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1992 DIGILAW 67 (KAR)

GOPALA IYENGAR v. BYLA HANUMAN THAIAH

1992-02-07

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K. S. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is aggrieved by an order rejecting his application for amendment of me pleading. The revision petition is presented under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code ('cpc' for short ). ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contends that because this is an inter locutory order made in the exercise of a jurisdiction under Civil Procedure Code for amendment of the pleading, it is revisable under Section 115. Even otherwise, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, revision under Section 50 is not maintainable in view of the decision of this court in Ankaiah v M. Veerabhadrappa, reported in 1979 (1) kar. L. J. 427. In the said decision, Justice puttaswamy observed that an order which was interlocutary cannot be construed as an order falling under the said term under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act and a revision petition against the said order was not maintainable. That was a matter where, in the course of cross-examination of the landlord, counsel for the tenant asked certain questions; the owner objected to those question. The objections were overruled, and therefore, the landlord challenged the said order. It was held to be not an order eligible to be revised. ( 3 ) IN Central bank of India v Gokulchand, AIR 1967 SC 799 , the Supreme Courtwas concerned with an order rejecting an application for appointment of commissioner; from any order of the rent controller, an appeal was provided to the rent control tribunal. Tribunal held, above order was not an order against which an appeal could be filed. The Supreme Court held that right of appeal was provided by Section 38 (1) to a party aggrieved by same order which affects his right or liability. In the context of Section 38 (1), it was held the phrase "every order" did not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. At page 800, the Supreme Court held:"in a pending proceeding, the controller may pass any interlocutory orders under sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the rent control tribunal from every order passed by the controller under the act. Even an interlocutory order passed under Section 37 (2) is an order passed under the act and is subject to appeal under Section 38 (1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the rent controller refusing to set aside en ex-parte order is subject to appeal to the rent control tribunal. "this court in ankaiah's case, therefore applied the ratio of the decision in central bank's case to hold that the term "every order" in Section 50 will not cover interlocutory orders governing the procedural matters. That docs not mean, the revisionsl jurisdiction of this court under Section 115, CPC, would be attracted to such a situation. ( 4 ) IN Babu, A. V Bhaskershetty, 1982 (2) kar. Lj. 43, the question arose directlyin the manner raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner herein. In the said babu's case, the premises involved was contended as agricultural and hence the proceedings under the Rent Control Act was not maintainable; this preliminary objection was rejected by the trial court, against which a revision petition under Section 115, CPC was filed. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner in the said case that, the order under challenge being an interlocutory Order, it was not revisable under Section 50, and hence sectionl 15, CPC could be invoked. After referring to various decisions cited and the language of ihe relevant Provisions, juslice n. d. venkatesh, held at page 45:"section so has been extracted above in full. After referring to various decisions cited and the language of ihe relevant Provisions, juslice n. d. venkatesh, held at page 45:"section so has been extracted above in full. Since we are concerned with sub-section (2) only, we may nole the difference in the wordings of sub-section (2) with the Provisions referred to in the aforesaid decisions. In none of those cases we have a provision similar to sub-seclion (2) of Section 50 of the act. Under those Provisions what was provided was for an appeal "from every order or against any order or decree". But, in the instant case, "the district judge may, at any time, call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the court of munsiff. . . . . For the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. " it may be noted that the powers conferred on the dislrici judges are almost supervisory in nature. The words are of a very wide amplitude, and besides, it is not merely "any order" passed that comes within his revisional powers but also "proceeding taken" by it (the court of the munsiff), why should the district judge probe into the proceeding taken, if not, to satisfy himself, as to the legality or correctness of the same - the proceeding taken. What would these words "proceeding taken" mean in the context in which they arc used. We may note that these words arc not found in any of those clauses that had come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above. "therefore, the learned judge concluded that every proceeding can be subjected to the scrutiny of the superior court under Section 50 of the kama laka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('act for short ). ( 5 ) THEREFORE, even procedural matters and orders made there under may attractthe rcvisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of the Act, because, each of them is a "proceeding" referred in Section 50. The scope of the supervisory jurisdiction under Section 50 is thus wider than the one provided under Section 115, CPC. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, this docs not mean that, court exercising tbe jurisdiction under Section 50 should or would proceed to examine the legality or correctness of the proceeding, as and when it is challenged. The scope of the supervisory jurisdiction under Section 50 is thus wider than the one provided under Section 115, CPC. ( 6 ) HOWEVER, this docs not mean that, court exercising tbe jurisdiction under Section 50 should or would proceed to examine the legality or correctness of the proceeding, as and when it is challenged. The jurisdiction under Section 50 is equally discretionary, as Section 115, CPC. Section 50 (1) and (2) use ihe words "may" while creating the power in the high court and the district court. The court "may al any lime call for and examine. . . . . " are the relevant words, indicating the discretionary jurisdiction created by this provision under the act. To what extent this discretion should be exercised is for the court lo decide depending upon ihe facts and circumstances of the case. Unless an error or irregularity is set al right immediately, irreparable damage would resull lo the case of an aggrieved party, or the course of juslice would be gravely injured, it will be a sound exercise of jurisdiction not lo interfere with the. Proceedings pending in the trial court. Parties before ihe court fight out to have, their respective rights vindicated. Many of the interlocutory orders would not affect ihe ultimate decision al all. For example, if the appointment of commissioner is denied by the trial court, it may ultimately transpire lhat, the purpose of having ihc commissioner appointed is served by some other evidence and the ultimate decision of the court was not affected by the non-appointment of the commissioner; or, even olherwise, the parties who sought the commissioner appointed, but failed al the interlocutory stage in that regard, ultimately succeeded on merits of the case. At a particular stage of ihe trial, summoning of a witness may have been sought without success. But in the course of trial, the fact sought to be proved through thai person, may occur through some other witness, document or circumstance. ( 7 ) IT is in these circumstances, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 50it an interlocutory stage, court is entitled to consider the general principle applied by the Supreme Court, while exercising the scope of Section 115, CPC in major S. S. khanna v Bri. FJ. ( 7 ) IT is in these circumstances, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 50it an interlocutory stage, court is entitled to consider the general principle applied by the Supreme Court, while exercising the scope of Section 115, CPC in major S. S. khanna v Bri. FJ. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 , at page 501:"that is not to say that the high court is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate court and the conditions in clauses (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary : the high court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied. The interlocutory character of the Order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal, from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the high court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction," ( 8 ) THE Rent Control Act expects a speedy culmination to the litigation and therefore, trial is lo be summary. Provisions of Civil Procedure Code do not control the trial; those Provisions are looked at, only for guidance. If every interlocutory proceeding is to be revised by recourse to Section 50, delay in the completion of the trial will be inevitable. There is no reason to hold the observations of the Supreme Court in central bank's case (quoted earlier), as entirely inapplicable to the exercise of the power under Section 50 of the act. ( 9 ) THE principles stated by the supreme court in the two decisions stated above, would govern, generally, in all revisional jurisdictions. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the revision petition filed under Section 115, CPC is not maintainable. ( 11 ) IT was brought to my notice by the learned counsel for the respondent that, earlier, a revision petition was filed against the same order under Section 50 of the Rent Control Act and the said revision petition was withdrawn by the petitioner's counsel with liberty to file a fresh revision petition. ( 12 ) IN the result, the revision petition is dismissed as not maintainable. --- *** --- .