JUDGMENT On two grounds remand is made allowing two interlocutory applications. Defendant-appellants' prayer was allowed to amend the written statement and his other prayer for appointment of Commissioner for local inspection was also allowed. What is not disputed is that decree impugned in appeal was based under Clause (c) of section 12 (1) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, for short, 'The Act'. Issue No.4 was framed by the trial Court to decide it as complained nuisance was created by the tenant-defendant, respondent in the Court of appeal. The pleadings in regard to that Issue I have read. The short complaint made by the plaintiff is that under the stair case there was little space which was used by the plaintiff-landlord for storage of cement, bricks etc. When the plaintiff removed or added to the articles stored the defendant-tenant obstructed him in doing so and that was cause of nuisance. That averment in the plaint the defendant denied. However, the lower Appellate Court took the view in para 22 of the judgment that the amendment prayed was justified because defendant wanted to plead that the plaintiff did not reside in the suit premises and that the open space and also the Patore the plaintiff had sold out having accordingly no surviving interest in the space concerned. Another plea the defendant proposed to take was that there was a direct passage to the suit house from the main road and there was never any right of passage through the open space inside the house. The averments sought to be made in the written statement by way of amendment could have no relevance at all to the cause of action agitated under Clause (c) of section 12 (1) of the Act on the basis of which the impugned decree was passed. Whether there was a nuisance or not on the facts pleaded by the plaintiff himself and proved by him was the only question that was to be decided by the trial Court. Because, the plaintiff, as the law settled, is, must stand or fail on his own case. I have no doubt, therefore, that the plea for amendment in the written statement was misconceived plea and that was wrongly accepted. Because, the plaintiff, as the law settled, is, must stand or fail on his own case. I have no doubt, therefore, that the plea for amendment in the written statement was misconceived plea and that was wrongly accepted. In so far as the other prayer allowing the Commissioner's appointment is concerned for that too there was no scope because whether the acts of the tenant-defendant (appellant in the Court below) tantamounted to nuisance in law would be relatable to the pleadings and evidence adduced in support of that pleading by the parties. There was nothing for the Commissioner to discover about the existence of the space under the stair-case or about any open space in the suit house in regard to the passage. In report of plea of nuisance it was never the case of the plaintiff-respondent that there was an obstruction caused by the defendant-tenant to the user of any passage in making the case of nuisance. In deciding issue No.4 the trial Court has exhaustively dealt with evidence and confined its findings impugned to the pleadings relating to obstruction caused by the tenant-defendant to plaintiff's use of the space under the stair-case. Although objection was raised in the lower Appellate Court by the instant appellant (Plaintiff-landlord) that the appeal was not maintainable, that objection was rejected and the appeal was heard and decided and a direction was made remanding the suit for retrial. Accordingly, nothing remains in that objection to be decided afresh. The lower Appellate Court misdirected itself in making the remand for the short reason that the two interlocutory applications were wrongly allowed and that happened as the pleadings were not properly appreciated and the trial Court's decree too was not analysed. The only question to be decided by the lower Appellate Court was whether the decree passed under section 12 (1) (c) of the Act on the pleadings and evidence was sustainable or not. It was not the burden of the trial Court or indeed even of the respondent (defendant tenant) to make out a fresh case or a new case for the plaintiff-respondent that decree be passed in the alternative under Clause (0) of section 12 (1) of the Act because no such contention was pressed and indeed no cross-objection was even filed in the lower Appellate Court to claim that relief. For the aforesaid short reasons I have no doubt that the remand being improperly made for retrial on misconceived grounds, the impugned order passed in the appeal is not sustainable in law. Times without number it has been reiterated that remand is an exceptional course and efforts the appellate Court must-make to decide on merits appeals within the scope of challenge agitated in the appeal to the decree impugned. The appellate Court is not supposed to enlarge the scope of appeal and embark on fresh inquiry itself or direct such an inquiry to be made by the trial Court to protect litigation. For all the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed and the remand is set aside. The appeal shall be taken back on file and decided on merits. Records shall go down at once and counsel shall appeal in the lower Appellate Court on 3.3.1992. In the Court of IInd Addl. District Judge, Gwalior, the appeal shall be heard and decided there afresh.