D. K. Jam, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the claimants under Section 110-D ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the act ) is directed against the awardof the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short the tribunal ) dated 26 July19. 88 in Suit No. 186/81. ( 2 ) ON 30/07/1977 at about 2 P. M. Surinder Kumar, son of theappellants, aged about 13 years, along with one Ved Prakash, both on a cycleleft from their residence at Prithviraj Road from the service road. They saw atruck bearing registration No. DLL 8003, emerging from Tughlak Road sideon the Tughlak Lane, driven by respondent No. 1, at a high speed. Thetruck took a sharp turn on the right hand side towards service road and itdashed against the cycle. Surinder Kumar and Ved Prakash fell down fromtheir cycle. Surinder Kumar died on the spot and Ved Prakash received injurieson his right leg and other parts of his body. It is the case of the claimantsthat after the accident respondent No. 1 tried to run away from the spot butwas apprehended by some persons, who appeared as witnesses before thetribunal. Before the Tribunal, the claimants claimed that the deceased was astudent of 8th Class and belonged to a family which had the history of longevity of life. Accordingly, the claimets made a claim of Rs. 1 lakh againstthe respondents. Respondents 1 and 2, the driver and the owner of the. truckrespectively, did not contest the. petition. It was contested only by respondentno. 3, the Insurance Company, on diverse pleas. ( 3 ) THE learned Tribunal framed the issues on the pleadings of theparties. The parties led their evidence before the Tribunal. The Tribunalheld that respondent No. 1 was driving the truck rashly and negligentlycausing the accident as a result of which deceased Surinder Kumar died; thatdeceased was 12 years and three months old at the time of the accidentand would have started earning after about ten years or so and thus wouldhave started providing help to his parents. The Tribunal found that thedeceased being only 12 years old, the parents would have been more than 45years of age by the time the deceased would have started earning. Taking intoaccount all these factors, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that 16 was yearswas an appropriate multiplier to be adopted in the case of the appellants. The Tribunal found that thedeceased being only 12 years old, the parents would have been more than 45years of age by the time the deceased would have started earning. Taking intoaccount all these factors, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that 16 was yearswas an appropriate multiplier to be adopted in the case of the appellants. Asregards the dependency of the appellants, the Tribunal opined that thedeceased, after completion of his studies would have started earning Rs. 1000. 00to Rs. 1,500. 00 per month or so and would have contributed Rs. 250. 00 permonth to the family. Thus, the yearly dependency was determined Rs. 3,000. 00. Accordingly, the Tribunal computed the compensation payable to the appellantsat Rs. 48,000. 00 by applying the multiplier of 16. Interest claimed on thecompensation amount, however, was not allowed. ( 4 ) CLAIMANTS have filed this appeal for. grant of higher compensationand interest. There is no cross-appeal by any of the respondents. The factof the accident and the liability of the truck for causing accident on 30/07/1977, therefore, stand admitted. The only question for consideration, thus, isof the quantum of compensation and liability to pay interest thereon. ( 5 ) MR. H. S. Dhir, learned Counsel for the appellant, has assailed theorder of the Tribunal on two grounds, namely, (i) compensation awarded bythe Tribunal is neither just nor is its mode of computation correct and; (ii) thereasons given by the Tribunal while declining to grant interest are factually andlegally incorrect. On the other hand, Mr. Manmohan Sarin, learned Counselfor respondent No. 3 i. e. the Insurance Company, while supporting the award,has submitted that in fact the award is more than liberal in fixing the multiplierof 16 on the facts of the present case. On the question of interest, he submitsthat Interest acts as compensation for the period during which the dependentsare deprived of the earnings of the deceased. His contention is that it is inthe nature of restitution and the concept of restitution does not apply in a casewhere the deceased was not an earning member. ( 6 ) THE first question which arises for consideration is the amountpayable to the claimants/appellants on account of the death of the deceased. The principles governing the assessment of compensation payable to dependentsof the deceased in such cases have been reiterated in a catena of cases. Following its earlier judgment in Gobald Motor Services Ltd. and Am. ( 6 ) THE first question which arises for consideration is the amountpayable to the claimants/appellants on account of the death of the deceased. The principles governing the assessment of compensation payable to dependentsof the deceased in such cases have been reiterated in a catena of cases. Following its earlier judgment in Gobald Motor Services Ltd. and Am. v. R. M. K. Veluswamy and Ors. ,air 41962 SC1,the Supreme Court in C. K. Subramanialyer and Ors. v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair and Ors. (1970) ACJ 110, deciding a caseunder the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, in which a boy of 8 years was killed by abus, reiterated the principles on the question of assessment of damages inthe following words: "compulsory damages under Section I A of the Act for wrongfuldeath must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiariesand that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economicloss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule formeasuring the value of the human life and the measure of damagescannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but theamount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circunastances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of thebeneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since theelements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceasedto the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case,in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rulefor measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, thecourt must exclude all considerations of matter which rest inspeculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cashvalue of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. Inaddition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniarybenefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority. "thus, there is no exact formula or a set standard to determine the quantum ofcompensation payable in such cases. The compensation to be assessed is thepecuniary loss caused to the dependents by the death of the deceased. Forthe purpose of calculating the just compensation, the annual dependency of thedependents should be determined in terms of the annual loss accruing to themdue to the abrupt termination of life. The compensation to be assessed is thepecuniary loss caused to the dependents by the death of the deceased. Forthe purpose of calculating the just compensation, the annual dependency of thedependents should be determined in terms of the annual loss accruing to themdue to the abrupt termination of life. For this purpose broadly speaking,annual earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident and/ or later andamount out of the same which he was spending or could spend for themaintenance of the dependents will be an important determining factor. Thebasic figure will then bemultiplied by a suitable multiplier. On the question asto what is the law and practice of multiplier, this Court in the case of Sushiladevi ami Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1985) ACJ 255, observed asunder: "the multiplier was devised beacause of the uncertainities of thefuture. Future prospects may be bright or dull. Life may be fullof rewards and promotions. Or one may have unemployment and ill-health in store. Who know? In determining the multiplier, however,the Court will not simply adopt the number of years from trial toretirement age or the age of death, for that would be to make noallowance for the "general vicissitudes of life" nor for the acceleratedreceipt of what might otherwise have been spread over forty years. A reduction of the multiplier will therefore be made to effect adiscount in respect of those factors. In practice, there is maximum,of about 18 as the multiplier, but there is no automatic relationshipbetween the multiplier and the plaintiffs age: thus a multiplier of15 or 16 would be the norm whether the plaintiff was aged 18 or 35,though it would be a steady decline after the age. "in the instant case the deceased was a young boy of about 12 years. For enhancement, it is contended that the boy was very good at studies and had brightchances of becoming an Engineer; that the boy was helping his father in fieldsand thus was rendering financial help to the family to the extent of Rs. 250. 00 permonth. Although in the statement of the father of the deceased (P. W. 5), thereis a bald statement to the effect that the deceased was rendering financial helpto the extent of Rs. ,200. 00 per month, but there is no evidence on the record thatthe parents of the deceased ,did possess some agriculture land. 250. 00 permonth. Although in the statement of the father of the deceased (P. W. 5), thereis a bald statement to the effect that the deceased was rendering financial helpto the extent of Rs. ,200. 00 per month, but there is no evidence on the record thatthe parents of the deceased ,did possess some agriculture land. In fact, thereis nothing on the record to show that his parents were engaged in agriculture. As regards his chances of bright career as an Engineer, these are unpredictableuncertainities of life which one cannot foresee. He could beunemployed anda burden, on the family as well. Having regard. to it all, I am of the consideredview that the Tribunal has in the light of all these factors, applied the correctprinciples on the issue and found that 16 is an appropriate multiplier to beadopted on the yearly dependency of Rs. 3,000. 00. ( 7 ) TAKING an overall view of the matter the amount of Rs. 48,000. 00awarded by the Tribunal appears to be just and proper and in accordance withthe principles, noted above, as also the present trend of decisions, which havei been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties, It is well settled thatin the matter of ascertainment of damages, the appellate Court should be slowin disturbing the findings reached by the Courts below, if they have taken allthe relevant facts into consideration. These findings should be disturbed onlywhen there are compelling reasons. . 1 do not find any infirmity in the order ofthe Tribunal and as such no interference is called for on the question ofquantum of compensation. ( 8 ) THE second question is about the grant of interest. No doubtsection 110 CC of the Act empowers the Tribunal to allow interest in its discretion, which has to be a judicial discretion, and if the Tribunal disallowsinterest for no cogent reasons, the mistake can be rectified. In the instant casethe Tribunal has disallowed interest on two grounds : (i) the claimants/appellants have themselves delayed the case throughout; and (ii) the deceased wasonly a child at the time of accident and would have started earning after about10/12 years. I do not agree with the learned Tribunal on this issue. In the instant casethe Tribunal has disallowed interest on two grounds : (i) the claimants/appellants have themselves delayed the case throughout; and (ii) the deceased wasonly a child at the time of accident and would have started earning after about10/12 years. I do not agree with the learned Tribunal on this issue. ( 9 ) I have perused the record of the Tribunal and it seems difficult toconclude that it was the claimants/appellants alone who had been seekingadjournments or were responsible for delaying the proceedings before it. As amatter of fact from 15/02/1984 to 7 February, 1985, there wre was no Presiding Officer, from 7/02/1985 to 25 February, 1986 the casecase was beingadjourned for effecting service on the respondents and then there was lawyers strike. I also find that some adjournments were sought for and granted on therequest of the respondents. The appellants cannot, therefore, be dubbed withdelay or penalised for a longer. span of proceedings before the Tribunal. ( 10 ) MR. Dhir has made reference to a number of decisions, the latestbeing G. Padmanabhan Nair and Ors. v. G. M. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. andanother, 1989 ACJ 873, wherein a young boy of 13 years, like the deceased,was involved in a fatal accident. The rate of interest awarded in this case is12% per annum. This Court in Hara Singh and Ors. v. Mew a Ram Singh and Ors. , 1987 ACJ 979 has also awarded interest @ 12%. ( 11 ) I am, thus, of the considered view that the petitioner should havebeen granted interest. Having regard to the rate of interest on the Governmentsecurities like National Savings Certificates and long term fixed deposits inbanks, I feel, an interest at the rate of 12% per annum will be reasonable inthe instant case. ( 12 ) IN the result, the appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award ismodified to the extent that the appellants will be entitled to interest at the rateof 12% per annum on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunalfrom the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of paymen (s) to theappellants. ( 12 ) IN the result, the appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award ismodified to the extent that the appellants will be entitled to interest at the rateof 12% per annum on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunalfrom the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of paymen (s) to theappellants. The additional amount, now payable as interest, shall be paid tothe appellants through Counsel, by the Insurance Company, respondent No. 3,within two months from today, failing which, on this amount also, the appellants will be entitled to future interest at the rate of 12% per annum in terms ofthe impugned award. ( 13 ) IN the circumstances, however, the parties will bear their own costs.