JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. - In the proceedings initiated by Respondent No. 3 u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 seeking release of the residential accommodation in dispute which was under the tenancy of the Petitioners the application for which was filed in the year 1984. the Prescribed Authority Respondent No. 2 vide its judgment and order dated 8-8-86, while allowing the said application granted one month's time to the tenant Petitioners to vacate the premises Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority releasing the accommodation in dispute, the Petitioners filed an appeal u/s 22 of the aforesaid Act which was dismissed by the appellate court, Respondent No. 1 vide the judgment and order dated 12-4-89 where under the order passed by the Prescribed Authority was upheld. 2. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the Petitioners have now approached this Court seeking reversal of the impugned orders. The landlord-Respondent No. 3 has put in appearance in the case and has filed a counter-affidavit. The Petitioners have, in reply, filed a rejoinder-affidavit. Besides, the aforesaid affidavits, the Petitioners have filed a supplementary rejoinder affidavit and in reply thereto a supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the landlord. On 19-7-89 the counsel for the parties had jointly stated that they agreed that the writ petition may be heard and finally decided at the admission stage. 3. When this case was taken up on 22-4-92 the counsel for the parties have again jointly requested that this case be decided finally at the admission stage. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case in which the writ petition may be finally disposed of at this very stage under the second proviso to Rule 2(1) of the Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court. 4. It is admitted to both the parties that the landlord was employed in the Ministry of Railway, New Delhi and was residing in a government accommodation provided to him in a public building He had to retire from the post held by him on 31-3-85 and on account of the secession of his employment he had to vacate the aforesaid public building which he had got in connection with his service in Ministry of Railways. It is admitted to both the parties that the Respondent No. 3 has retired from the government service and that during the pendency of the appeal before Respondent No. 1 he had vacated the public premises after retirement. 5. The application for release in the present case, had been filed by the Respondent No. 3 seeking benefits available u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Before Respondent No. 1 two questions had been raised by the Petitioners which were as to whether the Respondent No. 3 was the owner/landlord of the property in dispute and whether the application u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act no XIII of 1972 was a malafide one. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has, in support of this writ petition, urged the aforesaid two questions before me and has tried to assail the findings recorded by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The counsel for the Respondent, however, has asserted that on the concurrent findings recorded by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 which findings are duly supported by the evidence which is on the record, no ground has been made out for any interference by this Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary supervisory jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. I have heard Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners as well as Sri B.D. Mandhyan learned Counsel for the landlord at some length and have carefully perused the record. 8. The Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding to the effect that the Respondent No. 3 was the owner/landlord of the accommodation in dispute and that there was no such evidence available on the record which could lead to an inference that the decree passed in Original Suit No. 472 of 1984 had been obtained in a fraudulent manner or on the basis of some misrepresentation. It may be pointed out that it was admitted to the Petitioners that the premises in dispute exclusively belonged to Smt. Kaushalya Devi, the mother of the Respondent No. 3. Original Suit No. 472 of 1984 bad been filed by Respondent No. 3 against Mst. Kaushalya Devi wherein it had been asserted that his father had expired on. 22-9-80 and after his death it had been mutually settled amongst all the three persons viz. Original Suit No. 472 of 1984 bad been filed by Respondent No. 3 against Mst. Kaushalya Devi wherein it had been asserted that his father had expired on. 22-9-80 and after his death it had been mutually settled amongst all the three persons viz. the Respondent No. 3 his father and Smt. Kaushalya Devi that the premises in dispute which formed a separate unit exclusively belonged to Respondent No. 3 and any other member of the family had no right or concern therewith. In the suit the Respondent No. 3 had sought for a declaration to the effect that he was the owner and landlord of the separate unit of the premises in dispute. This suit was decreed on the basis of a compromise. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority upholding the compromise decree passed in Original Suit No. 472 of 1984 was upheld by the appellate court Respondent No. 1. The appellate court has further recorded a finding on an appraisal of evidence on record that the Respondent No. 3 was the exclusive owner/landlord of the property in dispute, the information whereof was duly communicated to the Petitioners. The findings recorded by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and the question relating to the genuineness of the compromise decree and that the Respondent No. 3 was the exclusive owner/landlord of the premises in dispute are findings on questions of fact arrived at after appraisal of evidence. These findings do not suffer from any such infirmities which may justify any interference therein. 9. Counsel for the Petitioners has further contended that the application u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 filed by the Respondent No. 3 was not maintainable. In this connection it has been urged that during the pendency of the appeal before the Respondent No. 1 Smt. Kaushalya Devi had expired on 31-12-88. The effect of this death was that succession to the right, title and interest of Smt. Kaushalya Devi was opened on the said date and since she had died intestate, the Respondent No. 3 along with the other descendants of Smt. Kaushalya Devi became entitled to a share in the building exclusively owned and possessed by Smt. Kaushalya Devi which was situated in the City of Meerut. 10. 10. The assertion of the counsel for the Petitioners is that in the about eircumstances the Petitioners got a share in a residential accommodation at least with effect from 31-12-88 and in this view of the matter an alternative residential accommodation became available to the Respondent No. 3 so as to preclude the application of Section 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The assertion further is that the benefits available under the aforesaid provision could not, under the law, be extended to a landlord who had an alternative residential accommodation available to him which could be utilised for residential purposes after his retirement or secession of employment which necessitated the vacation of the accommodation provided to such an applicant. 11. During the pendency of this writ petition the Petitioner tried to bring on record certain allegations of fact which according to him could not be brought to the notice of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The facts in this connection have been stated in the rejoinder affidavit and in the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. It is not disputed that these facts according to the Petitioners disclosed that a residential accommodation situated in the Union Territory of Delhi had become available to Respondent No. 3 during the pendency of the appeal in the court below. 12. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that the new evidence reference to which was made in the rejoinder affidavit and the supplementary rejoinder affidavit should be taken into account while deciding this writ petition as an additional evidence on the question relating to the availability of the alternative residential accommodation to the Respondent No. 3. The Petitioners, therefore, sought to assail in this writ petition the findings recorded by the Respondent authorities on the question of the availability of the alternative residential accommodation to the Respondent No. 3 on the basis of the facts which have been stated in the rejoinder-affidavit and the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. 13. The further question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether while deciding a writ petition exercising supervisory jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India any additional evidence could be allowed to be brought on record and considered. 14. 13. The further question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether while deciding a writ petition exercising supervisory jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India any additional evidence could be allowed to be brought on record and considered. 14. A Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Udai Bhan Singh alias Babban Singh v. Board of Revenue U.P. 1974 RD 107 while relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh and Another Vs. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1445 and in the case of Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. Vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1598 held that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not a continuation of the suit or proceeding giving rise to it. It further held that if a writ petition is not a continuation of the original suit or proceeding unlike an appeal or revision the inference is not only reasonable but inevitable that the orders passed in the original suit or proceeding or in an appeal or revision arising there from do not merge in the orders passed in such petition. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Rameshwar and Others Vs. Jot Ram and Another, AIR 1976 SC 49 has observed as follows: In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 this Court dealt with the adjectival activism relating to post institute circumstances. Two propositions were laid down. Firstly, it was held that 'it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suit or institutes the legal proceeding. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date of action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right cause, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The courts ' procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal Vs. Later developments cannot defeat his right cause, as explained earlier, had the court found his facts to be true the day he sued he would have got his decree. The courts ' procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action. This position finds support in Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (1971) 1 SCC 34 After making the aforesaid observations the Supreme Court observed that where the nature of the relief as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair that the relief is mouled varied or reshaped in the light of updated facts. 16. It has further been observed that the subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. 17. It was clarified that conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. 18. The court in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Union of India 1977 AWC 440 , had observed that while deciding a writ petition it has only to be seen if the judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from any manifest error of law. Subsequent events particularly which require to be ascertained on evidence, cannot be taken into account for holding that the District Judge had committed any manifest error of law in the circumstances of the case. 19. The question here is not about taking into consideration any event which had come into existence subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The question is about taking into account certain facts which had come into existence much before the filing of the writ petition and had not been brought to the notice of the Respondent authorities. 20. 19. The question here is not about taking into consideration any event which had come into existence subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The question is about taking into account certain facts which had come into existence much before the filing of the writ petition and had not been brought to the notice of the Respondent authorities. 20. Taking into consideration the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above and further taking into consideration the decision of the Full Bench referred to above there is no escape from the conclusion that additional evidence to assail the findings returned by the competent authority in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction in any proceeding cannot be allowed to be utilised as an additional evidence in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21, It may further be stated that the Court in its decision in the case of Rang Lal v. Lilawati AIR 1929, Alld. 375 held as follows: In second appeals decision of fact cannot be impugned. It is clear that this evidence is tendered in order to impugn a question of fact. I hold that it would be useless for this Court to accept the evidence for the purpose for which it is tendered and I further hold that it cannot... It was further observed that- ...Where a party wishes to produce further evidence affecting a matter of fact it must get that evidence produced before a Court which can decide a question of fact. It is useless for him to tender that evidence before a court which is confined to question of law.. 22. In the case of Muni Lal and Others Vs. Prescribed Authority and Others, AIR 1978 SC 29 , the Apex Court had observed thus: ...Where the High Court has refused to interfere with the finding of fact we cannot find fault with the High Court. Even if the findings were wrong on the evidence before the Court, it is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority... 23. Even if the findings were wrong on the evidence before the Court, it is not for the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion which may be different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority... 23. In the case of Bal Swaroop Srivastava v. Additional District Judge 1980 UP RCC 58, this Court observed thus: ...The Court in certiorari jurisdiction sends for and examines the record for this purpose. Obviously an order of the Court or Tribunal below cannot develop a jurisdictional error apparent because of subsequent happenings.... The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that findings of fact cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If a finding on the question of fact cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Rang Lal v. Lilawati (supra) there can be no justification for permitting additional evidence being brought on record. Moreover in the present case no application has been filed for bringing on record any additional evidence. What has been asserted is that new facts which have been stated in the rejoinder affidavit and the supplementary rejoinder affidavit may be treated to be additional evidence and be taken into consideration as such. 24. In the facts and circumstances, therefore, the oral request made by the counsel for the Petitioner for taking into consideration the new facts alleged in the rejoinder affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit which do not fall within the category of subsequent events and are facts which according to the Petitioner himself had come into existence much before the filing of the writ petition cannot be taken into account as additional evidence in the present proceedings. 25. Even otherwise, assuming that the Respondent No. 3 had succeeded in getting an alternative residential accommodation in the Union Territory of Delhi in the year 1988, this fact by itself could not be utilised to defeat the right which stood secured in favour of the Respondent No. 3 by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Much reliance has been placed by the counsel for the Petitioner on the decision in the case of Kalyan Rai Saxena v. II Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr 1982 (1) ARC 362. The implications arising under this case were considered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bhuvnesh Chandra Agarwal v. Ill Additional District Judge, Moradabad 1992 (1) ARC 207 and it was held that the alternative accommodation which can be said to be available to bar the applicability of Section 21(1-A) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 should be within the same City where the accommodation in dispute is situated U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has no application to any area outside Uttar Pradesh If the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is accepted it will lead to wholly unwarranted results The submission of the counsel for the Petitioners that the availability of the alternative accommodation irrespective of its location is sufficient for disentitling a landlord from getting any benefit available u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 cannot be accepted the location of the alternative accommodation is a very relevant factor. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is extended to its logical end it will mean that if a landlord is shown to have a residential accommodation which is situated even out side India, it will still make the provision contained in Section 21(1-A) of the U P Act No. XIII of 1972 inapplicable and such a provision cannot come to the rescue of a landlord, who satisfies the requirements envisaged therein. This could never have been intended. It is therefore, obvious that the location of the alternative accommodation has to be kept in mind before denying the benefits available to a landlord as envisaged u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. This could never have been intended. It is therefore, obvious that the location of the alternative accommodation has to be kept in mind before denying the benefits available to a landlord as envisaged u/s 21(1-A) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It may be noticed that in Explanation I to Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act no, XIII of 1972 it has been provided that no objection by the tenant against an application for release shall be entertained in case the tenant or any member of his family who had been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same City, Municipality, Notified Area or a Town area. The emphasis in the aforesaid explanation is on the availability of an alternative accommodation situate in the same City, Municipality, Notified Area or Town Area. If, for the tenant, for the availability of the alternative accommodation, the location of the alternative accommodation has been made a pirvotal factor there could be no justification for not taking the location of the alternative accommodation available to the landlord to be such a factor for denying the benefits envisaged u/s 21(1-A) of the Act. If for the tenant the availability of an alternative accommodation in a City, Municipality, Notified Area, Town Area other than that where the accommodation in dispute sought to be released is situated has been made irrelevant and the availability of such an accommodation could not deprive him from contesting the release application, there could be no justification for denying the landlord the benefits available u/s 21(1-A) of the Act on the basis of the availability of an alternative accommodation in a City, Municipality, Notified Area or Town Area other than that where the building sought to be released is situated. The view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Bhuvnesh Chandra Agarwal v. III Additional District Judge, Moradabad and Anr. (supra) is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and there is no merit in the submission advanced by the counsel for the Petitioners. 26. The view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Bhuvnesh Chandra Agarwal v. III Additional District Judge, Moradabad and Anr. (supra) is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and there is no merit in the submission advanced by the counsel for the Petitioners. 26. So far as the availability of the alternative accommodation to the landlord on account of the death of Smt. Kaushalya Devi is concerned, suffice it to say that the Respondent No. 1 has after carefully considering the facts and circumstances of the case recorded a finding that the Respondent No. 3 cannot be compelled to reside in house No. 263 as he will only become a co-sharer without actual possession and will not have any immediate right of possession in that accommodation. The Respondent No. 1 has further recorded a finding that the Respondent No. 3 had asserted in his affidavit that no portion of house No. 263 had fallen to his share. The Respondent No. 1 has further observed that there was no other evidence controverting the statement of Respondent No. 3. 27. The Respondent No. 1 has further believed the case of the Respondent No. 3 that he wanted to settle at Meerut. The Respondent No. 1 has further recorded a finding that the application filed by the Respondent No. 3 for the release of the accommodation was not a malafied one. It has been observed that the Respondent No. 3 has already retired and having vacated the public premises is passing his time waiting for the release Chandra of the property in dispute. As observed in the case of Bhuvnesh Agarwal v. III Additional District Judge, Moadabad (supra) Section 21(1-A) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 confers a right to certain landlords to recover immediate possession of the premises belonging to him which are in possession of their tenants. In the contingencies mentioned therein a right accrues to the landlord to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him for satisfying the need for a suitable residential accommodation This right is of an overriding type. 28. In the contingencies mentioned therein a right accrues to the landlord to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him for satisfying the need for a suitable residential accommodation This right is of an overriding type. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the impugned orders cannot be said to be vitiated in law on account of any such error much less manifest error of law which may warrant an interference by this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed. 30. However, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present ease, in order to enable the Petitioner to shift to any other accommodation, I think it will be in the interest of justice that the impugned order be not given effect to for a period of three months from today provided the Petitioner deposits in advance the rent for the said period within ten days. I, therefore, order accordingly. 31. There shall be no order as to costs.