JUDGMENT S.R. Singh 1. The above mentioned writ petitions arise out of a proceeding under section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of plot nos. 19/2/1, 61/2, 19/2/2, 19/2/3 areas 0.343, 0.178, O 040, O015 and O 104 acre respectively, which are situate in village Tilakpur, Pargana Gopalpur, Tahsil Sagari, District Azamgarh. 2. In the basic khatauni petitioners Achche Lal, Vishwanath and others were recorded as tenure holders of these plots, Dallu. Ballu and Shiv Pujan were recorded in the basic khatauni in varg-9 over plot no. 19/2/1 area 0.343 acre and plot 61/2 area O.178 acre. Both these plots as also plot no. 19/2/2 area O 040 acre and plot no. 19/2/3 area O 015 acre were recorded in the bhumidbari khata of Achche Lal and others in the basic khatauni. But plots no 19/2/2 and 19/2/3 ware found on the spot as abadi during field to field partial Plot No. 91/2 area O 104 acre was recorded in the sirdari khata of petitioners Achche Lal and others. In their objection under section 9-A (2) of the U.P.C.H. Act Dallu Ballu and Shiv Pujan sons of Charittar claimed that they acquired sirdari right in respect of plot nos. 19/2/1, 61/2 and 91/1 by adverse possession while in respect of plot nos. 19/2/2 and 19/2/3 they claimed ownership on the ground that they have got their abadi over these plots and accordingly they prayed that the names of Achche Lal and others be expunged from the revenue papers and their names be recorded therein. 3. The recorded tenure holders Achche Lal and others contested the objection filed by Dallu, Ballu and Shiv Pujan and asserted their own right, title and interest in the plots in dispute. Their case was that Charittar, the father of Dallu was in unlawful occupation over the plot no. 19/2 area, 398 acre and plot no 61/2 area O.178 acre. A suit for his ejectment was filed under section 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) on 7-5-1960 with the allegation that Charittar, the defendant in the suit had entered into forceful possession of the suit land in August, 1366- F i.e. 1958 The suit was decreed by the trial court on 10-9-1963. An appeal against the said decree was filed by Charitar, who died during the pendency of the appeal and Dallu, Ballu and Shiv Pujan were substituted in his place. The appeal was dismissed on 1-5-1967 and the decree dated 10-9-1963 passed by the trial court was affirmed. In the mean time the decree holders had moved an application for execution of the decree on 12 4-1966 and the objection filed by Dallu. Ballu and Shiv Pujan against the application for execution on 18-6-1966 was rejected and the execution Court allowed the execution application vide order dated 26-6-1967 and directed delivery of possession over the plots which were the subject matter of the decree. It is alleged that the possession was delivered to them on 3-7-1967. In view of these facts it was alleged by Achche Lal and others that Dallu and others had no claim in respect of these plots. As regards plot no 91/1 the objection filed by Dallu and others was opposed on the ground that a suit under section 229-B of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 was decided in their (Achche Lal and others) favour before the commencement of the Consolidation proceedings in the village and the decision had become final between the parties. 4. The parties adduced their evidence before the Consolidation Officer, who dismissed the objection filed by Dallu and others vide order dated 20-2-1969. Appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 6-6-1969. The revision purporting to be on behalf of Dallu, Ballu and Shiv Pujan though filed with the signature of Ballu alone was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 9-4-1970. A writ petition it being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3658 of 1970 filed against the aforesaid orders was rejected summarily by the High Court vide order dated 29-9-1970. Petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected by Division Bench vide order dated 3-3-1976. Dallu, the petitioner in writ petition No. 21502 of 1989, preferred a revision on 8-2-1973 against the appellate order dated 6-6-1969 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing the revision. Dallu, the petitioner in writ petition No. 21502 of 1989, preferred a revision on 8-2-1973 against the appellate order dated 6-6-1969 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing the revision. His case was that he was living in Bombay and had no knowledge of the appellate order or the revisional order as also the order passed in the writ petition referred to above. Though the writ petition purported to have been filed by all three brothers but according to Dallu he was unaware of it and never authorised, in fact he could not have authorised being ignorant of the revisional order, any one to file writ petition on his behalf. 5. The Deputy Director or Consolidation refused to condone the delay and dismissed the revision as barred by time vide order dated 3-10-1977. Dallu then preferred a writ petition it. being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1648 of 1977 which was allowed by order dated 4-10-1983. The order dated 3 10-1977 dismissing the revision as barred by time was quashed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation was directed to examine the claim of the petitioner Dallu for condonation of delay in preferring the revision petition afresh in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment dated 4-10-1983. Thereafter the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and condoned the delay in preferring the revision vide order dated 15-12-1986 and after hearing the parties on merits the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision in part vide order dated 11-38-1989. The petitioner Dallu was held to be bhumidhar of plot no. 19/2/1 area .343 acre and plot no 61/2 area .178 acre and names of the recorded tenure holders were ordered to be expunged. Plot no. 19/2/2 and plot no. 19/2/3 were ordered to be recorded as abadi of the petitioner Dallu after expunging the same from the khata of the petitioners Achhe Lal and others. As regards plot no. 91/1 area .104 acre the Deputy Director of Consolidation maintained the basic year entry and upheld the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation, 6. The petitioners Achche Lal and others have filed writ petition no. As regards plot no. 91/1 area .104 acre the Deputy Director of Consolidation maintained the basic year entry and upheld the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer Consolidation, 6. The petitioners Achche Lal and others have filed writ petition no. 20236 of 1989, thereby impeaching the order dated 15-12-1986 whereby the delay in filing revision by Dallu was condoned as also the order dated 11-8-1989 passed on merits in so far as it is against them in respect of plots no 19/2/1, 19/2/2, 19/2/3 and 61/2. Dallu on the other hand has preferred the other writ petition it being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21502 of 1989 impeaching the order dated 11-8-1989 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in so far as it is in respect of plot no. 91/1. Mr. Sripat Narain Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Achche Lal and others and Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing In amicus curiae for the petitioner Dallu, were heard at some length. The Original records of the Consolidation Courts and that of the suit u/Sec. 209 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 were also perused. Learned counsel for the petitioners Achhe Lal and others urged; (1) that Dallu being one of the applicants in the revision which was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 9-4-1970 and one of the petitioners in writ petition No. 3658 of 1970 which was dismissed summarily vide order dated 29-9-1970, was not entitled to file revision afresh against the same very order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 6-6-1969 and that in any event he would be bound by the revisional order dated 9-4-1970 on the principle contained in Order 31 rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure in as much as the revision preferred by his brothers being his co-sharers would be deemed to have been filed for his benefit as well. Reliance was placed upon a decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 AWC 895 ; (2) that in execution of the decree for eviction passed in suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 relating to plot no. Reliance was placed upon a decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 AWC 895 ; (2) that in execution of the decree for eviction passed in suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 relating to plot no. 19/2 (398 acre) and 61/2 (178 acre) possession was delivered to the decree holders on 3-7-1967 and the same having become final between the parties they were bound by it and the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in holding otherwise; and (3) that the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation holding Dallu as owner of the abadi over plots no. 19/2/2 and 19/2/3 was without jurisdiction in as much as the Consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question as to the ownership of abadi plot. 7. Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner Dallu in writ petition No. 21502 of 1989, who happens to be contesting respondent in writ petition filed by Achhe Lal and other refuted the submission made by Mr. SRIpat Narain Singh and urged that : (1) Dallu had no knowledge of the appellate order dated 6-6-1969 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and he was not party to the revision which was dismissed on 9-4-1970 nor he was a party to the writ petition No. 3658 of 1970 and as such neither the order dated 9-4-1970 passed by the Deputy Director of ' Consolidation nor the order dated 29-9-1970 summarily rejecting the writ petition would come in his way and that in any event he was entitled to get his claim examined on merits in view of the order dated 4-10-1983 passed in writ petition no. 1648 of 1977, Dallu v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh and others preferred against the order dated 3-10-1977 dismissing his revision as barred by time; (2) the trial court's decree dated 10-9-1963 merged in the appellate decree dated 1-5-1967 and it was the appellate decree which was capable of being executed and not the trial Court's decree and therefore the execution of the trial court's decree after it merged in the appellate decree is to be treated as; non-est and void and has to be ignored. Reliance was placed upon a full bench decisions of this Court in Shobrat Singh v. Bridgmen, ILR 4 Alld. Reliance was placed upon a full bench decisions of this Court in Shobrat Singh v. Bridgmen, ILR 4 Alld. 376 and Muhamrfia Sulaiman Khan v. Mohammad Yar Khan ILR 11 Alld. 267; besides Lonan Kutti v. Thoman, AIR 1976 SC 1645 and Jaisraj v. Hemraj, AIR 1977 SC 1011 ; (3) the revenue court's decree for eviction dated 1-5-1967 having not been executed at all, the decree holders lost their right, title and interest in plot no. 19/2 area .398 acre and plot no. 61/2 area 178 acre, which were subject matter of ejectment suit and the petitioner Dallu acquired sirdari right under section 210 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951; (4) the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in so far as it relates to plot no. 91/1 area. 104 acre is patently erroneous inasmuch as the petitioner Dallu had acquired sirdari right by adverse possession under section 210 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and the Judgment of suit under section 229-B of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 was of no avail to the petitioners Achche Lal and others: and (5) Achche Lal and others having contested the revision on merits after the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation condoning the delay in preferring the revision by Dallu and having succumbed to the order of this Court in writ petition no. 1648 of 1977, are now estopped by principle of constructive res judicata from pleading that Dallu is bound by the order dated 9-4-1970 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the order dated 29-9- 1970 passed by the High Court. 8. So far as eviction decree in suit under section 209 is concerned, it was in respect of the then plot no 19/2 area .398 acre and plot no 61/2 area .178 acre. It is evident that the entire area of all the sub-divisions of plot no, 19, as recorded in the basic khatauni, was the subject matter of eviction suit along with plot no. 61/2. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that if it is found that the eviction decree was executed, the judgment debtors would have no claim in respect of plot no. 61/2. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that if it is found that the eviction decree was executed, the judgment debtors would have no claim in respect of plot no. 19 area .398 acre plot no 61/1 area 178 acre and if it is found that the decree for eviction was not executed, the decree holders would lose their rights by virtue of section 210 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951, which provides that if a suit for eviction is not filed against a person in unlawful occupation without consent of the tenure holders within the statutory period of limitation or if the decree for eviction is not executed within time, the tenure holder's right would extinguish and the person in unlawful occupation would acquire sirdari right. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has held that the decree for eviction was not executed and that the dakhalnama on which reliance was placed by the petitioners Achhe Lal and others was not genuine, The original record of the suit for eviction was summoned by me and the perused in presence of the parties' counsel. It is evident from the record that parwana for dakhal-dehani was issued on 15-6-1966 and the Kurk Amin was directed to put the decree holders in possession and return the dakhalnama by 30-6-1966 Dakhalnama on record indicates that Dakhal was given on 3-7-J967. Though it is difficult to hold that Dakhalnama is 'furgy' or not genuine as held by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the question that requires consideration is as to whether it can be ignored as void and non-est 9. In Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986 , while interpreting rules 24 and 25 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that the execution of the decree has to be completed by the date specified in the process issued for this purpose and that the warrant for delivery of possession cases to be executable after expiry of the date fixed for execution. The warrant for delivery of possession dated 15-6-1966 referred to above required the delivery of possession to be effected by 30-6-1966, In the instant case delivery of possession is said to have been effected on 3-7-1987 on the basis of the warrant of delivery for possession dated 15-6- 1966. The warrant for delivery of possession dated 15-6-1966 referred to above required the delivery of possession to be effected by 30-6-1966, In the instant case delivery of possession is said to have been effected on 3-7-1987 on the basis of the warrant of delivery for possession dated 15-6- 1966. Such a delivery of possession to my mind, is non-est and void having been effected otherwise that in accordance with law i.e. rules 24 and 25 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure which were attracted by virtue of section 341 of the U P. Act No 1 of 1951. The warrant for delivery of possession having ceased to be operative after 30-6-1966, the delivery of possession in pursuance thereof would be non-est and void. 10. The execution of decree for eviction has to be ignored also on the ground that the trial Court's decree merged into the appellate decree dated 1-5-1967 and therefore it lost its entity and ceased to be capable of execution after the appellate decree dated 1-5-67 came into existence as a result, of the appellate judgment upholding the judgment and decree of the trial court. Execution of a non-existant decree is no execution in the eye of law for the purpose of section 210 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951 In Shobrat Singh v. Bridgman, ILR 4 Alld. Execution of a non-existant decree is no execution in the eye of law for the purpose of section 210 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951 In Shobrat Singh v. Bridgman, ILR 4 Alld. 376, decided by a Full Bench of this Court the question referred was, "where a suit is heard in first or second appeal and a decree is passed, is the decree of the Court of last instance the sole decree which is capable of execution, or may the specifications contained in the decree; of the Lower Court or Courts be referred to and enforced by the Court to which the application for execution has been made, "ft was held by the Full Bench that the "appellate decree is the final decree, and the only decree capable of being executed after it has been passed, whether the same reverses, modifies, or confirms the decree of the Court from which the appeal is made", but in case where "the decree of the lower Court with all its specifications, is simply affirmed by, and adopted in, the decree of the last appellant Court, it would then be open to the Court executing such last decree to refer to the decree of the lower Court for information as to its particular .contents." 11. Full Bench decision in Shobrat Singh's case (supra) was considered in Goverdhan Das v. Gopal Ram, ILR 7 Alld. 366 and it was held that "the effect is nothing more than that the last decree is to be regarded as the decree to be executed, whether it reverses, modifies or confirms but when it affirms and adopts the mandatory part of the first Court's decree, that decree may be and should be referred to, and the mandatory part of it so affirmed should be executed as though it was the decree of the appellate court." 12. The Full Bench decision in Shobrat Singh's case (supra) was considered by later Full Bench in Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Knan, 11 ILR 267 and it was observed by Edge, C.J. ; "I fail to see how a decree which has been superseded can be executed. Even apart from authority, it appears to me that the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate Court, whether that decree reverses, modifies or affirms a decree below". Even apart from authority, it appears to me that the decree to be executed is the decree of the appellate Court, whether that decree reverses, modifies or affirms a decree below". Straight, J. was also of the same view but Mahmood, J. gave a dissenting judgment, but so far I am concerned, I feel bound by the majority view expressed in Muhammad Sulaiman Khan's case (supra) reiterating the view taken in the earlier Full Bench in Shorat Singh's case (supra). Mr. Sripat Narain Singh placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in U. P. State v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 . In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that an order of dismissal based on departmental enquiry by an Officer in the Department and an order passed by another Officer next higher in rank dismissing appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for revision by the head of the department can hardly be equated with any propriety with the decrees made in civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure by the court of first instance and the decree dismissing the appeal therefrom by an appeal court and the order dismissing revision petition by a yet higher court. Discussing the question Supreme Court observed as below; "..........in the next place while it is true that a decree of a court of first instance may be said to be merged in the decree passed on appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Munni Bai, 41 Ind. App. 104 AIR 1914 PC 65, or for computing the period of limition for an application for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jawad Hussain v. Gendan Singh, 53 Ind App. 197 ; AIR 1926 PC 93. But as pointed out by Sir Lawrace Jankins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v, Pirthi Chand Lal, 46 Ind. App. 52 ; ILR 46 Cal. 670 at pp. 678 and 679 AIR 1918 PC 151 at pp. 197 ; AIR 1926 PC 93. But as pointed out by Sir Lawrace Jankins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v, Pirthi Chand Lal, 46 Ind. App. 52 ; ILR 46 Cal. 670 at pp. 678 and 679 AIR 1918 PC 151 at pp. 152 and 153, whatever be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian Law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal." 13. In the instant case the appellate decree passed in suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 was not merely one of dismissal, rather trial court's decree was upheld and affirmed by the appellate court. Further the question is not whether the presentation of appeal against the trial court's decree had the effect of suspending or interrupting the effect of the trial court's decree, rather the question is whether the original decree was capable of execution after pissing of the appellate decree. In my opinion the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of U. P. State v. Mohd. Nooh, (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners Achhe Lal and others, According to Full Bench decision of this Court referred to above trial court's decree ceased to be executable after passing of the appellate decree, Execution, if any, on the basis of the trial court's decree has to be ignored as non est. 14. However, next question that requires consideration is as to what is the effect of defacto execution of the trial court's decree and which already merged in the appellate decree and ceased to be capable of being executed for that reason. In my opinion the delivery of possession on the basis of the trial court's decree would not arrest the ensuing of the consequence of non- execution of decree for eviction under section 210 of the U P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and accordingly nothing can prevent the judgment debtors Dallu and others from acquiring sirdari right under section 210 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. The petitioners Achhe Lal and others could acquire right if they were allowed to continue in possession for more than statutory period of limitation prescribed for a suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951, but in the instant case before they could be said to have acquired such right, the village was brought under consolidation operation as a result of Notification under section 4 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and as such continuance of possession of Achhe Lal and others thereafter would not enure to their benefits for the purposes of section 209 read with section 210 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. The next question that requires consideration is, whether the revision filed by Dallu was barred by res- judicata in view of the order dated 9-4-1970 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the order dated 29-9-1970 passed by the High Court summarily rejecting the writ petition filed against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 9-4-1970. The decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1982 AWC 895 relied upon by Mr. Sripat Narain Singh no doubt supports his contention that the revision filed by Dallu against the same very appellate order dated 6-6-1969 against which earlier revision filed by Ballu, the brother of Dallu was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 9-4-1970 was not maintainable but I am of the opinion that the petitioners Achhe Lal and other cannot be allowed to raise this plea in view of the judgment of this Court dated 4-10-1983 passed in writ petition No 1648 of 1977, Dallu v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others. In order to appreciate the question. I may quote the following passage from the said judgment : "The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has strenuously urged that the petitioner and his brothers have already lost the case upto the highest court of this country, hence it would be abuse of the process of the court to permit them to rake up the point again. I may quote the following passage from the said judgment : "The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has strenuously urged that the petitioner and his brothers have already lost the case upto the highest court of this country, hence it would be abuse of the process of the court to permit them to rake up the point again. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner had summoned the record of the writ petition in which the claim of the petitioner along with his brothers bad been negatived and it has been emphasized that Shri Sirish Prasad, a counsel of this court, had appeared on behalf of the petitioner and his brothers in the writ petition, hence the petitioner's claim has been negatived and it is not a fit case where interference should be made with the impugned judgment." X X XX XX "I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the contesting opposite party Ram Kumar and I have also examined the record of the writ petition in which allegedly the claim of the petitioner along with his brothers, stands negatived. It is noteworthy that a vakalatnama on the record in favour of Shri Sirish Prasad in writ petition No. 3658 of 1970 exists but the signature of the petitioner on the vakalatnama appears to be doubtful. In the presence of the counsel of the: opposite party I have got the signature of the petitioner on blank papers and also thumb mark of petitioner's brother Ballu and I direct that the aforesaid paper be kept under the sealed cover and it may not be lost hereafter. In the circumstances of this case I am not prepared to account the contention that the petitioner's claim has been negatived by the higest court of this country. It will depend upon the materials to be brought before the revisional authority in this connection. Prima facie the signature on the vakalatnama in favour of Shri Sirish Prasad does not tally with the signatures of the petitioner on the blank paper which has been directed to be kept under sealed cover." The Court went on the hold further ? It will depend upon the materials to be brought before the revisional authority in this connection. Prima facie the signature on the vakalatnama in favour of Shri Sirish Prasad does not tally with the signatures of the petitioner on the blank paper which has been directed to be kept under sealed cover." The Court went on the hold further ? "On the allegations for condonation of delay in preferring the revision petition by the petitioner, the question arises whether the petitioner knew the order of the appellate court and whether the petitioner had already appeared before this Court or was represented in the highest court and these questions would be a matter to be examined hereafter. For the time being it is enough that the impugned order of the revisional authority, as indicated above, suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed and the opposite party shall get all opportunities to lead evidence and put forward his claim before the revisional court hereafter. As I have indicated above that the petitioner does not appear prima facie to have been represented in the earlier litigation, hence it would be proper for the revisional authority to re-examine the claim of the petitioner for condonation of delay in light of the materials on record or the materials to be brought by the parties on record hereafter. I am not prepared to accept at this stage on the materials before me that the petitioner had litigated earlier and had lost his claim. However, my observation would not be treated as final and the revisional authority would re- examine the claims of the parties in the light of the evidence before it" 15. It is evident from the aforesaid decision between the parties that the plea raised on behalf of the petitioners Achhe Lal and others as to the binding character of the earlier decision of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 9 4-1970 and that of the High Court dated 29-9-1970, was not accepted by the High Court, though it was left open to be considered in the light of the material to be produced before the Deputy Director of Consolidation as observed in the judgment dated 4-10-1983. In fact the material was brought before the Deputy Director of Consolidation so as to prove that Dallu was one of the petitioner in the earlier revision and the writ petition decided on 9-4 1970 and 29-9-1970 respectively. The contention based on the decision of this Court in Ram Chander's case (supra) has been negatived in view of the observation made by this Court to the effect that "in the circumstances of the case I am not prepared to accept the contention that the petitioner's claim has been negatived by the highest court of this country." I would be sitting in appeal over the judgment of this court in writ petition no. 1648 of 1977, If I take a contrary view and hold that even if Dallu was not a signatory of the revision and the writ petition decided on 9-4-1970 and 29-9-1970 respectively, his claim is barred by the principle contained in Order 41 rule 4 of the Coda of Civil Procedure as held in Ram Chander v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1982 AWC 895 It is settled proposition of law that one Judge can not sit in appeal over the judgment of another Judge of the concurrent jurisdiction The judgment dated 4-10-1983 being the judgment between the parties, is binding upon them. The point which could have been raised in support of the plea that the revision preferred by Dallu was not maintainable, if not raised or if raised but negatived can not be allowed to be raised again by virtue of the principle of constructive res-judicata The petitioners Achhe Lal and others could no doubt have overcome the difficulty by adducing evidence and material before the Deputy Director of Consolidation as observed fey this Court in its judgment dated 4-10-1983 to prove that the writ petition No. 1648 of 1977 was filed by Dallu and others but no effort was made before the Deputy Director of Consolidation to prove that the writ petition No. 1648 of 1977 was filed under the instruction of Dallu. 16. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that so far as plots no. 16. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that so far as plots no. 19/2/1, 61/2, 19/2/2 and 19/2/3 are concerned, right, title and interest of Achche Lal and others in these plots extinguished under section 210 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951 and the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in respect of these plots does not call for any interference even if it be held that the Consolidation Courts had no jurisdiction to adjudicata the question of title with regard to abadi plots no. 19/2/2 and 19/2/3. The Deputy Director of Consolidation himself has observed that the Consolidation Courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicata upon the question of ownership with regard to abadi land. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has in fact decided the case in favour of Dallu on the basis of the Civil Court's judgment. Although according to Civil Court's judgment on record abadi of Dallu was found to be on a portion of these plots, but as held above these plots were included in the then plot no. 19/2 area .398 acre, which was subject matter of suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951 and since I have held that Dallu acquired right by adverse possession on account of non-execution of the decree for eviction, the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in respect of these plots call for no interference. This brings me now to the dispute with regard to plot no. 91/1 area .104 acre which was recorded in the sirdari khata of Achhe Lal and others in the basic khatauni This plot was not subject matter of suit under section 209 of the U. P. Act No 1 of 1951 referred to herein before though it was subject matter of another suit under section 229-B of the U. P. Act no 1 of 1951, which was decided in favour of Achhe Lal and others. 17. As regards plot no. 17. As regards plot no. 91/1 area .104 acre, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has held as under : Jaha tak gata sankhya 91/1-104 ka sambandh hai iske samband men chunk i dhara 209 ka koi bad nahi la aur nigrani karta dhara 229-B ka bad bar chuka hai atha is kanto par nigrani karta ko koi adhikar diya jana uchit nahi hai aur is kante ke sambandh me adhar barsh pratishti purvat rahegee. 18. The suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 in respect of plot no. 91/1 filed by Achhe Lal and others was decreed on 5-4-1965, but it appears from the earlier judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that Charittar was held to be in adverse possession of the said plot since 1365-F as would be evident from paragraph 5 of the judgment dated 9-4-1970 which may be quoted as below : "As regards plot not. 91/1, it is borne out from the records that the opposite party had filed a suit u/Sec. 229-B, which was decreed in their favour on 5-4-1965. This order has become final. As regards the claim of adverse possession, the applicants have tiled extract from 12 years khasra in which the possession of Charittar, their father, is recorded since 1365-F. The name of the applicant has come to be recorded under class 9 since 1371-F. There is no evidence that their posses ion started prior to 1365-F. Since the suit u/Sec 209-filed by the opposite party was within limitation, the opposite party cannot get sirdari rights by virtue of their illegal possession." The relevant portion of the impugned order extracted herein before suggests that the suit in respect of plot no. 91/1 was one for declaration and not for ejectment while the earlier order dated 9-4-1970 of Deputy Director of Consolidation as extracted above suggests that it was a suit for declaration and ejectment. 91/1 was one for declaration and not for ejectment while the earlier order dated 9-4-1970 of Deputy Director of Consolidation as extracted above suggests that it was a suit for declaration and ejectment. If it was a suit for declaration sure and simple without there being any relief for possession even in the alternative and Charittar and after his death Dallu are found to be in adverse possession, since 1365-F, as held by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in his order dated 9-4-1970 and their possession continued uninterruptedly for more than the statutory period of limitation, the right, title and interest of the recorded tenure holders would extinguish and the one in adverse possession would acquire right under section 210 of the UP. Act No 1 of 1951, and if a relief for possession was also sought in the suit under section 229 B then it has to be seen whether the decree was executed in time and if not executed, whether the limitation had run out on the date of notification u/Sec. 4 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. These questions haves not at all been examined by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Therefore the impugned order in so far as it relates to plot no. 91/1 is, in my opinion, vitiated by error of law. 19. In view of the above discussion the writ petition No. 20236, of 1989, Achhe Lal and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others is dismissed while the writ petition no. 21502 of 1989, Dallu v. Consolidation Officer and others is allowed. The impugned order dated 11-8-1989 in so far as it relates to plot no. 91/1 is quashed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation shall decide the revision in so far as it relates to the aforesaid plot afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. Petition dismissed.