This civil revision is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.9.84 passed by the Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar, Silchar in Title Appeal No. 127 of 1978 allowing the appeal and Reversing the judgment of the Munsiff No. 2, Silchar passed in Title Suit No. 244 of 1975 dismissing the plaintiff suit. 2. The predcessor-in-intrest of the first to third opposite party Late Kajal Chandra Paul alongwith fourth to seventh opposite party brought a suit in the Court of Sadar Munsiff (Title Suit No. 244 of 1975) against the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, Late Jagtish Chandra Paul, praying for a decree for recovery of khas possession of the premises described in the schedule of the plaint by evicting the defendants and also for recovery of rent etc. The defendant Late Kajal Chandra Paul contested the suit; filed written statement. During the pendency of the suit, Jagat Chandra Paul, one of the plaintiffs, as well as Kajal Chandra Paul, the defendant died and the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff Jagat Chandra Paul and defendant Kajal Chandra Paul were brought on the record. The plaintiff filed the suit on the ground that the defendant was a tenant and he became a defaulter. Besides, the plaintiffs also required the suit house for their own use. After recording the evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendant, the Munsiff dismissed the suit holding that the defendant was not a defaulter and also there was no bonaftde requirement of the suit house by the plaintiffs. 3. Against this judgment and decree the plaintiff filed an appeal (Title Appeal No. 127 of 1978) in the Court of the Assistant District Judge. After hearing the parties, ADJ allowed the appeal answering the issue No.5 i.e. bonafide requirement of the suit house by the plaintiff, in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. The Assistant District Judge, however, rejected the ground of defaulter and answered the issue in favour of the defendants. Hence, the petitioners have filed this present revision petition against the appellate judgment of the Assistant District Judge. 4. This revision petition was admitted on 4.3.85 and was pending for disposal. On 19.12.91 the opposite party filed a petition informing the Court about the subsequent events that had taken place, viz. Hence, the petitioners have filed this present revision petition against the appellate judgment of the Assistant District Judge. 4. This revision petition was admitted on 4.3.85 and was pending for disposal. On 19.12.91 the opposite party filed a petition informing the Court about the subsequent events that had taken place, viz. the suit premises alongwith other houses adjoining to it was completely burn down by fire on the night 15.2.91, and the suit house let out to the defendants (tenants) was completely destroyed and, therefore, the relationship of the landlord and tenant in respect of the demised house came to an end and the tenancy existed between the petitioners and opposite party stood determined by the doctrine of frustration as envisaged under section 56 of the Contract Act and also under section 108 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act (in short the of Act). Therefore, the opposite party prayed for dismissal of the suit without going to the merit of the petition. 5. Against the said petition, the petitioners have not filed any counter, controverting the averments made in the said petition. On the other hand, the counsel for the petitioner has admitted that the suit house was gutted by fire that broke out on 15.2.91 causing material destruction of the house. 6. The questions in this revision petition now require for determination are: First, whether after the destruction of the shop house by fire, the relationship between the landlord and tenant existed hereinbefore came to an end and tenancy automatically determined or not. Secondly, wither the suit premises are required by the platntiff/opposite party for their own, use and occupation? 7. I have heard both sides Mr. B.K. Das learned, counsel for the opposite party has submitted' that the suit was decreed by the trial Court and the said decree was affirmed by the first appellate Court and there being no further appeal, the tenancy was determined by the said decrees. Filing of the present revision will not Change the position in any way, more so, as the suit house was completely burnt down by the. said fire and with the destruction of the suit house the tenancy stood determined. Mr. Das has further submitted that the suit house having been destroyed the contract regarding tenancy that existed between the landlord and tenant was frustrated as envisaged under section 56 of the Contract Act. Mr. said fire and with the destruction of the suit house the tenancy stood determined. Mr. Das has further submitted that the suit house having been destroyed the contract regarding tenancy that existed between the landlord and tenant was frustrated as envisaged under section 56 of the Contract Act. Mr. Das has also drawn my attention to the provision of section 108(e) of the TP Act and has tried to show that as the entire suit house was burnt down in the said fire, there is no question of exercising the option by the tenant as contained in the said section 108(e) of the TP Act. Mr. Das has further submitted that even if the revision petition is allowed the petitioner cannot have any right to continue in possession on the land, on which the demised house stood as it ceased to exist now. Therefore, the petition deserves dismissal. 8. Mr. D.N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the contention of Mr. Das. He has submitted that doctrine of frustration as envisaged under section 56 of the Contract Act is not applicable in the instant case. The frustration of a contract is contemplated in an executory type of contract. But in the present case, it is a transfer of interest by way of lease of the suit property and not mere contract and, therefore, the doctrine of frustration is inapplicable. 9. On the rival contentios of the counsel of the parties, it is to be seen whether destruction of the shop house by the fire, the tenancy is determined? On perusal of the pleading as well as from the finding of the courts below it appear that the landlord leased out the shop house to the tenant Now the question is what the 'shop house' means. Does the shop house denote the structure of the shop house, viz. roof, wall, doors, window or does it also include the land on which the structure of the shop house stood. There was no specific averment by the landlord that only the shop room without the land on the shop room stood actually let out there was also no plea of the landlord that the land under the shop house was specifically excluded from the lease by express of words or by necessary implication 10. There was no specific averment by the landlord that only the shop room without the land on the shop room stood actually let out there was also no plea of the landlord that the land under the shop house was specifically excluded from the lease by express of words or by necessary implication 10. Question of applicability of the doctrine of frustration came up for consideration, in Simper vs. Coombs, (1948) 1 All ER 306, Mrs. Simper was a tenant of a house near Victoria Docks, London. The house was then struck by a flying and was practically demolished. Mrs. Simper was injured and she was taken to a rest centre and later to the North of England where she was under medical treatment. Latter on she returned and was accommodated in a requisitioned house. Throughout this time she paid no rent for the house, she however, hoped to resume her tenancy of the house, which the landlord bad begun rebuilding in 1915, but she did not succeed in doing so because as soon as it wad rebuilt the landlord himself occupied it. Therefore, she brought action claiming that her tenancy was never deter mined-and that she ought to be treated as tenant of the premises in the said case. Lord Denning, J., held thus : ''... The position at common law is plain. She had a contractual tenancy, and, that tenancy has never been determined by due notice to quit. It, therefore, continues in existence. The destruction of the house by a bomb did not determine the tenancy. It is well settled that the destruction of a house does not by itself determine the tenancy of the land, on which it stands. That was realised at the beginning of the recent war, and so in the Landlord the Tenant (War Damage) Act, 1939, there was a number of elaborate provisions dealing with the position when houses were damaged by enemy action, and an elaborate system was prescribed by the Act whereby a tenant could give a notice of disclaimer, which, if accepted, would mean the surrender of the lease disclaimed, or a notice of retention. If he gave a notice of retention, there was no rent payable while the house remained unfit for occupation, but he still remained tenant. He retained the land .." 11. If he gave a notice of retention, there was no rent payable while the house remained unfit for occupation, but he still remained tenant. He retained the land .." 11. The essential of the doctrine of frustration is based is that of impossibility of performance of the contract, when there occurs a changed circumstances which make the performance of the contract impossible and parties are absolved from the further performance as they did not promise performance of impossibility. This doctrine comes into play when a contract becomes impossible of performance after it made, on account of circumstances beyond control. This doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or a part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of impossibility. 12. The applicability of this doctrine of frustration came up for consideration in the Courts of England. The House of Lords held that case of building lease, by interruption for a time by war would not frustrate the tease. However, the house was divided on the question - whether doctrine of frustration could apply to a lease. The decision of Court of Appeal was however, that the doctrine of frustration would not apply to a lease. 12 A. In Raja Dhrar Dev Chand vs. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024 , the Supreme Court held that by its express terms, section 56 of the Contract Act does not apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer. A covenant under a lease to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. But on that account the transfer of property resulting from the lease granted by the lessor to the lessee is not declared void. By section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act the chapters and sections which relate to contracts are to be taken at part of the Contract Act, 1872. That section however does not enact and cannot be read as enacting that the provisions of the Contract Act are to be read into the Transfer of Property Act. There is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer. Under a lease of land there is a transfer of right to enjoy that land. There is a clear distinction between a completed conveyance and an executory contract, and events which discharge a contract do not invalidate a concluded transfer. Under a lease of land there is a transfer of right to enjoy that land. If any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let out, because of fire, tempest, flood, violence of an army or a mob, or other irresistible force, the lease may, at the option of the lessee, be avoided. The frustration may however occur when the entire-demised house became non-existent. Say for instance, when building with land is swallowed by river or sea, but mere destruction of the house is not enough to say demise - house has become non-existent. 13. Regarding the frustration of contract in India, the Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose vs. Mngneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 1954 SC 44 , held thus : “…. We hold, therefore, that the doctrine of frustration is really an aspect or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 of the Indian Contract Act. It would be incorrect to say that section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to cases of physical impossibility and that where this section is not applicable, recourse can be had to the principles of English law on the subject of frustration. It must be held also, that, to the extent that the Indian Contract Act deals with a particular subject, it is exhaus­tive upon the same and it is not permissible to import the principles of English law 'dehors' these statutory provisions. The decisions of the English Courts possess only a persuassive value and may be helpful in showing how the Courts in England have decided cases under "circumstances similar to those which have come before our Courts...” 14. In Ghanshiam Das vs. Debi Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 1998 . The decisions of the English Courts possess only a persuassive value and may be helpful in showing how the Courts in England have decided cases under "circumstances similar to those which have come before our Courts...” 14. In Ghanshiam Das vs. Debi Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 1998 . the Supreme Court while finding out the meaning of house or building observed as follows: "...The word 'building' has not been defined in the Act and must, therefore, be constructed in its ordinary grammatical sense unless there is something in the context or object of the statute to show that it is used in a special sense different from its ordinary grammatical sense. In the Websters New International Dictionary the word "building" has been defined as follows: "That which is built specif: (a) as now generally used a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less perman­ently and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, store house, factory, shelter for beasts or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding or similar structure though designed for permanent use where it boat ship or other vessel of navigation". On the basis of the natural meaning of the word building as observed by the Supreme Court in Ghanshiam Das (supra) is not only the super structure of the building but also includes the site on which the building stands. 15. Following the meaning of the building as held by, the English Courts as well as by the Supreme Court, the meaning of the word `building' includes site of the building which is an integral and inseparable part of it. Without the site the structure of the shop room on the land cannot normally, exist, therefore, when a shop room is letout for occupation such lease would also normally take the site unless the site is specially excluded from the lease. From the above, it will appear that in a case where a shop house is let out it will include ordinarily the land on which the shop house existed. 16. This Court had also the occasion to discuss a similar matter in Rajendra Nath Sarma vs. Kamdhin Kajbhor, AIR 1971 A&N 160. From the above, it will appear that in a case where a shop house is let out it will include ordinarily the land on which the shop house existed. 16. This Court had also the occasion to discuss a similar matter in Rajendra Nath Sarma vs. Kamdhin Kajbhor, AIR 1971 A&N 160. In the said decision a Division Bench of this Court held that the doctrine of frustration as contained in section 56 of the Contract Act is inapplicable in. case of lease as this doctrine only applies to a contract. In the said case, the defendant occupied the house standing on the suit land. The said house was gutted by fire. The defendant instead of surrendering the land constructed his own house on the land in spite of protest and continued to occupy, and hence the plaintiff brought the suit. In the said case, this Court has held that simply because a material portion of the property, viz. the house was wholly destroyed it cannot be automatically determined unless the lessee exercises his option on that ground. Thus it is for the lessee, who can avoid the lease under such circumstances and that being the position, there was no determination of the lease which was subsisting on the date of the institution of suit. This Court further held that it is open to the plaintiff to choose whether they should take action for eviction of the tenant as required under the law. 17. In a recent decision the Kerala, High Court in George J. Ovungal vs. Peter, AIR 1991 Kerala 55, took a, similar view. In the said decision the Court held that super structure of the shop room alone cannot the subject matter of the tenancy and that by destruction of the shop room, the tenancy in respect of the said shop room would not automatically determine the lease and put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant. Even after the destruction of the super structure of the shop room, the tenant is entitled to continue in possession of the land upon which the super structure of the shop room stood before its destruction, as part of the property demised subject to all the rights and liabilities as a tenant. 18. Even after the destruction of the super structure of the shop room, the tenant is entitled to continue in possession of the land upon which the super structure of the shop room stood before its destruction, as part of the property demised subject to all the rights and liabilities as a tenant. 18. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that, with destruction of the shop house the tenancy does not come to an end, Inasmuch as the shop house alone is not a demised property. The demised, property not only includes the shop house, but also the land on which the, structure of the shop house stood and that being so, there cannot be any determination of tenancy. Therefore, I find that there is no force on the contention of Mr. Das in this regard, and accordingly the submission fails. 19. The next point urged by Mr. Das is that the lower appellate Court after having considered all the aspect of the matter, held that the plaintiff actually required the suit premises. There is nothing wrong in the said finding and therefore this Court may not interfere with the finding. 20. Mr. Choudhury has submitted that the lower appellate Court reversed the finding on the issue of "bonafide requirement" by taking into considera­tion of some extraneous and irrelevant factors. The decision of the appellate Court on this issue was not a real decision, but a purported decision. He has further submitted that the Court below while coming to the finding in respect of the said issue failed to follow the guidelines given by this Court in various decisions. The appellate Court without first determining as to whether there was genuine need of the suit house by the plaintiff, answered the said issue in favour of the plaintiffs thout such finding the Court below had no juris­diction to grant decree for eviction as envisaged under section 5 (1)(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (for short the Act). 21. From the observations of the lower appellate Court it appear that the defendants were carrying on business on the suit house since 1950. The father of the plaintiff (PW 1) also carries on his own business in a house contiguous to the suit house. The plaintiff (PW 1) and his father ace jointly engaged in carrying on the said business. From the observations of the lower appellate Court it appear that the defendants were carrying on business on the suit house since 1950. The father of the plaintiff (PW 1) also carries on his own business in a house contiguous to the suit house. The plaintiff (PW 1) and his father ace jointly engaged in carrying on the said business. They have been carrying on this business since several years. However, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal granting a decree for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement holding that the plaintiff's son should be given opportunity to start his own business. 22. From the discussions of the learned Assistant District Judge in respect of the said issue, it does not appear that the plaintiffs had proved that they had requisite finance to start a new business and there is also no evidence that the plaintiffs had taken steps for starting a fresh business to show the bonafide requirement of the suit house by the plaintiffs. In order to show the bonafide requirement of the suit house by the plaintiffs for running the busi­ness it is the duty of the plaintiffs to prove their financial capability and that they were taking various steps for starting the business. But that itself is not sufficient to show the requirement of the suit premises is bonafide. The plaintiffs are required to prove something more than that The expression "bonafide requirement" containing in section 5(1)(c) of the Act must be understood with reference to the evidence adduced by the landlord as to the bonafide character of his/their requirement. 23. Bonafide requirement of the landlord should be genuine and honest conceived in good faith and the Court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. The landlord's desire for possession however, honest it might otherwise be as inevitably a subjective element in it that desire to become a requirement of law must have an objective element of a need. 24. Mr. Choudhury has placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) AIR 1974 SC 1596 (Mattulal vs. Radhelal); (ii) (1984) 1 GLR 392, (Madhurilata Devi vs. Gourapada Basak) and (iii) (1986) 2 GLR 463. Mr. 24. Mr. Choudhury has placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) AIR 1974 SC 1596 (Mattulal vs. Radhelal); (ii) (1984) 1 GLR 392, (Madhurilata Devi vs. Gourapada Basak) and (iii) (1986) 2 GLR 463. Mr. Das has placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) (1977) 1 SCC 3 (Giridhar Das vs. District Judge, Varanasi), (ii) (1984) 1 GLR 392 (Madhurilata Devi vs. Gourapada Basak) and (iii) AIR 1991 SC 1760 (Gulabbai vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra & others). 25. Relying on these decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that while granting a decree for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement as contained under section 5(1)(c) of the Act, the Court must first be satisfied from the evidence on record that there is genuine need for the suit house by the landlord. Besides, the hardship of the tenant is one of the relevant factors to be considered by the Court. In Satyendra Chandra, Gupta (supra) this Court has held thus:- "... even if the question of comparative hardship be non-examinable while deciding a case covered by the provisions of the Act, a Court of law may not be able to shut its eyes if an order of eviction is to result in throwing a tenant out of his occupation...". In Muttulal vs. Radhelal (supra) the Apex Court held that mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he would require accommodation in occupa­tion of the tenant for the purpose of Starting and/or continuing his own business is not decisive. It is for the Court to apply objective test and not a subjective one. The burden is on the landlord that he genuinely requires accommodation for the purpose of starting his business by proof. In Madhurilata Devi & others (supra) this Court held that a vague assertion of expansion of business is not enough. In the said case the plaintiff (landlord) did not specify the manner of expansion of business. No docum­entary evidence was adduced to establish that the landlord genuinely and honestly required the shop. Therefore, the Court rejected the claim of bonafide requirement. In Giridhar vs. District Judge; Varanasi (supra) the Apex Court held that comparative hardship of the landlord as well as the tenant should be taken into account. No docum­entary evidence was adduced to establish that the landlord genuinely and honestly required the shop. Therefore, the Court rejected the claim of bonafide requirement. In Giridhar vs. District Judge; Varanasi (supra) the Apex Court held that comparative hardship of the landlord as well as the tenant should be taken into account. In Gulabbai vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra (supra) the Apex Court has held that in case of events subsequent to the filing of the suit, in appropriate cases should also be looked into. In the said case the plaintiff appellant constructed a spacious bungalow where she with the members of her family had been reading, there was no bonafide requirement for the plaintiff. The decision of this case does not support the case of the opposite party herein. 26. In the case in hand, from the discussions of the first appellate Court, it is clear that the plaintiffs have already a business by the side of the shop house where his son, PW 2, is also engaged. Their claim is that for expansion of business they have to start another shop in the suit house. From the ratio of the decisions cited above, it is the duty of the landlord to prove by adducing evidence that he requires the premises bonafide to get a decree for eviction. But before granting a decree the Court has to consider the compa­rative hardship of the tenant who will be thrown out of his business etc. It is evident that the petitioner- defendants are carrying on their business on the suit premises since 1950 and the said business is the only source of their livelihood. Besides, there is also no evidence on record to show that actually the plaintiff or any of them had the financial capability to start a new business and they for that purpose took necessary steps such as, obtaining permission from the authorities concerned. Even such proof is not enough. Mere statement of the plaintiff that the suit house is required by them for starting a business cannot entitle them to get a decree under the law, mere desire to take possession of the house is not a bonafide requirement. Even such proof is not enough. Mere statement of the plaintiff that the suit house is required by them for starting a business cannot entitle them to get a decree under the law, mere desire to take possession of the house is not a bonafide requirement. Further in the event of granting a decree for eviction the hardship of the defendant will be immense in view of the fact that they are carrying on their business on the shop house, since 1950 and that business is the only source of their livelihood and that they have no other place t o go and start a business a new. 27. In view of the above. I am of the opinion that the learned lower appellate Court without considering these aspects of the matter hid no jurisdiction to grant decree for ejectment. Therefore, I hold that the judgment and decree dated 20.9.84 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge No. 2, Cachar, Silchar, in Title Appeal No. 127 of 1978 cannot be sustained in law and I, therefore, set aside the same and dismiss the suit. In the result the petition is allowed with cost throughout.