Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff who has lost in both the Courts below has preferred this appeal. The Suit O.S. No. 1063 if 1979 on the file of the Additional District Munsif, Cuddalore, is for declaration of the plaintiffs alleged title to the suit property and for consequential injunction, or alternatively for partition of his 2/3rd share in the suit property, which is in extent of 66 cents in R.S. No. 700/4 out of a total extent of 78 cents therein. The plaintiff based his title on Ex. A6 dated 23.5.1979, a sale deed in relation to the suit property executed by one Vridhambal and her daughter Rani in favour of the plaintiff and according to the plaintiff, the said vendors under Ex. A6 got the property under a settlement deed Ex. B1 dated 21.12.1938 (registration copy of which is Ex. A1) executed by the 1st defendant, his father Murugesam Pillai and brother Manickam Pillai in favour of the said Vridhambal and Ram. Under the said Ex. B.1, the said Vridhambal was given life interest and after her lifetime, the remainder absolute interest went to the abovesaid daughter Rani. But, the case of the 1st defendant is that the said settlement deed Ex. B.1 is not valid since the property is a joint family property and cannot be gifted away. Regarding the character of the property gifted, there is no dispute and it is admitted that the property under Ex. B.1 was a joint family property belonging to the family of the 1st defendant, his said father and brother. Defendants 2 to 5 are only tenants. 2. The Courts below have held that the contention of the plaintiffs Counsel that Ex. B.1 is not a gift deed, but only a pre-marital arrangement cannot be accepted. Ex. B1 recites that the property under Ex. B1 is given to the abovesaid Vridhambal, the second wife of the 1st defendant for her maintenance since the 1st defendant has taken a third wife. Therefore, the courts below have held that Ex. B.1 cannot be held to be a document executed in lieu of promise to marry the abovesaid Vridhambal and that is why, the Courts below have held that Srinivasan Padayachi v. Parvathi Ammal (62 L.W. 411) is not applicable to the present case. 3. However, the learned counsel for the appellant formulated before me the following three submissions:— (1) Ex. B.1 cannot be held to be a document executed in lieu of promise to marry the abovesaid Vridhambal and that is why, the Courts below have held that Srinivasan Padayachi v. Parvathi Ammal (62 L.W. 411) is not applicable to the present case. 3. However, the learned counsel for the appellant formulated before me the following three submissions:— (1) Ex. B.1 is a valid document since it was not a settlement without consideration, but actually with consideration. (2) Since all the existing coparceners of the family were the transferors under Ex. B1 and since the above said Manickam Pillai, one of the transferors therein, though a minor at the time of Ex. B1 was represented by his natural guardian and fathetvthe abovesaid Murugeasam Pillai, the s aid Ex. A1 is valid. In this connection he relied on the decisions in Arunachala Pillai v. Sampurnathachi (27 M.L.J. 485), Patrachariar v. Srinivasachariar (I.L.R. 40 Madras 1122) and Venkoba Sah v. Ranganayaki Ammal (AIR 1936 Madras 967 = 44 L.W. 483). (3) In view of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Vendors of Ex. A6 should have been held to have good title. 4. Regarding the first submission, I am unable to see how Ex. B.1 could be considered as a document for consideration, I have already mentioned that it was given in lieu of maintenance for the abovesaid Vridhambal. The transferors under Ex. B.1 do not get anything in return for themselves executing the said document in favour of the abovesaid Vridhambal. It is clear that it is only a transfer without any consideration and hence only a gift. Under Hindu Law, normally a gift of coparcenary immovable property could be made by a coparcener only for pious purposes or to a daughter and that too in reasonable limits. 5. But, it has to be considered whether Ex. B1 could held to be valid on the basis of the abovesaid second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. No doubt, this line of argument was not advanced in the Courts below and the Courts below also have not considered this aspect. But, if the said argument relates to a pure question of law, there is no bar for me to consider the same in this Second Appeal. No doubt, this line of argument was not advanced in the Courts below and the Courts below also have not considered this aspect. But, if the said argument relates to a pure question of law, there is no bar for me to consider the same in this Second Appeal. No doubt, this is not one of the substantial questions of law framed by this Court at the time of the admission of this Second Appeal. Even then, there is no bar for me to consider the said question since it is purely a question of law and a specific ground to that effect, viz. , ground No. 6 has also been raised in the memorandum of grounds of this Second Appeal. 6. No doubt, the learned Counsel for the respondents sought to argue that it was a mixed question of fact and law. I am unable to see how a factual question is also involved therein. It is obvious that it is a pure question of law. 7. The abovesaid decisions 27 M.L.J. 485, I.L.R 40 Madras 1122 and A.I.R. 1936 Madras 967 = 44 L.W. 483 and also Kuppuswami v. Perumal (A.I.R 1964 Madras 291 D.B.) and T. Venkata Subbamma v. T. Rattamma (A.I.R 1987 S.C. 1775) support the abovesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. No doubt, these decisions reiterate the principle that even where one coparcener makes a gift of the family property with the consent of all the Other than existing coparceners, the gift is valid. But, in the present case, no consent is necessary since admittedly all the then existing coparceners, viz., the 1st defendant, his father and brother were the excutants of Ex. A1 settlement. No doubt on the date of Ex. B1 one of the abovesaid persons viz., the 1st defendants brother was a minor. But, he was represented by his natural guardian, and father, Murugesan Pillai. Therefore, there is proper representation of the abovesaid minor executant also. Further, the said minor also did not subsequently challenge the validity of Ex. B1 in so far as his share in the family property. No doubt the learned Counsel for the respondent argues that it is borne out by Ex. Therefore, there is proper representation of the abovesaid minor executant also. Further, the said minor also did not subsequently challenge the validity of Ex. B1 in so far as his share in the family property. No doubt the learned Counsel for the respondent argues that it is borne out by Ex. B2 mortgage deed executed by the 1st defendant in 1947 that a partition took place in 1944 between the 1st defendant and his abovesaid minor, brother, relating to the suit property and other properties and that the factum of the said partition would show that the abovesaid minor brother had impliedly challenged the settlement under Ex. B1 in so far as his share. I am unable to accept this contention. First of all no deed has been produced showing the abovesaid partition of 1944, though there is reference in Ex. B.2 about the factum of the above said partition thus: Tamil This only shows the factum of the abovesaid partition. Even regarding that, it is stated in Ex. B2 that the said partition was through unregistered written document. That apart, the recitals of the said written document is not known. While so it cannot be said that by virtue of the said partition, the abovesaid 1st defendants brother challenged Ex. B.1 settlement in so far as his share in the suit property is concerned. Therefore, on this ground I have to hold that Ex. B.1 is valid. 8. Just to reiterate what has been held in the abovesaid decision cited, I may point out some observations in some of those decisions. In A.I.R. 1936 Madras 967 (D.B) ( supra ), which no doubt related to a will, one executed a will bequeathing certain property to his daughter with the consent of his brother, B, the sole surviving coparcener, and mortgaged the property. In the abovesaid circumstances, the Division Bench held that B, by his will, was deliberately disposing the properties in favour of his daughter and the said will having been executed with the consent of the only other coparcener B, who was the only person at that time that would be adversely affected by it, was enforceable as a family settlement or arrangement and that therefore the claim of the daughter should prevail over that of the mortgages. The said decision followed the abovesaid decision 40 Mad 1122. The said decision followed the abovesaid decision 40 Mad 1122. In A.I.R. 1964 Madras 291 (supra), which also relates to a case of Will, it has been held that if all the coparceners of a joint family agree and consent, a will executed in respect of a share of one member of the joint family, can be given effect to as a family settlement. The Supreme Court also has held in the abovesaid A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1775 as follows: “It is, however, a settled law that a coparcener can make a gift of his undivided interest in the coparcenary property to another coparcener or to a stranger with the prior consent of all other coparceners. Such a gift would be quite legal and valid.” Therefore, the abovesaid Ex. B1 settlement is valid on the abovesaid ground. 9. However, the learned Counsel for the respondents argues that Ex. B.1 should be held to be invalid in view of another reason, viz., that the gift there in was not accepted by the donees and acted upon. No doubt S. 122 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donees for its validity. The learned counsel for the respondents contend that since the original settlement deed Ex. B1 was only filed by the 1st defendant and the plaintiff filed only the registration copy thereof, Ex. A1, it is clear that the donor 1st defendant retained the original title deed with himself despite the execution of Ex. B1. But, on that ground alone, it cannot be held that there is no acceptance by the donees in the present case, if really possession of the gifted property was handed over to the donees. No doubt, the said counsel argues that possession was not so handed over pursuant to Ex. B1, but it continued to remain only with the 1st defendant But, I find that there are documents filed by the plaintiff which would show that possession was with Vridhambal subsequent to Ex. B1. These documents are (1) Ex. A2 dated 5.1.1963, a registered lease deed executed by Vridhambal for herself and as guardian of her abovesaid minor daughter in favour of one Arumugham Pillai relating to the suit property. (2) Ex. A4 dated 24.12.1969, another registered lease deed executed by the said Vridhambal in favour of one Ranganatha Padayachi, (3) Ex. B1. These documents are (1) Ex. A2 dated 5.1.1963, a registered lease deed executed by Vridhambal for herself and as guardian of her abovesaid minor daughter in favour of one Arumugham Pillai relating to the suit property. (2) Ex. A4 dated 24.12.1969, another registered lease deed executed by the said Vridhambal in favour of one Ranganatha Padayachi, (3) Ex. A5 dated 30.9.1973, another registered lease deed executed by the same Vridhambal in favour of the said Ranganatha Padayachi. (4) Ex. A7 to A13 list receipts with reference to the suit property, for Vridhambal paying the list between the period 1970 and 1974. 10. No doubt, as against these documents, the 1st defendant has filed (1) Ex. B2 dated 17.10.1947, the registered usufractuary mortgage deed executed by him in relation to the suit property in favour of the Natesa Mudaliar (2), Ex. B.3 dated 20.10.1947, a registered lease deed executed by the abovesaid mortgagee Natesa Mudaliar in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of the suit property and (3) Ex. B.6 dated 2.5.1979, a registered lease deed executed by the 1st defendant in respect of the suit property. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, these documents would show that the 1st defendant was in possession of the suit property. But, 1st defendant is only the husband of Vridhambal and he has also deposed as D.W. 1 that there was no enmity between him and her and that Ex. B1 property was looked after by him. So, simply because Ex. B2 and Ex. B6 were executed by him, it cannot be contended that possession was with him in his individual capacity. 11. That apart, this most important thing is D.W. 1 does not depose at all that the gift under Ex. B1 was not accepted by his wife Vridhambal. On the other hand, he deposed on cross-examination as follows: Tamil This shows that Ex. B1, even as per D.W. 1 is a valid document and it cannot be now argued that there was no acceptance of Ex. B1. gift deed. Further, there is also no merit in the argument that Ex. B1. was not acted upon since I do not find any legal sanction for any such contention. 12. B1, even as per D.W. 1 is a valid document and it cannot be now argued that there was no acceptance of Ex. B1. gift deed. Further, there is also no merit in the argument that Ex. B1. was not acted upon since I do not find any legal sanction for any such contention. 12. The third submission of the learned Counsel for appellant based on S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, will not be available at all to the appellant since there was no such plea at all. If title has to be traced through a different source, there should be a specific plea and it is settled law that relief cannot be grated if it is not founded on pleadings. Therefore, there is absolutely no merit in this submission. 13. Anyway, since the abovesaid second submission of the appellants counsel if accepted, the Second Appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed with costs throughout.