ORDER 1. The controversy raised in this petition is whether an employee, whose services were terminated prior to July 30, 1976, i.e., prior to amendment of Section 62(i) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short, the 'Act'), can institute the proceedings even after lapse of period of one year, the period prescribed for commencing the proceedings, without first approaching the Labour Court in the manner prescribed. 2. Counsel beard. 3. After hearing counsel, we are of the opinion that the bar of limitation imposed by M.P. Ordinance No. 12 of 1976, does not apply to an employee, whose services were dispensed with prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance and who made an application for reinstatement after the Ordinance came into force, as before the incorporation of the period of limitation, no limitation was prescribed; therefore, the vested right of an employee to approach the Labour Court in the manner provided and during the time prescribed prior to July 30, 1976, cannot be taken away by necessary implication by the ; proviso so added, by amendment, to Section 62(i) of the Act, which is the settled view of this Court, See Somsingh v. M.P.S.R.T.C., 1980 MPLJ 211, Dwarkasingh v. The Industrial Court, M.P. and Ors., 1989 M.P.S.L.R. 981 (D.B.). 4. Coming to the question of approach, Section 62(i) of the Act, as it stood prior to its amendment vide M.P. Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 1976, provided that an employee desiring a change would commence the proceedings in relation to an industrial dispute falling under Clause (a) of paragraph (A) of Sub-section (1) of Section 61 within three months from the date of last approach under Sub-section (3) of Section 31 of the Act. 5. Section 31 speaks of notice of change. The relevant provisions of Section 31 (3) of the Act, as they stood prior to the amendment, were as follows: "31. 5. Section 31 speaks of notice of change. The relevant provisions of Section 31 (3) of the Act, as they stood prior to the amendment, were as follows: "31. Notice of change.- (3) A representative of employees or an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II or any other matter arising out of such change may make an application to the Labour Court in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such application shall lie unless the representative of employees or the employee, as the case may be, has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period." 6. A bare reading of Section 31(3) shows that it is only when application as contemplated by the proviso to Section 31(3) is made and no agreement is arrived at between the employer and the employee in respect of the change in relation to an industrial matter enumerated in Schedule II of the Act or any other matter arising out of such change, that the employee has to move the Labour Court in the prescribed manner. The proviso to the sub-section however imposes the condition that no application shall lie to Labour Court unless the employee has first approached the employer with a request of change in the manner prescribed. That is the view of this Court in General Manager M.P. S.R.T. Corporation v. Radheylal 1963 MPLJ 359 and M.P. Transport Co. Ltd. v. Gohiram. 1963 MPLJ Note 135 7. After the amendment by Ordinance, the question again was considered in case of Somsingh (supra). This Court in para 4 after quoting the two provisions, as they stood prior to amendment, observed that an employee who was dismissed from service, could file an application before the Labour Court under Section 31 (3) of the Act praying for the relief of reinstatement within three months from the date of the last approach made by an employee under Section 31 (3) of the Act; as no period was prescribed of making last approach, the period of three months prescribed in Section 62(i) of the Act was to be reckoned from the date of last approach which could be made at any time. 8. 8. In Dwarkasingh's case (supra) while considering the effect of the amendment, the Court agreed fully with the view taken in Somsingh's case (supra) and laid down that the use of the words "the date of last approach" appearing in Section 62(i) before its amendment in 1976, means that the date when approach has ended, the period of limitation prescribed thereunder would commence only after approach has thus ceased. This is also the view of another Division Bench of the Court in Chhotelal v. Factory Manager, J.C. Mills Ltd., 1981 JLJ N. 2, wherein it has been held that approach is the terminus quo to the commencement of the proceedings under Section 31(3) of the Act 9. As a result of the above discussion, we are of the view that in a case where an employee desired a change in respect of an industrial matter, the employee could commence the proceedings only in accordance with the manner prescribed in Section 62(i) and Section 31 (3) of the Act; therefore, the order of the Industrial Court deserves to be quashed to that extent. 10. From the record it is clear that the parties led evidence in respect of making last approach before commencing the proceedings, but the Labour Court did not decide the question. It is also clear that the employee had led evidence on merits of the claim. Therefore, if the petitioner/ employer desires to lead any evidence on merits of the claim or on other issues, except those of limitation and approach, an opportunity be given to it. The matter being very old, we direct the Labour Court to decide the case within three months from the date of appearance of the parties, which we fix as August 10, 1992, of which the parties have been noticed here. The Labour Court shall proceed de die in diem (from day to day) and men shall decide the case in accordance with law on all issues excepting the question of limitation. 11. The petition is disposed of. The petitioner to bear the cost of the employee. Counsel's fee Rs. 250.- is pre-certified. C.C. to parties today.