ORDER S.K. Chawla, J.-- 1. Three young lawyers of this Court have filed this petition for initiating contempt of Court proceedings, against an Officer occupying the post of Director General of Police and another, a newspaper Editor. 2. This is not a motion by " any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General" in terms of Clause (b) of section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is not even stated that Advocate General was approached to give consent. The petition can at best be treated as information to this Court to take suo moto action. If it is information, as it can be nothing else, it was wrong on the part of the lawyers to have styled themselves as petitioners and to show the alleged condemners as non-petitioners. The Supreme Court in P.N. Duda v. P. Shivshankar, (1988) 3 SCC 167 in paragraph 54 of the report has approved of the directions given by Delhi High Court in such matters. The information even though lodged in the form of a petition, inviting the High Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution, should not, if the informant is not one of the persons named in section 15 of the said Act, be registered as a petition and should not be placed for admission on the judicial side. On the other hand, such a petition should be placed before the Chief Justice for orders in chambers and the Chief Justice may decide either by himself or in consultation with the other Judges of the Court whether to take any cognizance of the information. The proper title of such a proceeding should be " In re.........(the alleged contemnors)." The present petition having been, however, filed and also entertained, it may not be proper to dismiss it on the above point of procedure. 3. It is stated in the petition that in the issue of daily Dainik Bhaskar dated 15.9.1992, non-petitioner no.2 Shri Ramesh Chand Agarwal, the Chief Editor of the paper, published a news item under the caption "HAMARI NYAYIKA PRAKRIYA DOSH PURNA HAI -- RATHORE", meaning thereby that our judicial process/ system is defective. It is stated in the news item that non-petitioner no.1 Shri K.S. Rathore, the Director General of Police, M.P. while discussing. It is stated in the news item that non-petitioner no.1 Shri K.S. Rathore, the Director General of Police, M.P. while discussing. with the journalists at Gwalior told them inter alia that the main defect of our judicial process system is that significance is not attached in the Courts to the statements of Police Officers, although the Investigating Officer in the case happens to be none other than Police Officer. The news item was published as Annex.1. Its extract is given below: nSfud HkkLdj fnukad 15 flrEcj 1992 gekjh U;kf;d izfØ;k nks'kiw.kZ gS & jkBksj uxjizfrfuf/k Xokfy;j 14 flrEcj 1 e/;izns"k iqfyl ds egkfuns"kd —‘.kflag jkBksj us vkt i=dkjksa ls ppkZ djrs gq, dgk fd gekjh U;kf;d izfØ;k nks'kiw.kZ gS blfy, iqfyl }kjk fxj¶rkj fd, x, lHkh vijkf/k;ksa dks ltk ugha fey ikrh ,d loky ds tcko esa mUgksaus dgk fd gekjh U;kf;d izfØ;k dk izeq[k nks'k ;g gS fd iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa ds c;ku dks U;k;ky; esa egRo ugha fn;k tkrk tc fd eq[; vuqla/kku drkZ ogh nsrk gSA mUgksaus dgk fd vijk/kh dh fxj¶rkjh ls U;k;ky; rd igqapus ds fy, chp dh izfØ;kvksa esa Hkh [kkeh gS ------------------------------ e/; izns"k esa dbZ vkradoknh fxj¶rkj fd, x, gSA Xokfy;j "kgj dh dkuwuh O;oLFkk ds laca/k esa mUgksaus dgk fd ---------------------------- mudk iz;kl jgsxk fd os bl {ks= esa tYnh lqfo/kk,a iqfyl dks eqgS;k djk,¡A e/;izns"k esa uDlyh xfrfof/k;ksa dh ppkZ djrs gq, dgk fd ------------------------- iqfyl cy esa 600 vkj{kd vkSj c<+k, x, gSA ftUgsa vk/kqfudre gfFk;kj fn, tk jgs gSA It is stated in the petition that the already mentioned statement and caption in the news item, shown by underlining in the above extract, were contemptuous and had lowered the reputation and dignity of the Courts in the minds of general public. They also amounted to influencing the Courts and were interference with the course of justice giving an impression that the Courts reject the evidence of Police Officers without properly scanning the same and adopt a defective procedure with a view to let off accused persons. The contempt proceedings be, therefore, initiated against both the non-petitioners. 4. "Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." -- said Lord Atkin in Ambar v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago in 1936 A.C. 322, (335). The contempt proceedings be, therefore, initiated against both the non-petitioners. 4. "Justice is not a cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." -- said Lord Atkin in Ambar v. Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago in 1936 A.C. 322, (335). Administration of justice and Judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Such criticism should in fact be welcomed, so long as it does not impair or hamper the administration of justice or does not lower the respect for the judiciary or destroy public confidence in it. But there should not exist any wrong impression, if such exists, that denigrating or decrying a particular judge may amount to contempt but general criticism, howsoever vile, malicious or spiteful of the Judicial system as such, can never amount to contempt. 5. The case of E.M. Sankaran Namboodribad v. T.N. Nambiar in (1970) 2 SCC 325 was a case of criticism of Judicial system as such. Shri Namboodripad was the Chief Minister of Kerala and in a press conference had made critical remarks relating to' the judiciary, which inter alia was described by him as "an instrument of oppression and the Judges as "dominated by class hatred, class prejudices", "instinctively" favouring the rich against the poor. He also stated that as part of the ruling classes the judiciary "works against workers, peasants and other sections of the working classes" and " the law and the system of judiciary essentially served the exploiting classes." Shri Namboodripad claimed that his observations did no more than give expression to the Marxist philosophy and what was contained in the programme of Communist party of India. By a majority judgment of the Kerala High Court, Shri Namboodripad was convicted for contempt of Court and fined Rs.1,000/-, or simple imprisonment for 1 month. In appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Shri Namboodripad. It was observed by the Supreme Court that the law punished not only acts which did not in fact interfere with the Courts and administration of justice but also those which had that tendency, that is to say were likely to produce that result. Judged from that angle, there was no doubt, it was observed, that the criticism made by Shri Namboodripad had that tendency and amounted to contempt of Court. It was further observed that Shri Namboodripad had misunderstood the. Judged from that angle, there was no doubt, it was observed, that the criticism made by Shri Namboodripad had that tendency and amounted to contempt of Court. It was further observed that Shri Namboodripad had misunderstood the. teachings of Mark and Engels or had deliberately distorted them. The likely effect of his words had to be seen and they clearly had the effect of lowering the prestige of Judges and Courts in the eyes of the people. It was irrelevant that he might not be intending that result. That would be a matter for consideration in the' sentence to be imposed on him but could not serve as a justification for contempt. 5-A. Another case in which general criticism of the judiciary came to be considered was the decision in P.N. Duda v. P. Shivshankar and others reported in (1988) 3 SCC 167 . In that case Shri P. Shivshankar, who was at the relevant time Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, delivered speech at a Seminar on "Accountability of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary under the Constitution of India" organised by the Bar Council of Hyderabad on November, 28, 1987. He stated in his speech that the Supreme Court was composed of elements from the elite class; that because the judges had their 'unconcealed sympathy for the haves' they interpreted the expression 'compensation' in the manner they did; that because of this the word 'compensation' in Article 31 was interpreted contrary to the spirit and the intendment of the Constitution and that the Constitution therefore had to be amended by the 1st, 14th and 17th Amendments to remove this 'oligarchic' approach of the Supreme Court with little or no help. Shri P. Shivshankar also referred to Holmes Alexander's column entitled 9 Men of Terror Squad' making a frontal attack on the functions of the U.S. Supreme Court and posed a question "how true Holmes Alexander's was in the Indian context?" He further stated in his speech that twenty years of valuable time was lost in this confrontation• presented by the judiciary in introducing and implementing basic agrarian reforms for removal of poverty but "What is the ultimate result". The removal of the Maharajas and Rajas and privy purses were criticised because of the view taken by the Supreme Court which according to Shri P. Shivshankar was contrary to the whole national upsurge. The removal of the Maharajas and Rajas and privy purses were criticised because of the view taken by the Supreme Court which according to Shri P. Shivshankar was contrary to the whole national upsurge. Then he made reference to Kesavananda Bharati and Golaknath cases and observed that a representative of the elitist culture of this country, ably supported by industrialists and beneficiaries of independence, got higher compensation by the intervention of the Supreme Court in Cooper case, (1970) 1 Sec.248. Shri P. Shivshankar ended by saying: " the antisocial elements i.e. FERA violators, bride burners and whole horde of reactionaries have found their haven in the Supreme Court." . 6. The Supreme Court held that the speech of the Minister had to be read in its entirety. The Minister was making a study of the attitude of the Supreme Court. Such a study perhaps was important for the understanding of the evolution of the Constitutional development. Whether the criticism made in the speech against the Supreme Court was right or wrong was another matter but such criticism was permissible in a free society. In some portions of the speech the language used could have been avoided by the Minister, having the background of being a former Judge of the High Court. The Minister perhaps could have achieved his purpose by making his language mild but his facts deadly. But the speech read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administration of justice into disrepute or impair administration of justice. In that view it was held that the Minister was not guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court. 7. It will thus appear that so far as criticism of the Judicial system is concerned, if the same is made in a manner designed to lower respect for the judiciary and destroy public confidence or is designed to bring administration of justice into ridicule or to hamper Administration of Justice, it is contempt of Court. The likely effect of criticism has to be seen and if the words have the effect of lowering the prestige of Judges and Courts in the eyes of the people, it is contempt of Court. The contemnor cannot then be heard to say that he did not intend that kind of result. That may be a matter for consideration in the sentence to be imposed on him but cannot serve as a justification for the contempt. The contemnor cannot then be heard to say that he did not intend that kind of result. That may be a matter for consideration in the sentence to be imposed on him but cannot serve as a justification for the contempt. But if the criticism is fair and reasonable, it is protected by the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the first clause of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Such reasonable criticism in fact must be encouraged because it is after all by heeding to criticism that the defects in a system come to light and attempt can be made to remove them. The fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the first clause of Article 19(1) of the Constitution is not an unfettered right but is subject to reasonable restrictions given in the second clause of that Article; namely, that among other things, it should not amount to contempt of Court. 8. Coming to the present case, the Director General of Police, Shri Rathore is said to have criticised the judicial process system as defective in which the main defect, according to him, was that due importance was not given to statements of Police Officers made in Courts even though the Investigating Officer of the case happens to be none other than Police Officer. This is the kind of criticism which hardly has any tendency to lower the respect of the people in the Judiciary or to destroy public confidence in it. The criticism, if at all, gives food for thought. Are Police Officers unduly disbelieved in cases merely because they happen to be Police Officers? Do the Courts expect a higher standard of proof when the case turns on the evidence of a Police Officer? Even the Apex Court had to enter a caveat and had to remind the Courts about proper approach in cases involving evidence of Police Officers. The following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 40 of the decision in Raja Khirna v. State of Saurashtra in AIR 1956 SC 217 are pertinent: "The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not a judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds there for. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration." 9. We are dearly of the view that the criticism which the Director of Police, Shri K.S. Rathore is said to have made about the Judicial process or the system was well within limits, and no case at all is made out for initiating contempt proceedings. In the circumstances, the petition is summarily dismissed.