the assessee. S.276B provides punishment in the case of failure to pay the tax deducted at source. Then S.278AA provides as under: "278AA. Then, Chapter XXII provides offences and prosecutions for the various contraventions committed by the assessee. S.276B provides punishment in the case of failure to pay the tax deducted at source. Then S.278AA provides as under: "278AA. Notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of S.276A, section 276AB (or section 276B) no person shall be punishable for any failure referred to in the said provisions if he proves that there was reasonable cause for such failure". Section 278B deals with the prosecutions for the offences committed by the companies. I have referred the relevant provisions of the Act and rules With which we are presently concerned for the sake of convenience to appreciate the grounds submitted before me. (10). Now, I would like to deal with the various decisions referred before me in the course of arguments. (11) In Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras & Anr. Vs. S.V. Angidi Chettiar (1), the Apex Court of the country while considering the penalty provisions provided u/s 28 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, observed as under : "The power to impose penalty u/s 28 depends upon the satisfaction of the Income-Tax Officer in the course of proceedings under the Act; it cannot be exercised if he is not satisfied about the existence of conditions specified in clauses (a), (b) or (c) before the proceedings are concluded. The proceedings to levy penalty has, however, not to be commenced by the Income-Tax Officer before the completion of the assessment proceedings by the Income-Tax Officer. Satisfaction before conclusion of the proceeding under the Act, and not the issue of a notice or initiation of any step for imposing penalty is a condition for the exercise of the jurisdiction." (12). In D.M. Manasvi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax. Gujarat (2), the Supreme Court, while considering the incidence of penalty as provided u/s 271(1) of the Act, observed as under: "The fact that notices were issued subsequent to the making of the assessment orders would not, in our opinion, show that there was no satisfaction of the Income-Tax Officer during the assessment proceedings that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished incorrect particulars of such income. What is contemplated by clause (1) of S.271 is that the Income- tax Officer of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have been satisfied in the course of proceedings under the Act regarding matters mentioned in the clauses of that sub-section. It is not, however, essential that notice to the person proceeded against should have also been issued during the course of the assessment proceedings Satisfaction in the very nature of things precedes the issue of notice and it would not be correct to equate the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officer or Appellate Assistant Commissioner with the actual issue of notice. The issue of notice is a consequence of the satisfaction of the Income-Tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and it would, in our opinion be sufficient compliance with the provisions of the statute if the Income-Tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is satisfied about the matters referred to in clauses (a) to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 271 during the course of proceedings under the Act even though notice to the person proceeded against in pursuance of that satisfaction is issued subsequently." (13). In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi-II Vs. Rajinder Kumar Somani (3), a Division Bench of Delhi High Court considered the question as to whether the penalty proceedings were not correctly initiated u/s. 271(1) (A) of the Act. After comparing the similar provisions of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 and the Act of 1961, it was observed as under : "The 1961 Act has changed the above position. A careful perusal of Sec. 275 of this Act shows that it has laid down bars of limitation in two respects, one explicitly and the other by necessary implication. The explicit limitation "is that the order imposing the penalty has to be passed within a particular time. While we are not concerned with that period of limitation here, it is necessary to notice that the period of limitation prescribed starts running from the "end of the financial year in which the proceedings initiated are completed." Thus, indirectly, but by necessary implications, the statute has also provided that the action for imposition of penalty must be initiated in the course of (as far as we are concerned) the assessment proceedings. It is thus not enough that the ITO is satisfied in the course of the assessment proceedings that a case for penalty exists, it is further necessary that he should have initiated some action for the imposition of penalty in the course of such proceedings. It depends on the facts of each case whether any such action has been initiated before the date of completion of the assessment." (14). On the basis of the above decisions, learned counsel for the petitioners tried to convince, that the very facts of not initiating penalty proceedings by the Assessing Authority showed that the Authority was satisfied that there were good and sufficient reasons for the default in depositing the TDS amount in time. I am unable to accept such a broad preposition of law canvassed before me. In my view no such presumption can be raised simply on non-initiation of penalty proceedings. The above decisions do not lay down such a broad principle of law. Hence, I have no hesitation to reject the submission. (15). The learned counsel, then, relied upon a Bench decisions of Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax. Delhi-I Vs. Raunaq & (P) Ltd. (4), in which, it was held that section 221 of the Act enables the ITO to impose a penalty where an assessee is in default in making the payment of tax, yet, the imposition of penalty cannot be automatic as consequence of the. default. It was held that it is a question of fact to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the each case if good and sufficient reasons existed for a non-levy of the penalty. (16). Another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Nemi Chand Garg Vs. Income-Tax Officer, D-Ward, Ajmer (5). In that case, the assessee was prosecuted for the offences u/ss.227 & 276 C of the Act. The prosecution was based on the findings of the Income Tax Officer which were reversed by the Commissioner of Income Tax in appeal. On the basis of the findings of the Appellate Authority a petition u/s 482 Cr. P.C. was filed before this Court to quash the proceedings. The petition was accepted by this Court to a limited extent relying upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand Vs. ITO (6), wherein, it was held as under : — "Heard counsel, special leave granted. P.C. was filed before this Court to quash the proceedings. The petition was accepted by this Court to a limited extent relying upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand Vs. ITO (6), wherein, it was held as under : — "Heard counsel, special leave granted. In view of the finding recorded by the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal that it was clear on the appraisal of the entire material on the record that Shrimati Janak Rani was a partner of the assessee firm and that the firm was a geniune firm, we do not see how the assessee can be prosecuted for filing false returns. We accordingly, allow this appeal and quash the prosecution." This Court held as under : - "At the moment, the judgment of the Commissioner, dated March 26, 1985, is in existence as prima facie valid protective umbrella to the assessee. That being so, it would certainly be abuse of process of the court and may even appear to be unusual and improbable if, for the same, the assessee is being prosecuted. It would, therefore, be in the interest of justice that by invoking the exercise of power u/s 309, Criminal Procedure Code, that further proceedings are not taken till the judgment of the commissioner dated March 26, 1985, which is sub-judice before the Tribunal is examined and the decision is given by the Tribunal." (17). In Banwari Lal Satyanarain & ors. Vs. State of Bihar & anr. (7), it was held by the Patna High Court that the prosecution of an accused under the provisions of the Income Tax Act is liable to be discontinued if the Statutory Authority under the Act passed any order on the merits in favour of the assessee, who is an accused in a criminal trial, in relation to the very same default which is the subject-matter of a criminal trial as well as the order which had attained finality. In that case, the following questions were formulated by the Judge: — "Whether, in a penalty proceedings, where an authority under the Act who has expert knowledge of the subject has recorded a finding that the assessee had furnished good and sufficient reasons for failure to deduct and/or pay the tax, within time, and dropped the penalty proceeding or deleted the same, as the case may be, can it be said that he is still liable to be prosecuted under section 276 B of the Act? Can a criminal court, inspite of a finding by the statutory authority under the Act that the assessee furnished good and sufficient reasons for not deducting and paying the tax within time, take a different view and hold that the failure on the part of the assessee was without reasonable cause or excuse?." (18). The Honble Judge gave the answer in the negative and held that the process of a criminal court should not be allowed to be abused in cases where an assessee has succeeded in proving good and sufficient reasons for his failure before an authority under the Act in a penalty proceedings. In the judgment, the effect of section 278 A of the Act was also considered as under:– "Now, it has to be seen as to what is the effect of the amendment. Can it be said that, after the amendment, the question whether on accused had any reasonable cause or not for not deducting and paying tax within time is only of academic importance and not relevant for a criminal court ? My answer is emphatically in the negative. Section 278AA is nothing else but a proviso to section 276B of the Act, but a separate section has been inserted in the Act, as similar provisions have been made with respect to prosecution u/ss 266A, 276AB, 276DD and 276E. The cumulative effect of the amendment, in my view, is that in case of prosecution under section 276B of the Act, two things have to be shown; firstly, that there was failure on the part of the assessee in deducting or paying the tax within time and, secondly, that the failure was without any reasonable cause. The cumulative effect of the amendment, in my view, is that in case of prosecution under section 276B of the Act, two things have to be shown; firstly, that there was failure on the part of the assessee in deducting or paying the tax within time and, secondly, that the failure was without any reasonable cause. So far as the first pre-requisite is concerned, even after the amendment, the prosecution has to prove the same, but so far as the second pre-requisite is concerned, the prosecution is not required to prove the same as the effect of the amendment is that now there is a presumption in favour of the prosecution that the accused has no reasonable cause for his failure; of course, the presumption is not explicit, but the same becomes implicit if section 276B is read alongwith section 278AA why I say so will be apparent from Section 278-AA which lays down that no person shall be punished for such failure, if he proves that there was reasonable cause for such failure." (19). In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chembara Peak Estates Ltd. (8), a Bench of Kerala High Court considered the ambit of the circumstances for levying the penalty under Section 221(1) of the Act on a reference made to it under the Income Tax Act. It held that the imposition of penalty was not an automatic consequence of the default and it was also not mandatory. The Bench places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (9). (20). In Sequoia Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. & others Vs. P.P. Suri, ITO, Central Circle XX, New Delhi (10), the Income-tax deductions were made by the accused from the amount of interest paid by him, but, there was a delay in depositing the same in the Central Government treasury. A complaint was filed under Section 276-B of the Act. The Income Tax Officer had also commenced penalty proceedings under Section 201 (1A) and 221 of the Act. The Income Tax Officer imposed a penalty, but, in appeal, the order of penalty was quashed holding that there was sufficient and good cause for the default in the payment of tax. While deciding so, it was also held that the scope and purport of penalty proceedings and prosecutions are separate and independent. The Income Tax Officer imposed a penalty, but, in appeal, the order of penalty was quashed holding that there was sufficient and good cause for the default in the payment of tax. While deciding so, it was also held that the scope and purport of penalty proceedings and prosecutions are separate and independent. The existence of the one or the other was no bar to any of them. An Assessee could be levied penalty, as well as, punished by prosecution. (21). On the basis of the above decisions, an argument has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the absence of the penalty proceedings against the petitioners, criminal element disappears and it cannot be said that the default was without reasonable cause. Learned counsel, therefore, argued that the criminal proceedings should be quashed. (22). This argument can be rejected for the simple reason that in the Income Tax Act, there are separate provisions for levy of interest, penalty and criminal prosecution. The charging of interest has a different purpose to compensate the Department for depriving it of the user of the money during the period the payment-was withheld. Criminal proceedings has nothing to do either with the levy of interest or penalty. In the absence of these proceedings also, criminal prosecution can be launched if the ingredients of the offence under Section 276-B of the Act are made out. No presumption can be drawn to the effect that there were good and sufficient reasons for the default in making the payment of the tax simply on the ground that penalty proceedings were not initiated. In the same way, simply charging of interest by the Department for the delay also does not, in my view, obliterate the prosecution. The Assessee can be charged interest as well as punished by prosecution. No such presumption can also be drawn that in case penalty proceedings were initiated, the petitioners would have satisfied the Appellate Authority that there were good and sufficient reasons for the delay in payment. I am also fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in Jayyappan Vs. S.K. Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticerin(ll), wherein it was held as under:- "It is true that as observed by this Court in Uttam Chand & others Vs. I am also fortified by the judgment of the Apex Court in Jayyappan Vs. S.K. Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticerin(ll), wherein it was held as under:- "It is true that as observed by this Court in Uttam Chand & others Vs. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle, Amritsar (1982) ITR 909, the prosecution once initiated may be quashed in the light of a finding favourable to the assessee recorded by an authority under the Act subsequently in respect of the relevant assessment proceedings but that decision is no authority for the proposition that no proceedings can be initiated at all under Section 276C and S.277 as long as some proceeding under the Act in which there is a chance of success of the assessee is pending. A mere expectation of success in some proceeding in appeal or reference under the Act cannot come in the way of the institution of the criminal proceedings under Section 276C and Section 277 of the Act. In the criminal case all the ingredients of the offence in question have to be established in order to secure the conviction of the accused. The Criminal Court no doubt has to give due regard to the result of any proceedings under the Act having a bearing on the question in issue and in an appropriate case it may drop the proceedings in the light of an order passed under the Act. It does not however, mean that the result of the proceedings under the Act would be binding on the criminal court. The Criminal court has to judge the case independently on the evidence placed before it. Their Lordships further observed as under: — "We do not, however, agree with the view expressed by the High Court of Calcutta in Jyoti Prakash Mittor V. Haramohan Chowdhary (1978) 112 ITR 384 . In that case on a complaint made against the assessee for an offence punishable u/Section 277 of the Act, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate issued process. Thereupon the assessee questioned the validity of the initiation of the criminal proceedings before the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that until the penalty proceedings initiated in respect of the same period under Section 271 (1) (c) of the Act were finally disposed of, no complaint could be filed. Thereupon the assessee questioned the validity of the initiation of the criminal proceedings before the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that until the penalty proceedings initiated in respect of the same period under Section 271 (1) (c) of the Act were finally disposed of, no complaint could be filed. The contention of the assessee was opposed to the principles of natural justice as he would be deprived of the benefit of a finding which was likely to be recorded in his favour in the penalty proceedings. It was argued on behalf of the Department that the penalty proceedings under Section 271(l)(c) had no direct bearing on the maintainability of a prosecution launched under Chapter XXII of the Act. The High Court took the view which according to us is an erroneous one that the provisions of S.279(1A) of the Act established the necessity for the completion of the penalty proceedings before the institution of the prosecution and therefore as long as the penalty proceedings were pending the criminal proceedings could not be instituted." (23). In Gopal Lal Dhamani etc. Vs. I.T.O. and others (12), the facts were that under the provisions of Section 132 (1) and (1A) of the Act, a search was conducted in the business premises of the assessee and in the search, cash, precious, semi- precious stones etc. were found. The I.T.O. finalised the proceedings under Section 132(5) of the Act. Thereafter, complaints were filed under Section 276 of the Act for various assessment years. The proceedings were challenged before the High Court on the ground that it was pre-mature and there were no reasonable grounds for prosecuting the petitioners unless a regular assessment order was made by which it could be said that the petitioners will fully evaded in any manner payment of any tax penalty/interest. This contention was repelled by this Court and it was held that it was not necessary that the prosecution can only be launched after regular assessment was made. (24). The argument with regard to validity of the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 279(1) of the Act can be properly raised before the Trial court at appropriate time. (25). In M/S Nanalal Sobhagmal & ors. Vs. (24). The argument with regard to validity of the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 279(1) of the Act can be properly raised before the Trial court at appropriate time. (25). In M/S Nanalal Sobhagmal & ors. Vs. Union of India and Others (13), it was held that always it was not necessary for the Authority concerned to apply its mind and it was also held that the requirement of application of mind can be proved by the prosecution at the trial stage by leading evidence. (26). The last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that initiation of the criminal proceedings by the Department without notice and giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners can be rejected out-right as there is no such statutory requirement under the law. The only requirement for initiation of criminal proceedings is provided under Section 279 of the Act, which says that such prosecution should be at the instance of the Commissioner. In the absence of any statutory requirement, criminal proceedings cannot be terminated on the ground that the principles of natural justice is violated, if the same is launched without prior notice of an opportunity of being heard. (27). After the above discussions, the legal position can be summarised as under:– i). The scope and purport of interest/penalty proceedings and prosecution under the Income Tax Act are separate and independent. The existence or the absence of the one or the other is no bar to any one of them; ii). Simply charging of interest by the Department under Section 201 (1-A) of the Act for the delay in the payment of the amount to the Central Government does not obliterate the prosecution; iii). The non-initiation of penalty proceedings does not lead to a presumption that the default in payment was for good and sufficient reasons or that the Assessee was deprived to establish that there were good and sufficient reasons for the default in payment; iv). Non-initiation of penalty proceedings in a case cannot be quoted with a case where the penalty proceedings were initiated and a finding is recorded by the Competent Authority that there were good and sufficient reasons for the delay in payment; v). Non-initiation of penalty proceedings in a case cannot be quoted with a case where the penalty proceedings were initiated and a finding is recorded by the Competent Authority that there were good and sufficient reasons for the delay in payment; v). There is no statutory requirement either under Section 279 or under any other provision of the Act to give show cause notice to the Assessee before criminal proceedings are initiated against him. In other words, a notice or a right of being heard before launching criminal proceedings under the Income Tax Act for the offences mentioned under Chapter XXII is not mandatory and proceeding cannot be quashed on this ground. Though, if such notice is given by the Department, it may check frivolous and unnecessary criminal cases or such cases where the default in payment is technical or committed in good faith. The question of compounding the offence may also be considered by the concerned authority prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings if such notice is given to the assessee desirous to compound the offence. (28). Before parting with, I would like to say that the principles on which the complaint can be quashed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well settled. In State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others (14), the Apex Court of the country has given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice: — 1). Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2). Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3). Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4). 3). Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4). Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5). Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6). Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7). Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceedings is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Admittedly, the present case does not fall in any of the categories mentioned above. (29). I may also point out that the offence under Section 276-B read with Section 278-B of the Act is compoundable as provided under Sub-Section (2) of Section 279 of the Act by the Chief Commissioner or the Director General even after the institution of the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the petitioners shall be free to approach to the concerned authority if they so desire for compounding the offence. If it is so done, it is expected from the said Authority to consider such request sympathetically keeping in view that the delay in making payment is not abnormal and that the interest have also been charged from the petitioners to compensate the Revenue for the delay. (30). The petitions are, therefore, dismissed as indicated above.