JUDGMENT : P.P. Gupta, J. By this writ petition, the Petitioner, Rakesh Kumar Sharma, who is an elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Dayanatpur, Tehsil Hathras, District Aligarh, has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the suspension order dated 5-2-1992 (Annexure 15' to the writ petition and the order dated 17-2-1992 (Annexure 24') passed by the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra. 2. The Petitioner was elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha Dayanatpur Tehsil Hathras, District Aligarh in the year 1988. There were serious complaint of mal practice and mismanagement of the Gaon Sabha property against the Petitioner A show cause notice was, therefore, given to the Petitioner by the S.D.M. Hathras, District Aligarh on 8-1-1992. The Petitioner, however did not submit any reply to this notice Ultimately, by the impugned Order dated 5-2-1992 (Annexure 15') the S.D.M., Hathras, District Aligarh, respondent No. 1, suspended the Petitioner. Being aggrieved the Petitioner filed a revision before the Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, respondent No. 2. Along with the revision, an application for staying the order dated 5-2-1991. passed by respondent No. 1, was also moved After having heard the parties, the learned Commissioner rejected the said application on 17-2-1991 Annexure 21'. Feeling aggrieved from the orders dated 5-2-1992, passed by respondent No. 1, and dated 17-2-1992, passed by respondent No. 2 the Petitioner has come up in a writ petition before this Court. 3. With the consent of the parties, the petition was heard finally at the stage of admission. 4. The first submission made on behalf of the Petitioner was that no show cause notice was ever served on him. Accordingly, it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that since he has not afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order by respondent No. 1, the impugned order dated 5-2-1991 was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was now settled that in such cases of suspension of Pradhans, no opportunity of hearing need be given to them. Accordingly, it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that since he has not afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order by respondent No. 1, the impugned order dated 5-2-1991 was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was now settled that in such cases of suspension of Pradhans, no opportunity of hearing need be given to them. Unlike under Clause (g) there is no parallel provision u/s 95(1)(gg) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act to give an opportunity of hearing before passing the suspension order against a Pradhan This view has been taken in an earlier case of Salig Ram v. Collector 1985 ALJ 1267, and recently also in the case of Gopi Singh v. State of U.P. 1991 ALJ 85, Thus, I find no force in the argument that since no opportunity of hearing was given to the Petitioner, the impugned order dated 5-2-1992, passed by Respondent not was bad in law. Since, under the law, no opportunity of hearing is needed, the impugned order does not vitiate on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was given to the Petitioner before passing the impugned order. 5. The second contention of the Petitioner is that the impugned order dated 5-2-1992, passed by respondent No. 1 is not based on any prima face satisfaction on the existence of grounds under Clause (g) of Section 95(1) of the Act. 6. I have gone through the impugned order dated 5-2-1992. It is an elaborate order which mentions that serious irregularities against the Petitioner were found. Respondent No. 1 appears to be prima facie satisfied that there was mismanagement of the Gaon Sabha property. Therefore, be was satisfied that the grounds for removal of the Petitioner under Clause (g) exist. It was only after that prima facie satisfaction that the order of suspension was passed against the Petitioner. On the face of this order it cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned order has been passed without prima facie satisfaction by respondent No. 1. 7. The last submission made on behalf of the Petitioner was that there was no material before respondent No. 1 to base his prima facie satisfaction regarding the existence of grounds under Clause (g) of Section 95(1) of the Act. Suspension u/s 95(1)(gg) of the Act is passed during pendency of the enquiry against the Pradhan. 7. The last submission made on behalf of the Petitioner was that there was no material before respondent No. 1 to base his prima facie satisfaction regarding the existence of grounds under Clause (g) of Section 95(1) of the Act. Suspension u/s 95(1)(gg) of the Act is passed during pendency of the enquiry against the Pradhan. As against such an order of suspension revision lies which, in my opinion, is also an efficacious remedy. The Petitioner has already availed this remedy and has filed a revision, which is pending before the learned Commissioner, I, therefore, refrain from making any comments on the issue whether or not there was sufficient material before respondent No. 1 to base his prima facie satisfaction regarding existence of grounds under Clause (g) of Section 95(1) of the Act because that may effect the ultimate decision of the revision. Whether there was actual prima facie satisfaction of the prescribed authority or not before passing the impugned order can more appropriately be decided by the revisional court, where whole record is available and both the factual and legal controversies are decided. 8. In view of the fact that the Petitioner has already availed of the alternative remedy by way of filing a revision, I do not find any exceptional or extra-ordinary circumstances of the case to interfere in the impugned order dated 5-2-1992, passed by respondent No. 1, and the order dated 17-2-1992 passed by respondent No. 2 rejecting the stay application of the Petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition has no merits and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. However, it is being made clear that respondent No. 2 shall decide the revision on merits within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.